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L I T h e ( a l l e g e d ) r e s u r g e n c e o f ( c i t y - ) r e g l o n s in E u r o p e 
In t he 1990s, t h e a t t e n t i o n o f var ious discipl ines such as economic and pol i t ica l 
geography, po l i t ica l economy and pol i t ica l science became cent red on ' t he region' . 
The idea t h a t sub-na t iona l regions were ' resurg ing ' (STORPER, 1995) and ' re -emerg ing ' 
(SCOTT, 1998) rel ied above all on the observa t ion t h a t wh i l e t he a u t o n o m y o f nat iona l 
gove rnmen ts in manag ing the i r te r r i to r ies had been weakened, at t h e same t i m e 
specif ic regional assets had become i m p o r t a n t in secur ing compe t i t i ve advantages 
in a g lobal economy (see e.g. A M I N and THRIFT, 1994; COOKE and MORGAN, 1998; fo r an 
overv iew, see e.g. MOULAERT and SEKIA, 2003) . As several analysts suggested, in t he 
expand ing knowledge-dr i ven economy, it is at t h e regional scale t h a t processes o f 
in te r - f i rm and in ter -organ iza t iona l learn ing and innova t ion can th r i ve mos t 
product ive ly (for a discussion see e.g. LAGENDIJK, 2001 ; MACKINNON, CUMBERS and CHAPMAN, 
2002). In add i t i on , increasing g lobal in terconnectedness and in terdependence 
seemed t o be at t h e root o f t he reassert ion o f ident i t ies and, re lated t o t h a t , o f claims 
fo r pol i t ica l a u t o n o m y at var ious scales (see e.g. CASTELLS, 2 0 0 4 [ i 9 9 7 ] ; VAN HOUTUM, 
2002) . More specif ical ly, i t has o f t e n been t h e dynamics o f (uneven) economic 
deve lopmen t t h a t has fed demands for regional (na t iona l ) ' au tonomy . In some cases, 
such as t h a t o f N o r t h e r n Italy or Cata lon ia, regional ist movemen ts have been bu i l t on 
the percept ion t h a t t hey are held back by poorer regions t o w h i c h t hey are a t t ached . 
In o ther cases, such as Scot land, demands for Scot t ish a u t o n o m y have been fue l led 
by a resen tmen t o f English d o m i n a t i o n (KEATING, 2001 ; SPENCER and WOLLMAN, 2002). 
By speaking o f t h e resurgence and re-emergence o f regions, scholars w ished t o 
acknowledge t h a t regions were, in t i m e s p re -da t ing t h e f o r m a t i o n o f na t ion-s ta tes , 
re levant economic , pol i t ical and cu l tu ra l un i ts (PAASI, 2001). The so l id i f i ca t ion o f 
modern s tate power be tween t he seventeenth and t w e n t i e t h centur ies , however, 
imp l ied a new, s ta te - te r r i to r ia l perspect ive on t h e popu la t i on (i.e. 'society ' ) (HAKLI, 
2001). Regions became thus submerged in to na t iona l te r r i to r ies ; at t h e same t i m e , 
concern w i t h regional par t i cu la r i t y "became subord ina te t o t h e nat iona l h is tory 
pro ject and pursued main ly by l i t t le - regarded amateurs in local h is tor ica l societ ies" 
(APPLEGATE, 1999, p. 1160). 
It is in v iew of t he 'devaluat ion o f regions' (ibid.) t h a t t he re-emergence o f regions 
in t h e 1990s became labelled as 'new regional ism': 'new', because it was seen as a 
phenomenon t h a t is no longer internal t o states, bu t is un fo ld ing in a global iz ing 
1 As LAFFAN (n.d.) notes, "[i]n some Instances, regionalism is in fact synonymous with the re-emergence 
of nationalism within European nation-states".The notion of nationalism will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter2. 
i 
context (KtATiNG, 1997, PAASI, 2001) Actually, as many emphasized, the re-emergence of 
regions did not result simply from a bundle of "spontaneous" processes "out there" 
Scholars 'rediscovering' the region as an interesting object of study (see STORPER, 1995) 
moved gradually from a more analytical, descriptive perspective to a more normative, 
prescriptive one, and actually promoted a policy focus on regions (LAGENDIJK, 2001) The 
literature advocating regionalism has attracted much criticism, both for its philosophical 
and methodological looseness, and for its normative perspective (LOVERING, 1999, 2001) 
In spite of these perceived shortcomings, the insights of the literature have spiralled 
successfully into the field of policy-making (LAGFNDIIK, 2001) and have exercised a 
considerable influence upon governance practices (BRENNER, 2003) Ultimately then, the 
term 'new regionalism' has been used to refer to three, interlinked, phenomena first, 
to the (allegedly) 'spontaneous' re-emergence of regions, second, to the strand of 
academic work heralding the prominence of regions, and third, to policy efforts to 
regionalize various domains of the state (see KEATING, 1997,1998) 
The rather smooth expansion of 'new regionalist thinking' into the realm(s) of 
state (re)orgamzation was greatly due to the fact that the line of thinking above f i t 
well the rationale of neoliberal reforms that gained momentum on a global scale 
especially from the 1980s Following Harvey, neoliberalism can be described as "a 
theory of political economic practices which proposes that human well-being can 
best be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an 
institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, 
free markets and free trade" (HARVEY, 2006, ρ 145) The 'neoliberahzation of the state' 
has implied the imperative of fiscal discipline for public expenditure and a supply-side 
orientation for development investments and, as such, signalled a profound 
rethinking of the scalar and territorial management of the state In particular, 
adhermgtothe redistributive ideals of the welfare state-such as equity and equality 
- is (claimed to be) less and less possible Instead of being regarded as recipients of 
central government aid, and as sites of national policy implementation, sub-national 
territorial units became increasingly expected to act as self-reliant, collective actors 
The heightened concern with regions as (possibly) key actors of economic regulation, 
political decision-making and identity-building suggested that the 'imagined 
community' at the national level would be replaced with 'imagined units of 
competition' at the regional level (LOVERING, 1999) New regionalism has been m fact 
'competitive regionalism' and has supported the idea that (city-)regions that are 
regarded as the spearheads of national space economies should receive central state 
assistance, while 'the rest' should cope through proactively carving out a niche for 
themselves (e g BRENNER, 2004, MASSEY, 2001, 2007) 
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The adoption of a more strategic approach to spatial management (HEALEY et al., 
1997) - in Europe also promoted by the European Union (EU), especially through its 
system of structural aid redistribution (BACHTLERand TUROK, 1997; HERRSCHELand NEWMAN, 
2003; KEATING, 1997), - made regions and places turn into subjects of strategic 
intervention (LAGENDIJK, 2007). furthermore,this approach stimulated the development 
of regional structures where these did not already exist (AMIN and TOMANEY, 1995). The 
demand for developing regional strategic and institutional capacity could greatly 
draw on insights from new regionalist scholarship concerning'institutional thickness' 
and 'social capital', among other things (see LAGENDIJK, 2001). With policy-makers 
assuming that regional identity was a magic ingredient of the recipe for regional 
cohesion and attractiveness, identity-building became firmly part of the development 
strategies of (often newly delimited) regions (PAASI, 2009). In some cases, the idea 
that the benefits from regional institution-building would be realized only through 
genuine empowerment fed also plans of state political decentralization and of the 
establishment of regional governments (see e.g. HUDSON, 2005; MORGAN, 2006). 
Initial interpretations of new regionalism as causing cracks in the edifice of the 
nation-state that had solidified into the essential unit of socio-economic regulation, 
political organization and identity-building in the post-war period were soon dropped. 
By the early 2000s it became clear that although the scala rand territorial management 
of the state had undeniably undergone some changes, the prediction of new 
regionalist accounts regarding the 'emergence of regions' was overstated (HERRSCHEL 
and NEWMAN, 2003; LE CALÉS, 1998). Despite the "the tragi-comic proliferation of 
regional development strategy statements" (LOVERING, 2001, p. 353), processes of re-
gionalization proved to be much more hesitant than propagators of new regionalism 
had suggested. In line with the apparent indecisiveness of state spatial reforms, the 
view gained currency that in spite of much talk about the market, "only rhetorically 
has neoliberalism meant 'less state'; in fact, it has entailed a thoroughgoing 
reorganization of governmental systems and state-economy relations" (PECK and 
TICKELL, 2007, p. 33, emphasis original; see also PECK and TICKELL, 2002). In an attempt to 
stress that we have to do with a quo/zioi/Ve change of nation-state power (PECK, 2001), 
scholars have coined inventive terms such as "new statism" (DEAS and WARD, 2000, p. 
282), " the changing centrality of the nation state" (ALLMENDINGER and TEWDWDR-JONES, 
2006, p. 3), "re-statisation" (GOODWIN, JONES and JONES, 2006, p. 40), or "the reconfigu-
ration of the state" (LOUGHLIN, 2007, p. 392). 
Although 'new regionalism' seemed to lose ground, it did not take long for it to 
reappear in the form of another policy orthodoxy, that of '(new) city-regionalism' 
(see HARRISON, 2007). EU regional policy discourse had (again) a role in shaping this 
5 
'new' orthodoxy by claiming, from the late 1990s on, that Europe's cities are key to 
the process of economic and monetary integration (HERRSCHEL and NEWMAN, 2003) The 
(then) future expansion of the EU and the prospect of regional policy based on larger 
regions being financially unaffordable, as well as the perceived reinforcement of 
economic globalization and competition, all supported a greater attention for a 
network-conception of EU space and the view of cities as the motors of the economy 
This view could draw on various writings heralding the emergence of cities and 
city-regions as key economic and political players These writings suggested that 
newly shaping urban-regional entities "function as territorial platforms for much of 
the post-Fordist economy" (SCOTT, 2001, ρ 4) and that "the revival of the city state 
could be the necessary complement to the expansion of a global economy and the 
creation of a European state" (CASTELLS, 1994, ρ 32) For some, "[t]he spread of the 
market appear[ed] paradoxically to be leading to a return of the political mfrastate 
territories such as cities" (BAGNASCO and LE GALES, 2000, ρ 25) Defying cautionary 
remarks of scholars (GONZALEZ, TOMANEY and WARD, 2006, HARRISON, 2007, JONAS and WARD, 
2007) in a way that has been strongly reminiscent of the initial expansion of 'new 
regionalism', the city(-region) centred variant of the above-mentioned orthodoxy has 
gained wide resonance m policy-making circles across Europe 
1.2 Shifting (perspectives on) state spatialities 
This study can be seen as being rooted m my puzzlement about, and the wish to come 
to terms with, the debates on regionahzation that gained momentum m Hungary m 
the late 1990s Looking back, the Master's programme of my choice entitled 'Regional 
policy and economics' [Regionalis politika es gazdasagtan), established m 1994 at the 
(then) Janus Pannonius University of Pecs, appears now clearly as a manifestation of 
the fact that new regionalism had gained a foothold m Hungary Arriving at this 
recognition took a while, however, and a better grasp of how and why 'new 
regionalism'took a particular form was still a long way to go My concern with gaming 
a better understanding of developments m Hungary, coupled w i t h a growing, more 
general fascination wi th the institution o f ' t h e state' and its historical development, 
can thus be seen as the initial motivation of the current study Similarly to much 
existing scholarship then, the present thesis approaches 'new (city )regionalisms' as 
processes that signal and embody changes in (the spatiahty of) the state 
But what is 'the state'? As HAY and LISTER note, "[n]o concept is more central to 
political discourse and political analysis than that of the state Yet, whilst we all tend 
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to think we know what we're talking about when we refer to the state, it is a 
notoriously diff icult concept to define" (HAY and LISTER, 2006, p. 1). It goes beyond the 
scope of this thesis to give a thorough account of the genealogy of the concept of the 
state. However, some brief remarks are inevitable in order to make clear in which way 
the current study wishes to contribute to the vast literature on state (spatial) 
restructuring, and on the 're-emergence' of (city-)regions more specifically. 
Broadly speaking, the development of the understanding o f ' the state' has been 
closely interlinked with the evolution of the institutional complex designated as the 
state (HAY and LISTER, 2006). Derived from the Latin status, meaning social status or 
standing, in pre-modern times 'the state' was seen as residing in the body of the 
ruler; state and 'sovereign' were indeed synonymous (ibid.). The work of sixteenth-
century century thinker Machiavelli is commonly regarded as making the first step 
towards a modern understanding of the state in terms of a public polity that exists 
separately from the person of the ruler. The first unquestionably modern view of the 
state in turn is generally attributed to Hobbes's Leviathan that, mirroring the rise of 
the absolutist state, conceptualized the state as being a distinct form of authority 
independent of those who give effect to its power (HAY and LISTER, 2006; see also e.g. 
HARVEY, 1983; NFISON, 2006). 
While Hobbes' thought marked a point of transition between the commitment 
to absolutist state and the struggle of liberalism against tyranny (HELD, 1989), it was 
Weber who advanced an understanding of the state as a liberal-democratic state 
securing individual liberties and allowing the voluntaristic interplay of conflicting 
interests (DUSZA, 1989). According to Weber, one of the key characteristics of the state 
is the "regulation of the competition for political offices and selection of the bearers 
of rulership according to established rules" (Weber, cited by DUSZA, 1989, p. 76). 
Actually, this (part of Weber's) definition has been given relatively less attention in 
the scholarly literature. At the same time, another Weberian definition, stating that 
the state is "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Weber, cited by BRENNER et 
al., 2003, pp. 1-2) has been generally accorded the status of the definition of the 
modern state (HAY and LISTER, 2006). The latter definition is relevant in view of the 
present study especially because it expresses some fundamental assumptions about 
modern state spatiality-. first, that mutually exclusive, territorially self-enclosed 
states constitute the basic units of the global political system; second, that the 
'domestic' and the 'foreign' are regarded as fixed features of the modern inter-state 
system; and third, that the state is conceived of as a static 'container' enclosing 
economic, political, social and cultural processes (BRENNER et al., 2003; TAYLOR, 1999). 
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This Weberian conception of territorially exclusive state-territorial orders reflected 
the inter state system that developed in Europe from the Treaty of Westphalia m 
1648 until the late twentieth century (CAPORASO, 1996) 
In the post-war decades, theoretical interest m the state received a new impetus, 
greatly rooted in the apparent success of the Keynesian welfare national state This 
reviving interest was dommantly Marxist-inspired and was thus concerned primarily 
wi th explaining how the welfare state managed post-war capitalism A key 
contribution of Marxist writings of the 1960s and 1970s was their emphasis on the 
relational nature of state power, and on states' capacities to project their power into 
social realms well beyond their institutional boundaries (JESSOP, 2001) This approach 
became increasingly criticized from the 1970s on as being too 'society centred' This 
criticism was voiced by a newly-forming, 'state-centred' current that advocated a 
return to classic theorists such as Weber and that contended that the state had a real 
autonomy vis-a-vis wider societal forces (ibid ) 
There is no room here to discuss in more detail the polemic exchange between 
'state-centric' and 'society-centred' approaches (see e g JESSOP, 1990, 2001) What is 
noteworthy in view of the current study is that the broad changes usually referred to 
with the catchword 'globalization' presented a new challenge for the theorization of 
the state (see e g LISTER and MARSH, 2006) As Taylor noted m 1999, referring to the 
widely accepted 'container view' of states mentioned above "[a]s we come to the end 
of this century, more and more commentators are reporting that the containers are 
leaking their hard-won contents" (TAYLOR, 1999, ρ 157) Accordingly, the Weberian 
conception of states as sovereign territorial containers appeared less and less tenable 
Also, with the boundaries between (domestic) state and non-state actors becoming 
blurred (see e g PAINTER, 2000), the Weber-inspired assumption that there is a clear 
dividing line between state apparatus and society was increasingly questionable 
Furthermore, as Lister and Marsh noted, the emphasis of the Weberian conception of 
the state on control and legitimate coercion became "misguided m a period where rule 
depends much more heavily on consent than it did" (LISTER and MARSH, 2006, ρ 256) 
While the neo-Webenan perspective became broadly challenged, this did not lead to 
the prominence of a single perspective on the state, today, a wide variety of approaches still 
exist (for an overview, see HAY, LISTER and MARSH, 2006) Nonetheless, it is possible to identify 
some points of convergence Most notably, there is agreement between the different 
existing approaches on seeing the state as an unstable system that is interdependent with 
other systems m a complex social order (JESSOP, 2001) In other words, it is commonly accepted 
that the state should not be regarded as unified, coherent and territorially sovereign, but as 
a political project in a continual process of (re)formation (PAINIER, 2000) 
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The choice of a particular state-theoretical framework for the current study was 
guided primarily by this study's central interest in the shifting spatìalìtìes of the state 
under neoliberalism. In fact, the exploratory literature review already directed my 
focus to a strand of scholarship that has risen to prominence recently through its 
attempts to develop a distinctively political geographic perspective on the basis of 
Marxist-informed political economy (e.g. BRFNNER, 1999; 2000; 2004; JESSOP, BRENNER 
and JONES, 2008; MACÌEOD and GOODWIN, 1999). Proponents of this strand ascribe 
without exception to Bob Jessop's regulationist state-theoretical framework. As I will 
discuss below, the regulationist perspective entails broadly a view of the state as a 
key institutional mediator of capitalist relations. Jessop's theoretical framework in 
particular defines the state as "a specific institutional ensemble with multiple 
boundaries, no institutional f ixi ty and no pre-given formal or substantive unity" 
(JESSOP, 1990, p. 267). Furthermore, Jessop proposes to regard the state as "a distinct 
ensemble of institutions and organizations whose socially accepted function is to 
define and enforce collectively binding decisions on the members of society in the 
name of their common interest or general wi l l " (ibid., p. 341). As such, Jessop's concept 
of the state undoubtedly responds to the contemporary demands facing state theory 
mentioned above. Actually, however, the significance of Jessop's state theory resides 
more in the fact that it has also fruit ful ly addressed the long-standing philosophical 
puzzle concerning the relationship between structure and agency (see HAY, 2006). 
Jessop has thus not only acknowledged the inherent lack of coherence of the state, 
but, through his distinctive 'strategic-relational approach' to the state, he has also 
offered a way to grasp how the state's temporary coherence is being (re)formed. The 
above-mentioned strand on the emergence of new state spaces was actually born 
out of attempts to 'spatialize'Jessop's state theory. Ultimately, the strand in question 
was chosen as the starting point of this study for two main reasons. First, because it 
is a well-identifiable, relatively compact and very prominent strand of work on state 
spatial restructuring that includes many inspiring empirical analyses. Second, because 
it is theoretically sophisticated and offers a rich conceptual vocabulary. 
1.3 Research motivatiori and objectives 
While the roots of this study lie in a sense of confusion about new regionalisms in 
Hungary, its driving force soon became a growing discontent with the regulationist, 
strategic-relational approach to the state that turned out to give few clues to 
Hungarian developments. In the course of the preliminary appraisal of Hungary's 
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recent state spatial reforms, the regulationist approach proved unsatisfactory for an 
m-depth understanding of actual transformation processes I attributed this first to 
Hungary not only undergoing a process of 'neoliberahzation', but also of post socialist 
transition The subsequent assessment of regulationist accounts of state spatial 
reforms m England confirmed, however, that the regulationist approach falls short of 
making sense of the way new regionahsms actually unfold Following these 
observations, the key objective of this research was formulated to offer a theoretically 
informed framework for understanding h o w - if at all -(city-) regions have 'resurged' 
as new objects and subjects of policy-making in Europe under neohberalism 
This study's theoretical framework was inspired by existing criticisms of the 
regulationist perspective As several scholars have already pointed out, the 
perspective's mam shortcomings emanate from regulatiomsts' problematic concep­
tualization of the political aspect of state restructuring Regulationist accounts, 
although ascribing to a view of the state as an inherently unstable political project, 
are still characterized by a subtle but substantial bias towards an emphasis on the 
enduring role of the state in regulating capitalism However, remaining attached to 
any 'non-negotiable characteristics' of the state, such as 'its' capitalism, restricts our 
purchase on political reality (HAY and LISTER, 2006, ρ η) This is not to deny that 
capitalist relations have an important effect on the options available to actors 
However, claims considering such an effect should not be simply derived by deductive 
reasoning from theory, rather, they should be grounded m empirical analysis (PAINTER, 
1997) Assuming, in line with critics, that it is only by incorporating the political 
dimension more firmly into our framework of analysis that we can arrive at a better 
understanding of the shifting geographies of the state, the objective became to 
elaborate a perspective that conceptualizes the restructuring of the state as an 
inherently political process, as a path-dependent, multi-actor struggle about the 
meaning of spaces of state intervention More specifically, I assumed that throughout 
the evolution of the nation-state the formation of state spaces has been inextricably 
interlinked with struggles about the meaning of the nation(al society) as a spatial 
community Based on this assumption, analysing the (spatial) redefinition of the 
state as a process that is necessarily also about the contestation of the meaning of 
'the nation' promised to offer new insights for a better understanding of 
transformation processes Accordingly, the focus of this research is more specifically 
on how the understanding of the nation as a spatial community has been implicated 
in state spatial restructuring processes 
In line with these objectives, developments m Hungary and England were 
explored not only with the aim of offering contextualized case studies of recent state 
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spatial reforms. Rather, state spatial reforms in Hungary and in England were retained 
as case study objects for this thesis also with the aim of advancing a new theoretical-
conceptual framework for the political geographic analysis of state spatial 
restructuring. This ambition could greatly rely on the proliferating academic 
literature theorizing (state) spaces not as given objects, but as devices that order 
(and thus give meaning to) social relations and that are themselves manifestations of 
power relations (e.g. ACNEW, 1999; GLASZE and MATTISSEK, 2009; COVERDE, 2009; HÄKLI, 
2001; MASSEY, 2005; PAASI, 2002; 2004; PAINTER, 1997; JENSEN and RICHARDSON 2004; ZIERHOFER, 
2005). However, scholars ascribing to a social constructionist perspective on (state) 
space have done so on the basis of diverging philosophical foundations, and Agnew's 
remark from a decade ago that " [a j t the moment only philosophical confusion reigns 
supreme in much writ ing about place, space and region" (AGNEW, 1999, p. 93) still 
seemed timely. The elaboration of the thesis' theoretical approach that I call 'Politics 
of Space Approach' relied on an in-depth engagement with the meta-theoretical 
assumptions of existing accounts and, ultimately, the thesis wishes to contribute to 
ongoing scholarly debates by discussing the roots of the confusion. 
Given the choice of examining state spatial reforms in terms of processes of 
contestation, and the objective of highlighting the inherently political nature of 
reforms, the theoretical approach developed here aligns with the meta-theoretical 
assumptions of discourse theory. While steps have already been taken by others to 
ground geographical inquiry in discourse theory (GLASZE and MATTISSEK, 2009), this 
study wishes to offer a more comprehensive exploration of the implications of 
discourse theory for contemporary debates in geographical scholarship. 
Finally, it should be noted that the theoretical approach presented here does not 
pretend to be a new theory of the state. Rather, it wishes to offer a lens through 
which the ongoing struggles to define the state (spatially) can become better 
understood and the outcomes of the above struggles be better explained. As such, 
the Politics of Space Approach ultimately opens up the way for rethinking the above 
struggles. 
1.4 The structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows. First, Chapter 2 gives a thorough assessment of 
regulationist accounts that have offered one of the most dominant perspectives on 
state spatial restructuring in contemporary political economic and geographical 
scholarship. Beyond offering a structured overview of the perceived shortcomings of 
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regulationist scholarship, it is also examined how these shortcomings are rooted in 
the philosophical assumptions underlying regulationist writings 
Chapter 3 proceeds with the discussion of Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory 
and argues that it provides a good basis for addressing the shortcomings of 
regulationist accounts Subsequently, a discourse-theoretically inspired approach, 
labelled 'Politics of Space Approach', is developed that conceptualizes state spatial 
restructuring as a process of discursive selectivity Chapter 4 goes on to discuss how 
the Politics of Space Approach was translated into methodology and into the use of 
particular methods for the empirical case studies of the thesis The same chapter 
explains also the case studies' role vis-a-vis the overall theoretical arguments 
formulated by this study 
The following two chapters give a thick analysis of what the neohberalization of 
the state has implied for the spatial organization of the state in Hungary (Chapter 5) 
and England {Chapter 6) While both cases are directed principally at the way new 
city(-region) centred state spatial reforms have developed in the two countries, the 
evolution of (the struggles around) these reforms is investigated within a wider time 
frame Finally, m Chapter 7 the mam findings of the research are summarized and 
reflected upon 
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Theorizing new state spaces 
through the regulationist, 
strategic-relational approach 

Over the past two decades, there have been numerous attempts to theorize how the 
state as a political institution is being transformed in the course of the post-1970, 
'globalizing era'. As Brenner aptly notes, one could observe a growing body of literature 
with an "almost dizzying range of theoretical orientations, disciplinary/postdiscipli-
nary locations, substantive research foci and normative-political concerns" (BRENNER, 
2009, p. 124). 
As noted in the Introduction, this study starts from the strand of state-theoreti-
cal writ ings that have applied a regulationist, strategic-relational approach (SRA) to 
the state. I propose to take this approach as a starting point because it has become 
one of the most dominant perspectives on state spatial restructuring in contemporary 
political economic and geographical scholarship. This prominence is not surprising: 
the regulationist view has not only supplied compelling, critically engaged accounts 
of state spatial transformation, but has done so on the basis of a comprehensive and 
rigorous theoretical framework. On the other hand, I would also like to draw attention 
to the approach's shortcomings. In connection with that, I consider discussing the 
regulationist approach also useful as this will allow me subsequently to elucidate 
better the perspective that I will propose as an alternative. 
To be sure, writings applying the above approach do not form a homogeneous 
body of accounts with clearly definable boundaries. Even if we restrict our focus to 
the work of Bob Jessop alone, which developed a specifically strategic-relational 
approach to state regulation, we face a research agenda that has constantly evolved 
over the past decades, addressing newly emerging concerns and developing new 
concepts. Nonetheless, I would argue that there are good reasons to treat the writings 
in question as belonging under the heading of 'regulationist scholarship' - a label 
that I chose in order to be able to refer conveniently to the above writings throughout 
this study. So what keeps the 'regulationist scholarship' together? First of all, an 
adherence to (various currents of) Marxism, implying a view of the state as performing 
a range of regulating functions necessary to the reproduction of capitalist social 
relations. Second, consequently, regulation ist scholars share the objective of revealing 
the structural mechanisms that underlie the capacity of the state to renew itself as 
the institutional mediator of capitalist relations. Third, at the same time, the scholars 
in question share a commitment to social justice. As they regard the above 
mechanisms as contributing to injustice, the main motivation for revealing them is to 
bring emancipatory change. Finally - in particular more theoretically engaged -
regulationist scholars ground their inquiries in critical realism, a philosophy of science 
that is (regarded by the above scholars as) supportive of the above objectives. 
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On the whole, the regulationist, strategic-relational approach to the state has 
undoubtedly substantial merits as (part of) a general theory of the reproduction of 
the capitalist state as a set of spatial-institutional practices However, this is also 
where its weaknesses lie In this chapter, I will discuss m more detail in what respect 
the core assumption underlying the regulationist literature, namely that capitalism is 
the primary unify mg element of statehood, prevents us from arriving at a f me grained 
picture of actual restructuring processes Principally, the current chapter will argue 
that due to the above assumption, regulationist scholars are drawn to a view where 
changes to the state's (spatial) organization - such as emerging forms of (city-) 
regional governance, for example - tend to be explained m functional terms, as 
responses to the current neohberal imperative A look at actual restructuring 
processes suggests, however, that the formation of new state spaces -1 e the scales, 
territories and fields of state spatial interventions - is much more messy, geared not 
simply to the alleged needs of globally mobile capital, but shaped by ongoing political 
struggles about the way society should be managed Of course, I do not wish to 
suggest that regulatiomsts regard state restructuring as a mere technical issue of 
institutional reshuffling, indeed, references to the political character of the above 
processes are recurring in regulationst scholarship Nonetheless, I would like to argue 
that due its subtle but persistent economic bias, the above scholarship cannot fully 
appreciate the political realities that shape the restructuring of the state 
Of course, criticizing regulationist accounts is not new, and this chapter will rely 
on existing criticisms In addition to giving a systematic overview of these criticisms, 
I will, unlike most critics, consider also how the perceived shortcomings are grounded 
in the (sometimes implicit) critical realist assumptions of the accounts m question 
Such a philosophically engaged discussion of the regulationist literature on state 
spatial restructuring will be especially relevant m view of the alternative approach to 
state spatial restructuring that I will introduce m the next chapter and rely on to 
examine recent transformations of state spatiahty m Hungary and England m the 
empirical (f i f th and sixth) chapters 
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2.1 The regulationist, strategic-relational approach to state spatial 
restructuring 
2.J.; The regulationist, strategic-relational approach to the state: genealogy, 
key assumptions and main arguments 
As noted above, the regulationist, strategic-relational approach (SRA) to the state has 
been principally formed through the work of Bob Jessop, whose research has focused 
on developing a critical perspective on the transformation of the capitalist state 
induced by the interconnected crises of the mixed economy and the Keynesian 
welfare national state associated with Atlantic Fordism. Against the backdrop of this 
broader concern, Jessop has been especially interested in examining the post-war 
crisis of the British state and the Thatcherite neoliberal response to it, as well as the 
subsequent neoliberalism of New Labour (JESSOP, 2002; 2007). As such, Jessop was 
one of the many scholars who engaged in the post-Fordist debate of the early iggos 
(see e.g. AMIN, 1994): a debate that concerned the nature and direction of the new 
phase of capitalist development unfolding from the mid-1970s and, in particular, the 
regulatory practices of the state in this new phase. Jessop's perspective, which 
conceptualized the post-1970 transformation in terms of a shift from 'the Keynesian 
welfare national state' to the 'Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime' (see 
Box 2.1), became particularly influential. 
However, what makes Jessop's work particularly relevant in view of the present 
study - and this is the reason why it is given more attention here - is that it goes 
beyond the mere ideal-typical description of changes and has been concerned also 
with developing a comprehensive theoretical-conceptual framework for the 
understanding of the changes in question. As part of his long-term and still ongoing 
research project on the transformation of the capitalist state, Jessop, by drawing on 
various sources within the broad tradition of Marxist historical materialism, has 
elaborated the strategic-relational approach to the state. As Jessop recalls: 
"My theoretical reflections on the state began in the micl-i970s as part of the revival of 
West European Marxist interest in the state in capitalist societies and have now provided 
the guiding thread of my intellectual project for more than three decades. I did not set out 
to develop a strategic-relational approach. Yet it has become an important heuristic 
perspective for my contributions to the critique of political economy and for addressing 
more general issues of the social sciences" (JESSOP, 2008, p. 12) 
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Box 2.1 The key features of the 'Keynesian welfare national state' and the 
'Schumpetenan workfare post-national regime' in comparison2 
Economic policy 
emphasis 
Keynesian welfare 
national state 
Full employment and planning 
in relatively closed national 
economies 
Schumpetenan workfare 
post-national regime 
Innovation and 
competitiveness in relatively 
open national economies 
Social policy Social wage considered as 
a means of redistribution and 
social cohesion 
Objective of labour market 
flexibility-» 
social policy subordinated to 
economic policy -> downward 
pressure on social wage that 
becomes considered as a cost 
of production 
Primary scale of 
governance 
National state scale, local 
and regional states serve as 
transmission belts for national 
and social politics 
The importance of the national 
scale of policy-making and 
implementation is seriously 
challenged as sub-and 
supranational scales gam 
more power 
Relations between 
state, society and market 
Combination of anarchic 
market forces and top-down 
planning associated with 
post-war mixed economy, 
tripartite corporatist 
arrangements based on a 
producers'alliance between 
big business, big labour and 
the national state 
Growing reliance on partner­
ship, networks, consultation, 
negotiation and other forms 
of reflexive self-organization 
Source JESSOP (1999 2 0 0 0 2002b 2002c) 
Jessop stresses that by labelling welfare state regimes as Keynesian and workfare state regimes as 
Schumpetenan he does not want to suggest that Keynes and Schumpeter were the founding fathers 
of the above regimes As he further notes by referring to the economists in question he has identif ied 
emblematic thinkers whose ideas have come to be associated (rightly or wrongly) w i t h the state s role in 
promoting capital accumulation in specific periods and/or economic regimes Keynes was often cited t o 
justify the increasing concern w i t h the states possible role in securing ful l employment Schumpeter has 
been rediscovered as a theorist of innovation as the motor force of long waves of economic expansion 
There were analogues to Keynes [ ] but Keynes has become the emblematic figure for macroeconomie 
management oriented to the demand side Likewise other economists have examined the dynamics of 
competit ion innovation entrepreneurship and long waves of economic g r o w t h but none has done so as 
vividly and comprehensively as Schumpeter (JFSSOP 2002b ρ 257) 
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It goes beyond the scope of this study to reiterate the overview that JESSOP (2008) 
gives about the development of the SRA during the past three decades; here only 
some key points are highlighted. JESSOP (2008) identifies three main sources of the 
SRA: German politics, French economics and Chilean biology'. As to German politics, 
it refers to post-war German state theory, the influence of which on Jessop's work 
has co-existed with the influence of Antonio Gramsci and that of Nicos Poulantzas, 
two Marxist thinkers who had attempted to overcome the economic determinism of 
traditional Marxism. A key inspiration from Gramsci for Jessop has been the concept 
of hegemony that Gramsci used to denote that the power of the ruling class over 
others is dependent not solely on economic resources, but on the ability o f tha t class 
to project its own way of seeing the world so that those who are subordinated to it 
accept it as 'common sense'. In other words, Gramsci emphasized the role of 
ideological dominance, through which the dominant classes assure the consent and 
support of subordinate groups for a particular conception of the unity of the state 
and the common good. As to Poulantzas, Jessop has relied on his conceptualization of 
state as a social relation, i.e. the recognition that the state is not a simple instrument, 
subject, or an intrinsic entity. Concerning Fre/ic^eco/iom/cs, it is the Parisian regulation 
school in institutional economics in particular that has shaped Jessop's intellectual 
trajectory. Briefly, regulation theory, a variant of evolutionary and institutional 
economics, was born out of a concern with how, despite its structural contradictions 
and class conflicts, capitalism can continue to expand for relatively long periods. In 
particular, regulation theory proposed an interpretation of growth in the post-Second 
World War period which was based on the institution of Fordist regimes (BOYFR, 2002) 
(see also Sox 2.2). Key to this interpretation was an emphasis on the socially em bedded 
and socially regularized character of the economy. As to Jessop, he became 
"particularly interested in regulationist work that explores its changing role in securing 
the extra-economic as well as economic conditions for capital accumulation and in 
institutionalizing class compromises that facilitate accumulation" (JESSOP, 2008, p. 24). 
Finally, JESSOP (2008) notes that as he was attempting to combine relevant concepts 
from German politics and French economics, he came across Chilean biology, if not 
directly, at least through German social theorists, especially Niklas Luhmann, Günther 
Teubner, and Helmut Willke. In his own words: 
3 Jessop identifies these three sources in the spirit of an alleged remark by Lenin, according to whom the 
three sources of Marxism as developed by Marx himself were German philosophy, French politics and 
English economics (see JESSOP, 2008, pp. 22-23). 
2' 
From them [the above mentioned German theorists] I took the concept of autopoesis or 
self production and several related notions Transposed (some would say illegitimately) 
from cell biology to sociology autopoetic theory suggests that major societal subsystems 
(such as the economy law politics and science) can be studied as self referential self 
reproducing and self regulating (JESSOP 2008 ρ 26) 
Box 2.2 The regulation approach 
Regulation theory originated m France in the 1970s and early 1980s in the work of a number 
of Marxist economists including Michel Aghetta, Robert Boyer and Alain Lipietz It has 
subsequently been developed by economists, geographers, political theorists and others 
working in a variety of countries As a result it has become a rich but highly diverse, school 
of thought In fact, there is no one unified 'regulation theory' and many writers now prefer 
to talk about a 'regulation approach' It is important to clarify the signification of'regulation', 
for the French term regulation does not correspond to the English regulation usually referring 
to 'conscious and active intervention by the state or other collective organizations' In French, 
this latter sense is conveyed by the word réglementation, and not by regulation (the word 
used by regulation theorists) Furthermore, the term 'regulation' is often used in the context 
of general systems theory and biology to mean self regulation By contrast, with both the 
deliberate rule making of réglementation and the auto-regulation of a negative feedback 
system, regulation theory looks at the kinds of regulation that are neither wholly deliberate 
nor automatic (PAINTER, 1995, ρ 277, see also MACLEOD, 1997) 
Although Jessop himself identifies the above discussed three sources of the SRA, 
arguably we can add a fourth, namely David Harvey s geographical historical 
materialism, which has played a key role m turning the SRA into a decidedly spatial 
perspective As CAsiRtb (2002, ρ 192) notes, "Harvey is one of the very few living Marxists 
who bases his work almost exclusively on insights drawn directly from Marx s later 
political economy writings" Accordingly Harvey's work (HARVEY, 1982,1985) starts out 
from the assumption that capital has an essentially conflict ridden character, stemming 
from its double objective of constantly reducing turnover time and eliminating spatial 
barriers to its circulation process on the one hand, and consolidating itself temporarily 
within an appropriate socio-territorial configuration (a 'spatial fix') on the other 
Following Harvey, it has been the tension between 'fixity'and motion' m the circulation 
of capital that has underpinned the construction, deconstruction and reconstruction 
of spatial fixes (including both physical as well as non physical spatial infrastructures) 
throughout capitalism s history Spatial fixes show a tendency towards "a structured 
coherence to production and consumption within a given space" (HARVEY, 1985 ρ 146, 
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emphasis added). While spatial fixes are the indispensable preconditions for capital's 
circulation, no spatial fix can ever definitively resolve the endemic problem of over-
accumulation under capitalism and, consequently, each round of accumulation creates 
its new spatial fix (see also BRENNER, 1998). 
Drawing on the above-mentioned intellectual sources, Jessop's conceptualiza-
tion of the state took its distinctive shape through his evolving strategic-relational 
approachtothequestionof structure and agency. Centra I to the SR A is the assumption 
that the existence of agents and structures is relational (structure and agency are 
mutually constitutive) and dialectical (their interaction is not reducible to the sum of 
structural and agential factors treated separately). Accordingly, the 5RA focuses on 
the dialectical interplay of structure and agency in real contexts of social and political 
interaction (see HAY, 2002). The novelty of the SR A can be most usefully demonstrated 
by referring to a previous dominant structure-agency conceptualization, that of 
Giddens' structuration theory. The latter theory, by treating structure as an emergent 
effect of the action of agents and agency as a mode of skilful action that is 
constrained/enabled by structures, retains a dualistic form. Jessop's SRA overcomes 
this dualism by examining structure in relation to action and action in relation to 
structure. Structures are consequently treated analytically as strategically-selective 
in their form, content and operation; in other words, structures are regarded as 
privileging some actors and actionsoverothers. At the same time, actions a re likewise 
treated as structurally-constrained, more or less context-sensitive, and structuring. 
This implies that actors, when undertaking a course of action, (potentially) make a 
'strategic-context' analysis in order to assess how structures privilege some actions 
over others. Figure 2.1 below of the SRA's logic of conceptual development illustrates 
well that the above-mentioned dialectical duality of the SRA, appearing in the third 
row, goes beyond the Giddensian conceptualization that corresponds to the second 
row. Actually, Jessop introduces a further step (fourth row) in order to acknowledge 
the spatial-temporal dynamics of dialectical duality. While the conceptual pair in the 
third row refers to the duality of structure and agency at a particular time (or, as 
Jessop calls it, 'conjuncture'), those in the fourth row refer to the strategic-relational 
aspects of successive conjunctures. Finally, the f i f th row indicates that insofar as 
reflexively reorganized structural configurations and recursively selected strategies 
and tactics co-evolve over time to produce a relatively stable order out of a potentially 
unstructured complexity, we can talk of the 'structured coherence' (or stability) of 
this co-evolving, self-organizing order (see JESSOP, 2001b; 2005). It is important to note 
that Jessop stresses that this stability, and thus structured coherence, is multiply 
tendential. As he notes: 
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"First, since the reproduction of structures is only ever tendential so too are their strategic 
selectivities, second, since structures cannot guarantee their self reproduction but only 
privilege some strategies over others, there is always scope for actions to overflow or 
circumvent structural constraints, third, since subjects are never unitary, never fully aware 
of the conditions of strategic action, never fully equipped to realize their preferred 
strategies, and always face possible opposition from actors pursuing other strategies or 
tactics, failure is an ever-present possibility, and fourth, institutions often embody 
structural contradictions and create strategic dilemmas" (JFSSOP, 2005, ρ 51, emphasis 
original) 
Figure 2.1 A strategic-relational approach to structure and agency 
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It is by reinterpreting the above-mentioned intellectual sources within the context of 
the SRA to structure and agency that Jessop has offered a distinctive conceptualization 
of the capitalist state. This conceptualization offers a view of the state as a special 
form of social relations, constituted by certain spatio-temporal features, and not 
having any'pre-given' substantive coherence. The functional unity and organizational 
coherence of the state as an institutional ensemble is always temporary and is the 
outcome of socio-political struggles mediated by the state's strategic selectivity. 
To referto Jessop: 
"By strategic selectivity, I understand the ways in which the state considered as a social 
ensemble has a specific, differential impact on the ability of various political forces to 
pursue particular interests and strategies in specific spatio-temporal contexts through 
their access to and/or control over given state capacities - capacities that always depend 
for their effectiveness on links to forces and powers that exist and operate beyond the 
state's formal boundaries" (JESSOP, 2002b, p. 40) 
It is important to note that the institutional apparatus of the state operates 
autonomously from the capital relation, i.e. it is not the instrument of it. For Jessop, 
the 'social f ix' (a mode of regulation) partially compensates for the incompleteness 
of the capital relation and gives it a specific dynamic through the articulation of its 
economic and extra-economic elements. One necessary aspect of this social f ix is the 
spatio-temporalf ixthat refers to the different scales of action and different tempora I 
horizons that may be used to handle different aspects of capital's structural 
contradictions (JESSOP, 2002b; JESSOP and SUM, 2006). By speaking of spatio-temporal 
fix, Jessop carries forward Harvey's original concept of 'spatial fix'. The extended 
notion is intended to acknowledge that temporality has also a role in securing the 
relative structural coherence of capital accumulation (JESSOP, 2000, p. 336). 
The interdependence of the economic and the extra-economic entails that the 
economic cannot be regarded as determinant in any way. Building on previously 
mentioned ideas concerning autopoietic systems, Jessop argues that the economy 
can be seen as ecologically dominant, referring to the structural capacity of the 
economy to imprint its developmental logic on other systems' operations far more 
than these latter systems are able to impose their respective logics on the economy. 
It is important to note that the ecological dominance of the capitalist economy is 
contingent and historically variable and "even when conditions do favour the 
long-term ecological dominance of the capitalist economy, other systems may gain 
short-term primacy in response to crises elsewhere" (JESSOP 2002b, p. 28). 
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More recently, in what JESSOP (2008) calls the third phase of the development of 
the SRA, the above-sketched theoretical-conceptual framework has become refined 
by considerations of the way actors' interpretations, identities and argumentation 
come into play in the socio-political struggles through which the state is constantly 
reconfigured The attempt to give these aspects more weight has relied first of all on 
the combination of three approaches the regulation approach, neo-Cramscian state 
theory, and critical discourse analysis (JESSOP, 1999) As JESSOP (ibid ) argued, the 
regulation approach already entails an implicit constructivism that helps to 
acknowledge that the economy is not a 'given' realm, but a socially constructed 
object of regulation Jessop further considered neo-Gramscian theory useful as it 
stressed that there are important socio-cultural aspects to the state Finally, critical 
discourse analysis could be drawn on to point out that the definition of (economic) 
spaces of regulation entails the production of meaning (JESSOP 1999) It is on this basis 
that Jessop and Sum (JESSOP, 2004, 2008, JESSOP and SUM, 2001, 2006, SUM, 2004) have 
built on to introduce a 'semiotic turn' and to elaborate a framework of 'cultural 
political economy' (CPE) Central to this framework is 
"the claim that the interests at stake in relations of power are significantly shaped by the 
discursive constitution of identities modes of calculation strategies and tactics and not 
just by the so called 'objective position of specific agents in a given conjuncture (as if they 
existed outside of discourse), and also that the primary institutional mechanisms in and 
through which power is exercised, whether directly or indirectly themselves involve a 
variable mix of discursive and material resources" (JESSOP and SUM, 2001, ρ gj) 
CPE can be regarded as the refinement and extension of the strategic-relational 
approach, in the sense that it focuses on how the dialectic interaction of the semiotic 
(referring to the intersubjective production of meaning) and the non-semiotic 
constitute and reproduce agency and structure (JESSOP, 2004) Earlier discussed 
insights with regard to the shaping of 'structured coherence' can be reformulated by 
adding that the recursive selection of semiotic practices and extra-semiotic practices 
contributes to structured coherence (ibid ) Regarding the question of state spatial 
restructuring more specifically, it is CPE's notion of "economic imagmaries" that is 
particularly relevant, referring to those discursive formations that aim at defining 
specific economies as 'natural' objects of regulation m political struggles around the 
selection of new spaces for state intervention (see JESSOP and OOSTERLYNCK, 2008) 
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2.7.2 The SRA as a distinctive critical realist framework 
In order to be able to locate Jessop's framework within the broader field of social 
theorizing, as well as to prepare the ground for the proposed theoretical framework 
of the present study, it is important to spell out the more specific philosophical 
foundations of the SRA. Jessop sees affinities between critical realism and the 
regulation approach and argues that "if we take Bhaskar's approach to realism as a 
reference point, the regulation approach works (whether implicitly or explicitly) wi th 
a critical realist ontology and epistemology" (JESSOP, 2002d, p. 109). On this basis, he 
sees his SRA as being shaped through what he calls 'a dialogue' between critical 
realism and the regulation approach (JESSOP, 2002d; JESSOP and SUM, 2006). It goes 
beyond the scope of this study to give a thorough account of Bhaskar's work that has 
had significant resonance in geographical scholarship. This section will solely discuss, 
drawing on Bhaskar's and other prominent critical realists' writings, those key critical 
realist assumptions that are considered to be relevant in view of the assessment of 
the SRA. 
Bhaskar's critical realism is a philosophy of social science, seeking to combine 
ontological realism, epistemologica! relativism and judgemental rationality (BHASKAR, 
1998, p. xi). Astoontological realism, it refers to the belief that there Isa reality existing 
independently of our interpretation and knowledge of it. The term 'reality' here is not 
reserved for material-physical things and entities: for critical realists, something is real 
if it has an effect or makes a difference (FLEETWOOD, 2004). As to epistemologica! 
relativism, it implies the assertion that all interpretations and knowledge are socially 
produced; in other words, the meaning of reality is produced in an intersubjective 
process (FAIRCLOUCH, JESSOP and SAYER, 2004; SAYER, 2004). It is important to note that 
critical realists assume that knowledge of reality is fallible and also that there are 
rational grounds on the basis of which we prefer some accounts of reality over others 
- th is assumption is that of judgemental rationality. 
Commonly, the aspect of intersubjective meaning production is denoted by the 
terms 'discourse' or 'semiosis'. Crucially, critical realists assert that statements about 
reality, i.e. about 'what there is' (ontology) cannot be reduced to how we interpret 
and what we know about that reality (epistemology); collapsing the former into the 
latter would entail committing the epistemic fallacy. As Bhaskar notes: 
"[W]e [critical realists] believe in the possibility and actuality of a world without human 
beings, and therefore without discourse. What critical realism says is that we can actually 
say something about the general character of that world, we can say that it must be 
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structured, differentiated, open, governed by laws which are transfactual, constituted by 
its own kind of contradictions and antagonisms, and without reason, intelligibility or 
discursive practice" (Bhaskar in LACLAU and BHAÏKAR, 1998, pp 11-12) 
The emphasis on the distinctiveness of the extra-discursive realm and the discursive 
realm is thus a cornerstone of critical realism" Following critical realists, discursively 
formulated interpretations and knowledge (construals) of the world can inform and 
change established social practices (constructions) that are considered, due to their 
relatively solidified nature, as being 'beyond' discourse, i e extra-discursive Whether 
they will actually do and how effective they are m this regard - in other words, to 
what extent they become 'causally efficacious' - depends, however, partly on extra-
discursive conditions, including physical constraints and institutional power relations 
(FAIRCLOUCH, JESSOP and SAYER, 2004, SAYER, 2004) 
The notion of 'causality' is indeed central to the critical realist perspective 
According to critical realists, an object can be said to possess a set of necessary causal 
powers in its status as an object (ROBERTS, 2002) To refer to BAYER'S (2004) example, an 
organization may have the power to fire workers The effects of causal powers 
depend, however, on the presence or absence of certain contingent conditions to 
stay with the same example, this meansthat whether or not the organization actually 
exercises its power to fire workers depends on particular conditions, such as the 
restructuring of production (see also CLOKE, PHILO and SADLER, 1991) Based on these 
assumptions, critical realists' aim is to gam knowledge of underlying structures, 
objects and powers through processes of rational abstraction that seek to distinguish 
between necessary and contingent properties and relations. It is important to note 
that this understanding of causality is also indispensable to critical realists' 
emancipatory objectives Following Bhaskar, critical realists hold that social practices 
are informed by ideas which may or may not be true, such as the idea that gender is 
innate rather than a product of socialization. To identify understandings m society as 
false and actions informed by them as falsely based is to imply in turn that (other 
things being equal) those beliefs and actions, and indeed any conditions which 
tended to encourage them, ought to be changed. The effectuation of change m turn 
necessitates 'appropriate causal interventions' that rely on the knowledge of how 
4 Although some scholars prefer to speak of the semiotic/extra semiotic (e g FAIRCLOUGH, JESSOP and SAVER, 2004, 
Jissop, 2004, 2008, JESSOP and SUM, 2001), hereafter I wil l only refer to the discursive/extra discursive While 
some nuances may be lost this way ('semiotic' is intended ίο capture non-verbal modes of intersubjective 
meaning production), I argue that this loss is not problematic from the point of view of sketching critical 
realism's standpoint Moreover, speaking categorically of a discursive/extra discursive split in critical 
realism allows me subsequently to contrast critical realism better w i t h discourse theory as an alternative 
perspective 
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the determinations one wants to avoid work (SAYER, 2004, pp. 14-15). 
An important feature of Bhaskar's critical realism is that although Marx and 
more generally the philosophical Marxist tradition are not Bhaskar's only source of 
inspiration, and Bhaskar is by no means a dogmatic Marxist, the main aspects of his 
work revolve decidedly around Marxist themes and a Marxist mode of reasoning 
(NIELSEN, 2002). Bhaskar himself notes that: 
"[cjritical realism is not designed to support the interestsof any particular political tendency 
or faction. It is oriented to the pursuit of truth and understanding. However, through 
critical realism, positive values are generated by rational argument, which show that 
capitalism is evil and immoral" (Bhaskar, cited by WiuMon, 2005, p. 773). 
Whether and how critical realism and Marxism can be combined has been subject to 
much scholarly debate (see BROWN, FLEETWOOD and ROBERTS, 2002). According to Sayer, 
"[a]lthough there are many affinities between critical realism and Marxism, the 
former does not entail the latter" (SAYER, 2000, p. 8, n2). Those opposing the 
combination of the two bodies of thought argue that "critical realists misinterpret 
Marx when they suggest that he is a closet realist" (ROBERTS, 2001, p. 551) and that the 
philosophy of critical realism itself does not imply the normative/political claims that 
often accompany it. Or to refer to Hodgson, while (some) critical realists are critical 
of capitalism, "they have no developed critique of capitalism that connects explicitly 
with critical realism itself" (HODÜSON, 1999, p. 7). Others argue at the same time that 
critical realism as a philosophy of science is compatible wi th Marxism and can 
'augment Marxism' (FLEETWOOD, 2002). 
It goes beyond the scope of this chapter to consider this scholarly debate in 
detail; the remarks above were intended to put into context the stance of Jessop, 
who, as Roberts notes, "is a useful theorist wi th whom to investigate the deployment 
of critical realism within geography" (ROBERTS, 2001, p. 559). JESSOP (2005) himself 
regards Marx as a major precursor of Bhaskar's critical realism and stresses that the 
latter body of thought should be seen as a justif ication for a realist position in general, 
but not as one for any particular realist position. Jessop's particular take on critical 
realism is shaped by his particular take on Marxism (ROBERTS, 2001), more specifically 
by his inspiration from the regulation approach that he sees as a Marxist account of 
capital as a social relation (JESSOP, 20O2d). So in what sense can we see Jessop's SRA as 
being shaped through 'a dialogue' between critical realism and the regulation 
approach? In this respect, one can refer to Jessop and Sum's remark that "the 
reproduction of capitalist societies is neither a fateful necessity nor a wilful 
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contingency" (JESSOP and SUM, 2006, ρ 318) Furthermore, "natural necessities [of 
capitalism] are rational abstractions there is no logic of capital but a series of logics 
with a family resemblance, corresponding to different modes of regulation" (JESSOP, 
2002d, ρ 105, s e e a ' s o JESSOP and SUM, 2006), which are chance discoveries made 
through definite social practices (JESSOP and SUM, 2006) In other words, following 
Jessop (and Sum), we should not assume that capitalism m general has necessary 
causal powers, which are contingently realized in particular contexts The formation 
of particular spatio-temporal fixes can be seen as contingently necessary The latter 
term, evidently evoking the critical realist conceptualization of causality, is intended 
to suggest that particular spatio-temporal fixes are produced through the contingent 
(1 e non-necessary, accidental) interaction of multiple causal chains Particular 
spatio-temporal fixes are thus not - as the concept of 'ecological dominance' already 
implied - determined by economic causes The fixes in question are necessary as the 
(contingent) coming together of the above causal chains m a definite context has 
necessary effects (JESSOP, 1990) For Jessop, from the above it follows that in terms of 
epistemology, one is required to combine concepts, assumptions and principles of 
explanation from different theoretical systems, in order to arrive at an adequate 
understanding of contingently necessary events (ibid ) In the light of this recognition 
we can better understand JESSOP and SUM'S (2001) call for a post-disciplinary 'cultural turn' 
for the rethinking of political economy - a turn that entails a creative synthesis of 
various disciplinary perspectives 
2 7 3 'Spatmlizmg' the strategic-relational approach to the state 
In the course of its evolution, Jessop's SRA laid an increasing emphasis on state 
spatiality, leading to the argument that spatio-temporal fixes "may help to displace 
or defer contradictions [of the capitalist economy]" (JESSOP, 2002b, ρ 35, emphasis 
original) Initially, however, the SRA as proposed by Jessop was less concerned wi th 
the spatial dimension of state restructuring According to Brenner, "[l]ike much of 
mainstream and radical political economy at the time, Jessop conceptualized the 
geographies of statehood as being configured relatively unproblematically around 
two more or less fixed scales of political-economic life, the global and the national, m 
and through which political strategies could be articulated" (BRENNER, 2009, ρ 125) 
Martin JONES' (1997) seminal article on the spatial selectivity of the state was among 
the first to attempt to turn the SRA into a more 'spatially sensitive' approach Jones 
found that Jessop's notion of 'hol lowing out' could not capture the complexity of the 
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state's spatial transformation. For Jessop, the term 'hollowing out' (of the 
nation-state) referred to the displacement of powers from nation-states upwards (to 
supranational institutions), downwards (to local states) and outwards (to networks 
of international networks of local and regional states). Arguing that 'hollowing out ' 
is a too obscure term, Jones proposed to 'spatialize' Jessop's strategic-relational 
approach to the state through the concept of spatial selectivity. This concept was 
intended to suggest that the state has a tendency to geographical privileging, which 
is a process that takes on both material and ideological forms, and through which 
certain places are favoured through accumulation strategies. 
From around the turn of the millennium onwards, Jessop's work has devoted 
more systematic attention to what he has termed 'the political economy of state 
rescaling' (BRENNER, 2009). JESSOP (2000) argued that the current round of globalization 
has brought about the 'relativization of scale', a process in which the national scale 
has lost its primacy and in which no other scale has yet won a similar primacy. 
Distancing himself from earlier-made remarks on the 'hollowing out of the state', 
JESSOP (1999) argued that the reordering of relations between different political tiers 
is better captured by the term 'denationalization'. As he stressed, the weakening of 
the national state in projecting "its power inside its borders (let alone beyond them) 
in the interests of accumulation" does not entail a simple withering away of the 
national state. Rather, "the loss of autonomy engenders both the need for 
supra-national coordination and the space for subnational resurgence and extends 
thereby the scope for the national state itself to mediate between the supra- and 
subnational" (JESSOP, 1999, p. 7). From remarks made elsewhere it appears that for 
Jessop, 'the space for sub-national resurgence' is that of the space of cities and 
city-regions. In his own words: " [a l though neoliberal projects are being pursued on 
many different and often tangled scales, it is in cities and city-regions that the 
various contradictions and tensions of "actually existing neolibera I ism" are expressed 
more saliently in everyday life" (JESSOP, 2002c, p. 452). Furthermore, Jessop holds that 
the national scale has been "challenged by the rise of global city networks more 
oriented to other global cities than to national hinterlands" (JESSOP, 2002b, p. 50). 
Neil BRENNER (1998; 1999; 2000; 2001; 2003; 2004), drawing in particular on the 
already mentioned work of David Harvey and that of French sociologist Henri tefebvre, 
as well as on Jessop's scalarturn, made considerable efforts from the late 1990s on to 
develop a "systematic spatialization of Jessop's strategic-relational state theory" 
(BRENNER, 2004, p. 25). Brenner's work stands out through his explicit conceptualiza-
tion of space that stresses the'processual' (i.e. not pre-given) character of spaces and 
refuses all kinds of 'spatial fetishism'. As Brenner notes: 
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"[a]ll aspects of social space under modern capitalism must be understood as 
presuppositions, arenas and outcomes of dynamic processes of continual social 
contestation and transformation [ ] I shall use standard terms such as space, territory 
place and scale - but it must be emphasized that these labels connote ongoing processes 
of spatiahzation, territonalization, place making and scaling, rather than fixed, given, or 
static entities" (BRCNNCR 2004, ρ 32, emphasis original) 
As such, Brenner aligns with the dialectical conceptualization of the state-society 
relation that gained ground during the 1970s and 1980s, especially in Marxist 
scholarship, and that implies that not only is space a social construction, but that the 
social sphere is spatially constructed too (see e g COLLINCE, 2005, MARCHART, 2004, 
MASSEY, 1992) As Massey put it "space is a social construct-yes But social relations 
are also constructed over space, and that makes a difference" (MASSEY, 1985, ρ i2) 
Brenner has stressed that state rescalmg is not synonymous with state spatial 
restructuring as such, but is, next to territonalization, place-making and networking, 
one dimension of it (BRENNER, 2009) Nonetheless, the notions of scale and rescalmg 
have been central to Brenner's writings, and his insights have inspired a wide-range 
of theoretically oriented, as well as empirically focused, accounts On the whole, 
Brenner's work has greatly contributed to turning these concepts into the cornerstones 
of the study of contemporary state spatial restructuring (eg ALLMENDINGER, 2003, 
ALLMENDINGER and HAUGHTON 2007, 2009, Antipode 2002, BRENNER et al, 2003, CUMBERS, 
MACKINNON and MCMASTER, 2003, CUALINI, 2004, European Planning Studies, 2006, 
MACLEOD, 1999, MACLEOD and GOODWIN, 1999,1999b) BRENNER (1998,2000) acknowledges 
first of all Smith's and Swyngedouw's conceptual foundations for a social construc­
tionist approach to the analysis of geographical scale, according to which geographical 
scale is not neutral and fixed, but the product of socio-economic relationships and 
political struggle In line with that, BRENNER (ibid ) argues that each geographical scale 
is a socially constituted, politically contested and historically variable dimension of 
social relations Referring to Lefebvre's point that social spaces interpenetrate each 
other, BRENNER (2000) stresses that geographical scales are closely interlinked and 
thus should not be regarded m isolation from each other As Brenner puts it, "[e]ach 
geographical scale is constituted through its historically evolving positionahty within 
a relational grid of vertically 'stretched' and horizontally 'dispersed' sociospatial 
processes, relations and mterdependencies" (BRENNER, 2001, ρ 6o6) Reformulating 
Harvey's views on the spatial fix, BRENNER (1998) further speaks of scalar fixes for 
capital, which position each geographical scale within determinate hierarchical 
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patterns of interdependence and thereby constitute relatively fixed and immobile 
infrastructures of territorial organization for each historical round of capital 
circulation. As "the geography of state spatiality must be viewed as [...] an outcome 
of continually evolving political strategies" (BRENNER, 2004, p. 76), processes of scalar 
fixing are also inherently political. This aspect is captured by the notion of the'politics 
of scale' or 'politics of rescaling' (BRENNER, 1999; 2001). 
Brenner focuses in particular on what he calls " two specific forms of territorial 
organization", namely cities and states, which he sees as "the essential geographical 
components of each scalarfixfor capital" (BRENNER, 1998, p. 461). While the specificity 
of the urban to capitalist accumulation has figured central to much geographical 
inquiry, Brenner's attention has been more specifically directed to the way the state 
has been involved in the regulation of urban spaces. To this end, he has drawn on the 
four-volume work of Lefebvre entitled De l'Etat, in which Lefebvre explored the key 
aspects of state spatial intervention under capitalism. BRENNER (2000, p. 370) reiterates 
the fol lowing three Lefebvrian insights in particular. First, states operate to mobilize 
space as a productive force through various forms of infrastructural investment, 
spatial planning, industrial policy and financial regulation directed towards different 
geographical locations and scales. Second, the state operates as the most crucial 
institutional mediator of uneven geographical development under capitalism; in 
addition to promoting industrial growth, the state also attempts to alleviate the 
polarizing socio-spatial effects of growth on a variety of scales. Third, states deploy 
diverse strategies to order social relations hierarchically on different geographical 
scales, at once to maintain social cohesion and to impose a functional differentiation 
of space. On the whole, BRENNER (1998) asserts the central role of the state in the 
production of capitalist territorial organization and hypothesizes that "the tension 
between f ix i ty and motion in the circulation of capital has periodically triggered 
major transformations in the scalar organization of the territorial state" (BRENNER, 
1998, p. 472). Processes of state spatial restructuring may be understood as a continual 
layering of successive rounds of regulation within a constantly evolving mosaic of 
state spatiality. According to Brenner: 
"A key task that flows from a strategic-relational-spatial approach to statehood is to Investigate 
the path-dependent layering processes through which successive rounds of state spatial 
regulation emerge within entrenched formations of state spatiality" (BRENNER, 2004, p. 111). 
Brenner identifies three major waves of rescaling in particular, each occurring in 
conjunction with one of the global economic crises of the last centuries: that of 
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1873-96, that of the 1930s and that of the post 1970s period Most of his attention is 
devoted to the post 1970 round of crisis-induced capitalist restructuring, which 
Brenner holds to be possibly more profound than the previous rounds of rescalmg 
According to Brenner, this most recent round is that of 'denationalization', because 
"the circulation of capital can no longer be adequately conceived with reference to 
autocentric 'national economies' or the image of a world economy parcelized into 
distinctive national-territorial spaces" (BRENNER, 1998, ρ 475) Underlying Brenner's 
analysis of the post 1970 period is a conceptualization of state space that sees the 
latter 1) as an ongoing process of change rather than as a static thing, container, or 
platform, 2) as having a polymorphic rather than a merely territorial geographical 
form, and 3) as having a multiscalar rather than merely a national organizational 
structure (BRENNER, 2004, ρ 74, emphasis original) 
In order to conceptualize what he calls the 'polymorphic' character of state 
spatiality, BRENNER (2004) first of all distinguishes between t w o dimensions of state 
space state space m the narrow and m the integral sense The former refers primarily 
to changing forms of state territoriality (borders), the latter to non territorial as well 
as territorial modes of state intervention into socio economic processes The concept 
of "state spatial projects", referring to the differentiation of state territoriality into a 
partitioned, functionally coordinated and organizationally coherent regulatory 
geography, corresponds to state space m the narrow sense "State spatial strategies" 
in turn can be viewed as the strategic embodiment of state space in the integral 
sense, attempting to influence the geographies of social and economic relations 
beyond the state apparatus proper within a given territorial jurisdiction It is within a 
matrix constituted by these t w o concepts on the one hand and the scalar and 
territorial dimension of state pol iciesontheotherthat Brenner locates the para meters 
for the evolution of state spatial selectivity (see Figure 2 2) 
Following Brenner, if we examine post-1970 trends of state spatial restructuring, 
then similar patterns of changes can be broadly observed throughout Western 
Europe In particular, Brenner argues that the formation of new state spaces has, on 
the one hand, entailed a broad shift of state spatial projects towards decentraliza 
tion and administrative customisation, and, on the other hand, a broad reorientation 
of state spatial strategies towards the promotion of scalar multiplicity and 
development concentration m particular places (see Figure 2 3) 
Focusing on urban policies in particular, BRENNER (1999, 2003, 2004) argues, by 
discussing a new wave of metropolitan urban reforms m Western Europe, that "the 
scales of urban and regional territorial organisation are becoming ever more crucial 
at once as regulatory instruments of the state" (BRENNER, 1999, ρ 446 see also BRENNER 
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Figure 2.2 Parameters for the evolution of state spatial selectivity 
Scalar dimension: 
the scalar 
articulation of 
state policies and 
institutions among 
different levels of 
political-economic 
organization 
wi th in a given 
territory 
TeiritoTial 
dimension: 
the territorial 
articulation of 
state policies and 
institutions among 
different types of 
juridical units or 
economic zones 
wi th in a given 
territory 
State spatial projects 
Geographies of state territorial 
organization and administrative 
differentiation wi thin a given 
territory 
Centralization vs. 
decentralization 
• Centralization of state 
operations: tends to 
concentrate political authority 
at one overarching scale of 
state administration (generally 
the national) 
• Decentralization of state 
operations: transfers various 
regulatory tasks away from 
the central coordinating tier 
of state power (genera 1 ly to 
subnational levels) 
Uniformity vs. customization 
• Promotion of uniform and 
standardized administrative 
coverage in which broadly 
equivalent levels of service 
provision and bureaucratic 
organization are extended 
throughout an entire territory 
• Promotion of patchy, 
differentiated, or uneven 
administrative geographies in 
which customized, area specific 
institutional arrangements and 
levels of service provision are 
established in specific places 
or geographic zones within a 
territory 
State spatial strategies 
Geographies of state 
intervention into socioeconomic 
life wi th in a given territory 
Singularity vs. multiplicity 
• Privilegingof a s/ng/e dominant 
scale (for instance, the 
national) as the overarching 
level for socioeconomic 
activities 
• Distribution of socioeconomic 
activities among multiple 
spatial scales 
Equalization vs. concentration 
• Promotion of an equalization 
of socioeconomic activities and 
investments within the state's 
territorial borders: goal is to 
spread socioeconomic assets 
and public resources as evenly 
as possible across a national 
territory and thus to alleviate 
territorial inequalities 
• Promotion of a concentration 
of socioeconomic activities 
and investments: goal is to 
promote the agglomeration 
of socioeconomic assets and 
public resources in particular 
locations, places and regions 
within a territory 
Source: BRENNER, 2004, p. 97. emphasis original 
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Figure 2.3 Brenner's hypothesis on the production of new state spaces 
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Italicized font hypothesized spatial features of emergent, post-1970s state reforms 
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2003; 2004). As he notes, in contrast to forms of metropolitan governance prevailing 
during the Fordist-Keynesian period, which emphasized administrative modernization, 
inter-territorial equalization and the efficient delivery of urban services, the new 
waveof reforms focus on the promotion of capital investment. On the whole, Brenner 
sees'urban locational policies', which aim at enhancing the territorialized competitive 
advantages of strategic cities and regions, as a distinctive feature of state territorial 
management, especially from the 1980s onwards. Brenner presented his findings in 
his comprehensive work entitled New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the 
Rescaling of Statehood (BRENNER, 2004) that contains examples f rom the UK, France, 
Germany, Italy, Denmark and the Netherlands5. In this book, Brenner critically remarks 
5 More specifically, Brenner discusses the following examples of'new metropolitan regionalism'; from the 
UK. Greater London and Greater Manchester; from France, Greater Lyon and Lille Metropolis; from Italy, 
Bologna Metropolitan City;from Germany. Stuttgart Region, Hannover Region, and Frankfurt/Rhine Mam 
Region; from Denmark, the Copenhagen metropolitan area; from the Netherlands. Greater Rotterdam and 
Greater Amsterdam (BRENNER, 2004, pp. 276-280). 
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that through the explicit support of interlocality competition, recent state spatial 
reforms have in fact institutionalized "a regressive politics of unfettered territorial 
inequality and sociospatial polarization" (BRENNER, 2004, p. 304). 
In a more recent paper, BRENNER (2009) notes that the reorientation of state 
spatial strategies towards urban centric, competitiveness-oriented forms of 
locational policy still appears quite pervasive across the EU and argues that his 2004 
book's broad interpretation of Western European trends still holds. At the same time, 
Brenner (ibid.) also acknowledges that in most EU countries, urban locational policies 
are not being promoted on a grand scale (like in France and the Netherlands which he 
mentions as examples) or debated so explicitly in the public sphere. As he further 
notes, 
"[i]nstead, they [i.e. urban locational policies] are generally pursued through more subtle, 
yet no less pervasive, institutional recalibrations, policy reorientations and regulatory 
experiments, whether within established state agencies or within newly created organs of 
post-Keynesian statecraft" (BRENNER, 2009, p. 129). 
Above, Brenner's work was made central because it can be seen as outstanding in 
terms of theoretical-conceptual depth and its ambition to give a general account of 
recent state spatial rescaling. However, a brief reference needs to be made here, first, 
to the work of Swyngedouw, who has not applied the SRA, but has been, next to 
Brenner, a much-cited theorist of rescaling, and second, to the writings of a group of 
UK-based scholars on the new regionalist reorganization of the UK state. SYWNGEDOUW 
(1997; 2004) has assumed, similarly to Brenner, that scales are never fixed, but are 
being socially constructed through struggle. SYWNGEDOUW'S (2004) 'scalar perspective' 
proposes in particular to conceive of scalar configurations as regulatory order(s) or 
as networks, whereby 'regulatory order' refers to geographical-institutional 
arrangements (like states, regional/local forms of governance, or transnational 
organisations like the European Union), and 'networks' refer to the spatial or 
geographical arrangements of interlinked economic activities. According to 
SWYNGEDOUW (2004, p. 33), there is a continuous tension between 'scales of regulation' 
and 'scales of networks': as the latter contract and expand through processes of 
de- and re-territorialization, the former emerge as institutionalized territorial 
compromises that mediate processes of cooperation and competition. Swyngedouw's 
research focus, just as Brenner's, has been firmly on 'the urban(-regional)'. As he 
notes: 
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"[T]he city is the laboratory of capitalist globalisation The most positive developments, 
such as technological and social innovation, but also the most negative and perverse 
effects, such as poverty and exclusion, are expressed in the city" (SWYNGFDOUW, 2007, ρ 22) 
In contrast, the focus of a group of UK scholars, who have attempted to develop a 
'spatially sensitive political economy perspective' (GOODWIN, JONES and JONES, 2005) on 
the basis of Jessop's strategic relational approach, has been on UK devolution and the 
regionalization of economic governance GOODWIN, JONES and JONES (ibid , 2006, 2006b) 
propose to carry forward Jessop's framework by introducing the notion of 'fill ing in' 
As they note, "[t]he use of the concept of 'fi l l ing in' focuses [ ] on the manner in 
which power is being transferred, and on the scales it is being transferred to" (GOODWIN, 
JONES and JONES, 2005, ρ 425) Referring this way to a geographically constituted and 
spatially constructed process, the notion of 'fi l l ing in' is introduced as a complement 
to the concept of 'hollowing out', which latter implies more an abstract sense of 
restructuring away from one level only (1 e the national) As the authors note, the 
notion of 'fi l l ing in' "allows one to appreciate the dynamics associated with the 
continuous 'emergence' of state organizations in the regions and territories of the 
UK" (GOODWIN, JONES and JONES, 2005, ρ 425) From this perspective, the establishment 
of Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) in the eight English standard regions can 
be seen as one instance of 'f i l l ing in' Furthermore, according to JONES (2004), the 
setting up of RDAs can be regarded as a new territorially defined regulatory project 
of the state Also, it is a new means to manage economic crisis via political institutions, 
a part of a political strategy to consolidate national state power This is ensured, 
according to Jones, by the fact that RDAs provide differential access to the state 
apparatus, privileging business and Labour Party activists In other words, "the 
regional scale is 'strategically selective'" (JONES, 2004, ρ 195) More recently, Jones' 
framing of regionalization as the crisis of crisis-management was carried forward by 
Harrison, who argued that the rescalmg of economic governance from the region to 
the city region "merely distracts attention away from the state's inability to manage 
the capitalist tendency for uneven development" (HARRISON, 2007, ρ 329) 
Finally, it is important to consider those recent writings of some of the above-
mentioned prominent scholars working with the SRA m which the scholars m 
question attempt to pin down their understanding of space in more explicit 
philosophical theoretical terms I propose to focus on t w o articles in particular, one 
co wri t ten by JESSOP, BRENNER and JONES (2008) and one by JONES (2009) While this 
might appear as a limited base from which to draw conclusions, these articles, due to 
their agenda-setting ambitions, give a good summary of these scholars' spatial 
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perspective. Concerning the two papers in question, statements centring around 
two issues need to be considered in particular: i) statements supporting a realist 
relational view of space and 2) statements in favour of a multidimensional perspective 
of spatiality. These statements are crucial for locating state regulationist scholarship 
and also for developing an alternative perspective on the formation of state spaces. 
As to the relational v iewof space, JESSOP, BRENNER and JONES (2008) find it important 
to ascribe to it in order to avoid spatial fetishism as defined by SAYER (2000). Briefly, 
according to SAYER (1985; 2000), 'spatial fetishism' is at issue if one separates space 
and substance, and speaks of the causal effects or uses of space, i.e. if one takes 
space for a thing existing independently of objects. This view is incorrect because in 
Sayer's view, 'space-as-such' and 'spatial relations' are literally abstractions without 
content; "spatial relations only exist through objects, of whatever kind". Furthermore, 
"[t]he spatial relation of between-ness cannot, of itself, be said to have any effects or 
make any difference... space makes a difference, but only in terms of the particular 
causal powers and liabilities constituting it" (SAYER, 1985, p. 52, emphasis added). In line 
with Sayer's view, JESSOP, BRENNER and JONES (2008) prefer to speak of 'sociospatial 
relations' instead of 'spatiality'. JONES (2009) argues moreover that for realist 
relationists, "true statements about space are made true by facts about material 
bodies and the way they are related, which can involve detailed and diverse empirical 
observations and abstractions from reality" (JONES, 2009, p. 10, emphasis original). 
The main task for realist relationists is to examine what forces govern the existence 
of material objects, and to distinguish between necessary and contingent spatial 
relations Linking up the above view with the SRA, J NI. (2009) notes that socio spatial 
relations are neither automatic nor naturally necessary features of capitalism. Rather, 
these relations 
"are deeply processual and practical outcomes of strategic initiatives undertaken by a wide 
range of forces produced neither through structural determinism nor through a 
spontaneous voluntarism, but through a mutually transformative evolution of inherited 
spatial structures and emergent spatial strategies within an actively differentiated, 
continually evolving grid of institutions, territories and regulatory activities" (JONES, 2009, 
p. 12, emphasis original). 
As to the necessity to acknowledge the multidimensionality of (state) space, it is the 
central argument of JESSOP, BRENNER and JONES' (2008) paper in which the authors wish 
to further refine the spatialized SRA. To this end, Jessop and colleagues design what 
they call - after territories, places, scales and networks - the 'TPSN framework'. The 
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authors argue as follows "[a]s previous advocates of a scalar turn, we now question 
the privileging, in any form, of a single dimension of sociospatial relations, scalar or 
otherwise" (ibid , ρ 389) The authors do acknowledge that those included m the 
TPSN framework are not the only (important) spatial dimensions of social relations, 
but they argue that these are possibly the most salient in work on contemporary 
political-economic restructuring The TPSN framework is intended to carry forward 
earlier work based on the SR A by 1) stressing the importance of all the four dimensions 
m the analysis of spatio-temporal fixes, and 2) highlighting that each particular 
spatio-temporal fix is a historically and geographically specific, strategically selective 
TPSN combination 
2.2 A critical assessment of regulationist scholarship 
According to Brenner, "[a] geographically attuned and scale-sensitive approach to 
state theory is required in order to decipher the new state spaces that are being 
produced under contemporary capitalism" (BRENNER, 2004, ρ 2, emphasis added) On 
the basis of three interrelated sets of arguments, I would like to argue, however, that 
the way regulationist accounts are 'attuned geographically' is problematic First, the 
accounts in question are not sensitive enough to the geographically particular 
formation of new spaces This is the case because second, the regulationist SRA, m its 
commonly applied form, provides an inappropriate conceptualization of state 
restructuring as a social process and third, and more specifically, because it offers an 
inadequate framework for conceptualizing state restructuring as a soao-spatial 
process Let us consider these interrelated criticisms m turn 
2 2 7 The problems of applying the regulationist view to any state 
As Cerny noted, considering the fact that SRA informed accounts focus largely on 
Western Europe (or North America and Australia), "[o]ne wonders how much state 
rescalmg is actually taking place in developing countries" (CERNY, 2006, ρ 691) In a 
recent article, BRENNER (2009) enumerates a number of studies focusing on various 
countries outside 'the West' that work with the concept of rescalmg, as evidence 
that state rescalmg is unfolding on a global scale However, to say that rescalmg is 
unfolding across the globe is a rather general statement, and Brenner's more specific 
findings considering rescalmg processes m urban regions in Western Europe are far 
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from general. DRAHOKOUPIL'S (2007) study, for example - a study figuring in Brenner's 
above-mentioned list of cross-country rescaling literature - actually notes that the 
parameters of state spatial restructuring in the Czech Republic (Figure 2.3) are 
different from those that BRENNER (2004) sketches for Western Europe. A preliminary 
assessment of Hungary's state spatial reforms - the subject of one of the two case 
studies of the present research - suggested similar divergence in the case of Hungary. 
Hungary's state spatial restructuring cannot be straightforwardly described by the 
four-fold shift as suggested by Brenner (i.e. a shift towards the decentralization of 
state administration, the distribution of socio-economic activities on multiple scales, 
the promotion of customized, area-specific arrangements and the promotion of 
development concentration). Although in the post-1990, period Hungary became 
decidedly 'neoliberalized', no urban locational policies comparable to those in 
'Western capitalist countries' have been formulated in Hungary. 
Of course, considering that the regulationist SRA to the state focuses on the 
reproduction of the spatial-institutional conditions of capital accumulation, 
Hungary's seemingly diverging course of development from that (those) in the 'West' 
is not surprising. As DRAHOKOUPIL (2007) noted, the application of the state-theoretical 
methodology to the analysis of post-socialist states faces serious challenges. Above 
all, in the case of these states one has to deal "not only with the state's role in the 
reproduction of conditions for capitalist accumulation, but also with its role in the 
very introduction of the fundamental conditions for capitalist accumulation" 
(DRAHOKOUPIL, 2007, p. 406, emphasis original). Drahokoupil actually argues that we 
could still conduct a path-dependent functional analysis for the study of post-socialist 
cases; this would entail considering recent regulatory changes as part of "the tr ial-
and-error search for an 'appropriate' state project that would co-constitute a 
relatively stable accumulation regime" (DRAHOKOUPIL 2007, p. 407). In terms of state 
spatial reorganization, this would mean in particular that the parameters of state 
spatiality are seen as being selected in the above trial-and-error search, which is also 
a layering process where newly emergent state spatial projects and state spatial 
strategies interact with inherited configurations of state space (BRENNER 2004). 
However, applying such a functional approach to a post-socialist case is far from 
straightforward. Drahokoupil is right to point out that post-socialist states "have 
been posf-socialist for more than a decade" (DRAHOKOUPIL 2007, p. 408, emphasis 
original). However, there is still the problem of defining the point when conditions 
for capitalist accumulation were "in their place" and from which point it would be 
appropriate to apply a functional analysis to state restructuring. Furthermore, some 
other elements of Jessop's framework are also difficult to interpret in the case of 
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Hungary (and possibly m the case of other 'non-Western' states), for example the 
point made concerning the ecological dominance of the capitalist economy Accounts 
of Hungary's increasingly polarized party politics (eg ACH, 2004, CRESKOVITS, 2007, 
PALONEN, 2006, 2009, SCHOPFLIN, 2007) that "dominates the economy and the economic 
players according to its own daily interests" (VERESS 2006, ρ 58) suggest that politics 
might have become ecologically dominant in Hungary This would even f i t Jessop's 
framework, for he argues that "even when conditions do favour the long-term 
ecological dominance of the capitalist economy, other systems may gam short-term 
primacy in response to crises elsewhere" (JESSOP, 2002b, ρ 28) We could assume that 
it is the ongoing crisis of post-socialist identity construction, nation-building and 
state formation that leads to the apparent primacy and (temporary) ecological 
dominance of politics However, considering that Hungary is committed to fulf i l the 
Maastricht convergence criteria and has m fact faced neoliberal imperatives 
throughout the whole post-1990 period, the view of the ecological dominance of 
politics is hardly tenable 
On the whole, at f irst sight the term rescalmg might be considered as an apt 
conceptual lens through which we can grasp the spatial restructuring of any state 
This is what Brenner himself suggests when saying that "[ i]n principle, any formation 
of state spatiality could be examined through this [Figure 2 3] conceptual scheme by 
being positioned appropriately within one of the analytical quadrants along each of 
the axes depicted" (BRENNER, 2004, ρ 103) What Brenner seems to ignore here is that 
if we take seriously the specific regulationist assumptions of the SRA, into which he 
wishes to integrate "questions of space, territory and geographical scale" (BRENNER, 
2004, ρ 83), then the widespread applicability of the scale concept is far from 
straightforward 
2 2 2 A biased conceptualization of state restructuring as a social process 
It might be tempting to argue that although the regulationist literature's explanatory 
potential is limited with regard to 'post-socialist cases', the latter are special 
exceptions and the above potential is best examined m a 'Western capitalist case' 
However, an initial appraisal of recent state spatial reforms in England, the subject of 
the present research's other case study, also raised doubts concerning the merits of 
the regulationist literature in accounting for changes in the case of an 'established 
Western capitalist state' Some elements of recent state spatial reforms in England 
seem to f i t well the regulationist SRA For example, the establishment of Greater 
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London can be easily read as strategic place promotion within global and European 
circuits of capital, and regulationist scholars have indeed come up with this 
interpretation (e.g. MACLEOD and GOODWIN, 1999). On the other hand - contradicting 
Brenner's point on the alleged shift towards the promotion of differentiated 
administrative geographies - RDAs were established in every English region (thus in 
both the more and the less prosperous ones) with the same powers and tasks, on the 
basis of the same organizational regulations. It seems then that the persisting 
inequality between England's regions has not been promoted (only) by differential 
treatment, as Brenner's framework suggests, but (also) by 'treating unequals equally' 
(MORGAN, 2002; 2006). According to Morgan, "addressing the [North-South] divide 
through the creation of RDAs is nonsense because RDAs have been established in 
every region rather than just in the northern regions" (MORGAN, 2002, p. 804). 
Furthermore, the more recently emerging city-regional arrangements in England 
(outside London), the specific focus of one of the case studies of the present research, 
can also not be interpreted straightforwardly with the SRA to the state. Although 
some analysts anticipated that city-regions might become new sites of state spatial 
regulation (e.g. GONZALEZ, TOMANEY and WARD, 2006; HARRISON, 2007), in summer 2007, 
which is the end point of this case study research, it seemed that government policy 
would actually refrain from a straightforward support for the establishment of 
city-regions. Following much policy talk about the role of cities and city-regions as 
drivers of the economy and the need to refocus development interventions on them, 
the government finally committed itself to "work with sub-regions to allow economic 
development issues to be managed at this level" (HM TREASURY, BERR and DCLG, 2007, 
p. 3, emphasis added). In viewespecially of the pol icy talk about cities and city-regions 
this could be regarded as a rather reserved promise. Although city-regional 
governance continued unfolding, it is questionable whether we can regard England's 
city-regions, following Brenner's insights, as the new scalar fix that constitutes 
relatively fixed and immobile infrastructures of territorial organization for capital 
circulation. Or, if we have to see city-regions in their present form as the result of 
more subtle state regulatory experiments, which, according to BRENNER (2009), 
characterize the latest wave of urban locational policies, then the question remains 
how the SRA framework helps to understand the apparent turn to such, more subtle 
spatial interventions. 
This leads us to the key point of this chapter that the regulationist SRA to the 
state falls short of contributing to an in-depth account of the spatial restructuring of 
an 'established Western capitalist state' (for the analysis of which it has been 
designed). Certainly, this criticism is not new; regulationist writings - whether or not 
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ascribing more specifically to a strategic-relational approach - have received various 
criticisms These criticisms have been largely overlapping and/or interlinked, and 
have concerned three mam issues 
i) the high level of generality of the statements made by some regulationist 
accounts, 
2) an economic bias and the insufficient treatment of the multiple constraints/ 
claims at play in state spatial restructuring, 
3) the unsatisfactory acknowledgement of the strategies, interpretations, identities 
and mundane practices of particular agents, 
(for various combinations of the above criticisms see e g LARNER, 2003, 2005, LARNER 
and LEHERON, 2002, LE CALÉS, 2002, PAINTER, 2006, RACO, 2005, STUBBS, 2005, UITERMARK, 
2005, WARD and JONAS, 2004) Ultimately, the remarks above are all part of a more 
general criticism, namely that regulationist scholarship does not adequately 
conceptualize the inherently political nature of neoliberal state spatial restructuring 
At first sight, the above-mentioned criticisms might seem misplaced Regulationist 
scholars repeatedly stress that they regard state spaces not as given, but as being 
contingently reconfigured through path-dependent political struggles involving 
different actors Jessop himself argues that 
"one must pay careful attention to the structurally inscribed strategic selectivity of the 
specific state forms and political regimes, and move away from abstract, often essentialist 
theonzation towards more detailed accounts of the complex interplay of social struggles 
and institutions" (JESSOP, 2002b ρ 41) 
I would like to argue, however, that such statements and commitments fail to 
genuinely shape, and become realized in, actual regulationist research agendas 
In order to understand why this is the case - and also in order to reformulate the 
criticisms above at a more abstract level - we need to revisit some fundamental 
assumptions of the regulationist framework and, above all, the specific philosophical 
anchoring of these assumptions 
First of all, let us take the assumption about the contingent necessity of particular 
spatio-temporal fixes that stresses that socio-spatial reality is not determined by a 
single force, but is constituted by the confluence of multiple chains of causality 
What is problematic concerning this assumption is that by looking at the formation 
of spatio-temporal fixes m terms of (the critical realist idea of) contingent necessity, 
the regulationist view presupposes the existence of distinct realms of society, each 
with its own (set of) causal chains That thinking along these lines is problematic -
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and that the recognition that the realms in question are interdependent does not go 
far enough - becomes obvious if we think of practices of regulation, for example a 
grant scheme for local governments. While on the one hand, we might identify 
various 'components' of this practice that originate in the fields of economy, politics 
and so for th , we cannot straightforwardly relegate the above practice itself to one 
particular realm. This does not mean that the common practice of referring to the 
sphere of the economy, politics etc. is fundamentally wrong. This study assumes, 
however, that we should remain aware of and be able to question - and the 
regulationist perspective leaves little if any room to do so - the way the boundaries 
of the above realms are created and continuously contested. 
Actually, next to the emphasis on the non-deterministic character of the economy, 
Jessop's work contains a number of statements that still suggest a functionalist-
economic bias. While Jessop, on the one hand, says that he sees no reason "[w]hy, 
even where capital is capable of self-valorization, it has to become the dominant 
principle of societalization" (JESSOP, 1997, p. 566), elsewhere he speaks of keeping 
centre stage the "inevitable, incompressible and unsurpassable contradictions and 
dilemmas of the capital relation" (JESSOP, 2004b, p. 10). The notion of 'functionality', 
which is intended to be a descriptive category (DRAHOKOUPIL, 2007), capturing how a 
spatio-temporal fix helps secure the coherence of a particular capitalist formation, is 
also problematic. As HAY (2004) notes, it is unclear to what extent Jessop's functional 
language is intended to be explanatory. Arguably, as soon as we want to move from 
an account of a formation's static coherence to an account of a formation's dynamic 
change (or stability), thinking in terms of functionality risks of slipping towards 
functionalism - something Jessop explicitly condemns. The concept of 'ecological 
dominance' can also be seen as suggestive of the (potential of) functionalism. 
While JESSOP (2002b) stresses that the ecological dominance of the capitalist economy 
is contingent, ult imately he asserts that the capitalist economy has a "quasi-
transcendental meta-code". 
Drawing on MOUZEUS (1988), we can actually say that in spite of his sophisticated 
conceptual vocabulary, Jessop tends to remain attached to the Marxist strategy of 
upholding the primacy of the economic. By thinking, on the one hand, of state politics 
in terms of a separate field from the market economy, where the needs of capital 
might be neglected, and, on the other, of the capitalist economy as having a 
"meta-code", Jessop seems to suggest that structures are (primarily) economic and 
that politics is the sphere of agency. Drawing further on Mouzelis (ibid.), one can 
argue that underlying Jessop's framework there is an assumption of the economic 
and the political sphere being ontologically different, in the sense that structures are 
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primarily operating m the former and agents in the latter domain As a result, the 
political is predominantly conceptualized in terms of the economic The tendency of 
subordinating politics (as a realm of agency) to the economy (as an embodiment of 
structures) leads to an insufficiently nuanced view of political agency 
In addition to the above, regulationist scholars not only tend to uphold the 
primacy of the economic realm, but tend to privilege an "exchange relations reading 
of capitalism" (WARD and JONAS, 2004, ρ 2134) in their geographical analyses As Ward 
and Jonas critically remark, numerous scholars emphasize that previous, more overtly 
redistributional agendas have been replaced by new ones weighted towards economic 
growth, but they do not say much about the conflicts entailed by this shift In Ward 
and Jonas' own words, "attention to the social relations of production, consumption, 
and redistribution and their underlying geographies of conflict are, at best limited 
[in regulationist urban regional policy analysis]" (WARD and JONAS, 2004, ρ 2133) 
As they further argue, geographies of collective provision remain important and yet 
undertheorized aspects of contemporary geographical forms and strategies of 
territorial management at the sub national scale Other scholars have stressed as 
well that although neoliberalism is associated with market logics, we need to consider 
the economy m broader terms As Peck and Tickell aptly noted, "[l]ike the idealized 
market to which it pays homage, neoliberalism cannot stand alone As a restructuring 
ethos, it is inevitably grafted onto other state forms and social formations" (PECK and 
TICKELL, 2007, ρ 34, emphasis original) While m the case of 'Western capitalist states', 
neoliberal impulses form "a hybrid relationship with va nous forms of social democracy 
and residual welfare-statism" (PECK, 2004, ρ 393), m post-socialist countries such 
as Hungary they arguably do so w i t h the legacy of paternalist state socialist 
intervention 
To be sure, the above 'hybridity' and the conflicts that hybridity implies do not 
pass unnoticed by regulationist scholars Jessop, for example, stresses that there are 
political limits to welfare retrench ment that are rooted m the politics of representation 
(especially electoral dynamics and the mobilization of social movements), the internal 
organization of the state apparatus (eg vested departmental and ministerial 
interests) and the politics of intervention (legally entrenched citizenship rights) 
(JESSOP, 2002b) Still, we f ind no further indication as to how these political limits work 
and to what effect Furthermore, the regulationist literature tends to picture welfare 
interventions m the post war decades largely as apolitical Although explicit 
references to the Fordist-Keynesian period as "a golden age" are rare (see e g PECK 
and TICKELL, 2002, ρ 385), and the state is recognized as having a function of securing 
social cohesion m a conflictual society (JESSOP, 1999, ρ 15), there is a tendency "to see 
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Keynesian-welfarism as a normal arrangement, rather than as a temporary, and 
always tenuous, political settlement" (LARNÈR, 2005, p. 10). This "welfare state 
nostalgia" (ibid., p. n) is problematic, however, because it suggests that collective 
decision-making in the post-war decades was unproblematic, and 'good', while the 
individualism currently encouraged by neoliberal policies is 'bad' (BARNETT, 2005). 
Following POWELL and BOYNE (2001), we can say that regulationist scholars, by being 
critical of geographical inequality per se, are implicitly favouring centralism and do 
not consider that there is a trade-off between territorial justice and local autonomy. 
Local autonomy, although generally leading to greater geographical differentiation, 
is, however, also a 'good thing' (ibid.). 
Finally, a due understanding of politics is also undermined by Jessop's (and 
others') critical realist understanding of discourse as the production of meaning. 
In his framework of cultural political economy, Jessop restricts the significance of 
meaning to that of "complexity reduction" (JESSOP, 2008, p. 241) and links the 
effectiveness of claims of meaning to the way these claims correspond/resonate 
with institutionalized practices. As he notes in connection with the effectiveness of 
'economic imaginaries': 
"these imaginaries must have some significant, albeit necessarily partial, correspondence to 
real material interdependencles in the actually existing economy and/or relations between 
economic and extra-economic activities" (JESSOP, 2004, p. 162, emphasis added). 
Furthermore, when discussing the plausibility and appeal of particular economic 
imaginaries, Jessop argues that this "is also related ίο material contradictions and 
tensions in existing forms of economic regulation and/or governance as these impact 
on personal and organizational narratives" (JESSOP, 1999, p. 13, emphasis added). 
Scholars drawing on Jessop In their attempt to highlight how the production of 
meaning about spaces is an inherent part of rescaling have actually tended to focus 
on how business elites are successfully advocating urban policies that suit them (e.g. 
GONZALEZ, 2006; M GUIRK, 2004; 2007). While this might be seen as an undue 
simplification of Jessop's insights, Jessop is arguably guilty of offering a biased 
framework that can easily be applied in a one-sided way (cf. ROBERTS, 2001). On the 
whole, Jessop's (and Sum's) cultural political economy cannot fully meet its ambitions 
of a better acknowledgment of "subjects and subjectivities" and of giving a 
"discursive account of power" (JESSOP and SUM, 2001). The condition Jessop and Sum 
set for the Incorporation of other theoretical perspectives is namely that these 
perspectives should not undermine "the primary concern with the materiality of 
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capitalism, its structural contradictions and its associated strategic dilemmas" (ibid , 
ρ 99) This implies eventually that Marx's value theory is retained m order to explain 
the why of capital accumulation and state power, and other theories (such as 
Foucault's work) are drawn upon to explain the howaspect of economic exploitation 
and domination (HUDSON, 2006, JESSOP, 2007b) Such a combination of theoretical 
perspectives is far from unproblematic, however As Barnett notes m connection 
with Marxist and Foucauldian approaches, they are not necessarily as easily combined 
as they seem They imply namely "different models of the nature of explanatory 
concepts, different models of causality and determination, different models of social 
relations and agency, and different normative understandings of political power" 
(BARNETT, 2005, ρ 8) 
To conclude, it has to be noted that due to a structural-economic bias, and the 
resulting negligence of politics, the - often implicit - emancipatory ambitions of 
regulationist scholars concerning spatial justice become severely undermined For, in 
light of Jessop's emphasis on the economic, the room for "recursive reflexive 
dialectical analyses" (JESSOP 2001b, ρ 1226, emphasis added) becomes limited, and one 
wonders what the "reflexive, ironic 'optimism of the wil l '" (JESSOP, 2000, ρ 357) might 
be based upon 
2 2 s A problematic conceptualization of (the formation of) state space 
As noted above, regulationist scholars' conceptualization of social change implies 
soao-spatial change, due to these scholars' dialectic view of society and space 
Accordingly, a critical appraisal of how regulationists conceptualize state spatial 
restructuring could, in fact, largely reiterate the critical remarks that were made 
above about the regulationist view on social change More specifically, one could 
argue that the (mostly highly abstract) theonzation of socio-spatial relations from 
the privileged point of view of capitalist relations prevents regulationist scholars 
from acknowledging the diverse ways in which social relations are implicated m the 
formation of spaces Indeed, I would like to argue that several prominent scholars 
(e g BRENNER, 2004, BRENNER and THEODORE, 2002, JESSOP, 2000, 2008, JESSOP, BRENNER and 
JONES, 2008, JONES, 2009, SWYNCEDOUW, 2002, 2004) engaging w i t h issues of spatial 
change tend to adhere to a biased socio-spatial dialectic, where the social, understood 
primarily m terms of capitalist relations, outweighs the spatial In line with that, the 
scholars m question tend to deal wi th 'the spatial' m terms of the following threefold 
division 1) space as the fixed base through which capitalist relations are regulated, 
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2) space as the mediating instrument of power relations in times of capitalist crisis; 
and 3) space as the expression of a newly formed compromise on capitalist regulation. 
To refer to Swyngedouw, for example, "the power relations embodied in the things 
through which capitalism operate reveal systematic differences in positions of social 
power which, given their socio-spatial constitution, result in an uneven geography of 
change at all spatial scales" (SWYNGEDOUW, 2002, p. 46). This statement seems to 
suggest as if it was only in view of (the reproduction of) capitalism that power 
relations exist and have spatial effects. The critical realist informed statement 
according to which "true statements about space are made true by facts about 
material bodies" (JONES, 2009, p. 10, emphasis original) is even more evidently 
indicative of the conceptual subordination of space to some pre-given entities and 
structures. Similarly, the statement that "neoliberalism represents a strategy of 
political economic restructuring that - to borrow a phrase used by Lefebvre in a 
different context - uses space as its 'privileged instrument'" (BRENNER and THEODORE, 
2002, p. 343) lays bare regulationists' instrumental conceptualization of space. 
Regulationist scholars seem to become entangled, however, in a contradiction when 
they want to critically address the instrumentalization of space by policy-makers that 
on the other hand they themselves assume to be necessary. 
Against this background, some more specific weaknesses of the spatial perspective 
of regulationist scholars need to be discussed. Broadly, the weaknesses in question 
can be related to one of two, connected, issues: i) the unsatisfactory incorporation of 
(the idea of) 'the nation' into analyses of state spatial restructuring and 2) the reification 
of spatial categories (such as territory and scale, among other things) (see e.g. ANTONSICH, 
2009; BEAUREGARD, 2006; KRAMSCH, 2003; MANSFIELD, 2001; 2005; PAASI, 2008). The two 
subsections below will investigate these shortcomings in turn. 
Incorporating (the idea of) 'the nation' in the analysis of state spatial restructuring 
Regulationist scholarship, when stressing the ongoing importance of the state, often 
confirms the power of the nof;on-state or national state. But what does 'the 
nation(al)' mean for regulationists? For most authors, the 'nation' or 'national' are 
first and foremost scalar-territorial adjectives. In Jessop's work, for example, 'national' 
refers to a scale that has lost its primacy in regulating socio-economic processes. It is 
in particular the already mentioned term of'denationalization'that JESSOP (1999) uses 
to capture the reordering of relations between different political tiers. BRENNER (1998) 
applies the term in a similar fashion, to denote that the national scale had ceased to 
be the primary scale of capital accumulation. At this point, we should also take notice 
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of the notion of 'post-national' that Jessop introduces as an acknowledgement of 
"trends towards more multi ethnic or 'melting pot' and/or towards multicultural or 
fragmented, 'hybridic' post-modern societies that dissolve the ethnic and/or cultural 
bases of nationality" (JESSOP, 2008, ρ i68) Most recently, BRENNER (2009) stressed that 
the use of the terms 'denationalized'/'post-national' is not intended to suggest that 
we have to do wi th denationahzed/post-national state of affairs in substantial terms, 
rather, these terms are useful to capture a tendency 
Next to figuring as a scalar-territorial adjective, the prefix 'nation(al)' also 
appears m regulationist scholarship - although much less frequently - as an 
acknowledgement of the role of nationalism as an ideology m shaping state practices 
Those few who show concern with nationalism refer mostly to ANDERSON'S (1991) 
widely known conceptualization of the nation as an 'imagined community' What is 
important m view of this study's argument is that regulationist scholars tend to see 
the way the nation is imagined as being secondary (subordinated) to the way state 
practices are instituted JESSOP (2002b), for example, argues that all 'advanced 
capitalist states' can be described as formally sovereign territorial states presiding 
over 'national' territories On the other hand, JESSOP argues that there are various 
forms of nationhood ethnonational states based on a Volksnation, states based on a 
CIVIC nation {Staatsnation) encompassing shared commitments to the constitution 
and representative government, and states inclined more to cultural nationhood 
{Kulturnation) based on the active conforming by an ethical state of its citizens to 
shared understanding of national culture and civilization For Jessop, these forms of 
nationhood can be introduced "as a secondary variable when turned to the more 
detailed analyses of the institutional legacies and path-shaping possibilities of 
specific production and/or welfare regimes" (JESSOP, 2002b, ρ 174) In other words, 
following Jessop, the way the nation is imagined can be seen as an add-on variable 
that opens upa morenuanced understanding of the transformation of state practices 
Similarly, others seem to suggest that the (understanding of the) nation is 
subordinated to the state, because it is defined by it Jones and Jones speak for 
example "of the critical importance of nationalism as an ideology, and more 
specifically, as a common set of aesthetic and ritual practices that are promoted by 
all states" (JONES and JONES, 2004, ρ 410, emphasis added) 
This study does not consider it acceptable to use the 'nation(al)' exclusively as 
scalar-territorial adjective(s) and to regard (the understanding of) 'the nation' simply 
as a secondary explanatory variable m the analysis of the state But how should we 
then treat and incorporate the concept of 'the nation' m our analysis? 
This study cannot do justice to the vast existing literature dealing with the the 
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concept of 'the nation' (e.g. ANDERSON, 1991; GELLNER, 1983; HOBSBAWM, 1992; KEATING, 
2001; LEERSSEN, 2007; MILLER, 1995; SMITH, 1998; for an overview, see SPENCER and WOLLMAN, 
2002). Here, however, a brief discussion will suffice to underline that the contestation 
of the understanding o f ' the nation' plays a crucial role in the politics of state spatial 
organization. Consequently, we cannot understand the latter without paying more 
attention to the former. 
Following Spencer and Wollman's work, in which the authors review the most 
prominent perspectives on nationalism, the latter term can be defined broadly as "an 
ideology which imagines the community in a particular way (as national), asserts the 
primacy of this collective over others, and seeks political power in its name, ideally 
(though not exclusively and everywhere) in the form of a state for the nation (or a 
nation-state)" (SPENCER and WOLLMAN, 2002, p. 2). From the point of view of the current 
study, it is above all the first part of this definition that will be given attention. Unlike 
for many scholars, my main concern is not that the imagination of a nation rests 
crucially on a differentiation between those who are part of the nation and those 
who are not. While the way such differentiations are (re)made is undoubtedly an 
important object of study, I will largely bracket it in my analysis, in order to focus 
on another, relatively neglected, aspect of the imagination of the nation. More 
specifically, I would like to carry further KEATINC'S (2001) insight, according to which 
imagining a community as 'national' implies also a conception of the link between 
the particular and the universal. Accordingly, I suggest that we consider that the 
imagining of the national community also always entails a conception of how 
particular spaces (territories, places, scales, landscapes etc.) relate to (and, in fact, 
constitute) national space (however defined). What scholars (not only regulationists, 
who show litt le interest for the matter) mostly emphasize in this regard is that the 
formation of the modern state entailed the naturalization of a perspective that 
equated 'society' wi th the population within the state's territorial domain. More 
specifically, scholars have stressed that state power solidified through politico-
administrative practices that attempted to homogenize and unify state space in 
order to govern society (e.g. HAKLI, 1998; 2001; PAASI, 2001: TAYLOR, 1994; 1999). 
The parallel imagination of the nation entailed a society-wide, cultural appropriation 
of the national territory as 'homeland'; or to refer to PAASI (1996, 1999), the 'spatial 
socialization' of individuals became nationalized. As such, the imagination of the 
nation backed attempts to (re)order space and made these attempts appear as 
'natural' (SPENCER and WOLLMAN, 2002; TAYLOR, 1999). In other words, the anchoring of 
the idea of 'the nation' as an apolitical, 'natural' community of allegiance and 
solidarity paved the way for the 'naturalization of state space' (see BRENNER et al., 
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2003) Also, particular spaces - such as capitals, for example - could be privileged 'm 
the nation's interest' 
Nationalism, inasmuch as it helped the spatial interventions of the state to 
appear as objective necessities, contributed to the depoliticization of the (re)ordering 
of spaces Todepoliticize means "to deny, defuse, or displace the possibility of political 
conflict, choice or decision by subjecting public issues to alternative regimes of t r u t h " 
(CLARKE, 2004, ρ 34) Although mostly not mentioning it in such explicit terms, most 
scholars (including regulatiomsts) underline that instances of depoliticization are 
crucial, because they constrain (the perception of) the range of available options to 
actors This study aligns with this view and will show that we cannot have a good 
understanding of state spatial reorganization processes if we ignore how (some) 
decisions in these processes have been depoliticized through references to 'the 
nation' On the other hand, I would like to argue that we should beware of restricting 
our attention to instances of depoliticization Regulatiomsts, by assuming that the 
idea of 'the nation' is something that the state uses (can use) mstrumentally, in order 
to solidify its power (as the regulator of capitalism), tend actually to have such a 
limited focus At the same time, however, regulatiomsts are inclined to overlook the 
fact that the idea of the nation, and also any decisions justif ied by it, are subject to 
ongoing contestation In other words, the way the state orders space, and thus links 
particular spaces to national space, is not only anything but'natural ' (as regulatiomsts 
would agree), but also subject to an ongoing, political struggle The nation has been 
always a contested spatial community as constitutive parts of national space (regions, 
localities, various political and cultural groupings) have continuously competed for 
economic resources and political influence, as well as for cultural recognition within 
the frame of reference of the nation-state (see ZIMMER, 2003) Actors speaking for (1 e 
m the name of) various particular spaces m the above process have, by advancing 
specific claims about how 'their' space makes part of national space, constantly 
challenged state interventions that had made appeal to depoliticized notions of 
'national interest' 
In light of the remark that the linking of particular spaces to national space is 
subject to ongoing political struggle, we should reconsider t w o regulationist 
assumptions First, state spatial interventions m the broad sense can never be just 
purely technical measures that are imposed from above Rather, such interventions 
have to necessarily engage with the ongoing struggle about what particular spaces 
(places, regions, landscapes etc) mean to national space State practices ordering 
space are thus inherently cultural Accordingly, assuming (as regulatiomsts seem to 
do) that the state can easily manipulate the meanings of spaces to achieve certain 
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goals would mean that we are "dangerously reproducing a conventional separation 
of cultural reality from material life" (CORRICAN and SAYER, 1985, p. 2.). Meaning and 
practice are, however, not separable (see GREGSON, SIMONSEN and VAIOLI, 2001); state 
practices, being necessarily constituted by meanings, have always been inherently 
cultural. 
Second, the above remarks support the already made point that we should be 
alert to simplistic understandings of the post-war welfare state as being 'good' and 
of the neoliberal competition state as being 'bad'. BRFNNER (2004), for example, argues 
that in the post-1970 period, spatial policies in Western-Europe started to focus 
"explicitly upon the regulation of particular places and regions rather than treating them 
either as subunits of the national space-economy or as localized relay-stations within 
national administrative hierarchies" (BRENNER, 2004, p. 197). 
Furthermore, although the basic Fordist-Keynesian priorities of social redistribution, 
territorial equalization and class compromise were maintained, this has occurred 
"within the more bounded parameters of regional and local economies rather as a project 
to be extended throughout the entire national territory" (ibid.). 
In other words, Brenner suggests that while the welfare state was more concerned 
with redistribution across the whole national territory, in the post-1970 period this 
concern largely disappeared, and localities and regions were left more to their own 
devices. Eventually, as already noted, Brenner dismisses the spatial policies of the 
neoliberal state as institutionalizing "a regressive politics of unfettered territorial 
inequality and sociospatial polarization" (BRENNER, 2004, p. 304). 
Of course, the spatial organization of the welfare state was crucial in 
strengthening the idea of (national) society as a cohesive spatial community (see e.g. 
BELANO and LECOURS, 2005; MCEWEN, 2002; TAYLOR, 1994). Brenner is right to point out 
that recently, territorial competition has become explicitly propagated by state 
spatial policies. At the same time, however, Brenner, as well as many regulationist 
scholars, seems to assume rather uncritically that the spatial interventions of the 
welfare state rested on a 'just' (and competition-free) conception of how particular 
spaces should be treated. Furthermore, if we accept that the welfare state was 
successful in 'naturalizing'spatial cohesion, then it appears odd to suggest, as Brenner 
does, that this imagined cohesive community can be replaced without much diff iculty 
by 'imagined units of competition' at the urban/regional level (see LOVERINC, 1999). 
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However, as Clarke remarks 
'Conceptions of the public and the social, and their embedding in collective institutions, 
relationships and identities have proved surprisingly resistant to the threats and promises 
of neoliberalism ' (CLARKE 2004 ρ 43) 
Accordingly, we should not assume that this newly propagated form of competition 
unfolds without difficulties, making national territory dissolve into competitive units 
Instead, we should investigate how and with what effects the promotion of this form 
becomes part of the ongoing struggle about links between particular spaces and 
national space 
To sum up the arguments against the use of the terms 'denationalized/post-
national', the present study assumes that for a better understanding of the 
transformation of the nation state under neoliberalism, we need to examine how 
the relations between state, society (nation) and territory have been redefined 
Importantly, the emphasis on the importance of the national dimension is not meant 
here as an alignment with the (normative) view of those scholars who have argued 
that nations not only are, but will and should remain the legitimate bases for political 
mobilization and solidarity (e g MILLER,19956) Rather.this study wishestoacknowledge 
that (national) societies, by virtue of sharing the same politico institutional bounded 
space (see ANTONSICH, 2009), remain meaningful spatial communities that have to 
continue to workout ways of organizing that space In other words, national territory 
"deserves to be further investigated m its role of binding people together beyond the 
nationalist idea(l) of 'one territory, one people' (in cultural/ethnic terms)" (ANTONSICH, 
2009, ρ 79o) Against this background, the point made here is that for a better grasp 
of state spatial restructuring processes, we need to consider how the understanding 
of the nation as a spatial community has been implicated - and problematized - in 
the above processes From this perspective, 'the national' appears as a contested 
dimension, and the term 'post-national' is less helpful as it precludes the 
acknowledgment of contestation 
In connection with the reservations m applying the term 'post-national', I would 
like to argue finally, by drawing on MANSFIELD (2001, 2005), that the concept of rescalmg 
is often unhelpful m grasping current state spatial restructuring processes Above all, 
the term rescalmg suggests a directional transposition of something from one scale 
6 According to Miller [pjolitical communities should as far as possible be organized m such a way that their 
members share a common national identity which binds them together in the face of their many diverse 
private and group identities (MUUR 1995 ρ ι88) 
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to the other. However, as noted above, neoliberalism has entailed not deregulation, 
but re-regulation, and the latter cannot always be characterized straightforwardly by 
distinct, directional moves of transposition. As PECK and TICKELL (2002, p. 386) 
emphasize, 'the emergence' of local/regional spaces should be seen in light of what 
they call the "asymmetrical scale politics of neoliberalism" that vests local actors 
with responsibility without power and supranational regulatory systems with power 
without responsibility. Arguably, the notion of 'rescaling' cannot capture those 
changes in state regulation that imply the move of responsibility, but not the transfer 
of resources and/or discretional power to a particular scale (or those that imply a 
move of responsibility to, and the transfer of resources and/or discretional power 
from a particular scale). In fact, 'rescaling' wrongly contributes to the idea that the 
national is less important today than in the past (MANSFIELD, 2005). AS Mansfield (ibid.) 
suggests, actually it is more useful to speak about the (reconfiguration of the) scalar 
dimensions of practices than about the practices occurring at different scales. 
This allows us to better acknowledge the still important (albeit qualitatively changing) 
national dimension of various practices. Furthermore, it also helps directing our 
attention away from the attempt to define the relations between scales. The 
diff iculty of such a definition is well illustrated by Jessop's remark, according to 
which scale "comprises the nested (and sometimes not so nested) hierarchy of 
bounded spaces of differing size: for example, local, regional, national, continental, 
and global" (JESSOP, 2008, p. 105). Finally, the notion of 'f i l l ing in' (GOODWIN, JONES and 
JONES, 2005; 2006; 2006b) can be criticized along the same lines as that of'rescaling' 
as it also suggests that state restructuring is a one-directional process. Furthermore, 
as a complement to 'hollowing out', the term 'f i l l ing in' affirms that the former is 
taking place. However, 'hollowing out' as a generic term does not capture the widely 
accepted fact that the significance of the national dimension does not simply 
disappear, but becomes reconfigured. 
T>?e use of spatial categories 
Finally, I would like to address briefly the problematic use of spatial categories in 
regulationist scholarship. The first point I would like to make is linked to the tendency 
in regulationist accounts to distinguish between different societal realms, in 
particular between that of the economy and that of politics. The partitioning of the 
social into the above realms is enhanced by suggesting that the spatiality of these 
realms is also fundamentally different. As PAINTER (2008) notes, JONES and MACLEOD 
(2004) and SWYNCEDOUW (2004), for example, work with the same broad assumption 
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that concepts such as relationality and networks are suited to understanding the 
spatiality of the economy, whereas the geographies of politics are more appropriately 
addressed using the vocabulary of territory, scale, and boundedness That such a 
separation is highly problematic becomes evident if we consider that the network like 
operation of multi national firms is at the same time inextricably shaped by 
territorially defined spaces of regulation (see DICKEN and MALMBERC, 2001) Furthermore, 
as some have argued, territories, scales (PAINTER, 2008) and also places (MASSEY, 2005) 
can be understood as the effects and the outcomes of relational networks This 
remains, however, unacknowledged even in the TPSN-framework discussed above 
The TPSN approach speaks namely of the interaction of the territorial dimension and 
the network dimension, exemplified, for example, by networks of cooperation 
between territorial units, or by networks of cooperation stretching across territorial 
borders Thinking of territories, scales and places m terms of the effects of networks 
would mean to privilege one particular dimension, something that the TPSN 
framework wants to avoid in the first instance While the ambition of the designers 
of the TPSN framework of not neglecting any spatial dimension is laudable, the TPSN 
framework ultimately does not give any clue as to how territories, places, scales and 
networks come to exist at all In fact, the TPSN tends to reify territories, places, scales 
and networks as parts of a spatial reality 'out there' 
The second remark relating to the problematic use of spatial categories concerns 
the tendency to reify the meaning of 'the urban' Swyngedouw's comment on the 
city as a laboratory of capital ist globalization is a good illustration of how regulationist 
accounts tend to assume that urban spaces are the key animators of socio-economic 
changes and the condensations of the 'the good and the evil' of capitalism This view, 
however, runs the risk of neglecting that rural spaces are also deeply implicated m 
processes of socio economic transformation Furthermore, and even more 
importantly, it seems to ignore that the urban (and the rural) are not simply sites of 
change, rather, the meaning of the urban and the rural are continuously contested 
and rethought m the above processes (COVERDE, 2000) 
2.3 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter I reviewed those Marxist-informed, political economic writings that 
have analysed the spatial transformation of the state by applying a regulationist, 
strategic relational approach Briefly, the writings in question have suggested that it 
is (city-)regions that are selected strategically through state spatial reforms as mam 
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spatial actors in the "post-national" space economy, comprised principally of global 
trade and capital f lows. Furthermore, regulationist accounts also assume that 
urban-regional institutions tend to be easily colonized by locally based yet globally 
oriented business elites who have a dominant influence on spatial reforms. 
I argued that notwithstanding the sophisticated theoretical arguments and 
conceptual vocabulary, regulationist writings have a limited potential for appreciating 
thecomplexity of spatial restructuring processes. The accounts in question, by taking 
an instrumentalist perspective, tend namely to assume the strategic investment of 
urban-regional spaces, without an in-depth demonstration of how this actually 
occurs (if at all). I suggested that the instrumentalist bias results from the fact that 
regulationists view the state primarily in terms of a set of institutional practices that 
regulate capitalist social relations. In spite of recurring notice of the political character 
of restructuring processes, the regulationist view is doomed, because of its very 
at tachment to the structuring force of capitalist relations, to remain largely opo/zt/co/. 
In other words, the regulationist view is ill-equipped to acknowledge that neoliberalism 
as a hegemonic economic rationality has not simply inflicted a reconfiguration of the 
capitalist state as an institutional order, but that the above reconfiguration has come 
about via new interrogations as to what the state is and should be. Evidently, the 
latter question opens up a range of others, concerning the relation between state, 
society and nation, and how these relations are/should be managed spatially. 
The current study is based on the conviction that in order to arrive at a better 
understanding of state spatial restructuring processes, we need to engage more 
deeply with the political reality of the struggles that evolve around the above 
questions. Considering that such a deeper engagement seems unattainable from 
a critical realist starting point, I suggest above all that we build our inquiry on 
different philosophical foundations - foundations that enable us to acknowledge 
that state spatial restructuring is an inherently contested process, i.e. unfolding 
through a 'politics of space'. As I will argue in the next chapter, post-structuralist 
discourse theory offers such foundations and is thus well-suited to the elaboration 
of a different approach to the formation of new state spaces. 
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Towards a Politics of Space Approach 
to new state spaces 

In this chapter I will elaborate an approach to the analysis of state spatial restructuring 
which I will call the Politics of Space Approach (PSA). The label is inspired by the earlier 
quoted remark of Ward and Jonas, according to which we should conceive of "city-
regionalism as an actual politics of and in space ratherthan as an expression of a new 
era of capitalist development and postnational state territoriality" (WARD and JONAS, 
2004, p. 2122). It is importantto notethat the PSA is not based on a complete rejection 
of the regulationist, strategic-relational approach to state spatial restructuring. 
In particular, the PSA acknowledges that the strategic-relational approach has 
transcended the structure and agency dualism "ina simple yet sophisticated manner" 
(HAY, 2006, p. 78), and builds itself on the idea that socio-spatial change is produced 
through the interaction of strategic actors and the strategically selective context in 
which they find themselves. At the same time, the PSA aims at overcoming the 
shortcomings of regulationist scholarship identified in the previous chapter. Above 
all, as the designation suggests, the PSA aims at engaging with the inherently political 
nature of state spatial restructuring. Accordingly, the PSA regards neoliberalism not 
primarily as a hegemonic economic rationality inflicting a strategically selective 
reshuffling of the state, understood as the inst i tut ionalotherOfca pita I ist production. 
Rather, it inquires into how neoliberalism as a rationality has enforced new decisions 
about the state as a set of institutional relations and the way these order space. 
This does not entail the PSA ignoring the structural aspect of, and the general tendencies 
brought about by, the dominance of 'neoliberal ideas'. One of the key assumptions 
underlying the PSA, however, is that "[t]o achieve dominance neoliberalism has to 
do political work" (CLARKE, 2004, p. 30). It is the 'political work' inherent to neoliberal 
state spatial reforms that the PSA wishes to investigate in more depth. 
In line with the objectives above, I suggest that we embed the idea of strategic 
selectivity not in a framework based on a dialogue of critical realism and the 
regulation approach, but in a framework inspired by what has become commonly 
labelled as (Laclau and Mouffe's) discourse theory (DT). As I will show below, a 
discourse-theoretical perspective is useful in particular in addressing the 
shortcomings of the regulationist literature, especially because it allows us to discard 
a view from which the operation of the state has an essential unifying element 
(i.e. capital accumulation). Furthermore, a discourse-theoretical perspective makes it 
possible to acknowledge that state spatial restructuring is inherently a struggle 
about the meaning of the state. In particular, the perspective in question will also 
support this study's main argument that for a better grasp of state spatial 
restructuring processes, we need to consider how the understanding of the nation as 
a spatial community has been implicated in these processes. 
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DT is often pictured as antithetical to critical realism (and hence to SRA) and has 
been commonly criticized by critical realist/regulatiomst scholars I will briefly review 
the most common criticisms and will argue that most of these criticisms are 
misplaced, because they fail to recognize that although DT and critical realism share 
some concepts (eg 'discourse', 'contingency'), these concepts are used within 
fundamentally different meta-theoretical frameworks For example, critical realists 
have often voiced criticism of the assumption of DT that "there is nothing beyond 
discourse", on the basis of the critical realist understanding of the term 'discourse' 
(ι e the intersubjective production of meaning) However, as discussed below, within 
DT, 'discourse' has a completely different signification At the same time, I will align 
partly with criticisms directed at the lack of capacity of DT to address institutional 
constraints After an assessment of the gams from discourse theory for the analysis 
of state restructuring, I will examine, on the basis of Doreen Massey's work m 
particular, the possibilities and implications of applying discourse theory for the 
analysis of spatial change Finally, by distilling the observations made, I conclude this 
chapter with a sketch of the Politics of Space Approach, which will be a lens for 
examining state spatial restructuring m Hungary and England 
3.1 Discourse theory: genealogy, key assumptions a n d m a i n arguments 
The notion of 'discourse' has already appeared m the previous chapter in connection 
wi th the discussion of critical realism and Jessop and Sum's framework for a cultural 
political economy In fact, 'discourse' has become a central concept in much social 
scientific work in the past decades Broadly, the discursive turn in various disciplines 
of social science can be seen as expressing the recognition that social phenomena 
cannot be addressed properly without examining the way language (use) - or, m 
more general terms, 'the production of meaning' - is implicated in the production of 
those phenomena Against the backdrop of this shared concern wi th language and 
meaning, various discourse-analytic approaches have been developed with diverging 
foci of attention, conceptual vocabulary and, above all, theoretical assumptions 
As to Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory, it is sometimes regarded as a 
particular discourse-analytic approach (see e g JORCENSEN and PHILLIPS, 2002) On the 
other hand, considering that Laclau and Mouffe's approach consists primarily of 
theoretical propositions for the analysis of what they call discourse (or discursive 
formations), the label of discourse theory is more appropriate (TORFINC, 1999) Indeed, 
it is the latter designation that has been commonly used to refer to Laclau and 
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Mouffe's work. As analysts have pointed out, Laclau and Mouffe's theoretical 
propositions cannot be fully appreciated without their political agenda of radical 
democracy; in fact, their theoretical and political ambitions were meant to work in 
tandem (e.g. CHOULIARAKI and FAIRCLOUGH, 1999; TORFINC, 1999; TOWNSEND, 2004; WILLMOTT, 
2005). This political agenda of radical democracy can in turn be best understood in 
light of the post-1968 developments in the 'Western world', in particular the crisis of 
welfare state capitalism. To refer to TORFINC (1999), for intellectuals of the Left, the 
crisis of the welfare state appeared in fact as a triple crisis: as the crisis of the welfare 
state's 'classist', 'statist' and 'productivist' legacy. As to 'classism', i.e. the belief in the 
privileged roleof the working class, it was undermined by the proliferation of various 
social movements (such as feminist or green movements) in the aftermath of the 
1968 events. As to statism, i.e. confidence in central state planning, it was seriously 
challenged as the state, hit by the oil crisis, seemed incapable of restoring the 
conditions of economic growth and social cohesion. Finally, the crisis of the Fordist 
system of mass production, coupled by enhanced concerns with the environment, 
undermined productivism, i.e. the view from which economic growth appeared as a 
goal itself. In line with these developments, the framework of structural Marxism, 
which defined the state in functionalist and Instrumentalist terms, and adhered to a 
classist view of ideology, became increasingly untenable. Or to refer to Laclau and 
Mouffe, there was "an increasing gap between the realities of contemporary 
capitalism and what Marxism could legitimately subsume under its own categories" 
(LACLAU and MOUFFE, 200Φ985], p. viii). Laclau and Mouffe proposed to address this 
perceived gap by developing what has come to be called a "post-Marxist approach". 
It is important to note that in this case post-Marxism does not signify the rejection 
of Marxism (i.e. anti-Marxism), but the rereading of Marxist theory and the reinter-
pretation of Marxist categories. As Laclau and Mouffe note in connection with their 
book entitled Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics 
(LACLAU and MOUFFE, 2001 [1985]): "if our intellectual project in this book isposf-Marxist, 
it is evidently also post-Marxist" (ibid., p. 4, emphasis original). 
It has to be stressed that references below to Laclau and Mouffe 's discourse 
theory are not intended to suggest the unity of the authorship of Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy, or that of (post-structuralist) discourse theory more broadly. 
Scholars 'applying' a discourse-theoretical perspective have engaged wi th and 
elaborated on Laclau and Mouffe's (already different) positions in diverse ways, also 
by combining them variously with the insights of other post-structuralist thinkers. 
While remaining aware of this heterogeneity, I will not deal with the lines of division 
within the broader strand of discourse theory. Considering this research's ambition 
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to offer an alternative to the critical realist informed regulationist approach to state 
spatial restructuring, the alternative approach sketched below wil l build rather on 
the commonly shared ontological assumptions of discourse theorists. Accordingly, I 
will largely align with those who have discussed Laclau and Mouffe's work7 and/or 
post-structrualist discourse theory as a perspective unified along certain basic 
concerns and assumptions (e g JURCENSEN and PHILLIPS, 2002, TORFINC, 1999, 2005) 
Principally, considering its sources of inspiration, discourse theory can be seen as 
a rethinking of Cramscian theory through insights of post-structuralist thought, 
notably the work of Jacques Derrida and Jacques Lacan. As to the Cramscian roots of 
discourse theory, Laclau and Mouffe draw on Gramsci's concept of hegemony that, 
as noted m the previous chapter, denoted the capacity of the ruling class to eliminate 
oppositional forces by incorporating the demands of these forces into a 'collective 
wil l ' based on a shared system of values, attitudes, beliefs and morality Laclau and 
Mouffe acknowledge and carry forward Gramsci's proposition to see collective wil l 
asformed through the articulation of various identities, 1 e a process where identities 
are 'brought together' and mutually modify each other On the other hand, they 
disapprove of Gramsci's class reductiomsm, 1 e his view according to which ultimately, 
it is the position of the "fundamental classes" m the relation of production that 
secures their hegemony. For Laclau and Mouffe, this view implies not only the 
assumption that the economy is determinant in the last instance, but also that the 
economy operates as a homogenous space unified by necessary laws - assumptions 
that they regard untenable (LACLAU and MOUFFE, 200i[i985], p. 69) 
Instead, Laclau and Mouffe argue that the economy is not a self-regulated space 
subject to endogenous laws, that class subjects are not unified and homogenous, 
and that class positions are not the necessary location of historical interests (ibid , 
ρ 85). It is by starting out from these assumptions that Laclau and Mouffe develop 
7 Hegemony and Socialist Strategy has come to be seen as the founding document of Laclau and Mouffe's 
discourse theory (TOWNSFND, 2004), and the secondary literature tends to treat Laclau and Mouffe's 
above mentioned work as one (e g JORCENSEN and PHILLIPS, 2002, MARTIN, 2002, TORFING, 1999, WILLMOIT, 2005) 
As others have stressed, however, treating the work of the t w o authors as a coherent unity is not wholly 
unproblematic (THOMASSEN, 2005, WENMAN, 2003) Following WENMAN (ibid ), the reason for this is not only 
that since the initial publication of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe have published 
only one paper together (namely a response to a critique of their book, LACLAU and Mouirr, 1987), but also 
that there is already a tension discernible between the ethico-political commitments of the two authors 
in their common work Hegemony and Socialist Strategy More specifically, WFNMAN (2003) argues t h a t 
the above-mentioned book's theoretical propositions stem largely from Laclau (evidenced by Laclau's 
earlier paper that contained principally the same theoretical arguments), w h o has been less concerned 
w i t h taking a clear ethico political position Mouffe, in contrast, has been much more explicit about her 
ethico-political commitment She was not only the mam author of the last chapter of the book in question, 
discussing the agenda of radical and plural democracy, but has also subsequently published on the issue 
(see e g MOUFFE, 2005) 
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an understanding of hegemony based on an anti-economistlc view of the economy 
(TORFINC, 1999). Once the ultimate class anchorage of social identities is eliminated, 
Laclau and Mouffe can advance the point that every social identity is fundamentally 
'unfixed'. Here they draw on Derrida, who argued that meaning is not a positive 
feature of any entity, but intrinsically unstable and open to modification (LACLAU and 
MOUFFE, 2001 [1985], p. 112). Social identities become partially fixed through hegemonic 
practices of articulation. For Laclau and Mouffe, what results from such practices is 
called discourse (or discursive formation), i.e. a differential system of - temporarily 
solidified - meanings. In other words, discourse is "an attempt to dominate the field 
of discursivity, to arrest the f low of differences, to construct a centre" (ibid.). 
Arguably, the move from the more concrete critique of the privileged position of 
the economy and that of class relations to the rather abstract conceptualization of 
discourse might appear as rather abrupt. At a closer look we can actually recognize, 
however, that for Laclau and Mouffe, "the questioning of the transcendental status 
of the economy leads directly to the concept of discourse" (TORFINC, 1999, p. 40). 
In other words, starting out from the rejection of the view that the economy is the 
determining centre of social identities and the ultimate source of 'social meanings', 
Laclau and Mouffe make the more general claim that any meaning in the social world 
depends on contingently constructed rules and differences. Inline with that, divorced 
from any essential anchoring, 'hegemony' is no longer conceived as a strictly class 
practice, but as the logic of the construction of meaning in general, i.e. in all contexts 
(MARTIN, 2002). These claims have some important implications. First of all, for Laclau 
and Mouffe, "the notion of the social [is] conceived as discursive space" (ibid. p. x, 
emphasis original). In other words, discourse does not simply refer to one segment of 
social space, but social space is taken to be inherently discursive; there is thus no non-
or extra-discursive realm of the social (LACLAU and MOUFFE, 200l[l985], p. 107). 
Furthermore, the assumptions above also imply a radical critique of the categories of 
objectivity and necessity. As to the former, it is regarded not as rationally attainable, 
but as constituted by discourse; as to the latter, it is considered not as stemming 
from an underlying principle, "but from the regularity of a system of structural 
positions" (ibid., 106). 
Laclau and Mouffe thus radicalize Cramsci's notion of hegemony by untying it 
from its class basis. Within discourse theory, hegemony becomes a form of social 
relation in which the unity of a political force in the broad sense (e.g. class, but also 
the state, any movement, or other) hinges on the construction and maintenance of a 
discursive formation that provides a surface of inscription for a wide range of 
demands, views and attitudes (TORFINC, 1999). A hegemonic discursive formation has 
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thus to be able to fulf i l the function of universal representation, so that particular 
demands can recognize themselves in it and identify wi th it To illustrate this with an 
example that also supports this chapter's mam argument, the modern nation state, 
as a hegemonic form of organizing social relations for the management of populations, 
relies on the discourse of nationalism that provides such a surface of inscription (see 
TORFINC, 1999) On the one hand, the discourse of nationalism constructs the nation as 
a community by establishing a frontier between the Nation and its 'Other' and by 
asserting a difference between the nation and its 'outside' On the other hand, 
nationalist discourse, by suggesting that the subjects of a society share 'natural' 
bonds and are the 'same', attempts to eradicate the differences among the members 
of society or, at least, it tries to limit the extent to which they can be conceived of as 
different In discourse theoretical jargon, the nation is constructed via the 
simultaneous establishment of relations of difference vis-a-vis the nation's outside 
and relations of equivalence between the members of the nation To illustrate this, 
I refer to KUMAR'S (2003) work entitled The Making of English National Identity In this 
book, the author discusses how, in the eighteenth century especially, "[t]he idea of 
the Protestant nation, and the long struggle against France, had been the building 
blocks of Britishness They had minimized other national differences - English, 
Scottish, Welsh - in the face of a common enemy, and m defense of a common 
religious identity" (KUMAR, 2003, ρ 20i) Although Kumar does not rely on discourse 
theory himself, we can easily reinterpret his insights along the concepts introduced 
above Catholicism was at that t ime constructed as the British nation's 'Other', and 
the British nation's members formed a community through their Protestantism 
In connection with the above discussed points, t w o important remarks need to 
be made First, relations of equivalence are not simply established 'in word', but are 
also embodied in various material (state) practices to which all members of the 
nation are universally 'subjected' Laclau and Mouffe "affirm the material character 
of every discursive structure" (LACLAU and MOUFFE, 200i[i985], ρ io8, emphasis 
original) Second, the nation can never become a fully closed and self-identical 
community because there is no essential feature that all members of a nation share 
Even though a particular way of imagining the nation may be durable, the unity of 
the nation remains always precarious because no idea of the nation can ever 
transcend all the particular features and demands of its members for good To return 
to the example above, the definition of Britishness in terms of Protestantism was 
unstable inasmuch as it excluded the Irish - and the English and Scottish - Catholics 
(KUMAR, 2003) Furthermore, as KUMAR (ibid ) notes, new challengers of British power 
from the second half of the nineteenth century, namely Germany and the United 
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States, were also Protestant, and as a result the Protestant/Catholic difference was 
less apt to define the nation's common enemy. Also, the role of religion in general 
declined and could thus constitute less and less the relations of equivalence between 
the members of the nation. 
The above example illustrates that the attempt to make the nation a universal 
category, in the sense of establishing it as an umbrella for all the particularities of 
society, is doomed to remain an ambition that can never be realized. In this respect, 
Laclau and Mouffe speak of the impossibility of society or, in more abstract terms, of 
the impossibility of constituting "full totalities" (UCLAU and MOUFFE, 200i[i985], p. 125). 
In discourse-theoretical terms, 'the nation' is an empty signifier that different political 
forces try to 'fill', but can only ever do so partially and temporarily. The relations of 
difference and equivalence through which the nation (the society) becomes a 
community must be constantly actualized and renegotiated (see GASCHE, 2004). 
This brings us to Laclau and Mouffe's understanding of politics. First of all, it is 
evident that individuals, before they are constituted as members of a national 
community (or subjects of any other discourse), are the same In some aspects, while 
different in others. Following Derrida, Laclau and Mouffe regard the relation between 
equivalence and difference as undecidable. It is always within a particular discourse 
that relations of equivalence and difference are ordered in a particular way; in other 
words, a discourse constitutes a decision "taken in an undecidable terrain" (LACLAU 
and MOUFFE, 2001(1985], p. xi). A discourse of what is commonly called extreme 
nationalism advances (however implicitly) a particular decision as to which relations 
of equivalence are relevant for constituting the nation. Discourses thus fix meaning 
and identity by asserting certain equivalences and by concealing certain differences, 
and also by emphasizing other differences and concealing other equivalences. In fact, 
at an abstract level, discourses can be seen as constituting social reality (meaning) by 
systematically ordering it: by asserting relations of equivalence, discourses simplify 
social reality, by emphasizing relations of difference, they concede to complexity. 
Starting out from the premise that discourse constitutes social space, the 
recognition that discourse is inherently about ordering and decision leads usto Laclau 
and Mouffe's assertion that politics is not a separate realm of the social world. Rather, 
the political (operating through the hegemonic articulations established by 
discourses) constitutes the social. In Laclau and Mouffe's own words: the political has 
"the status of an ontology of the social" (ibid., p. xiv, emphasis added). This does not 
mean that everything is political; rather, it means that "there is no part of our social 
world that in principle is beyond politicisation" (DALY, 2008, p. 60, emphasis original). 
As Laclau and Mouffe point out, from their argument it follows that "social division 
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is inherent m the possibility of politics and [ ] m the very possibility of politics" (ibid , 
ρ χιν) In other words, politics (making decisions) is only possible if we assume that 
meanings are fundamentally unfixed and undecidable Meanings might be, and 
indeed are, fixed durably However, without assuming that meanings are inherently 
unstable, we would exclude the possibility of decision (politics) and, ultimately, 
suppress the room for the dislocation of established discourses, ι e the room for 
social change In connection with Laclau and Mouffe's assumption that the fixing of 
meaning is necessary but impossible (in the sense of f ix ing it forever), t w o last 
remarks need to be made, both pointing to the practical implications of discourse 
theory First, m Ime with the view that we need to conceive of meaning as inherently 
unfixed for politics to be possible, Laclau and Mouffe reject the (normative) idea that 
diverging social demands could be reconciled for good on the basis of rational 
consensus Rather, they assert that without conflict and division, a pluralist democratic 
politics would be impossible (ibid , ρ χνιι) Second, and closely linked to the above, 
discourse theory supports efforts to deconstruct any claims that posit meanings as 
naturally fixed, ι e as decided and given Such claims - ideologies - conceal the 
ultimate undecidabihty of meanings and, as such, constrain the room for decisions, 
ι e politics (see TORFINC, 1999) 
3.2 Putting discouTse theory in its place 
Laclau and Mouffe's Hegemony and Social Strategy and the broader strand of 
discourse theory has gamed many adherents in the past decades, but has also 
attracted serious criticisms In this section, I discuss the most recurring criticisms 
(indicating whether they were directed at Laclau, at Mouffe, at both, or at discourse 
theory more widely), by focusing on critiques formulated by critical realist scholars in 
particular On the one hand, this focus was chosen because critical realists have been 
among the most fervent critics of discourse theory On the other hand, given that the 
earlier discussed regulationist, strategic-relational approach to the state is based on 
a critical realist framework, it is insightful to put the frameworks of critical realism 
(and the regulationist SRA m particular) and discourse theory side by side 
From a critical realist perspective, discourse theory has been most commonly 
criticized for being idealist, for committ ing the epistemic fallacy (1 e for confusing 
what we can know about reality with what reality is like) and for ignoring the 
materiality/the structured character of reality To mention some concrete critical 
remarks and interrogations, Roy Bhaskar, m a debate wi th Ernesto Laclau, voiced his 
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concern that discourse theory tends towards an unacceptable dualism between the 
intelligible and the purely natural. Furthermore, Bhaskar argued that although all 
extra-discursive realities are constituted within discursive practice from the point of 
view of their intelligibility, they are not constituted in discursive practice from the 
point of view of their causal impact (Bhaskar in LACLAU and BHASKAR, 1998). JESSOP (1990), 
in his appraisal of Laclau and Mouffe's Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, disapproves 
of the 'exorbitation of language', i.e. of the way Laclau and Mouffe extend the 
concepts of discourse and discursive practices beyond language to all the ways in 
which social relations are endowed with meaning. According to Jessop, Laclau and 
Mouffe are 'empty realists', because they aff irm that entities of the real world "lack 
determination until discursively constituted in so many beings" (JESSOP, 1990, p. 298). 
Furthermore, Jessop argues that following Laclau and Mouffe's logic, "one could 
discursively turn base metal into gold" (ibid., p. 295). Also, Jessop is critical of the 
statement of discourse theory that society does not exist; according to him, this 
entails that the state does not exist either. Although Jessop and Sum make no explicit 
mention of discourse theory, one suspects that the dismissive remark concerning the 
"voluntarist vacuity of certain lines of discourse analysis, which seem to imply that 
one can will anything into existence in and through an appropriately articulated 
discourse" (JESSOP and SUM, 2001, p. 92) refers (also) to discourse theory. Similarly, even 
though Sayer does not referto discourse theory, the latter would certainly fall within 
the "relativist, idealist and strong social constructivist tendencies of social science" 
(SAYER, 2004, p. 15) that he, as a critical realist, opposes. 
Laclau and Mouffe, as well as other adherents of discourse theory, have repeatedly 
responded to the above criticisms, most of which are evidently based on a 
misunderstanding of the propositions of discourse theory. Laclau asserts that from 
the point of view of DT, one cannot speak of the causal impact of discourse on the 
external world, because the external world is also discursively constituted (Laclau in 
LACLAU and BHASKAR, 1998). It is important to note that this does not entail, from the part 
of discourse theory, the denial of a world that exists independently from our thought; 
DT is thus decidedly realist. Rather, in line with its already mentioned affirmation of the 
material character of discourse, for DT it is the material act of producing an effect that 
is regarded as discourse. Discourse is thus the totality of an act of performance, 
including linguistic and non-linguistic elements (LACLAU and MOUFFE, 1987) (unlike in the 
critical realist framework, where it refers to the linguistic dimension only). As Laclau 
emphasizes, this understanding of discourse does not mean that discourse theory 
establishes an analogy between language and society. Rather, it is intended to suggest 
"that social practices- language included-are structured by logics of equivalence and 
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difference" (LACLAU, 2004, ρ 323) Just as they assert that DT is realist, Laclauand Mouffe 
stress that it is also materialist, as it affirms the irreducible distance between thought 
and reality (LACLAU and MOUFFE, 1987; see also TORFINC, 1999) In fact, from Laclau and 
Mouffe's perspective, it is the critical realist notion of ' the way the world really is '-and 
the idea of a direct (or even indirect) access to it - that is the hallmark of idealism. 
The assumption that there is 'a way the world really is' implies that discourse (thought) 
could eliminate the gap between discourse and object, i.e that there could be a 
complete identity between discourse and object (DALY, 2008; GLYNOS and HOWARTH, 2007). 
As Laclau notes "insofar as discourse analysis sustains the irreducibihty of the real to 
discourse, it tries to break from this point of view of the idealist tradition" (Laclau in 
LACLAU and BHASKAR, 1998, p. 9). 
Critical realist accusations, as well as their rebuttal by discourse theorists, could 
be discussed at great length Instead of doing so, I would like to argue that such a 
confrontation is useless if we fail to fully recognize the meta-theoretical difference 
between the t w o frameworks (see Table 3.1) Although this meta-theoretical 
difference does not mean that adherents of the respective approaches do not agree 
on certain points, nonetheless, they are fundamentally diverging in meta-theoretical 
terms. It is important to note that 'meta-theoretical divergence' here does not simply 
refer to a different ontological and epistemologica! perspective, but to a fundamentally 
different understanding of what ontology and epistemology is, or whether the 
distinction between the t w o is useful at all 
While for critical realists, ontology refers to the independently existing world, for 
discourse theorists, ontology is "the level of constitution of any objectivity" (Laclau in 
LACLAU and BHASKAR, 1998, ρ 13) This latter view of ontology stems from Heidegger, who 
argued that an ontological inquiry concerns the preconditions for the existence of 
particular types of objects. In other words, an ontological inquiry focuses on the 
underlying presuppositions that determine what is to count as a particular type of 
object, how it is to be studied and that it exists at all8 An inquiry focusing on the 
particular types of objects and entities that exist (ontology for critical realists) is, 
according to Heidegger, and thus also in the view of discourse theorists, an inquiry on 
the ontical (or empirical) level (see GLYNOS and HOWARTH, 2007; HOWARTH, 2004) In light of 
8 As Heidegger formulates m his work Being and Time, ontology is a "theoretical inquiry which is explicitly 
devoted to the meaning of entities" (HCIDLCCER, i978[i927], ρ 32) Heidegger thus offers an interpretive 
approach to ontology that follows from his opposition to the idea that the subject is separated f r o m 
the object Instead, Heidegger maintains that we act m a world m which we are immersed and w i t h 
which we are familiar According to Heidegger, we thus have a pre-ontological understanding of the 
being of the objects that we observe and seek to describe, and ontology is an at tempt to put our practical 
understandings into words 'Doing' ontology entails drawing out those structural features in virtue of 
which objects show up for us as objects (see BIATTNÌR, 2006) 
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Table 3.1 Critical realism and discourse theory as meta-theories 
Points of 
convergence 
Ontology 
and 
Epistemology 
Structure and 
agency 
Discourse 
(semiosis)/ 
meaning 
Critical realism ( regulationist SRA) Discourse theory 
Anti empiricism, anti-foundationalism, rejection of 
methodological individualism 
refers to the different kinds of things (Opposes the is everything 
that exist in the world independent of ontology/ which is 
our knowledge epistemology constituted 
distinction) within discourse; 
the level of 
constitution of 
any objectivity 
refers to the fallible knowledge that 
we can have ofthe things that exist in 
the world 
their existence is relational (structure is approached through the 
and agency are mutually constitutive) assumption ofthe incompleteness 
and dialectical (their interaction is not ofthe structure that entails 
reducible to the sum of structural and the incompleteness of agents' 
agential factors) structural identities 
Discourse exists (for CR: also/ for DT: only) at a systemic 
extra-individual level 
Discourse refers to the intersubjective Discourse constitutes the ontology 
production of meaning; meaning is of DT; meaning is a matter of social 
complexity reduction significance 
Source: Author 's compi la t ion based on JESSOP, 1990; LACLAU and BHASKAR, 1998; MARTIN, 2002; MCANNULLA, 
2OO6; TORFING; I999 
their different positions on ontology we can actually understand why the discussion 
between the adherents of the two strands on how to think of structure, agency, 
discourse etc. has often led to a dead end. Critical realism and discourse theory stand 
for incommensurable meta-theories, and there is no neutral 'meta-meta-theoretical 
neutral position' (FURLONG and MARSH, 2007) from which they could be assessed. 
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What is important is to recognize that the attachment to the meta-theoretical 
perspectives above is motivated by fundamentally different inquiries As Wil lmott 
notes, "critical realists understand themselves to approach their subject matter 
primarily as 'scientists'" As scientists, they aim at revealing "the operation of 
generative mechanisms that have been previously overlooked or imperfectly 
identified" and at replacing "false, ideological understandings with more accurate or 
correct knowledge" (although they acknowledge the latter's fallibility) (WILLMOTT, 
2005,ρ 762) LaclauandMouffealsoaspiretocntiqueestablishedformsofknowledge, 
but they do so primarily as 'politicians' who "conceive of their subject matter, 
including themselves, as radically political" For them, the primary concern is "not the 
epistemologica! one of revealing phenomena that have been previously overlooked 
or misrepresented but, rather, the political-ethical one of constructing or advancing 
a social ontology that is compatible with emancipatory change" (ibid , pp 762-763) 
(The issue of whether the above are compatible will be discussed at the end of this 
section) 
In light of the above, we can better place another strand of criticisms, namely 
that discourse theory does not theorize (sufficiently) "the structures and institutions 
that always risk limiting 'politics' in particular social formations" (NASH, 2002, ρ 98, 
see also CHOULIARAKI, 2002) Mouzelis, for example, agrees with Laclau and Mouffe 
that all institutions are discursively constructed On the other hand, he stresses that 
one needs to recognize the fact that, "from the point of view of specific subjects 
situated in a specific historical t ime and social space, there are always institutional 
arrangements which are easily affected by their practices and other institutional 
arrangements which are not" (MOUZELIS, 1988, ρ 113) As he further notes, "the core 
institutions of a social formation often display such a resilience and continuity that 
their overall, extremely slow transformation can be seen only in the very longue 
durée, needing to be assessed m terms of centuries rather than years or shorter 
timespans" ( ibid, ρ 114) Similarly, Chouliaraki and Fairclough find that discourse 
theory "is unable to explain which social forces have greater capacity to effect 
articulatory changes and why" and argue that we need a concept of structure that is 
open but still relatively stable (CHOULIARAKI and FAIRCLOUGH, 1999, ρ 125) JLSSOP'S (1990) 
remarks echo that of other critics He argues that Laclau and Mouffe largely neglect 
issues of formal organization, institutional dynamics and strategic conduct 
Discourse theorists do acknowledge the above-mentioned points Howarth, for 
example, argues that Laclau "tends to overemphasize the ontological dimension at 
the expense of the ontical" (HOWARTH, 2004, ρ 267) At the same time, HOWARTH (ibid ) 
also notes that it should be clear that Laclau is a nota political theorist, but a political 
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ontologist. While the former is concerned with an ontical inquiry into the nature of 
specific types of political institutions, the latter is conducting an ontological inquiry 
that puts into question the very concept of political institution itself. It is thus not 
simply because of "the excessive fear of essentialism" (MOUZELIS, 1988, p. 121) that 
Laclau attaches a fundamental value to ontological contingency (referring to the 
necessary failure of any structure to attain full closure) and that he does not deal 
with the issue of o/if/co/or emp/nco/contingency (capturing the accidental possibility 
of events, see GLYNOS and HOWARTH,2007) raised by some critics. Rather, this attachment 
stems from the very aspiration to be (first and foremost) a political ontologist. Laclau, 
in response to Howarth's remark on the overemphasis on the ontological dimension, 
notes the fol lowing: "this is a charge to which i plead happily guilty, except that I do 
not see it as a criticism at all. I have located my theoretical intervention at the 
theoretical and philosophical level and it is at that level that it has to be judged" 
(LACLAU, 2004, p. 321). At the same time, LACLAU (ibid.) also stresses that the ontological 
inquiry of discourse theory would be without any use if it could not transmit its 
effects to ontical analyses. This means in particular that the ontical level is being 
redescribed in terms of the distinctions brought about by a discursive ontology. Or as 
Laclau and Mouffe argue in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: "[t]his moment of 
tension, of openness, which gives the social its essentially incomplete and precarious 
character, is what every project for radical democracy should set out to institutional-
ize" (LACLAU and MOUFFE 200l[l985], p. 190). 
This call on what "every project of radical democracy should institutionalize" 
leads me finally to two important remarks concerning the (realization of the) 
normative implications of discourse theory. To begin wi th the issue of practical 
realization - and this is also critically noted by JESSOP (1990) - , there have been as yet 
no clear answers to the question of how to actually institutionalize openness. 
As Howarth noted, the "[fjurther elaboration of this particular project for radical 
democracy, in conjunction with its justif ication vis-à-vis other radical critiques of 
radical democracy [...] is still required" (HOWARTH, 2004, p. 271). Laclau, due to his 
previously mentioned focus on the theoretical propositions of discourse theory, has 
not dealt w i th this issue. In contrast, Mouffe has been more concerned wi th 
elaborating on her theory of radical and plural democracy. Mouffe understands 
pluralism "as the principle that individuals should have the possibility to organize 
their lives as they wish, to choose their own ends, and to realize them as they think 
best" (Mouffe, cited by TORFINC, 1999, p. 252). According to Mouffe, the crucial issue 
for democratic politics is not the eradication of conflict via consensus, but the 
legitimation of conflict. The latter implies that the potential hostility and antagonism 
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of political forces is turned into agonism, where opponents are seen not as enemies 
to be destroyed, but as legitimate adversaries whose ideas should be fought (MOUFFE, 
2005) Following Mouffe, m an agonistic democracy, "[cjonsensus is needed both 
about the institutions which constitute democracy and about the ethico-pohtical 
va lues that should inform the political association There will always be disagreements, 
however, about the meaning of these values and how they should be implemented" 
(MOUFFE, 2005b, ρ io) In other words, "the very nature of those institutions 
[of democracy] is also part of the agonistic debate, but, for such a debate to take 
place, the existence of a shared symbolic space is necessary" (MOUFFF, 2005, ρ I2i) 
How the existence of such a shared symbolic space can be assured, and how consensus 
about the institutions of democracy can be reached is, however, not further discussed 
by Mouffe 
The second point I wish to discuss m more detail is the normative loading of 
Laclau and Mouffe's statement above, in which it is implicit that for Laclau and 
Mouffe, it is radical democracy (and not some other societal order) that should be 
institutionalized But is such a commitment to radical democracy compatible with 
discourse theory as a political ontology? According to Bertram, "[t]he problem here is 
that the activist has no choice other than to essentialize, that is, he or she must 
accept the metaphysical possibility of a better social order and the will-to-power that 
is implicit m any ideological fantasy [ ] Laclau is being ideological at the same time 
that he is undermining the basis of ideology" (BERTRAM, 1995, ρ ιοο 9 ) In other words, 
Laclau and Mouffe suggest that a particular organization of society (1 e a society 
based on radical democracy) is essentially desirable This claim, however, cannot be 
grounded in their ontology, because following that ontology, nothing is inherently 
'good' or 'desirable', rather, any claim of 'goodness' is but a claim that posits certain 
meanings as fixed Or as MARCHART puts it " [ i ] f we take seriously the notion of 
politico ontological difference, then we should recognize that we will never be able 
to secure an ontological ground that would found or determine a particular ontic 
politics [for example an agenda for radical democracy] [ ] - such a move would be 
clearly self contradictory" (MARCHART, 2007, ρ 157) Many scholars have expressed 
their discontent with the implications of discourse theory's ontology Noms, for 
example, wonders whether "politics [is] really a sphere that should be or even could 
be free of the distinction between good and bad reasons" (MORRIS, 2002, ρ 568) 
While discourse theory's critics raise valid points, I argue that subcribmg to 
discourse theory's ontology does not necessarily entail that we are ideological while 
9 Bertrams above mentioned remarks follow a quotation from Laclau s New Reflections on the Revolutions 
of Our Time 
74 
undermining the basis of (another) ideology. As Torfing notes, normative critique, as 
understood from a discourse- theoretical perspective, does "not consist of measuring 
a current state of affairs against some pre-established yardstick, defining once and 
for all what is right and good" (TORFING, 2005, p. 20). Rather, it takes "the form of an 
attempt to deconstruct the closure invoked by ethical, normative, political, cultural, 
economic and other discourses" (ibid.). Certainly, what we choose to deconstruct 
(and the fact that we choose to deconstruct something at all) is already indicative of 
a certain understanding of 'bad' and 'good'. However, this understanding does not 
have to be necessarily rooted in an ideological belief that something is 'bad' or 'good'; 
instead, it can be informed by concerns that arise out of a particular context 
(cf. GLYNOS and HOWARTH, 2007, p. 193). More specifically, this study does not engage in 
deconstructing 'neoliberal' spatial policies on the basis of the assumption that these 
policies are fundamentally 'bad' or 'unjust'. Rather than presupposing any particular 
view of what is 'bad' or 'unjust', the current study started out from the observation 
that (the im pacts of)'neoliberal'spatial policies have become regarded as problematic 
by actors 'in the field'. The objective of this study is not to give a clear-cut answer to 
the question of 'what needstobedone' in orderto improve spatial policy interventions. 
Instead, I wil l zoom in on the closures that delimit policy debates and will show how 
the framing of spatial policy claims in terms of particular understandings of 'the 
nation' closes us off from thinking about and doing things differently. 
3.3 The gains f rom a discourse-theoretical perspective for the analysis of 
state restructuring 
To date, discourse theory has been applied dominantly to what are commonly seen as 
the 'soft topics'of social science such as gender, ethnicity and social movements, and 
it has been rather absent from traditional core areas such as political economy 
(TORFING, 1999; 2005). One of the rare exceptions is TORFING'S (1999) study of how the 
welfare state as a discursive formation has been held together by the social imagery 
of a fully integrated society based upon freedom, equality and solidarity. The current 
research wishes to further demonstrate that a discourse-theoretical perspective -
even though it does not acknowledge such labels - is well-suited to address and to 
rethink 'hard' issue areas such as state restructuring. 
By speaking of 'a' (and not 'the') discourse-theoretical perspective, I wish to 
emphasize the point already made that there is no one such perspective. In fact, the 
discourse-theoretical perspective I develop here is a particular interpretation of 
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discourse theorists' commonly shared philosophical assumptions for the analysis of 
state spatial restructuring The appeal of discourse theory for the present study 
resides first of all in its relational ontology, on the basis of which we can examine the 
construction and transformation of social orders-such as the spatial organization of 
the state - on a non-essentialist basis 
Below I will discuss in more detail - w i t h the previously made criticisms about 
regulationist political economic accounts m mind - the usefulness of a discourse-
theoretical perspective for the present study In particular, I would like to argue that 
a discourse theoretical perspective is useful i) for engaging wi th the way in which 
state restructuring implies the contestation of meanings, and 2) for remaining aware 
of the 'political origin' of structural constraints that seem to be uncontested 
Concerning the first point, it is useful to refer to JESSOP'S (1990) disapproval of 
Laclau and Mouffe's statement that society does not exist as, for Jessop, Laclau and 
Mouffe suggest in this way that the state does not exist either, or at best as a 
tendential realization of state projects From the point of view of this study, it is 
exactly its emphasis on the fundamental instability of social structures that makes 
discourse theory a source of inspiration As Painter aptly notes, "[t]he conventional 
story of the state - t h a t it is unified, coherent, and territorially sovereign - is a story 
told by the state itself, and thus not to be taken on trust Instead, the state should be 
understood as a political project in a continual process of formation, deformation, 
and reformation" (PAINTER, 2000, ρ 361) As argued in the previous chapter, 
regulatiomsts, by positing that the state is f irst and foremost the institutional 
regulator of capitalist relations, cut themselves off from a more m-depth analysis of 
the political struggles about what the state is and should be A discourse-theoretical 
perspective allows us in turn to acknowledge that the state is a project and that the 
transformation of the state implies a re-articulation of the mutual relations between 
'state', 'society' and 'nation' Following discourse theory, what the state is, 1 e what it 
means, is fixed through the way the meaning of the state relates to that of society 
and that of the nation Accordingly, by drawing on discourse theory, we can consider 
state spatial restructuring as a process of contestation, not only of the state, but also 
of the nation as a spatial community 
As to the second point, ascribing to a discourse-theoretical perspective does not 
entail that one ignores that "the world around us appears for the most part to be 
rather decided and unambiguous" (TORFINC, 1999, ρ 64 65) In other words, the 
perspective in question does not neglect that the meanings of 'state', 'society' and 
'nation' are largely given through a wide range of institutional practices that are not 
actually contested or cannot easily be contested at a particular moment Here the 
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strategic-relational approach offers the important insight that it depends on the 
interaction of strategic actors and the strategically selective context what meanings 
become contested and how. The current study does build on the idea of strategic 
selectivity, but proposes to embed it not in a framework based on a dialogue of 
critical realism and the regulation approach, but in a framework inspired by discourse 
theory. An important gain from discourse theory is that it helps us to "remember that 
the political Origin' of the relatively enduring social institutions is repressed [...] and 
not eliminated" (TORFINO, 1999, p. 70). 
3.4 Space(s) f r o m a discouTse-theoretical perspective 
Before I move to the introduction of the Politics of Space Approach, it is necessary to 
consider what a discourse-theoretical perspective means or can mean for the 
conceptualization of space. In this regard, Doreen Massey's work is particularly 
noteworthy. Her relational conceptualization of space and agenda of a 'new politics 
of place' have been partly inspired by Laclau and Mouffe's thoughts. In this section, 
I will concisely discuss Massey's propositions, including those formulated with some 
fellow British geographers. I will argue, by relying on others' assessments (HOWARTH, 
1993; MARCHART, 2004), that in spite of some apparent parallels, and even explicit 
references, Massey's ideas do not f i t with the assumptions of discourse theory. 
In order to prepare the ground for the DT inspired Politics of Space Approach, I will, in 
the course of developing this argument, demonstrate how a discourse-theoretically 
inspired conceptualization of space would look like. 
As to Massey's work, it was, in line with the dialectical conceptualization of the 
state-society relation that gained ground during the 1970s and 1980s in Marxist 
scholarship,framedthroughtherecognitionthat not only is space socially constructed, 
but that "the social is spatially constructed too, and that it makes a difference" 
(MASSEY, 1992, p. 70). Massey's conceptualization rests on three propositions in 
particular (MASSEY, 1999; 2005), where the second and the third are in fact implications 
of the first. According to the first proposition, space is the product of interrelations; 
in otherwords, space is constituted through interactions. Massey links this proposition 
explicitly to Mouffe's insights on the relational production of social identities and 
argues that space is necessarily integral to and product of the process in which 
identities and interrelations are constituted (MASSEY, 1999). As Massey formulates: 
"[m]oregenerally I would arguethat identities/entities, the relations 'between'them, 
and the spatiality which is part of them, are all co-constitutive" (MASSEY, 2005, p. 10). 
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According to the second proposition, space should be understood as a sphere of 
possibility of the existence of multiplicity, m the sense of contemporaneous plurality, 
as the sphere of coexisting heterogeneity The assertion of plurality is important for 
Massey m order to be able to escape from "[t]he frameworks of 'Progress', of 
'Development', and of 'Modernisation', and the succession of modes of production 
elaborated within Marxism", frameworks that have proposed "scenarios in which the 
general directions of history, including the future, are known" (Massey, 1999, ρ 3, 
Massey, 2005) In other words, the assertion above is important for Massey in order 
to do away wi th the Western/Northern-biased perspective in defining what 
development/progress/modermzation is That perspective implies namely that 
places are not genuinely different but simply 'behind' or 'advanced' within the same 
story, their 'difference' consists only of their place m the queue MASSEY (1999b) argues 
that if we think m terms of places-m-a-sequence, then instead of acknowledging that 
the global South is really different, we imply-wrongly - t h a t it is only a slow version 
of the North Massey calls for'a fuller recognition' of geographical difference because 
that 
"would grant the other the different at least a degree of autonomy in that sense (where relative 
autonomy does not mean a lack of interconnection - some stories are more overarching than 
others, for example - but rather the absence of a teleology of the single story) In other words, 
a fuller recognition of difference would entertain the possibility of the existence of a multiplicity 
of trajectories' (MASSEY, 1999b ρ 271) 
The third proposition of Massey concerns the 'processual' nature of space As Massey 
notes, "precisely because space is the product of relation-between, relations which 
are necessarily embedded material practices which have to be carried out, it is always 
m a process of becoming, it is always being made" (MASSEY, 1999, ρ 2, emphasis 
original, see also MASSEY, 2005) Concerning the third point above, Massey connects 
her view on the continuous becoming of space wi th, among other things, a view that 
she accords to Laclau, namely that we can engage m any serious notion of politics 
only if we conceive the future as open As Massey notes, the relations she speaks of 
are not the relations of a coherent, closed system within which everything is related 
to everything else For Massey, space is "neither a container for always-already 
constituted identities nor a completed closure of holism [ ] For the future to be 
open, space must be open too" (MASSEY, 2005, ρ i i - i 2 , emphasis original) 
Underlying Massey's conceptualization of space m relational terms is the 
conviction that "thinking the spatial m a particular way can shake up the manner m 
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which certain political questions are formulated" (ibid., p. 9). In fact, Massey's whole 
research trajectory can be seen as an ongoing engagement, on the basis of her 
relational view of space, with the question of responsibility for geographical 
inequalities, especially in times of global interconnectedness and interdependence. 
In one of her early writings, Massey argued that the lagging behind of certain regions 
in the UK cannot be explained in terms of characteristics internal to those areas: 
"inequalities do not result from a simple absolute deficiency" (MASSEY, 1979, p. 57). 
Rather, as Massey argued, these inequalities were precipitated by changes in the 
relation of the UKeconomyasa whole, and of particular industries, to the international 
division of labour. In other words, they were produced through relationships that are/ 
reach beyond and outside the region. Accordingly, Massey asserted that 'the regional 
problem' should not be seen as a problem of a particular territorial entity, but should 
be seen as produced by the above-mentioned relationships (ibid.). She developed a 
non-territorial approach to place that she termed the 'progressive sense of place'. For 
Massey, "each place is the focus of a distinct mixture of wider and more local social 
relations" (MASSEY, 1991, p. 240, emphasis original), and the uniqueness of places do 
not derive from some internal specificity, but from the specific articulation of social 
relations through which they are constructed (ibid; MASSEY, 1993). 
One issue in connection with which Massey - often in collaboration with other 
prominent British geographers - has asserted the relevance of the above, relational 
understanding of place and region has been that of the reproduction of regional 
inequalities in the UK, i.e. the persisting dominance of the London/the South East 
vis-à-vis 'the Rest' of the UK. As Massey stressed with co-authors John Allen and 
Allan Cochrane in their seminal hook Rethinking the Region (ALLEN, MASSEY and COCHRANE, 
1998), the South East's reinforced economic strength under Thatcherism was not 
simply the outcome of market processes or of deregulation. Rather, it was 
fundamentally influenced by state intervention and emergent forms of regulation. It 
is by demonstrating that the social relations relevant to the South East's growth do 
not fall neatly within the territorial boundaries of a given South East region that 
Massey and her colleagues argued that we need to rethink the way we conceptualize 
regions more generally. More specifically, they called for thinking of regions in terms 
of social relations, i.e. as "a complex and unbounded lattice of articulations wi th 
internal relations of power and inequality and punctured by structured exclusions" 
(ibid., p. 65). 
The continuing dominance of London and the South East under the post-1997 
New Labour government (see e.g. MARTIN, 2009) and, in particular, the evidence that 
state intervention supports this dominance, fed further critical writings on the 
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treatment of regional inequalities MASSCY (2001) went on to stress that the 
characteristics of regions are relationally constituted, and thus what Government 
sees as the success of the South East on the one hand and as the poorer performance 
of 'the regions' (1 e the rest of the country) on the other cannot be explained by the 
characteristics of those very regions and, even less, addressed without attending to 
the relations between these regions The persisting London-centrism of New Labour 
was targeted with further criticism by AMIN, MASSEY and THRIFT'S (2003) pamphlet 
entitled Decentnng the Nation a Radical Approach to Regional Inequality, in which 
the authors reasserted the points already made by ALLEN, MASSEY and COCHRANE (1998) 
In particular, they stressed that the reproduction of uneven development is greatly 
rooted in the geography of power and that regional policy can only dimmish spatial 
inequalities effectively if it is addressing the relations through which these 
inequalities are produced It is on this basis that Massey and her colleagues oppose 
that regional (and urban) policies should be dommantly territorially framed The new 
politics of place that they advocate builds on the acknowledgment that the public 
sphere is not territorially given (AMIN, 2004) and that geographical responsibility 
should be thought of not as a nested set of Russian dolls, but as directed towards the 
relations on which one depends (MASSEY, 2004) Following this argument, the 
dependence of London's health service on nurses from developing countries who 
were trained in their home countries has serious implications for the assertion that 
one is a Londoner According to MASSEY (2007), the latter assertion implies (has to 
imply) the assumption of responsibility for the consequences of the above m-flow of 
workforce, such as the shortage of health care personnel m the nurses' country of 
origin It is important to note that the proposed new politics of place does not, as 
several critics (eg JONES, 2009, JONES and MACLEOD, 2004, MACLEOD and JONES, 2007, 
PAASI, 2009) seem to have (mis) interpreted it, deny that territoriality is and will remain 
relevant as a spatial organizing principle Rather, the new politics of place is a 
"territorially grounded politics that is responsive to relational space" (MASSEY, 2007, 
ρ 156) and is aware of the non-natural character of territorial delimitations 
At first sight, Massey's conceptualization of space in relational terms might seem 
to be a successful appropriation of Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory for 
geographical inquiry Massey's rejection of an understanding of space as a container 
for always-already constituted identities and as completed closure seem to parallel 
Laclau and Mouffe's point about the impossibility to fully constitute any structure 
Also, MASSEY'S (2007) account - even though it contains no references to discourse 
theory - of how the signification of London and the South East is constructed through 
positing the North or 'the Rest' as an opposite recalls Laclau and Mouffe's 
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argumentation. Similarly, Massey's (and others') agenda of a new politics of place 
appears as a spatially sensitive elaboration on (Laclau and) Mouffe's polit ical 
agenda. 
Below I will argue that in spite of MASSEY'S (1999; 2005) explicit references to the 
assumptions and propositions of Laclau and Mouffe, a closer look reveals that we 
should not see Massey's framework as a 'spatialization' of discourse theory. As to the 
agenda for a new politics of place, I will argue that it indeed can be seen as a 
spatialization of the agenda of radical democracy, but that also means importing 
some weaknesses of the latter. 
In fact, that Massey's framework diverges from discourse theory, in spite of the 
explicit references and the similarities perceived at f irst reading, is asserted by 
Massey herself. In her piece Politics and Space/Time, MASSEY (1992) notes that even 
though her "own inquiries were initially stimulated by Laclau's book" (ibid., p. 67), she 
deeply disagrees wi th some of Laclau's statements made in New Reflections on the 
Revolutions of Our Time (LACLAU, 1990). Specifically, Massey sees the following quote: 
"Politics and space are antinomic terms. Politics only exist insofar as the spatial eludes 
us" as fundamentally undermining her own efforts to conceptualize space in a 
politically progressive way (MASSEY, 1992, p. 66). On the whole, Massey sees Laclau as 
advancing - wrongly - an understanding of space as stasis, as a realm without 
temporality, and thus of passivity. As others (e.g. HOWARTH, 1993; MARCHART, 2004; 
STAVRAKAKIS, 2007) have noted, however, Massey seems to have misunderstood Laclau's 
propositions, in particular that for Laclau as a political ontologist, the notions of 
'space' and ' t ime' have a fundamentally different, namely ontological, signification. 
For Laclau, space stands for social space, i.e. society, spatialization refers to attempts 
to establish a hegemonic fixing of meanings, i.e. to politics, and 't ime' stands for 
dislocation. Thus, to Laclau, the difference between space and time is not a difference 
between passivity and objectivity. Considering Laclau's understanding of the terms 
above, we can recognize that the statement about the antinomy between politics 
and space is in fact a way to restate the earlier mentioned discourse-theoretical 
assumption that politics can never attain its objective to fix society (space) as a fully 
closed system of meanings (see MARCHART, 2004). Laclau's claim that space (as a fully 
closed system of meanings) is impossible is an ontological one and, as such, does not 
question Massey's analysis of (concrete) spaces produced by interrelations. The latter 
analysis rests, as HOWARIH (1993) notes, at the ontlcal (empirical) level. 
GLASZE (2009) is right to point out that labelling, following Laclau, o/iy attempt to 
fix social reality as 'space' is likely to create confusion in geographical thinking and is 
thus not useful. However, remodelling geographical thinking in terms of discourse 
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theory's division between the ontological and ontical dimensions remains crucial for 
the acknowledgement of the political character of the construction of spaces 
Actually, I would like to nuance HOWARTH'S (1993) and MARCHART'S (2004) assessment 
and argue, first, that Massey is not completely unaware of the above ontological/ 
ontical division (even though she does not use these terms) and second, that one 
cannot straightforwardly say that Massey's work is wholly on the ontical level As to 
the first point, MASSEY (2005) seems to link the ontical understanding of closure/ 
openness on the one hand and its ontological view on the other The former refers to 
empirical openness/closure, such as the free movement of workforce, or the bordering 
of labour markets Ontological openness/closure refers m turn to the extent to which 
the claims of meanings through which the instances of empirical openness and 
closure were established are open to questioning (openness), or not (closure) 
Concerning the second point mentioned above, Massey does make statements 
that suggest an ontological inquiry On the other hand, one can argue that these 
statements never amount to a definite move to the ontological level In addition and 
simultaneously, interrogations that are evidently on the ontical level indicate that 
Massey's inquiry is principally ontical Statements suggesting a move to an ontological 
inquiry are those for example that refer to the co-constitutive relations 'between' 
identities/entities (MASSEY, 1999, 2005), or more specifically, to the "mutually 
constitutive inter-relation" of the South East and the Rest (MASSEY, 2001, ρ η) Also, 
the remark that "[t]he imagination of 'the nation' is constructed through London" 
(MASSEY, 2007, ρ I2i) can be seen as indicative of an ontologically oriented inquiry into 
the presuppositions that determine how the British nation as an imagined community 
can exist (namely by having an unquestioned point of reference for its members, 
London) On the other hand, Massey's focus seems to be dommantly on relations 
understood as empirically observable links between objects and individuals MASSEY'S 
(2005) point concerning the impossible completeness of space refers to the -
empirically founded - recognition that within no territorially delimited entity is 
everything and everyone connected to each other As MASSEY (2005, ρ 12) notes, 
"[t] his is a space of loose ends and missing links", underlining that objects and individuals 
withm/'of' any entity necessarily have links with objects and individuals beyond that 
entity For Massey then, a place or a region is impossible as a closed territorial space, 
because we can never define (delimit) a place or a region m a way where actual links of 
those in the place/region connect only to others m the same place/region That it is 
impossible to delimit a region as a closed territorial space is also the message of ALLEN, 
MASSEY and COCHRANE (1998) as they call for rethinking the South East as a "series of open, 
discontinuous spaces constituted by social relationships which stress across [it] m a 
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variety of ways" (ALLEN et al., 1998, p. 5). Also, Massey's reference to the long history of 
regional antagonism in the United Kingdom (MASSEY, 2007, p. 117) pertains to the ontical 
level, as it concerns the empirically observable hostilities between actors who 'speak 
for' the South East and those who 'speak for' the North. 
Finally, a last and important evidence of Massey's focus on the empirical level is 
her assertion that particular spaces (such as the global South and North) are really 
different (MASSEY, 1999b). ForMassey,'difference'(just as'heterogeneity','multiplicity', 
'plurality', which she uses as synonyms) refers to the "contemporaneous existence of 
a plurality of trajectories; a simultaneity of stories-so-far" (MASSEY, 2005, p. 12). 
So what would an ontological inquiry into spaces look like from a discourse-
theoretical perspective? Why is it important at all to be aware of the ontical-
ontological division? And why is Massey's way of arguing that spatial entities 
(territories) are never unproblematic not 'sufficient'? Let us consider these questions 
in turn. As to the first question, an ontological inquiry would be concerned not with 
actual kinds of objects, such as actually observable spaces, but with the way these 
spaces became possible in the first instance. The focus would thus be on their 
conditions of possibility, considered in terms of relations of equivalence and 
difference. For example, thinking about urban spaces becomes possible by the 
establishment of a frontier between urban and non-urban (relation of difference), 
and the assertion of the sameness of elements on each side of the frontier (relations 
of equivalence). Or, a region becomes meaningful (i.e. possible) through the -
relational - differentiation of the 'inside' of the region from its Outside', and through 
the simultaneous overlooking of the internal heterogeneity of both the region and of 
the region's outside. Following the relational ontology of discourse theory, spaces 
(e.g. places, regions) as fully closed totalities are impossible not because they can 
never fully contain actual relations (as assumed by an ontical inquiry). Rather, they 
are impossible because the relational logics (relations of equivalence and difference) 
through which they become meaningful can never become fixed for forever. In other 
words, from a discourse-theoretical perspective, ontical spaces are never fully 
constituted social spaces. Assuming that regions are 'impossible' as complete social 
spaces does not imply that one denies the existence of a piece of land referred to as 
the 'South East', for example. However, from a discourse-theoretical perspective, 
what matters is only how physical space acquires meaning within concrete social 
practices (see HOWARTH, 2008). 
As to the second question, while it probably seems more evident and useful to 
deal wi th ontical spaces, i.e. with existing kinds of spaces, it might be less obvious 
why we need to do so on the basis of a relational ontology. At this point, ZIERHOFER'S 
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(2005) remark is insightful Although Zierhofer does not mention discourse theory, 
his statement that "all object-spaces are necessarily constituted on the basis of some 
preceding differentiations, codes, or semantics" (ZIERHOFER, 2005, ρ 32) fits and m fact 
expresses a discourse-theoretical perspective on space(s) Zierhofer notes that 
insofar as our analysis (of ontical spaces) 
'discloses the arbitrary presuppositions and assumptions of taken-for granted or naturalized 
significations it demonstrates the contingency of social order and renders it available to 
political debate - it is thus a form of deconstruction" (ibid , ρ 33) 
In other words, remaining aware of and deconstructing the 'political origin' of the 
various kinds of spaces that exist is necessary to be able to conceive of social (spatial) 
change 
Recognizing the ontical/ontological division furthermore allows us to address 
the limitations of the TPSN framework (JESSOP, BRENNER and JONES, 2008) discussed m 
the previous chapter, m particular its lack of concern wi th the way territories, places, 
scales and networks - and other spaces - come to exist, as well as its questionable 
selection of the four spatial categories above as the most relevant categories From a 
discourse-theoretical point of view, the TPSN framework restricts itself to ontical 
categories At the same time, the TPSN framework does not recognize that the above-
mentioned kinds of spaces - and those that the framework left out - are all 
ontologically relational, ie that they have come into being through the relational 
fixing of meaning From this (ontological) point of view, territorial, scalar and 
networked spatial formations are the same (cf PAINTER, 2008) By building our analysis 
on the ontical/ontological division, we can also reconsider the distinction between 
'state m the narrow sense' and 'state space m the integral sense' As discussed m the 
previous chapter, Brenner introduced these terms to refer to the changing geographies 
of state territorial organization on the one hand (former), and to territory-, place-, 
and scale-specific spatial interventions on the other (latter) Thinking m terms of the 
ontical/ontological division, both concepts introduced by Brenner referto the ontical 
level At the same time, Brenner does not deal with the question of how these ontical 
spaces are what they are Finally and crucially, via the ontical/ontological division I 
can clarify how the t w o case studies of this research, Hungary and England, are 
different or similar On the ontical level, Hungary and England are - and this seems 
evident - different Attributes such as 'Western capitalist' or 'post socialist' all 
pertain to the ontical level However, from the point of view of discourse theory's 
relational ontology, the state spaces of Hungary and England are 'the same' in that 
84 
that they are relationally constituted through logics of difference and equivalence. 
As to the third question above, I argue that what is problematic is that Massey is 
not consistent in questioning all spaces-, while she does question the common 
differentiation between the North and the South East of the UK, she suggests that 
the global South and North are really different. But on what basis should we 
appreciate the "positive multiplicity" (MASSEY, 2005, p. 51) of spaces in the case of the 
global South and North, and, at the same time, resist an a priori appreciation of the 
South East as an autonomous space wi th a trajectory of development of its own? 
Why can there not be multiple regional trajectories within nation-state territories? 
Why should we acknowledge macro-regional differences above the national scale 
and assume the possibility (desirability) of a single or, in any case, more coherent 
trajectory for the development of national territories, overwriting local/regional 
differences? 
To be sure, I do not want to suggest that Massey is not concerned with inequalities 
on a global scale; her engagement wi th the issue of geographical responsibility 
mentioned above is a clear indication of such a concern. However, the point I would 
like to highlight is that in Massey's writings, there seems to be a(n implicit) rejection 
of the idea that the South East (or the North, for that matter) could have their own 
trajectory. Although in her book entitled World City, Massey does argue at some point 
that we should rethink the geography of the UK as "a geography of trajectories with 
interests variously concordant and contending: a field of multiple and potentially 
conflicting interests" (MASSEY, 2007, p. 117), subsequently she speaks in favour of a 
politics of space "that recognized a commonality of interests in spite of the very 
different geographical positioning within the wider geographies" (ibid., p. 155). 
On the whole, Massey thus tends to reject the idea that different parts of the country 
could have their own tracejtory. This rejection is based on the assumption that the 
South East and the North co-constitute each other as regions within a national 
space-economy. This in turn is unified because "the biggest interests of ordinary 
people, in both London and 'the regions', are in common" (MASSEY, 2007, p. 155). 
As Massey elsewhere notes, "[a] more egalitarian and liveable London might be easier 
to achieve [...] within a regionally more egalitarian country" (MASSEY, 2007, p. 155). 
But can we assume the commonality of interests within a nation? What about 
those - by MASSEY (2007) much-criticized - claims of policy-makers that assert the 
necessity of privileged state support for London and the South East by arguing that 
this serves the nation's common interest? And howshould we understand 'egalitarian' 
and 'liveable'? It is useful here to refer to Crltchley, according to whom 
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the main strategy of politics is to make itself invisible in order to claim for itself the status 
of nature or a priori self-evidence In this way politics can claim to restore the fullness of 
society or bring society into harmony with itself (CRIFCHLEV 2004 ρ 114) 
In other words, the political character of claims is often concealed by the appeal that 
such claims attempt to make to some natural, harmonic state of affairs Paradoxically, 
while Massey recognizes that claims supporting London's privileged treatment and 
those picturing regional inequality as 'natural' are political claims, she seems to be 
unaware of the fact that her assumptions of a national common interest and of 
'egalitanamsm' as being 'good' are not apolitical ones either 
From a discourse theoretical perspective, however, the commonality of interests 
between members of the nation, or the 'goodness' of egalitanamsm and liveabihty 
cannot be simply assumed The denial that a commonality of interests is given results 
from the discourse theoretical assumptions concerning the impossibility of a fully 
constituted community As to the 'goodness' of egalitanamsm and liveabihty, it is 
useful to refer to Laclau's following remark 
Justice has no ultimate content [ ] it can play its role in argument precisely by not being 
linked to any such content 
Similarly, egalitanamsm is also an empty term and it cannot be posited as an objective 
rather, it becomes invested wi th meaning as it becomes articulated wi th other 
concepts to form a particular position, such as that of Massey In fact, Massey's 
implicit assumption that democracy is an ultimate 'good' (place "is an ongoing 
product of an agonistic democracy", MASSEY, 2007, ρ 2o8) is also questionable on the 
same grounds (just as the similar assumption of Mouffe mentioned above) 
On the whole, Massey's work can be taken as a useful starting point for elaborating 
an approach that, instead of tracing back state spatial restructuring primarily to the 
transformation of capitalism, acknowledges that restructuring should first and 
foremost be seen as shaped by the politics of space Massey, unlike proponents of the 
regulationist literature, shows more appreciation for the fact that "a full understanding 
of spatiality entails that there is more than one story going on in the world" (MASSFY, 
'
|999. Ρ 7) This is an important insight enabling us to address the particularities of 
state spatial restructuring m 'non-Western' post-socialist contexts such as Hungary10 
10 It has to be noted that Massey herself just as the overwhelming majority of English speaking geographers 
tends to ignore post socialist contexts entirely - even when calling for a more sustained engagement with 
the global South (HoRscHELMANNand SUNNINC 2008) 
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Also, MASSEY (2005) makes the important point that what matters in the first 
instance is not how empirically observable spaces are, but how they become what 
they are. Furthermore, she (and the scholars she has worked with) demonstrates 
convincingly that empirically observable spatial phenomena, such as regional 
inequalities, have been shaped ('have become what they are') through a particular, 
centralized configuration of political-economic power. These considerations of the 
structuring force of sedimented practices will be incorporated in the Politics of Space 
Approach below. On the other hand, I suggest that we should, following discourse-
theoretical insights, hold on more explicitly and consistently than Massey has, to a 
(post-structuralist) relational ontology and build the ontical (empirical) analysis of 
spaces on that ontology. By doing so, we can also avoid the shortcomings of the 
spatial perspective of regulation ist accounts, especially their tendency to reify spatial 
categories and their insufficiently nuanced conceptualization of the changes to the 
national dimension of state spaces. 
3.5 The Politics of Space Approach to state spatial restructuring 
In the course of arguing in favour of a discourse-theoretical approach to space, and to 
state spatial restructuring more specifically, the main elements of what I propose to 
call the Politicsof Space Approach (PSA) have already come to the fore in the previous 
sections of this chapter. The PSA builds on the discourse-theoretical understanding 
of discourse "as a relational system of signifying practices that is produced through 
historical and ultimately political interventions and provides a contingent horizon for 
the construction of any meaningful object" (TORFINC, 2005, p. 8). In other words, 
discourse constitutes a more or less coherent framework for what can be said and 
done (TORFINC, 1999). In orderto avoid confusion with other significations of'discourse' 
(especially 'discourse' in the sense of actual language use), I will hereafter use the 
term 'discursive formation', which LACLAU and MOUFFE (2001 [1985]) take to be 
synonymous wi th 'discourse'. 
The Politics of Space Approach further makes a difference between different kinds 
of actually existing spaces (ontical level) and the discursive space (ontological level) 
within which the meaning of actually existing spaces becomes fixed through the 
relational articulation of meanings. The PSA does attend to the (changes in) specific 
types of state spaces, but it is more specifically directed to an ontological inquiry 
examining how state spatial practices are structured by logics of equivalence and 
difference. In line with that, the Politics of Space Approach addresses the transformation 
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of the state's spatial organization (ontical level) by deconstructing the articulations 
(ontological level) through which the state, as a set of spatial-institutional relations, 
acquires its meaning, ι e becomes what it is, at a particular moment 
The ontical level can be more specifically approached by the relatively distinct 
realms m and through which the state operates, such as public administration, the 
electoral system, or different policy fields These realms systematically delimit and 
order the social relations that constitute the state and are thus discursive formations 
m their own right 
On the basis of the above, I can now reformulate the starting point of this 
research, namely that state spaces become restructured m an ongoing process 
where actors subjected to various discursive formations of space (re)negotiate the 
meanings of spaces Figure 3 7 below presents a schematic view of this starting point 
The proposed conceptualization of state spatial restructuring builds on the 
methodological relationalism of the strategic relational approach, but goes further 
m some respects In particular, it assumes the ontological instability of spaces, actors' 
identities and actors' relations, this is expressed by the dotted background of the 
scheme, and the dashed borders of the boxes labelled 'discursive formations of 
nation-state space' and 'actors' Discursive formations of state space are, albeit given 
at a particular moment, fundamentally (ontologically) incomplete, because they can 
never rely on a set of concepts with ultimately fixed meanings For example, the 
discursive formation of the policy field of regional economic development depends 
on temporarily fixed meanings of concepts that in themselves are empty of content, 
such as that of the 'region', 'economy', and 'development' From the point of view of 
concrete discursive formations that advance a particular way of f ixing the content of 
these terms, the latter ate floating sigmfiers For example, the 'region' can be seen as 
a floating signifier with respect to the policy field of regional economic development 
on the one hand and public administration on the other the discursive formation of 
the former and the latter f ix the meaning of the region (thus 'what the region is') 
m different ways 
Discursive formations of state space give meaning to the (operation of the) state 
as "the infrastructure" of government, 1 e a set of relations that govern society 
At the same time, they also always necessarily engage with what particular places, 
regions and landscapes mean to national territory, in other words, how they 
constitute national territory as a distinctive, 'natural' space Discursive formations of 
state spaces are also expressive of the geographical imagination of the nation, ie 
a historically evolving understanding of the nation as a spatial community 
Consequently, I will use the term discursive formations of nation-state space 
88 
Figure 3.1 A schematic framework for the Politics of Space Approach 
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As a consequence of the fundamental incompleteness of discursive formations, the 
actors subjected to these formations have (various) incomplete structural identities. 
For example, a mayor who is also a deputy in parliament is subjected, among other 
things, to the discursive formations of public administration, the electoral system, 
his/her party's regulations, various policy frameworks etc. In other words, he/she 
occupies different subject positions with regard to these formations. As a part of the 
range of subjectifications, the mayor in question is located in different power 
relations. 
So how does the process of state spatial restructuring unfold under'the pressures 
of neoliberalism'? To sketch PSA's answer to this question, let us first consider 
Torfing's remark that for discourse theory, "[t jhe incompleteness of the structural 
identity constitutes the subject as the locus of a decision about how to establish 
itself as a concrete subjectivity with a fully achieved identity" (TORFINC, 1999, p. 149)· 
Furthermore, "[sjocial and political agency are constructed as a part of the solutions 
they are advancing" (ibid., p. 151). In other words, the mayor's agency becomes 
constructed as he/she, in an attempt to 'harmonize' the various subject positions in 
which he/she finds himself/herself, advances particular claims/acts in particular 
ways. Following 'neoliberal' reforms that impose cost efficiency for municipal 
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budgets and make central state funding dependent on certain targets to be met, for 
example, the mayor finds himself/herself subjected to new constraints, and has to 
harmonize the various subject positions m which he/she finds himself/herself anew 
In the process of formulating new claims, he/she also unavoidably fixes (proposes to 
fix) the meaning of floating sigmfiers 
The struggle about the meanings of nation-state spaces unfolds as various 
actors, attempting to come to terms with their unfulfi l led identities (subject 
positions), advance claims/act in particular ways, based on their particular 
interpretation of the strategically (or as I will argue below discursively) selective 
context In the struggle for meaning, floating sigmfiers become articulated in the 
different claims of actors for example, particular understandings of 'region', 
'development', 'modernization', 'democracy' and 'urban', to name but a few possible 
sigmfiers, become articulated At this point, t w o remarks need to be made 
First, it is through the articulation of meanings that social change is taking place 
As DIEZ (2001) rightly notes, however, the understanding of change m terms of 
continuous articulations might look problematic m t h a t t h e argument is an inherently 
circular one articulations both emerge m the relational context of discursive 
formations, but also shape the latter Diez ultimately highlights the circular process 
above by a metaphor that I think insightfully captures the stability-m-motion of 
discursive formations Following Diez, we can consider discursive formations as 
glaciers In Diez's own words 
'[ i]n a snapshot it is the structures that allow for a very limited range of concrete 
articulations But wi th each of these articulations these structures are themselves 
transformed a bit, and attera longer timespan, the glacier/discourse [discursive formation] 
is no longer what it used to be" (Ditz, 2001 ρ 31) 
The second remark concerns the important question of what it depends on whether 
and to what extent articulations of meaning actually induce change in existing 
institutional (power) relations From the perspective of the PSA, the actual form of 
articulations depends on how the actors who advance the articulations m question 
are positioned within such relations It is here that the PSA incorporates the insight of 
Jessop's strategic relational approach that the state as a set of institutional relations 
has a selective (differential) impact on the ability of various political forces (actors) 
to pursue particular strategies At the same time, following the insights of discourse 
theory, this selective impact is not regarded in terms of structurally inscribed strategic 
selectivities (see Figure 2 J), but as structurally inscribed discursive selectivities 
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This latter conceptualization reminds us that the structural characteristics of the 
social world are discursively constituted by logics of equivalence and difference. 
Furthermore, instead of SRA's notion of structurally oriented strategic calculation, 
referring to the possibility of reflection on the part of actors about structurally 
inscribed discursive selectivities, the PSA prefers to speak of structurally informed 
(spatial) claims. As such, the PSA acknowledges that due to the ontological 
incompleteness of the structures that actors are subjected to, actors do not have 
given interests (see HOWARTH and STAVRAKAKIS, 2000). Furthermore, as actors are 
subjected to various structures simultaneously, actors cannot be simply rationally 
strategic. Although they might reflect on the selectivity of structural constraints 
(and thus on what their interests are at a given moment), it is fundamentally 
undecidable what claim/action would strategically 'serve' their interests. By actually 
making a claim/taking action, actors (propose to) make a decision (not necessarily 
fully consciously/rationally) in an undecidable terrain. In other words, it is ultimately 
actors who decide where their interests lie. For example, the mayor of our example 
can reflect on the consequences of not meeting centrally set targets (e.g. a cut in 
central state grants), but at the same time he/she might also reflect on the 
consequences of cutt ing back, in line with those targets, on municipal spending for 
particular projects (e.g. a drop of popularity among the local electorate). He/she 
faces a dilemma that cannot be solved rationally, only decided about politically. 
Of course, he/she is not alone and, by joining forces wi th other mayors, he/she 
might contest the government's measures on particular grounds, for example on the 
basis of claims regarding spatial justice. The example could, of course, be further 
elaborated at great length, and it still could not condense the complexity of 
actual processes. Nonetheless, even on the basis of this example, we can finally 
acknowledge that 'neoliberal pressures' are not unitary imperatives that tend to 
have deterministic effects. 
It has to be emphasized here that discursive selectivity within the framework of 
the Politicsof Space Approach isfundamentally different from the notion of discursive 
selectivity as understood by HAY (2002). On the one hand. Hay's remark that the 
context of social action does not only select for and against particular strategies, but 
also for and against particular ideas and narratives (it is this latter that he calls 
discursive selectivity), coincides wi th the point made by the PSA. On the other hand, 
arguing from a critical realist perspective. Hay takes actors to be fully conscious, 
reflexive and strategic - a view that contrasts that of the PSA. Furthermore, as 
FINLAYSON (2004) demonstrated, for Hay, a critical account of politics implies exposing 
the mismatch between reality and the ideas held about that reality. Hay thus 
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shares the assumptions of critical realist scholars concerning the (possibly) 
(mis)representational nature of ideas. As such, however, Hay loses sight of the fact 
that "[ i]n politics, ideas and concepts are not social scientific m nature they are 
political. Their function is not necessarily to be accurate and adequate descriptions of 
the world" (FINIAYSON, 2004, ρ 536). From the perspective of the Politics of Space 
Approach, the emphasis is not on whether actors' understandings of the context are 
accurate or inaccurate; rather, the PSA focuses on how actors, based on the 
articulation of their understandings of various things, make political claims 
As the empirical studies will demonstrate, PSA's view of state spatial restructuring 
as unfolding along the logics of equivalence and difference leads us to a fuller 
understanding than the regulationist SRA of why and how restructuring processes 
have actually taken place, and why and how new state spaces have institutionalized 
the way they have Certainly, regulationist accounts can convincingly explain the 
persistent dominance and strategic privileging of London and the South East (for 
example) by the state as resulting from a hegemonic struggle of different logics of 
capital They can account much less aptly, however, for the fact that attempts to 
move towards a selective differentiation of spaces m 'the rest of England', through 
the establishment of city-regions for example, has not been fully realized. Similarly -
because of the difficulties mentioned m the previous chapter - from a regulationist 
perspective we could not fully grasp the fading away of the 'pole programme' in 
Hungary that was originally thought to create a number of regional urban centres as 
counterbalances to Budapest 
The PSA in turn, by relying on the ontological concepts of logics of equivalence 
and difference for the conceptualization of nation-state spaces, can highlight 
better the above processes and their outcomes From the perspective of the PSA, we 
can regard state spatial restructuring and the actual (non)selection of spaces of 
intervention as an articulation between particularity and universality The spaces-
to-be-selected (regions, cities) embody demands for the recognition of particularity 
(in terms of political autonomy, resources etc ), the national dimension, due to the 
deeply-anchored role of the nation-state in organizing socio-spatial relations, 
constitutes the horizon of universality Any ambition to preserve or enhance the 
particularity of a space can only be realized by claiming (and by institutionalizing that 
claim) that that space (partly) embodies the universal, 1 e by 'giving up', to some 
extent, the particularity of that space 
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3-6 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I developed the Politics of Space Approach as an alternative to the 
regulationist, strategic-relational approach to state spatial restructuring. Table 3.2 
shows the most relevant assumptions and characteristics of the two approaches. 
It is im portant to emphasize that the PSA does not question the merits of regulation ist 
scholarship. If we are interested in the way the state as a set of institutional relations 
is implicated in securing the socio-spatial preconditions for sustainable capital 
accumulation, then regulationist accounts provide us with useful insights. If, however, 
we wish to understand how state spatial restructuring processes actually unfold, 
then we need to take a different perspective. That perspective should not be driven 
by the desi re to confirm a particular theory (as the SR A is preoccupied with confirming 
critical realist Marxism). Rather, we need a problem-driven approach that is geared 
towards an exploration of "what is actually going on in the world" (HOWARTH, 2004, 
p. 318). The PSA is such a problem-driven approach that does not wish to vindicate 
discourse theory (such an aspiration would actually contradict discourse theory's 
main assumptions), but draws on it in order to explore how state spaces are actually 
reconfigured. 
As I demonstrated in this chapter, the Politics of Space Approach, by being 
grounded in the relational ontology of discourse theory, can provide us with a more 
fine-grained analysis of state spatial changes. In particular, the PSA highlights that 
neoliberal rationalities can only become hegemonic by articulating with existing 
discursive formations where the process of articulation is shaped by the discursive 
selectivity of the nation-state. Also, the PSA shows that we cannot fully grasp state 
spatial restructuring processes and how particular spaces (regions, cities) have 
become selected (or not) as key spaces of state intervention, without considering 
how 'the national' continues to act as a universal horizon for ordering state space. 
As such, the PSA is an apt perspective from which to examine the recent episodes of 
state spatial changes in Hungary and England. 
93 
Table 3.2 A comparison of the regulationist, strategic-relational approach 
and the Politics of Space Approach 
Meta-theoretical 
foundations 
'Neohberal' state 
spatial restructuring 
is examined in 
terms of 
Politics 
The state 
The selection of 
new state spaces is 
structured 
Discourse (semiosis) is 
The analysis of 
discourse in relation 
to the analysis of state 
spatial restructuring is 
The mam question for 
'discourse analysis' 
and the task of the 
analyst are 
Regulationist Politics of 
strategic-relational approach Space Approach 
critical realism discourse theory 
a regulatory change in response the 'decisions made in an 
to a new phase of capitalist undecidable terrain', ie a process 
accumulation of struggle over the meaning 
of spaces, where the discursive 
formations constitutive of state 
spatiahty become challenged and 
reworked 
is a an autonomous realm of the constitutes an all-pervading 
social world dimension of the social world 
.is an ensemble of social is an ensemble of social 
relations, subject to an ongoing relations subject to an ongoing 
struggle about how capitalist struggle about what the state is 
relations should be regulated and should be 
institutionally 
by hegemonic struggles of by the logic of equivalence and 
different logics of capital the logic difference 
a set of symbolic a relational world of meaningful 
representations embodied in practices that systematically 
a range of texts, speeches and forms the identities of subjects 
signifying practices and objects 
a supplementary exercise the two analyses are 
coterminous 
How is false consciousness How do decisions appear as 
achieved? natural/ rational/plausible and 
To demystify instrumental not resulting from political 
language use by powerful actors choice? 
To deconstruct practices and 
(implicit) claims that suggest that 
a state of affairs/course of action 
is natural/rational/plausible 
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Studying the politics of space 

"To admit the perspectival character of knowledge should be to 
sharpen rather than blunt our critical stance" (DEAN, 1999, p. io ) 
As HOWARTH {2005), one of the leading discourse theorists conceded, discourse theory 
- as an approach that, per definition, cannot be totalizing - cannot be applied to all 
problems. A discourse-theoretical perspective lends itself particularly to the study of 
the constitution of political identities, of the establishment of political frontiers and 
ofthe practices of hegemonic articulation among certa in discourses and subjectivities. 
More generally, it offers a useful starting point for an inquiry into the way social 
phenomena in the broad sense become meaningful. Accordingly, as I argued in the 
previous chapter, post-structuralist discourse theory helps us to avoid presupposing 
that state spatial processes are driven by some underlying structural mechanisms; 
instead, it allows us to examine the above processes as the problematization of the 
way societies are managed. But how can we actually apply the Politics of Space 
Approach in concrete empirical analyses? This is the central question in this chapter 
that is intended to serve as a bridge between the often abstract considerations of 
the previous two theoretical chapters and the following two empirical chapters. 
In the first section below, some general remarks are made about how the 
theoretical premises of discourse theory translate into methodology and the use of 
particular methods. Second, the concrete research strategy followed for the current 
study will be discussed, including the selection of case studies and their role vis-à-vis 
the overall theoretical arguments formulated by this study. Subsequently, the 
generation and analysis of empirical data will be considered, and the way the findings 
of the analysis were organized into this thesis' narrative. 
4.1 The methodological implications of a discourse-theoretical approach 
As noted in the previous chapter, LACLAU (2004) argued that the ontological inquiry of 
discourse theory would be without any use if it were not to transmit its effects to 
ontical analyses. At the same time, seeing himself first and foremost as a political 
ontologist, Laclau has not been particularly concerned wi th the issue of how 
empirical studies can be conducted in terms o f the distinctions brought about by a 
discursive ontology. 
Empirical analyses undertaken subsequently by others might have been 
successful in re-describing the ontical level on the grounds o f t h e ontology above. 
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but they have tended to be insufficiently explicit about the way discourse theory's 
assumptions have 'guided' the empirical investigation In connection with that, 
HOWARTH (2005) speaks of a 'methodological deficit' m discourse-theoretical research 
At the same time, TORFINC (2005) suggests that a lack of concern wi th methodology 
among scholars working with discourse theory has stemmed (also) from "the 
dismissal, as a positivist obsession, of questions of method and methodology" (TORHNG, 
2005, ρ 27) 
This study aligns with HOWARTH'S (2005) and TORFINC'S (2005) view that method and 
methodology should not be regarded as anathema for analyses founded on a 
discourse-theoretical basis, but as relevant issues that should be dealt with explicitly 
and openly In order to clarify the objectives of research informed by discourse theory, 
it is useful to refer to the three 'types' of research mentioned by Howarth To begin 
with, 'method-driven' research is animated by the techniques of data-gathering and 
analysis 'Theory driven' research is driven to confirm a particular theoretical 
framework Finally - and it is this third group that research rooted m discourse theory 
belongs to - 'problem-driven' research is guided by the empirical phenomena under 
investigation, 1 e by "what is actually going on m the world" (HOWARIH, 2004, ρ 318) 
Atthe sametime, m line with discourse theory's assumption that 'there is nothing 
outside discourse', the problems subject to study, the techniques applied, the empirical 
data gathered, and the research strategy followed are not regarded as independently 
existing and atheoretical As to research problems, their existence and constitution 
"always presupposes the ontological assumptions and categories of discourse theory 
for their initial discernment and description" (HOWARTH, 2004, ρ 319) In other words, 
and regarding the current study more specifically, processes of state spatial 
restructuring as objects of analysis are rendered meaningful here m a particular way 
My choice of redescribmg actual (debates on) spatial reforms analytically in terms of 
a politics of space already presupposed an attachment to the discourse-theoretical 
assumption of regarding social practices as inherently political 
Just as research problems are not waiting 'out there' to be addressed, from a 
discourse-theoretical perspective, one cannot conceive of a neutral set of universal 
rules and techniques that can be applied mechanically (HOWARTH, 2005, TORFINC, 2005) 
Instead, a problem-driven analysis of discourse requires a constant invention and 
adjustment of particular methodological rules (TORFINC, 2005) Furthermore, the 
conceptual framework has to be articulated m each particular enactment of concrete 
research (HOWARTH and STAVRAKAKIS, 2000, ρ s) What is important is to avoid any 
essentialist or deterministic accounts of social practices, and also not to assume the 
primacy of texts, actors, or institutions This does not preclude accepting that certain 
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institutional practices are given at a particular moment (as part of the 'always already 
meaningful world' referred to above). However, it is crucial to remain aware of the 
fact that these realms - such as public administration, or different policy fields - are 
only relatively distinct and also that they are discursive formations, i.e. sedimented 
systems of meaning of ultimately political origin. 
Also, from the point of view of research based on DT, the line of division between 
'reactive' and 'non-reactive' sources of empirical data, i.e. those that suppose an 
element of inter-subjectivity and those that do not, is not relevant. In line with 
discourse theory's ontological assumptions, both reactive sources (such as interviews 
and participant observation) and non-reactive ones (documents and other objects, 
such as images or buildings) appear as such within particular systems of meanings, 
through a passage through subjectivity (namely that of the researcher). From this 
follows that "it is possible to treat all data as text" (HOWARTH, 2005, p. 336, emphasis 
original). Finally, the research strategy applied - including the choice of whether or 
not to focus on one or more case studies, or engage in comparative research-depends 
also on the questions that arise and on the issues that appear as problematic for the 
researcher within a particular discursive context (see HOWARTH, 2005). 
Discourse theory has been the target of much criticism for its 'indefiniteness' 
concerning questions of method. 'Anything goes', 'too relativistic', 'slippery', 'relying on 
anecdotal evidence and arbitrary choices of source', 'socially and politically irrelevant' 
have been frequently recurring remarks from sceptics (see e.g. CLASZE and MATTISEK, 
2009b; HOWARTH, 2005; VAN DEN BRINK and METZE, 2006; MATTISSEK and REUBER, 2004). 
Furthermore, assertions that research based on DT is producing new interpretations 
(HOWARTH, ibid.) and is actually "condemned to distort reality" (JÖRCENSEN and PHILLIPS, 
2002, p. 186) have been often interpreted - and dismissed - as scholars wanting to 
evade the charge of justifying (critical) scientific relevance (see e.g. CHOULIARAKI and 
FAIRCLOUGH, 1999). 
As referred to in the previous chapter, these criticisms might hold from meta-
theoretical positions that are different from (and in fact incommensurable with) that 
of discourse theory. From a discourse-theoretical point of view, the researcher, however, 
can never pretend to be an objective, external observer. Following the Heideggerian 
ontology that discourse theory is rooted in, the researcher as a subject does not have 
an unmediated access to reality, but finds himself/herself'always already' in a world of 
meaningful objects and practices, and the norms of that world provide the criteria for 
him/her to identify objects in the first place (see HOWARTH, 2005). 
As argued above, there is no neutral vantage point from which the meta-
theoretical stance of discourse theory could be dismissed. From that stance in turn. 
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the 'mdefiniteness' of discourse theory as a method is not problematic Rather, it 
expresses the strong reflexive character of research grounded in discourse theory, ι e 
its capacity to allow the researcher to reflect upon the way his/her research practice 
is inherently linked to the production of meaning that is subject to analysis m the 
first instance In fact, the 'mdefiniteness' above is a necessary condition of adhering 
consistently to discourse theory as an ontology 
Actually, ensuring that research is conducted m a reflexive way is far from 
straightforward, and difficulties m this regard do not arise "evenly" throughout the 
research process As regards the present study, the fact that my 'spatial socialization' 
(PAASI, 1996) has occurred largely through those taken-for-granted and common-sense 
understandings of 'Hungarian spaces' that I was supposed to deconstruct here, 
re-mterpretmg developments m the case of Hungary was more challenging 
To refer to Dorling, "we both as individuals and as society at large tend to f ind 
what we are looking for and what we are used to seeing" (DORLING, 2004, ρ 62) As to 
the analysis of state spatial restructuring m England, it required more work to trace 
how particular places, regions and landscapes are regarded as constitutive of England 
as a distinctive space 
The meta theoretical stance of discourse theory implies a particular 
understanding of the criteria of scientific validity, 1 e of the standards that the 
research must meet m order to count as qualified academic research Relying on 
Potter and Wetherell's work, JCRCENSEN and PHILLIPS (2002) discuss coherence and 
fruitfulness as key validity measures The former criterion is understood more 
specifically as the research's 'plausibility to the community of scholars' This actually 
echoes Dean's view, who argues that his (what could be termed a neo-Foucauldian) 
account "should bejudged m terms of its coherence, clarity, completeness and, above 
all, capacity to convince" (DEAN, 1999, ρ io) The criterion of fruitfulness refers m turn 
to the way research is generating new knowledge 
The current study wishes to deliver valid scientific insights as implied by the two 
criteria above Two issues need to be mentioned here briefly First, there is no 'one' 
community of scholars and thus no single understanding of plausibility - accordingly, 
one (sub-)community of scholars might considerthe present research more plausible 
than another Possibly, given that Hungarian geographical scholarship is characterized 
by an aspiration of "philosophical and political neutrality" and "a lack of social 
theories" (see TIMAR, 2003), members of the (sub-)community of Hungarian 
geographers (and of other disciplines dealing wi th spatial issues) might appreciate 
less an analysis grounded in discourse theory Second, the two criteria above might 
be m conflict with each other, for m an attempt to provide new insights, research 
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based on DT is at the same time trying to expand/reset the limits of plausibility. In 
line with Central Eastern European trends, existing work (by Hungarian scholars) on 
Hungarian state restructuring has tended, for example, to interpret deviations from 
'the West' largely as dysfunctionalities (see COETZ, 2001). This study wishes to avoid 
the trap of "premature normativism" (STUBBS, 2005), i.e. the elision between 
understanding and explaining how state restructuring unfolds on the one hand, and 
propagating a particular way of restructuring on the other. As such, however, by not 
assuming the desirability of an alignment with 'the West' right away, the current 
study might be seen by some as taking an implausible stance. On the other hand, 
those 'Western' scholars who adhere to the regulationist perspective and who are 
thus attaching great importance to the explanatory force of capitalist economic 
structures, might, for the reasons sketched in Chapter 3, be also questioning this 
study's plausibility. Being aware of the above sources of scepticism, this study 
assumesthat its thoroughly elaborated theoretical-conceptual framework, combined 
with thick empirical analyses, can be successful in claiming plausibility. 
Finally, a few words need to be said in connection with the alleged 'social and 
political irrelevance'of discourse-theoretical research. This issue was already touched 
upon in the previous chapter where it was noted that a discourse-theoretical 
perspective allows for a repoliticization of those (often implicit) claims that make a 
certain state of affairs/course of action appear as natural/rational/plausible. 
Research inspired by discourse theory is thus admittedly not 'problem-solving' 
research; instead of taking existing social structures as given and addressing 
anomalies that arise within those frameworks (HOWARTH, 2005), it deconstructs the 
very social structures themselves. The fact that discourse-theoretical research is not 
problem-solving does not mean, however, that it is socially and politically disengaged. 
Rather, discourse-theoretical research, including the present one, claims social and 
political relevance by offering a foundation for the rethinking of political struggles 
(see CLASZE and MATTISEK, 2009b). 
4.2 Research strategy: how case study selection helps make the point 
Casestudy based qualitative research strategies-whether rooted in discourse theory 
or no t -have been widely criticized for being arbitrary and unable to providea ground 
for generalizations. Indeed, the accounts of changing state spatialities in Hungary 
and England presented in the following chapters might seem to provide above all 
context-dependent knowledge. However, the main objective of the two case studies 
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is not merely to highlight the complex multi-actor struggles through which the 
"actually existing neoliberalism" (BRENNER and THEODORE, 2002) of Hungary and England 
has acquired its "messy" form (PECK and TICKELL 2007) In line w i t h FLYVBJERG'S (2001, 
2006) point that case studies can be an important means of theory building, the 
selection (or rather, retention) and the juxtaposition of the cases of Hungary and 
England are intended to support the theoretical arguments advanced in the previous 
chapter In other words, the case studies connect organically to the theoretical 
framework both m terms of 'the logic of discovery' and 'the logics of presentation 
and validation' (see HOWARTH, 2005) 
But what does 'organic connection' mean here? Above all, the choice of Hungary as 
the first case was crucial for identifying the shortcomings of the regulationist approach 
Using FLYVBJERG'S (2006) terminology, from a regulationist perspective Hungary can be 
regarded as an atypical or extreme case and, as such, "well-suited for getting a point 
across" (FLYVBJERC, 2006, ρ 229) As referred to m Chapter 4, Hungary's case is atypical 
inasmuch as in Hungary it was not a capitalist 'post-war Keynesian welfare state' (see 
LoBAO, MARTIN and RODRIGUEZ-POSE, 2009) that neoliberal reforms have reconfigured 
A further reason for regarding it as atypical (from a regulationist stance) could be that 
in Hungary, just as in other Central Eastern European countries, neoliberal regulatory 
adjustments m the 1990s were inextricably interlinked with, and shaped by, processes 
of post-socialist nation-building and state formation (see e g JESSOP, 1995) 
Of course, Hungary's neoliberal state transformation was (has been) different 
from that ofWestern capitalist states, especially in that it paralleled the establishment 
of the most fundamental institutional 'givens' of the state As noted in Chapter 3, 
the difference between Hungary and other Western capitalist states pertains to 
actually observable differences, and thus to the ontical plane However, starting out 
from the discourse-theoretical assumption that ontologically, both the state spaces 
of Hungary and England are constituted relationally through logics of difference and 
equivalence, state spatial restructuring processes in Hungary and England are similar 
('the same') Regulationist accounts, by remaining on the ontical plane, cannot make 
sense of the 'atypical messmess' and 'overpoliticized nature' of Hungarian state 
spatial reforms 
In the first instance, Hungary's case was treated here, m line w i t h the regulation ist 
view, as 'atypically messy' and 'overpoliticized' This point of departure was relevant 
for developing this study's (theoretical) argument inasmuch as it helped to 
demonstrate that we cannot account for the spatial restructuring of any capitalist 
state unless we go beyond an ontical analysis The need to move to the ontological 
plane and to do away with the privileging of economic structures m the face of 
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political ones might be less evident in the case of 'established Western capitalist 
states', the most common objects of regulationist analysis. However, if we accept the 
'ontological sameness' of the state spaces of Hungary and England, then we have to 
recognize that by restricting our analysis to the ontical plane, we can only have a 
limited understanding of the way state spatial restructuring unfolds in Western 
capitalist states. In other words, the choice of Hungary as a f irst case study had the 
aim of enhancing our reflexivity with regard to the inherently political nature of the 
spatial restructuring of any capitalist state. So although it was the preliminary 
findings of the Hungarian case study that motivated the elaboration of the Politics of 
Space Approach, the latter aspires to be a generally applicable theoretical-conceptual 
framework. The second case was selected with the aim of demonstrating the added 
value of the PSA for a study of a 'Western capitalist state' and, ultimately, of 
supporting the claim for general validity. Finally, England was chosen for the second 
case study as the restructuring of England's state spaces has been perhaps the most 
prominent subject of (the dominantly UK-based) regulationist scholarship. Given the 
extensive and widely-known existing literature on England, more room is created for 
the 'community of scholars' to assess the added-value of a PSA-based account. 
To conclude, the cases of Hungary and England are not compared here in the 
traditional sense, i.e. along a particular (set of) variable(s). In fact, from a discourse-
theoretical perspective, such a 'traditional' comparison in the strict sense is not 
conceivable because whatever we take to compare (e.g. systems of public 
administration), we cannot treat the units-to-be-compared as essentially'equivalent', 
only as sharing certain family resemblances (HOWARTH, 2005). In the present study, 
there is an element of comparison only to the extent that, as noted above, the case of 
Hungary enhances our reflexivity with regard to the political character of state 
spatial restructuring in (all) other cases. This does not exclude the possibility of 
comparing the discursive selectivities that shape (the restructuring of) the state in 
the t w o countries with regard to a perceived similarity (e.g. 'centralist' traditions) or 
difference (e.g. general attitude to the EU). Such a comparison lies, however, beyond 
the scope of this research and is thus not undertaken here. 
4.3 Collecting a n d analysing empirical d a t a 
The collection and the analysis of empirical data for this study took place in partly 
overlapping periods, fol lowing a η iterativelogic. Fol lowing a first round of preparatory 
reading based on academic accounts, the collection of empirical data for both case 
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studies started off with desk research, including the study of policy documents and 
press material Concerning the temporal scope, documents were gathered not only 
from the period regarded as the 'narrowfocus' of each case, ι e the elaboration of the 
2"d National Development Plan m Hungary, and the evolution of city-regionalism m 
England The initial literature study suggested that it is reasonable to consider 
documents from the post-1997 period (ie from the period starting with Labour's 
election victory) for the England case study and documents discussing post-1990 
developments more broadly for the Hungary case study Concerning the spatial scope 
(of the provenance of documents), a crucial issue to keep in mind was the trap of 
methodological temtonalism (see e g BRENNER, 2004, LARNER and LE HERON, 2002) 
In order to avoid this trap, I had to keep myself aware of the fact that the relational 
articulation of meanings through which discursive formations of nation-state space 
are (re-)produced cannot be mapped onto national territories Policy documents 
were traced on the internet, their relevance was assessed on the basis of scholarly 
references, references m the press and on the basis of cross-references in the 
documents themselves Press material included national and local newspapers, and 
the national and local professional press 
Table 4.1 Research methods and the two dimensions of empirical data analysis 
Research methods 
Desk research 
Academic literature 
Policy documents 
Press material 
Interviews 
Ontical enquiry 
focusing on 'What is' 
What kind of institutional power 
relations and institutionalized 
understandings (discursive 
formations) "are out there"? 
' ^ _V Ontologica! enquiry: 
?• ^r-p focusing on 'How what is is' 
Through the articulation of which 
meanings do institutional power 
relations and institutionalized 
understandings exist and appear 
as natural/rational/plausible? 
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The preliminary analysis of the collected material.justasall subsequent instances 
of data analysis, had two main dimensions. On the one hand, data analysis meant 
conducting an ontical inquiry focusing on the institutional power relations and 
institutionalized understandings (in fact discursive formations) that we can observe. 
On the other - and it is here that discourse theory actually appeared as a method -
data analysis implied conducting an ontological inquiry, i.e. tracing those articulations 
of meaning through which institutional power relations and institutionalized 
understandings exist and appear as natural/rational/plausible. 
Data analysis along these two dimensions was not carried out separately; in fact, 
the identification of institutionalized understandings (discursive formations) was a 
bridge towards the ontological inquiry. A number of important considerations were 
already kept in mind during this initial analysis. First, in spite of initial assumptions 
about the discursive formations that might be (primarily) important, I tried to allow 
the fieldwork to shape the focus and not the assumptions above. For example, it 
seemed commonsensical to assume that public administration might be a relevant 
discursive formation in view of state spatial restructuring. It was important to stay 
aware of such preconceptions and maintain, as much as possible, an openness 
towards other, 'less obvious' formations. 
A second issue I had to remain conscious of was that although texts might be 
good entry points for analysis, by conducting linguistic analysis alone one cannot 
apprehend the material character of every discursive structure (cf. GLASZE", 2007). As 
to the linguistic analysis of texts, it was limited to the excavation of the implicit 
assumptions that the author of the text / the actors that the text reported on 
advanced in connection with different spaces (floating signif iers) such as 'the region', 
'the county', ' the rural' etc. Following FAIRCLOUGH'S (2003, p. 55) categorization of 
assumptions, I looked for three main types of assumptions: existential assumptions 
about what exists, propositional assumptions about what is or will be the case, and 
value assumptions about what is good or desirable. These assumptions were in fact 
regarded as spatial claims that give meaning to particular spatial concepts (floating 
sign if iers). On the basis of a first inventory of spatial claims, it was possible to sketch 
a tentative mapping of the struggle over the meaning of different spaces. It should 
be noted here that the 'struggle' above was not always observable as an outright 
conflict over meanings. 
11 Glasze claims to draw on the "advancements of discourse theory by Laclau and Mouffe", but argues that 
"a triangulation of two linguistic methods Is appropriate to reveal temporary fixations" (CIAWF, 2007, pp. 
656,658) 
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A third crucial consideration was to examine m and through which institutional 
power relations and practices the text in question was produced, and if and how the 
text was challenging those power relations and practices Fourth, in order to 
acknowledge that academics are deeply implicated m the struggle overthe meaning 
of spaces, an ontological inquiry was extended to the academic accounts read prior 
to actual data analysis, as well as to those read subsequently 
In a second step, fieldwork was conducted for both case studies, consisting 
principally of interviews with various actors who had been either directly involved in 
the actual design and/or implementation of recent spatial reforms, or had thorough 
knowledge of the reforms Interviewees included academics and practitioners, and 
were identified ι η the course of desk research, and subsequently through snow-balling 
The interviews were unstructured, interviewees were asked, attera brief introduction 
of my research project, to share their thoughts about the process that was at the 
focus of each case study (ι e the elaboration of the 2nd National Development Plan in 
Hungary and the formation of the city-regional 'agenda'm England) More specifically, 
they were asked how their organization has been implicated in the process under 
study, and also about the relations that their organization has had with others The 
length of the interviews ranged from 30 minutes to 75 minutes The objective of the 
interviews was twofold A first objective was to gather material from which the 
spatial claims of the interviewees can be distilled for further analysis A second 
objective was to triangulate findings from desk research and insights gamed from 
interviewing Actually, the respondents further supplied me with policy documents 
and academic papers that they considered relevant for the understanding of reform 
processes 
The fieldwork carried out m Hungary and England differed m some respects 
First, fieldwork in Hungary was done m three steps, and included interviews with 
'local' actors (in the South Transdanubian Region), and also some with policy officers 
from the national level (1 e ministries) In contrast, fieldwork in England was carried 
out 'at once' and remained restricted to interviews with 'local' actors in the Yorkshire 
and the Humber Region, without the inclusion of national level policy officers While 
the splitting up of the field work f or the case of Hungary had merely practical reasons, 
the inclusion of Hungarian ministerial policy officers was judged necessary because 
of the (compared to the case of England, substantial) lack of policy documents 
available through which the reform process can be reconstructed 
The interviews were transcribed literally, analysed for spatial claims, on the basis 
of which the initial mapping of the struggle over the meaning of spaces was 
complemented/adjusted At this point, in spite of the higher number of interviews 
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conducted for the Hungarian case,the latter was still in need of more empirical input. 
A possible reason fo r tha t was t h a t - a s a symptom of the relative 'overpoliticization' 
(in the traditional sense) of the public sphere in Hungary - (most) interviewees were 
apparently trying to avoid making any (critical) remarks from which their political 
partisanship could be judged. In this respect, interviewees in England were much 
more open in their responses. In an at tempt to remedy the perceived lack of empirical 
resources, I decided to analyse parliamentary debates (available online), which indeed 
turned out to be a rich source of spatial claims. The starting point of the analysis of 
parliamentary debates was to examine debates prior to the enactment of a major 
regulation, such as the 2nd National Development Plan. In addition, searches were 
carried out on the basis of what had been previously identified as the key f loating 
signifiers, such as region, vidék etc. A key consideration I attempted to follow was 
that of giving attention to voices from both of the main political camps that are said 
to exist in Hungary, without reifyingthe divide. Similarly, in the case of press material 
and academic accounts, I tried to include accounts in my analysis so as to give room 
to voices from both sides. 
As noted above, of crucial importance was not to remain at the level of linguistic 
analysis, but to embed actors' claims in the present institutional field, as well as 
within a broader, historical perspective. Especially this latter aim of linking recent 
struggles over meanings to preceding ones, and of demonstrating their long-term 
path-dependency, necessitated the reading of sources otherthan academic accounts 
and policy documents that focus narrowly on spatial reforms in the two countries. In 
particular, works on history, politics and culture were studied. 
4.4 The way f rom texts to this text 
So how were the innumerable texts encountered and produced in the course of 
research reworked into this text? The guiding objective in this regard was to locate 
the claims made by various actors in a broader historical perspective by employing 
theoretical concepts and logics not readily available to the actors themselves (see 
HOWARTH, 2005). In other words, the empirical data gathered had to be redescribed in 
the analytical terms of the Politics of Space Approach. 
The fact that recent struggles over meaning are considered here to become 
intelligible within a broader historical perspective also explains why the process at 
the focus of each case study takes up only the last section of the respective chapter. 
The historical embedding - this refers in fact to the tracing of the structurally 
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inscribed discursive selectivities - of the arbitrarily delimited reform processes is 
longer than the discussion of the narrowly defined reforms This is, however, intended 
to support a better understanding of reform processes While the fol lowing chapters 
discuss developments m a chronological order, this line of narrative does not reflect 
the actual process of empirical research and data analysis 
Ultimately, it has to be stressed that in spite of attempts to give room to a wide 
range of different claims, the present account does not in any way pretend to be a 
'balanced' and neutral one. Just as texts were deconstructed m order to construct 
this text, the current text can be deconstructed as well 
n o 
I l l 

City-regions in Hungary: 
beyond the thinkabLe 

"Spatial harmony exists at different scales: [...] the country as a 
whole can be expected to become more harmonious through the 
presence of self-organizing, competitive regions, the presence of 
[urban] centres that balance out the dominance of the capital and 
bring dynamism into the countryside [vidék). and through the 
catching up of the most underdeveloped areas" 
(National Spatial Development Concept. 2005, p. H ' 1 ) . 
In the preceding chapters, I argued that 'new (city-)regionalism' should best be 
regarded not as a new regulatory experiment of the (neoliberal) state, but rather as 
the manifestation of a politics of space, i.e. as a process in which actors subjected to 
various discursive formations renegotiate the meanings of state spaces. Through the 
in-depth empirical case studies of the present and the following chapter, I will 
demonstrate why and howthe Politics of Space Approach (PSA) allows us to arrive at 
a more fine-grained account of changing state spatialities under neoliberalism than 
the regulationist, strategic-relational approach. In this chapter, I will first examine 
the case of Hungary that, as mentioned previously, drew my attention to the 
shortcomings of the regulationist approach in the first instance. Subsequently, 
in Chapter 6, I will show the added-value of the PSA for the analysis of state spatial 
reforms in England, in order to illustrate the general applicability of the PSA. 
As a preamble to the case study of Hungary, it is useful first to reiterate in more 
detail why the regulationist approach seemed to offer few clues regarding state 
spatial reorganization in Hungary. As noted in Chapter 2, regulationists have argued 
that the neoliberalization of the state has produced urban-centric, competitiveness-
oriented forms of locational policy. The quote above from Hungary's second and 
most recent National Spatial Development Concept (NSDC) (Orszagos Területfejlesz-
tési Koncepció) suggests that a focus on urban areas and an emphasis on 
competitiveness have come to characterize spatial development policy in Hungary. 
Infact.the second NSDC Introduced a newterm,that of'development poles', referring 
to larger regional urban centres that have a key role in strengthening regional 
competitiveness (see Figure 5.1). 
12 Quotations from Hungarian sources, including interview transcripts, are my translations 
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Figure 5.1 Regional development poles and axes 
Regionalis fejlesztési polusok es tengelyek 
Source; National Spatial Development Concept. 2005, p. 33 
At the same time, from the quote above it appears also that the NSDC views cities not 
only as motors of competitiveness, but also as key contributors to the "balanced 
development" of the urban network; cities are seen as crucial to spatial redistribution. 
The objective of "a balanced urban network" signals the NSDCs concern w i th 
Hungary's monocentric spatial structure. Although the gap between the capital and 
the rest of the country is not serious by international standards (ENYEDI, 2005), it has 
been long regarded as a key issue of Hungary's state territorial management. Cities 
following the capital Budapest in the urban hierarchy - Debrecen, Miskolc, Szeged, 
Pecs and Cyôr - are generally referred to as 'large city' (nagyvaros) in Hungarian, but 
while Budapest counts around 1,7 million inhabitants, none of the above-mentioned 
cities has even 200,000 inhabitants'3. 
13 According to the last census of 2001, the capital Budapest counts 1.712,677 inhabitants. The five 'large 
cities' have the following population numbers: Debrecen (198,905). Miskolc (184.125). Szeged (156.443), 
Pecs (153,335), and Cyor (129,412) (http://www.ksh,hu) Throughout the text, the literal translation of the 
Hungarian term 'nagyvaros' will be used, and inverted commas will refer to the fact that the largeness 
of the cities in question is relative, and also to the fact that the understanding of the Hungarian term 
'nagyvaros' has been historically contested (FARACO, 2009). 
l i b 
A second reason for not drawing far-reaching conclusions from the NSDC is that 
the insertion of concerns about the role of major urban centres in the development 
of Hungary into the NSDC has not been followed by central state incentives for 
urban-centric development (see e.g. SOMLYODYNÉ PFEIL, 2008). Instead, it is the much-
criticized characteristics of post-1990 settlement network and urban development 
policy14 that prevail: a lack of incentives for cooperation in urban areas (PFEIL, 1999; 
2001; SOMLYÔDYNF PFEIL, 2003) and the undifferentiated treatment of the various 
elements of the urban network (PFEIL, 2001b; FARACO, 2003). Existing initiatives for the 
organization of service provision at the micro-regional level still do not differentiate 
but continue to be tailored rather to the needs of rural areas and, consequently, 
ignore the functional links that cities have with their hinterlands. While newly 
appearing interventions for urban rehabilitation do work with differentiations, partly 
based on territorial statistical schemes (in the case of less developed micro-regions), 
and partly based on juridical-administrative ones, state regulation has still not 
encouraged the (institutional) strengthening of urban regions (CAZSO et al., 2008; 
SOMLYODYNÉ PFFIL, 2006). Furthermore, no institutional frameworks have become 
established to support locational policies that focus on particular city-regions. 
In fact, with the emphasis of the "pole programme" shifting towards cluster 
development (i.e. towards the supporting of business networks regardless of the 
geographical location of the participating businesses), the concept of 'development 
pole' has become largely stripped of its geographical aspect. As to the Budapest 
region more specifically, although the Development Council for the Agglomeration 
of Budapest was re-established in 2005, the Council lacks resources and has no role 
with regard to EU funds allocation that is based on Hungary's NUTS2,5 regional 
di vision. The administrative fragmentation of the capital (both Budapest Municipality 
and its constituting districts are autonomous local governments) and the lack 
of Institutional linkages with its hinterland continue to impede metropolitan 
strategy-making. On the whole, contrasting reconfigured metropolitan governance 
regimes across Western Europe (BRENNER, 2003; 2004), even the Budapest region, 
Hungary's main metropolitan region and assigned 'plug-in' to the Western European 
14 Telepules, i.e. settlement is commonly used in combination with the words 'structure', 'network', or 
'development' (policy) in Hungarian scholarly and policy literature. I decided not to translate telepules in 
the combinations above as 'urban', considering that Hungary has been characterized by a different path 
of urbanization from that observable m Western Europe (see e.g. ENVEDI, 1996) and that consequently, the 
Hungarian terms for'urban'(vdros/)andfor settlement can be treated less as equivalents. 
15 NUTS stands for 'Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics' and was established by the European 
Office for Statistics (Eurostat) to provide a single uniform breakdown of territorial units for the production 
of regional statistics for the European Union. Following Regulation No.1059/2003 of the European 
Parliament and of the European Council of 26 May 2003, the average size of NUTS 2 level units is defined 
by a minimum population threshold of 800 000, and a maximum population threshold of 3 million. 
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space-economy (e g National Spatial Development Concept, 1998), has not been 
' i n v e n t e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y ' (PERCER, 2 0 0 3 , RECHNITZER, 2 0 0 6 ) 
Actual ly, at a closer look, i t becomes e v i d e n t t h a t t h e NSDC, as w e l l t h e 2 n d 
N a t i o n a l D e v e l o p m e n t Plan (Nemzeti Fejlesztesi Terv) (GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
HUNGARY, 2 0 0 6 ) t h a t carr ied f o r w a r d t h e object ives o f t h e NSDC, w e r e rather reserved 
c o n c e r n i n g t h e s t r a t e g i c d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f urban regions, b o t h in t e r m s o f publ ic 
service del ivery and e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t In f a c t , t h e NDSC already d i l u t e d t h e 
pole concept 's o r i g i n a l g e o g r a p h i c a l focus o n t h e f i v e large cit ies m e n t i o n e d above 
t h r o u g h t h e inclusion o f m o r e cit ies and t h r o u g h t h e d e s i g n a t i o n o f a n u m b e r o f 
t o w n s as 'sub-centers ' F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e exceedingly centra l ized f r a m e w o r k o f 
N a t i o n a l D e v e l o p m e n t Plan (NDP) i m p l e m e n t a t i o n m a d e t h e s t r e n g t h e n i n g o f t h e 
p o s i t i o n o f large cit ies q u e s t i o n a b l e f r o m t h e onset (FARACO, 2 0 0 6 ) 
The o b s e r v a t i o n s above are e v i d e n t l y at odds w i t h t h e p o i n t m a d e by r e g u l a t i o n ist 
scholars t h a t u r b a n - c e n t r i c , c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s - o r i e n t e d f o r m s o f locat ional pol icy are 
t h e d i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e o f t h e spat ial o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e neol iberal s tate On t h e one 
hand, Hungary 's ' n e o l i b e r a h z a t i o n ' can surely n o t be q u e s t i o n e d (see e g LASZLO, 2 0 0 5 , 
SoKOL, 2001) As it has been w i d e l y discussed, post-social ist t r a n s f o r m a t i o n in H u n g a r y 
and e lsewhere has been g r e a t l y f o r m e d by t h e f a c t t h a t i t s t a r t e d at a t i m e w h e n t h e 
g lobal h e g e m o n y o f neohbera l ism was at i ts h e i g h t (DRAHOKOUPIL, 2007) The 
W a s h i n g t o n consensus o f 1989, w i d e l y seen as m a r k i n g t h e g lobal t u r n t o neol iberal 
pract ices (e g HARVEY, 2 0 0 6 ) , w a s o f f e r e d as a b l u e p r i n t f o r Central Eastern European 
(CEE) e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s by i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s (BEREND, η d ) and had a 
great role m s h a p i n g a c t u a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n processes A f t e r t h e neol iberal 'shock 
t h e r a p y ' o f t h e early 1990s (see SOKOL, 2001), t h e process o f EU accession a l l o w e d 
f u r t h e r l ibera l izat ion m t r a d e and f i n a n c e (LASZLÔ, 2005) W i t h t he c o m m i t m e n t t o 
jo i n t he M o n e t a r y Un ion , a cond i t i on o f EU membersh ip ' 6 , t h e impos i t i on o f rest r ic t ive 
economic and f inanc ia l ta rge ts became inev i tab le, a m o u n t i n g t o another 'shock 
the rapy ' On t h e other hand, t h e neol iberahzat ion o f Hungary has not been 
accompan ied by t h e select ive regu la tory pr iv i leg ing o f urban areas, on t h e cont ra ry 
Interest m cit ies and c i ty regions as bases for in teg ra ted s t ra teg ic governance is 
(again) more man i fes t a m o n g Hungar ian academics (FARACO, 2 0 0 6 , 2008 , 2 0 0 9 , 
GAZSO et al, 2 θ θ 8 , SOMLYODYNÉ PFEIL, 2 0 0 6 , Ter es Tarsadalom, 2008) But, at t he same 
t i m e , g o v e r n m e n t pol icy documen ts have only sparsely deal t w i t h t he issue, i f at all 
(e g MINISTRY OF SELF GOVERNMENT AND SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT, 2007) , and even t h e n w i t h o u t 
using t h e t e r m c i ty region (varosregio) 
16 EU candidate countries were precluded from the option of opt outs by the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 and 
committed to join the Monetary Union 
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The present chapter's objective is to examine the evolution of the concept of 
'development pole' and also why cities and city-regions have not been privileged 
institutionally in Hungary. More generally, this chapter wishes to grasp neoliberal 
state spatial forms that are not grounded in 'urban locational policies'. As I will show, 
the PSA framework, by reinterpreting the messiness of Hungary's state spatial 
reforms intermsof discursive selectivity, can help us to develop a better understanding 
of the lack of urban locational politicies in 'neoliberal' Hungary. More specifically, 
I will argue that the undifferentiated treatment of Hungary's urban regions can be 
explained by the way three particular discursive formations of state space - that of 
self-government, spatial development and development policy - became instituted. 
Furthermore, I will suggest that struggles around the redefinition of the Hungarian 
nation as a spatial community have significantly shaped these processes of 
institution. 
The focus of the current study is approximately on the period between May 
2004, i.e. Hungary's EU accession, and December 2006, when the 2"'' National 
Development Plan was approved by Parliament. However, for a better understanding 
of the persistent lack of urban locational policies in Hungary, the period in question 
is embedded within the broader post-iggo period of "actually existing post-socialism". 
Furthermore, it was indispensable to connect post-1990 developments to the period 
of "actually existing socialism", as well as to some milestones and characteristics of 
Hungarian state formation prior to that period. This broader historical embedding 
was considered im portant for demonstrating how the structurally inserì bed discursive 
selectivities of the state have evolved. As to the end point of the above-mentioned 
period, I consulted some policy documents (including calls for tender) that were 
issued between December 2006 and March 2008, in order to be certain that the 
actual measures taken are not radically diverging from the Ν DP on the basis of which 
I have drawn conclusions. 
5.1 Setting the scene: 'system-change' and the modernizat ion 
of H u n g a r y 
Although the unfolding of Hungary's post-socialist transformation is - j u s t as in the 
case of other CEE countries - commonly linked to the 'events of 1989' (SMITH and 
PICKLES, 1998), "actually existing socialism" started to become undermined much 
earlier. While the Soviet Union continued to maintain a f i rm geopolitical authority 
over it, Hungary, similarly to other CEE states, came increasingly under a peculiarly 
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late state-socialist form of economic dependence on Western capital This economic 
dependence took the form, especially from the 1980s, of a fast escalating indebtedness 
Hungary's 'dual dependency' was shaped by a set of interrelated processes, including 
the introduction of partial market elements in the late 1960s to the mid-1970s, the 
forming of a system of state subsidies that supported the private consumption of 
non essential commodities, and the experience of the global explosion of fossil fuel 
and energy prices (BOROCZ, 1992, BOROCZ and SARKAR, 2005) 
It is not the objective of this study to discuss the 'events of 1989', or the wide 
range of broader factors - such as the inefficiency of socialist economies (e g ADAM, 
1996, BEREND, 2001) and persisting legitimation problems (SZELENYI and SZELENYI, 1994) -
that contributed to the fall of socialism Briefly, it is assumed that post-socialist 
transformation should not be seen simply as a relatively unproblematic 
implementation of a set of policies involving neoliberal economic liberalization and 
marketization alongside democratization, but as a complex political economic 
process (SMITH and PICKLES, 1998) In the sphere of welfare (re)distribution, for example, 
a new welfare model was already introduced m the mid-1980s, thus prior to processes 
of democratization and marketization (HANEY, 2001) On the other hand, 'technically', 
the amendment of the constitution'7 in 1990 that characterized Hungary as an 
'independent democratic state under the rule of law' brought about political 'system 
change' (rendszervaltas) If, m turn, we consider the restoration of sovereignty as 
fundamental, then 'system change' was accomplished wi th the dissolution of the 
Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary (ROMSICS, 1999) 
Taking the start of the market economy as the mam indicator, ROMSICS (ibid ) dates the 
end of system change to the late 1990s (although, the 1990 amendment of the 
constitution already stated that Hungary was operating a 'market economy''8) 
According to GRESKOVITS (2004), economic transition in Hungary came to an end in the 
mid-1990s, without meaning that changes were entirely over 
In fact, just as its starting point, the 'end point' of post-socialist transformation 
cannot be defined m a straightforward manner Post-socialist transformation has 
been m some respects undoubtedly a transition (system change), thus something 
that can be seen as 'being over' However, from the "plurality of transitions" (STARK, 
1992), the 'less technical' ones - such as the redefinition of nationhood (e g FOWLER, 
17 Unlike other post socialist states Hungary did not adopt a new constitution but heavily amended its 
existing constitution (ie Act XX/1949 - itself modelled on [he 1936 Constitution) Although first it was 
understood that a new constilulion would be adopted by the newly elected parliament this did not 
happen nor has it to date Rather it is the (substantially amended) text of the previous constitution that 
is m force 
18 Act XL/1990 of 25 June 1990 Article 1(1) and Article 9(1)) 
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2004; OFFE, 1991; YOUNG and LICHT, 2001) - are arguably still not finished. As some have 
pointed out, current developments are still being shaped by the legacies of "actually 
existing socialism" (in combination wi th the legacy of post-1990 choices, see FOWLER, 
2002; STENNINC and HORSCHELMANN, 2008). 
Within the framework of the Politics of Space Approach, 'the events of 1989' (and 
1990) can be seen as events of dislocation that questioned and dismantled the 
socialist regime and, at the same, t ime fostered an acute need to create "a new 
discursive order that promises the full realization of the dislocated identities within 
a unified communal space" (TORFING, 1999, p. 195). The events in question have 
enforced fundamental decisions, among other things, concerning the issue of how to 
(re) organize state spaces in Hungary. Of course, as the struggle to delineate Hungary's 
post-1990 modernization strategy is ongoing, these decisions have become inevitably 
contested. Consequently, the process of post-socialist transformation has been 
continuously contested as well. 
The emphasis on the contested character of post-socialist transformation is 
central to the present study's consideration of the 'neoliberal imperatives' faced by 
Hungary. In fact, as several scholars (e.g. AGNEW, 2001; FARACO, 2003) have noted, the 
(subsequent waves of) neoliberal shock therapy that CEE countries have been 
subjected to explains largely the centralization of decision-making and the shrinking 
room for addressing spatial disparities. Genuine decentralization of development 
resources and competences to sub-national authorities in CEE countries has been 
halted by fears that decentralization aggravates fiscal imbalances and, as a 
consequence, endangers overall macroeconomic stability (DABLA-NORRIS, 2006). 
Furthermore, in face ofcontradicting neolibera I objectives, namely growth orientation 
vs. fiscal stringency - objectives that new member states had to commit themselves 
to - the central state has had limited room for addressing differences in spatial 
development (see BUDD, 1997; 2008). As AGH (2005) noted more specifically wi th 
regard to Hungary, it is the price paid for accession that the imperative of decreasing 
the budget deficit constrains the implementation of the second wave of sub-national 
territorial reorganization (the first being the reforms of the early 1990s). 
This study acknowledges that neoliberal policy imperatives have structurally 
worked against the strategic differentiation of sub-national spaces in Hungary. 
On the other hand, it assumes that this is only part of the explanation and that we 
can arrive at a fuller picture only if we consider that neoliberal rationalities become 
hegemonic in shaping state space by articulating wi th the discursive formations of 
nation-state space. In other words, we have to investigate how state spaces have 
been shaped through struggles over Hungary's (spatial) modernization. The present 
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chapter will proceed m three larger steps First, the foundational years of "actually 
existing post-socialism" are discussed. The subsequent section examines processes 
of state spatial reordering from the mid-1990s until the immediate aftermath of 
Hungary's EU accession Finally, based on the above, the last section offers a more 
detailed analysis of how dilemmas of state spatial organization, and m particular, the 
issue of the regulatory differentiation of cities and city-regions were addressed m 
the run-up to the approval of the 2nd National Development Plan, commonly referred 
to as New Hungary Development Plan (Uj Magyarorszag Fejlesztesi Terv) 
5.2 The foundat ional years of "actually existing post-socialism" 
In this section, the most important state spatial reforms of the f irst half of the 1990s 
are discussed the 1990 Local Self-Covernment Act (A helyi onkormànyzatokról szóló 
torvény) and its modification m 1994 The reforms in question established some of 
the key 'institutional givens' of the post-1990 Hungarian state, m other words, the 
reforms structurally inscribed some of the key discursive selectivities of the state. 
Here it should be noted that similarly to other post-socialist countries - and differing 
from the 'established capitalist states of Western Europe' - t h e structural inscription 
of the mam institutional 'givens' of the Hungarian state took place within a relatively 
short period m the late 1980s and early 1990s In that respect, the political origin of 
the structurally inscribed discursive selectivities of Hungarian statehood is more 
evidently traceable For example, Hungary's mixed electoral system, which embodies 
a structurally inscribed selectivity of the post-1990 Hungarian state, can be traced to 
a party political compromise m 1989 Similarly- and this will be examined below in 
more detail - t h e role of municipal and county authorities was also established m the 
course of a discursive struggle Of course, these 'givens' have not been irremovable 
constraints, even though practically speaking - especially in the case of legal 
amendments requiring a two-thirds parliamentary majority - they have often 
appeared as such In fact, as noted above, while as a result of transition, the new 
discursive order of Hungarian statehood has become largely given, at the same t ime, 
'system change' has become - and remained - contested 
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5.2.7 The iggo Local Self-Covernment Act 
The 1990 Local Self-Government Act was the first crucial milestone in Hungary's 
state spatial reorganization. In fact, the 1990 Act elaborated on the stipulations of 
the previously amended Constitution according to which "the country is made up of 
the capital, counties, cities and villages"19 (see HAJDU, 2005, p. 230). As Hajdu notes, 
the paragraph defining the basic territorial categories of the Hungarian state barely 
differed from the pre-i990 version, except the significant change that 'People's 
Republic of Hungary' was replaced by 'Republic of Hungary'. 
The 1990 Act defined the right to local government as the collective right of 
citizens living in the same settlement. Subsequently, the number of (municipal) local 
governments almost doubled, as many settlements separated from the larger units 
that were created in forced mergers in the 19605 and the 1971 reform. In the end, over 
35% of municipal self-governments had less than 500 inhabitants (PAL KOVACS, 1999). 
Also, the Act considerably cut back on the powers of the counties (see Figure 5.2). 
In order to warrant the autonomy of municipal self-governments, the Act designated 
the self-governments of villages, towns and counties as local governments. With 
regard to municipal/county relations, this meant that the two have a coordinative 
relationship and that no unilateral dependence is to occur (PFEIL, 1999). 
Municipal governments were presented with obligatory and optional tasks; 
however, no legal consequences were defined with regard to the failure to carry out 
the former (PFEIL, 1999). Eventually, municipal governments often tended to take on 
responsibilities for which they lacked the resources to deliver effectively. At the same 
time, they showed litt le willigness to utilize the provisions in the 1990 legislation that 
allowed them to carry out tasks of'supra-m unici pal nature' in cooperation with each 
other. According to PFEIL (1999), this reluctance was also due to the lack of adequate 
central incentives. In particular, the 1990 Act did not pay attention to the functional 
space of urban areas and ignored the integrative functions of cities. The fact that 
certain cities fulf i l functions of a regional centre, i.e. they provide public services for 
people from beyond their jurisdiction ('spill over'), was not acknowledged by the 
grant scheme according to which they received central subsidies (SOMLYÓDYNÉ PFEIL, 
2003). 
As to the function of counties, the 1990 Act stipulated that they have almost no 
administrative functions and can assume only those functions that municipal 
19 Furthermore, the Constitution stated that the capital is made up of districts and that in cities, districts can 
be formed (see HAJDU, 2005, p. 230). As this study does not focus on the spatial organization of the capital, 
it considers these stipulations less relevant. 
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Figure 5.2 Hungarian counties 
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governments are not obliged to perform or that they refuse to carry out. Counties' 
rather restricted budgets were to be determined by the decrees of the central 
government. An important stipulation of the new legislation concerned the tit le 'city 
with county rights' (megyei jogu varos) - a tit le, fol lowing the 1990 Act, accorded by 
Parliament to towns with more than 50 000 inhabitants' . Cities with this tit le were 
given the right to undertake county-level competencies within their own geographic 
area. It is important to note that the inhabitants of cities with county rights are not 
allowed to vote at county assembly elections. Furthermore, with the 1990 Act the 
practice of granting town status to settlements became liberal and any viIlage could 
apply to receive it. Finally, concerning meso-level state administration and local 
government supervision, the institution of the commissioner of the republic 
(köztarsasagi megbizott) was introduced. The commissioners were appointed by the 
President of the Republic" and had regional areas of responsibility. 
20 Subsequently, the 1994 modif icat ion granted the t i t le also to county seats w i th less than 50 0 0 0 
inhabitants (there were two such county seats, Salgotarjan and Szekszârd) (see STEINER and DARAZS, 2006). 
21 The President of the Republic Is elected by members of the Parliament for five years and has a largely 
ceremonial role. 
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As the municipal level became overly fragmented (and increasingly financially 
dependent on the central state) and counties weakened at the same time, 
deconcentrated agencies of the state started to proliferate. These organs gradually 
extended their influence over municipal and meso-level affairs (PAL KOVÂCS, 1999). No 
legal provision existed with regard to cooperation between county administrations 
and deconcentrated bodies (POGATSA, 2005). While the government claimed that the 
commissioners of the republic- who became increasingly active agents of the central 
government - were compensating for the weaknesses of the new local government 
sector, the opposition saw them as harassing especially opposition-controlled local 
authorities (FOWLER, 2001). 
In 1994, under the coalition government of the Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar 
Szocialista Part - MSZP) and the Alliance of Free Democrats [Szabad Demokratak 
Szövetsége - SZDSZ), a revision of the Local Self-Government Act was passed (the 
coalition had the two-thirds majority that is needed to amend the constitution and 
certain key laws, such as the Local Self-Government Act). The revision affected two 
meso-level institutions in particular, the office of the commissioner of the republic 
and county governments (assemblies). As to the former, they were replaced by 
county-based public administration offices in the nineteen counties and Budapest, 
with the head of office appointed by the Minister of the Interior. The government 
argued that 'the region' as a unit of public administration had not worked and that 
the heads of the new offices were to be civil servants and not quasi-political figures 
(FOWLER, 2001). 
As to county assemblies, it was stipulated that they be elected directly through 
lists. In particular, the MSZP had become a strong supporter of revived county 
government, presumably anticipating success in direct county elections to match its 
national position (in the 1994 parliamentary elections the MSZP achieved an outright 
majority). Actually, the institution of direct, list-based county assembly elections 
caused county politics to be 'colonized' by established national parties (FOWLER, 2001). 
The 1994 direct county polls saw 81% of county assembly seats taken by representatives 
of the six parliamentary parties, and all but two of the county assembly presidents 
elected after the 1994 sub-national elections were party candidates. This was a 
considerable shift from the 1990-1994 period when representatives of civic and 
non-party organizations and independent presidents had a much larger share. 
Furthermore, the governing parties emerged as the strongest force at county level 
(Ace, n.d.; FOWLER, 2001). It is important to note that a change of electoral rules in 1994 
opened up the way for cumulative mandates as it became possible for county 
assembly presidents and mayors to be parliamentary deputies at the same time 
"S 
(PALNE KOVACS, PARASKEVOPOULOS and HORVATH, 2004) The development of partisan links 
between county politics and the national parties further strengthened the 
institutional position won by county governments in 1994 (FOWLER, 2001) 
Finally, a crucial stipulation of the 1994 revision was the definition of county 
governments as 'territorial' (teruleti) self-governments Nonetheless, there were still 
obstacles to treating counties as 'one' territory, most significantly because a county 
and a city/cities with county rights within the same county's territory continued to be 
under the control of two separate regional authorities, without being represented in 
each other's bodies Although the 1994 modification attempted to appease the 
prevailing rivalry over the ownership and maintenance of meso-level institutions by 
prescribing reconciliation committees, cities with county rights continued to operate 
m a kind of isolation, without institutionalized connections to surrounding municipalities 
(PFEIL, 1999) Due to the fact that cities with county rights were not represented in the 
county assembly, county assemblies came in fact to represent small communities and 
towns As a result of this split-up, the formulation of comprehensive development 
objectives for the entire county became difficult (PAL KOVACS, 1999) 
5 2 2 Municipal and county self-governments as discursively selected state spaces 
Within the framework of the PSA, the system of self-government introduced by the 
1990 Act (and modified m 1994) can be regarded as a discursive formation of state 
space More specifically, it is a discursive formation based on a chain of equivalence 
between local autonomy and democracy, and the collective of inhabitants of a 
particular settlement Implicitly, it takes settlements to be the 'natural' basic units of 
democracy The discursive formation of self-government operates further along a 
certain juridical rationality of spatial ordering, positing 'self-government' and the 
equality of settlements - regardless of their size - as the unquestioned element of 
spatial order Even though m 1994, counties were identified as territorial (instead of 
local) self-governments, the discursive formation of self-government left hardly any 
room for addressing the relations between scales (and due to the equality of 
settlements, relations between places) In particular, any hierarchical understanding 
of inter-scalar and mter-mumcipal relations was made unthinkable 
As we will see later m this chapter, the institution of the discursive formation of 
self-government {onkormanyzatisag) has had profound consequences for the way 
other discursive formations of state space could develop complementary rationalities 
for the ordering of state space Accordingly, it is worth examining how the very process 
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of institution took place: such an examination supplies us with insights that will be 
helpful for understanding subsequent state spatial reforms. The institution of the 
system of self-government will be discussed here in terms of the discursive selectivity 
of the Hungarian state. The discussion will proceed in two main steps. First, the 
structurally inscribed discursive selectivities of nation-state spaces in Hungary are 
discussed. These selectivities can be mapped via those, relatively sedimented, spatial 
practices and meanings that have shaped the emergence of new (state) spaces in 
Hungary. Here, these spatial practices and meanings are discussed under four main 
headings: the significations of the county, the népies-urbanus debate, the urban-rural 
divide, and the Budapest-wde/i divide (the meaningof the term 'videk' w\\\ be discussed 
below). It should be noted that particular meanings and practices cannot always be 
neatly assigned under only one of the above-mentioned headings. This signals that 
rather than being clear-cut constraints, structurally inscribed discursive selectivities 
are relatively stable and interconnected sets of relational meanings and practices. In a 
second step, I will briefly discuss how different actors, in particular representatives of 
the newly formed political parties, made structurally informed claims in the 
parliamentary debates of the early 1990s on state spatial reforms, and how, eventually, 
the interplay of discursive selectivities on the one hand and the above claims on the 
other instituted the discursive formation of self-government. 
5.2.2.7 Structurally Inscribed discursive selectivities of Hungary's state spaces 
The significations of the county 
Counties are commonly seen as established by King (later Saint) Stephen whose 
coronation at Christmas 1000 or New Year 1001 is, following conventional Hungarian 
historiography, also the foundation of the Hungarian state. In fact, as HAJDU (2005) 
notes, during Stephen's rule the county system (consisting of between forty and 
forty-five units) co-existed with the remnants of the territorial organization of tribal 
society. Actually, the Hungarian designation for county, i.e. megye, a word with Slavic 
roots meaning 'border', did not even figure explicitly in the laws of Stephen and 
appeared only in the laws of Coloman who ruled at the end of the eleventh century 
(ibid.). 
The counties developed from medieval royal administrative units into agencies 
of home rule and self-government for the nobility in the thirteenth century22. 
22 The county ceased to be called 'county of the royal castle' (kiralyi varmegye) ana became 'county of the 
nobility' {nemesi megye). 
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The county was formed as the compromise between central royal power and the 
county nobility (HAJDU, 2005) as laid down in the 1222 Golden Bull, a charter resembling 
the Magna Carta (MAKKAI, 1994) At the same time, kings recognized that they could 
rely on the fort i f ied towns - t h e elite of which was mostly of German origin - m their 
struggle against the nobility In order to increase the political weight of towns - and 
to make them subject to royal control m face of that of the county nobility - special 
privileges were granted to them From the early f i f teenth century, different categories 
of free royal towns existed (ENGFL, 2001, PALNE KOVACS, 2008) Over the centuries, the 
county system became the stronghold of the political power and influence of the 
nobility (in particular the lesser nobility) Counties tended to function as 'miniature 
republics', wi th the alispan'1 act mg as the chief executive and the county congregation 
as the parliament (DEME, 1988) Crucially, the county-based system of self government 
in Hungary preserved its feudal character until the second half of the nineteenth 
century As such, it fundamentally contrasted with general trends of change m public 
administration m continental Europe, where centralized bureaucratic public 
administration systems emerged under eighteenth-century absolutism (KAUENBACH, 
η d ), breaking the territorial hold of the nobility over the countryside (DEME, 1988) 
The persistence of the power of the county-based nobility was strongly linked to the 
fact that the nobility represented the Hungarian nation (ibid , KALTENBACH, η d ) 
Hungary was part of the Habsburg Empire since 1526, and absolutist reforms were 
commonly perceived as decidedly 'foreign' and oppressive The counties claimed the 
right to pass judgement over the constitutionality of royal decrees and successfully 
boycotted those found illegal One (or possibly even the most) important boycott 
wasthat against the attempt of Emperor Josef 11 to deprive counties of their autonomy 
and to modernize public administration through the establishment of ten, 
mtendant-led districts m the mid-iySos (HAJDU, 2005) As a result, apart from the 
elected county officials, there was no royal or state bureaucracy at the local level m 
Hungary prior to 1848 This also entailed that "the peasant remained the subject of 
the noble instead of becoming the subject of the state" (DEME, 1988, ρ 576) 
As contemporary historians note, the 'heroic resistance' of the Hungarian nobility 
had a significant impact on local development While the county nobility fulfi l led an 
important public function by providing local administration when the state did not 
(DEME, 1988), county politics was often exhausted by fights for office and thus failed 
to deal w i t h tasks assumed by central administration m Western Europe (KALTENBACH, 
η d ) According to KALTENBACH (n d ), the price for the nobility's victory over absolutism 
23 The titular head of the county was a royal appointee the/o/spon Usually a magnate the/oispon seldom 
stayed m the county and real power devolved to the alispan 
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was paid by the development of Hungarian society: the 'patriotic' attachment to the 
feudal constitution meant also a resistance to modernization. 
The nobility's resistance to public administration reform was central to the 
debate between 'centralists' and 'municipalists' during the period from 1825 until 
1848, commonly referred to as the 'Hungarian Reform Era'. Here only a concise 
discussion of the debate is provided, based on BODY'S (1972) account. Centralists 
contended that the f i f ty- two counties of Hungary, exercising absolute power over 
local taxation, justice, public administration and welfare, and dominated by the lesser 
nobility, represented the greatest obstacle to reform. They proposed that through 
gradua I reform, the counties must surrender their powers to the Hungarian Parliament 
that should become the supreme legislative body. The next step would have been the 
establishment of a Hungarian ministry responsible to Parliament which, in turn, 
would have had to be recognized by the Austrian government as the highest executive 
in Hungary. In fact, centralists wished to build a new Hungary which would draw its 
political inspiration from the Enlightenment and Romanticism - t w o sources of the 
tradition of Western freedom. They were convinced that only the consistent 
application of the principle of liberty to all public issues - the county system, the 
nationalities, the Habsburg connection - would achieve their desired aim. 
Municipalists' programme in turn was designed to ensure the supremacy of the lesser 
nobility in Hungarian politics. This was to be done by preserving the feudal county 
system, by emphasizing Hungarian nationalism against the Habsburgs and by 
'Magyarizing' the Rumanian, Slovak, Serb and Croatian nationalities. Apart from their 
support for the full legislative rights of the Hungarian Parliament, the position of 
centralists and municipalists was fundamentally different. Centralists regarded the 
programme of municipalists as perpetuating political injustice. Municipalists in turn 
did not want to accept that Western influences must supplant traditional Hungarian 
practices (BODY, 1972). 
The Austro-Hungarian Compromise {Ausgleich) of 1867, founding the Dual 
Monarchy and establishing Hungary constitutionally as a semi-autonomous part of 
the Habsburg Empire, brought about a consolidation of Hungary's territorial 
administration (HAJDU, 2005). Counties lost their power of jurisdiction to independent 
royal courts and, as a result, counties'tasks became restricted to public administration 
(ROMSICS, 1999). Legislation passed between 1870 and 1872 on the administration of 
counties, and urban and rural districts revealed the government's desire to curtail 
local self-government and to encourage greater centralization. Each county was to 
be administered by a governor with extended powers, nominated by the government 
and appointed by the monarch (ibid.). As KALTENBACH (n.d.) notes, the fact that the 
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government's power was considerably constrained by that of the monarch explains 
the government's efforts to 'nationalize' self-government (and resulting 
centralization) persisting local autonomy would have even further restricted 
the government's room for action It is important to note that about one third of 
the posts available in central state offices and two-thirds of those in county 
administrations were controlled by a class formed by (part of) the nobility that 
failed to adapt to new economic conditions and became impoverished The social 
status of the low-paid and - because of its lavish lifestyle - often indebted landless 
gentry (dzsentn) that acquired these offices was higher than that of the wealthy 
bourgeoisie (BEREND, 1987) The expansion of paid offices entailed at the same time 
the decrease of county autonomy, counties gradually became the executive arms of 
the central state (KONRAD and SZELENYI, 2000) 
Under socialism, the council system was above all a framework for hierarchical 
state control, service provision and local development was only a secondary objective 
(HAJDU, 2005) As industrial location guidelines determined which settlements were 
"worthy of development", the idea of concentrated development was also at the root 
of plans for the settlement structure under socialism The mam logic o f - recurrently 
changing - development concepts was the hierarchical classification of settlements 
which continued to shape development thinking until the mid 1980s Settlement 
classification was at the same time a blueprint for the distribution of public services, 
where high ranking in the hierarchy meant central place status and thus preferential 
central funding, and lower ranking translated as negligence or complete abandonment 
(CERMUSKA, 2002, HAJDU, 2005) In fact, the functional ranking of settlements was less 
and less a descriptive exercise but acquired a highly normative character (KONRAD AND 
SZELENYI, 2000) The National Settlement Network Development Concept {Orszagos 
Telepuleshalozat-fejlesztesi Koncepao) of 1971 backed development investments in 
what were called "upper level regional centres" The Concept actually reinforced 
already existing processes of economic, social and administrative centralization 
In particular, the Concept enhanced the role of county councils by relegating 
development control for the majority of settlements (3000) to county settlement 
network development plans (HAJDU, 2005) The introduction of a - restricted - notion 
of self-government by the 3"1 Council Act in 1971 contributed to the empowerment of 
county councils Actually, the strengthened position of county councils in funds 
redistribution became subject to much critique (ibid ) The Concept became a basis 
for lobbying and rent-seeking as lower level settlements feared that they might lose 
out on investments (FARAGO, 2006) 
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At this point it has to be mentioned that under socialism, counties became 
strengthened not only vis-à-vis (the majority of) settlements. The reinforcement of 
the position of counties in the 1970s similarly played a role in the gradual fading away 
of the concept of (regional) planning districts. The delimitation of larger economic 
districts, modelled on Soviet regional planning practice, was on the agenda from the 
early 1950s on (FARACO, 2005; HORVÂTH, 2005), based on the view that administrative 
boundaries do not correspond to the needs of the planned economy. As a textbook 
on regional planning noted in 1954: 
"It is now clear that Hungarian territorial divisions based on the old county system no longer 
meet the objectives of [the project of] building socialism and create considerable amounts 
of conflicts" (Fürst, cited by FARACÓ, 2005, p. 77). 
In 1963, the government accepted the division of the country into six economic 
districts (with boundariescrossingcounty boundaries) for regional planning purposes, 
named after Budapest and the five larger regional centres (i.e. Gyor, Pecs, Szeged, 
Debrecen, and Miskolc). Counties competed with county seats in acquiring resources 
for industrial and communal developments and, in the case of the 'large' v/deit/cities, 
a compromise was formed according to which these cities would aspire only to 
'average' growth. County seats that did not belong to the above-mentioned group of 
'large cities' also opposed those cities being privileged. The five cities in question 
were not interested in pursuing outstanding growth either; most of them were still 
struggling to satisfy housing demand generated by the expansive industrialization of 
the 1950s and 1960s. Eventually, county leaders achieved that regional district plans 
were prepared on a county basis (KONRÂD and SZELENYI, 2000). In fact, in the course of 
Hungary's history, a regional level could only be imposed effectively on that of the 
counties by foreign rule. Most notably, following Hungary's defeat in the war of 
independence of 1848-49, fought against Habsburg rule, the Austrian authorities 
exacted a heavy-handed revenge. The Hungarian Kingdom - one of the five crown 
lands into which 'historical Hungary' was subdivided - came under absolutist 
administration: it was subdivided into five districts, governed by officials appointed 
by Vienna; at the same time, counties lost their autonomy (CANCÔ, 2001). Eventually, 
the district-based "public administration dictatorship" lasted only until 1861 (HAJDÜ, 
2005). 
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The 'népies-urbànus' debate 
The népies-urbànus2« debate has been fought by the intellectual elite over Hungary's 
desirable path to modernization and the legitimacy of various developmental 
strategies that Hungary ought to follow m order to catch up with the developed 
world While it goes beyond the scope of this study to give a detailed account of the 
enormously complex debate (see eg. FRICZ, 1997, GYURGYAK, 2007; HELLER and RENYI, 
1995), it is important to consider it briefly As intellectuals played a key role m the 
transition process25 in Hungary, the népies-urbànus debate was reactivated and came 
to shape the political and party landscape of the transition period (FRICZ, 1997) In fact, 
the debate continues to impact not only on what is 'thinkable' m terms of developing 
Hungary today, but also on what is 'thinkable' m terms of Hungary's spatial 
organization and development. Actually, the link between the evolving 'népies-
urbànus' divide and state spatial organization has gone largely unnoticed so far 
(although see FARACO, 2005) To date, the debate seems to have been more relevant to 
political and sociological analyses (e.g. FRICZ, 1997, GYURGYAK, 2007, MOLNAR, 2005, 
PALONEN, 2006; 2009) than to the analysis of state spatial reorganization This study 
wishes to stress, however, that proponents of the debate's two camps have not only 
proposed modernization strategies for Hungary, but have, at the same time, 
contributed greatly to framing understandings of the (desirable) forms of Hungarian 
state spatiality 
The 'népies-urbànus' debate can be traced back to the nineteenth century, and it 
re-emerged m the 1920s and 1930s as a literary debate and intellectual rivalry of two 
opposing (internally heterogeneous) camps. While these two camps agreed that 
'becoming part of Europe', embourgeoisement and 'becoming a nation' would be 
desirable, they differed fundamentally in their views on how this should be achieved 
(FRICZ, 1997) The folk writers' [népi irók) concerns were above all about rural poverty 
and backwardness, and they supported a form of anti-capitalist development based 
on small farm based agriculture They argued that rural social problems can be 
remedied by radical agrarian reforms, land redistribution and the modernization of 
small farms. In their view, land was not only the embodiment of wealth, but the 
symbol of national existence, furthermore, they saw the peasantry cultivating the 
24 Although all the English language sources that this study draws on translate the above as popuhst-
urbamst' (in fact, urbamst-populist), this translation is not considered here as appropriate The author 
agrees wi th Fricz (1997) that above all the translation of nepies as 'populist' is problematic, as it has a nega-
tive connotation that nepies, an adjective derived from the noun meaning'folk 'or 'people'(nep) does not 
have Accordingly, the Hungarian term wil l be used throughout the study 
25 Intellectuals did not play such a prominent role m other CEE transit ion countries as in Hungary In Poland 
for example, the first organized oppositional force, the Solidarity independent trade union, was "born" as 
a protest movement of workers (see e g PBOHNIICHI, 2006) 
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land as representing the nation (BURGER, 2005; CYURCYAK, 2007). As to the camp of 
urbanistak, they wished to synthesize socialism and individualism on the one hand, 
and socialism and liberalism on the other; they were propagating democratism and 
humanism. In fact, they were in favour of ' the' Western European developmental 
model and its adoption because they found that this model had proved its worth. 
The nepiek in turn argued that there are inherent differences between existing 
Western and Hungarian patterns of development that must be taken into account in 
the formulation of modernization strategies (FRICZ, 1997); briefly, Hungary should 
follow a 'third road' between East and West, and between capitalism and socialism 
(KOROSENYI, I 9 9 9 ) . 
In the post-war period, the (communist) Hungarian Workers' Party attempted to 
eliminate any debates concerning social modernization and, accordingly, stripped 
the népìes-urbónus debate of publicity (ERICZ, 1997). As ERICZ (ibid.) notes, however, 
while communists were inherently hostile to the liberalism of urbanistak, they did 
draw on népies symbolism to enhance the regime's popular appeal. Parallel to the 
appeasement of the regime from the 1960s onwards, the nepies-urbanus debate was 
gradually reactivated, with the views of the two camps appearing, albeit latently, in 
public debate. 
During the 1980s, the increasingly active opposition became largely shaped by 
the nepies-urbanus divide and, parallel wi th the 1989-90 turn, the debate became 
inscribed into Hungary's party political landscape. The two major oppositional forces 
of late socialism and main rivals in the first 1990 parliamentary elections, the 
Hungarian Democratic Eorum {Magyar Demokrata Forum - MDE) and the Alliance of 
Eree Democrats (SZDSZ), could be largely seen as carrying forward, albeit in 
reformulated terms, key elements of respectively népies and urbanus thinking26. 
Continuity with previous manifestations of the debate was observable especially as 
the two parties reproduced the traditional opposition between a more (national) 
particularist perspective on state modernization and a more universalist/ 
internationalist ('European') perspective. In other words, the MDE (the advocate of 
the népies legacy) formulated its critique of the socialist regime on the basis of a 
fundamental concern with the redefinition of a modern Hungarian national course 
of development. The SZDSZ in turn advanced a more liberal-technocratic critique of 
the socialist political-economic system, without the (often pathetic-emotional) 
concern of the other camp with issues of national identity. With, on the one hand, 
26 It has to be noted that the nepies-urbanus divide was not the only divide shaping the first period of 
parliamentary democracy between 1990 and 1994: KOROSENVI {1999). for example, speaks of three major 
(traditional Hungarian) 'political cleavages': the communist/anti-communist cleavage, the religious/ 
secular cleavage, and the rural/urban cleavage 
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the MDF emerging as the winner of the first elections and forming a government 
with the Independent Smallholders' Party [Fuggetlen Kisgazdapart - FKgP) and the 
Christian Democratic People's Party {Kereszténydemokrata Néppart - KDNP) and, on 
the other, the SZDSZ becoming the strongest oppositional force, supported by the 
Federation of Young Democrats {Fiatai Demokratak Szovetsége - FIDESZ) and (partly) 
by the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), the nepies-urbanus divide became further 
institutionalized Later, especially following the 1994 elections, a bipolar configuration 
of Hungarian politics along the népies-urbànus divide was even more strengthened 
(FOWLER, 2004b; KOROSENYI, 1999, PALONEN, 2006; 2009). The shift towards this bipolar 
politics from 1994 was significantly encouraged by Hungary's mixed electoral system 
m which majoritanan effects dominate proportional ones. 
The urban-rural divide 
The urban-rural divide has been one of the major traditional political cleavages in 
Hungary (KOROSENYI, 1999) that is closely related to the népies-urbànus debate As 
noted above, the nepiek propagated a view of land as the symbol of 'Hungananness'. 
It is in relation to this that 'vidék' (the countryside) acquired its (still existing) 
connotation as 'uncorrupted', 'patriotic', and 'healthy' Hungary (BART, 2002), the 
repository of national identity. At the same time, wi th Germans and Jews being over-
represented m the urban bourgeoisie, cities, and especially the capital Budapest, 
became seen as 'non-Hungarian'. Urbamstak, in turn, accused népiek of rural 
romanticism and argued that the 'good' of cities, including the urban masses' 
assertive enforcement of their rights, has to spread to villages They stressed that 
cities have been central to Western European development (GYURGYAK, 2007) Actually, 
considering the huge differences between Budapest (and also other cities) and the 
vidék m terms of living conditions m the 1930s27, the vidék has come to signify 
'backwardness''8 (see e.g. KULCSAR, 2008) 
At this point, it is useful to make some brief remarks on the process of urbanization 
m Hungary. The already mentioned foundation of the Dual (Austro-Hunganan) 
Monarchy in 1867 brought about an era of prosperity in Hungary, albeit m a spatially 
27 In 1930,83% of the apartments m Budapest had electricity and 85% piped water, in other (videki) cities, the 
proportions were 52% and 25% respectively (ROMSO, 1999, ρ 203) 
28 Videk, literally meaning 'surroundings' or 'environment', signifies 'the rest of the country' (as opposed t o 
Budapest), 1 e the 'countryside' and provincial cities At the same t ime, provincial (videki) cities have their 
own vtdek, m the sense of their hinterland Considering this richness of meaning,! have not translated [he 
Hungarian term and wil l indicate the specific connotation where necessary 
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unequal manner. Industrial take-off - generated by foreign (mostly Austrian and 
Czech) capital investment (KOVACS and DOVENYI, 1998) - was limited to a handful of 
cities and the modernization of these cities remained isolated within a predominantly 
pre-industrial urban network (ENYEDI, 1996). Furthermore, urbanization during the era 
of dualism was greatly linked to the assignment of state administration functions 
(BELUSZKY and GYORI, 2003). As administrative centres were needed in weakly urbanized 
areas as well, the settlements that acquired administrative functions (even county 
seat status) in these areas often had low population numbers and were often lacking 
in traditional urban functions. As KULCSÂR (2008) notes, in contrast to cities in the 
Western part of Europe, cities in Hungary (and Eastern Europe more generally) 
remained large villages characterized by the dominance of agriculture and a 
traditional social structure. These characteristics prevailed well into the 1930s when 
Hungary was still a semi-developed country with a society where feudalism and 
capitalism existed side by side (ANDORKA, 1993). The surviving remnants of feudalism 
made themselves felt above all in agriculture, with the unequal distribution of land. 
The distribution of land was extremely uneven; 40% of the peasantry had no land at 
all (BEREND and RANKI, 19B5). 
As a result of urbanization processes in the post-war period, the urban-rural 
divide has actually become (perceived to be) much less prominent and has become 
disentangled from nepies-urbanus viewpoints (FRICZ, 1997). Here it is important to 
mention that in spite of the declared objective of even spatial development under 
socialism, the decrease in income differences (and living conditions) between urban 
and rural areas did not result from state redistribution. Actual planning decisions 
under "actually existing socialism" were formulated through a series of relays: 
communist ideology and military considerations defined economic policy, economic 
policy priorities determined industrial policy, and industrial policy finally delineated 
the room for action for regional and urban planning (GERMUSKA, 2002). Ultimately, 
housing policy enhanced the effects of urban-biased industrial policy. Despite the 
proclaimed principle of 'equal access' to housing, the state subsidized only urban 
housing construction, not rural, on the grounds of sizeable urban housing shortage. 
(This shortage was due to the fact that both industrialization and collectivization in 
agriculture set off large-scale migration into Budapest and other industrial centres 
(NEMES-NAGY, 2003)). At the same time, as a side-effect of the market-oriented reforms 
of the New Economic Mechanism introduced in 1968, agriculture could profit more 
from the increasing role of the marketthan industry as a whole, and the development 
of the rural secondary economy, i.e. the agricultural production of the "household 
plots", contributed an important part to the improvement of the rural population's 
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income (ANDORKA, 1993, KOVACS, 1997) In other words, the decrease m income 
differences (and living conditions) resulted from the enhanced efforts of the agrarian 
population and commuting industrial workers In fact, the market relations that were 
given room acted as a corrective to central distribution that was equalizing m its 
rhetoric, but reproducing inequalities via bureaucratic hierarchies (KoNRAoandSzELENYi, 
2000) 
As noted above, m Ime with post-war urbanization processes, views of the nepies 
camp became less and less fed by the aspiration of improving the conditions of the 
rural and the urbanus group no longer promoted 'the urban' as the repository of 
development (FRICZ, 1997) However, the electoral support base of the two camps 
gradually reproduced such a spatial divide, and parties developed their claims 
regarding Hungary's spaces and scales m an attempt to consolidate (and possibly 
expand) their appeal in particular "kinds" of spaces To briefly highlight the 
geographical patterns of party support, I will draw here on Kovacs' analysis (KOVACS", 
2003, pp 258-259) According to Kovacs, on the basis of the f irst three post 1990 
elections, one could observe a strong urban/rural dichotomy (or even a Budapest/ 
country town/vil lage trichotomy) m terms of voting behaviour The traditional voting 
base of the FKgPand to a lesser extent the KDNP lay predominantly m rural areas and 
small towns wi th an agricultural character The traditional peasant and religious 
values of these parties, and the question of agricultural production, were more 
relevant to village people The distribution of votes cast for the MSZP and the MDF 
was somewhat more balanced m these settlement categories, whereas the liberal, 
West-oriented SZDSZ gained most of its votes in Budapest and other major cities 
While the MSZP and SZDSZ had fairly stable voting patterns over time, in the case of 
the FIDESZ one could observe a substantial shift after 1990 In 1990, FIDESZ gained 
support primarily from urban (Budapest) intellectuals 
The Budapest-videk divide 
Arguably, wi th Budapest being commonly regarded as ' the' city (matching 'European 
standards') m Hungary, its signification could have been largely discussed under the 
heading of the urban-rural divide Certainly, the view of cities as being 'non-
Hungarian', which gained foothold in the late 1800s, became most strongly related 
to Budapest Resentment towards Budapest was also fed by the events of post-First 
World War turmoil the revolution in October 1918 led to a short-lived republic, to be 
followed by a Communist takeover and a 133-day 'dictatorship of the proletariat' 
Under the right wing, authoritarian Horthy-regime (1920-1944), both revolutions 
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were condemned as the erring of a decadent nation. Furthermore, it became common 
to see the assimilation of Germans and Jews, and also that of other groups as 
'superficial' and to accuse Budapest's 'spoilt assimilation' for contributing to the 
collapse of historical Hungary (as a result of the 1920 Trianon Peace Treaty, Hungary's 
territory shrank to one-third of its pre-war size)29. 
The Budapest-wde/; divide has not, however, wholly overlapped with the 
urban-rural divide and should thus be discussed separately. Especially because the 
question of whether and to what extent selective state assistance to Budapest's 
development would entail broader national modernization (i.e. the modernization of 
the videk) has long been central to political debates. This question emerged first in 
the last decades of the nineteenth century. Urban growth in the era of dualism 
benefited Budapest30 the most. Budapest's elevated position as Hungary's economic 
and cultural capital was underlined by the fact that Greater Budapest, wi th its ribbon 
development of suburbs, contained only 5.1% of the country's total population, but 
28% of its workforce and two-thirds of its major industry (HOENSCH, 1996, p. 39). 
Hungary's provincial centres suffered as a result of the capital's dynamic growth; 
only Szeged had a population exceeding 100,000. A third of Hungary's towns, 
including half of its major cities with over 50,000 inhabitants, remained typical 
market towns with a pronounced village character, especially in the outlying areas. 
At the same time, by the 1910 census the population of Budapest increased to over 
one million, and the city advanced to the seventh place among Europe's larger cities. 
The share of Budapest within the population of Hungary increased to 6.0% (from 
2.2% in 1867) (KOVACS and DOVENYI, 1998). 
With respect to Budapest's development (also vis-à-vis the videk), a divergence 
of views formed along the main cleavage of constitutional politics that characterized 
post-1867 Hungarian polity. Instead of differing social programmes, their opposition 
to each other resulted from differing constitutional views and aims (HOENSCH, 1996), 
in particular with regard to the acceptance/rejection of the 1867 Compromise and 
the possibility to improve Hungary's legal position within the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy. The Liberal Party (established in 1875 as a successor of the Deak party) was 
the pro-Compromise element and supplied the prime minister until 1905; the 
29 Hostility to Budapest was thus also a form ofexpression of political anti-semitism and populist nationalism 
(see GVANI, 2004). It is not this study's objective to consider accusations of the nepies camp of anti 
semitism in detail. According to GVURCYAK (2007), népiek could be subdivided into four, more or less distinct, 
strands; one close to extreme Left, one f l i r t ing wi th extreme Right, one propagating a' third way'and one 
seeing Western democracy as their model. As Cyurgyak notes, "one cannot straightforwardly claim that 
the nepies movement was anti semitist, nor that it was not" (ibid,, p. 424). 
30 The capital came into being in 1873 as the settlements Buda, Pest and Óbuda were merged 
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Independence Party (established m 1874 through the merger of the 1848 Party and 
the Centre Left) fundamentally opposed the Compromise As to the former, it 
contended that there is no dilemma, because if the capital succeeds in becoming a 
European metropol is, then it will pu II the videk (the rest of the country) as a locomotive 
In contrast, the Independent Party wished to draw a clearer distinction between 
national and local interests While they acknowledged that the regulation of the 
Danube, or bridge and mam road construction had national significance, they found 
that architectural projects aiming at enhancing the metropolitan allure of Budapest 
did not (SIPOS, m Budapest Negyed, 1996) Until the end of the nineteenth century, 
liberal nationalism succeeded, however, in promoting Budapest as the focal point of 
national development and national aspirations The expression of Hungary's glory 
and grandeur via large scale architectural projects peaked in the millennial 
commemorations of 1896 (celebrating the 'arrival of Hungarians to the Carpathian 
basin') In fact, government policy of the time assumed that a centre is needed that 
can not only counterbalance the impact of Vienna, but can also act as a commercial 
and cultural emporium in the wider Central and South Eastern region (SIPOS, 1993) 
In some ways, Budapest - a melting pot itself - was designed to impress the many 
different ethnic minorities of the country by the visible ability of the Hungarian ruling 
elite to govern their land (FRANK, 2000) In line with these aspirations, government 
policy was not concerned with balanced urban development In view of Hungary's 
multinational character, the government did not see the lack of competing regional 
centres as a disadvantage the absence of such centres lowered the risk of emerging 
regionahsms that could have possibly jeopardized the country's territorial integrity 
(SIPOS, 1993) 
The dissolution of the Austro-Hunganan Monarchy and the following Treaty of 
Trianon created fundamentally new conditions for socio economic development in 
the newly emerging successor states (BEREND and RANKI, 1985, KOVACS and DOVENYI, 1998) 
In Hungary, the dominance of Budapest further increased (HAJDU, 2005) Only 47 
towns remained in the new territory of the state and most of the bigger and more 
developed centres which constituted the "counterpoles" of Budapest (such as Zagreb/ 
Zagrab, Bratislava/Pozsony, KoSice/Kassa, Oradea/Nagyvarad, Cluj Napoca/Kolozsvar, 
Timisoara/ Temesvar) were transferred to the neighbouring countries Out of the ten 
most populous cities only three (Debrecen, Szeged and Pecs) remained m Hungary 
The share of Budapest within the country's population increased to 15 4% by 1920 
(KOVACS and DOVENYI, 1998) The capital became the "waterhead" of the country, 
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concentrating more than the half of the Hungarian industrial production'1 (ibid.); at 
the same t ime, processing industries were cut from their raw material supplies and 
their markets (BEREND and RANKI, 1985). Urbanization taking place during the inter-war 
period reflected the extreme concentration of industry in Budapest, wi th the capital 
recording almost 75% of the country's total urban population increase between 1920 
and 1940 (KOVACS and DOVENYI, 1998). In the 1930s, relative economic backwardness 
and the persistence of a mixed capitalist/feudalistic society was reflected in the 
settlement system through the coexistence of a metropolis on a par with its Western 
European counterparts on the one hand, and of large numbers of villages plagued by 
rural poverty on the other (ANDORKA, 1993). 
As already mentioned in the introductory section, the framing of Hungary's 
spatial structure in terms of an antagonism between the capital and the rest of the 
country gained momentum from the 1920s, when hostility to Budapest became a 
form of expression of political anti-semitism and populist nationalism (CYANI, 2004). 
While in line with anti-Budapest sentiments, the necessity of decentralization was 
often evoked in the 1920s, it never realized. As SIPOS (1993) notes, scarce resources 
were a fundamental obstacle to the remodelling of the country's transport 
infrastructure, to the spatial redistribution of industries, and to granting central 
state support for development projects in provincial cities. Just as importantly, 
Budapest's self-government could collect a considerably higher amount of taxes 
ceded to local governments than provincial cities32, and the central government 
actually refrained from claiming part of Budapest's tax revenues for redistribution. 
In fact, hostility towards Budapest was appeased by revisionist considerations: it was 
argued that only the capital was capable of assuring cultural supremacy in the 
Carpathian Basin and, consequently, that its state of development had to be 
maintained. In the end, pro-Budapest concerns ensured the capital's financial 
autonomy and anti-Budapest concerns (especially fears of a 'red' takeover by social 
democrats) led to the curtailing of the city's administrative autonomy (ibid.). 
The dominance of Budapest was regarded as an issue that needed to be addressed 
also during socialism. Ultimately, however, Budapest kept its leading position in 
terms of allocated housing investments. The General Secretary of the Hungarian 
Workers' Party, Matyas Rakosi, gave the following explanation in 1954 concerning the 
31 According to GERO (in Budapest Negyed, 1996), the concentration of the mil l ing industry around Buda-
pest was due to the fact that In 1848 the mil l ing rights of the landed nobility were not abolished and, 
consequently, capital was invested where no such obstacles were absent. I.e.In cities. 
32 In 1934, collected taxes made up 22.4% of Budapest's total revenue, while only 37% of other cities' total 
revenue (SIPOS, 1993). 
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issue of why Budapest must have more apartments than rural towns 
"It is not the same if 1700 thousands [sic] of rural people or 1,700 thousands of the 
inhabitants of Budapest are grumbling about bad housing conditions" (cited by HORVATH", 
2005, ρ 45) 
5 2 2 2 Structurally informed claims in the iggo parliamentary debates 
The stipulations of the 1990 Act have been commonly interpreted by analysts as 
resulting from the desire to radically break with the socialist past and its state 
organizational doctrine of 'democratic centralism', predicated on centrally governed 
councils at different levels, 1 e county, township, city, village and district As PALNE 
KOVACS (2008) notes, those involved in the formulation of the 1990 Act assumed that 
Hungary's territorial administration had to be built on foundations that differ 
fundamentally from those of the past The ideal of'self-government' [onkormanyza 
tisag) that appeared as a principal political value in Hungary expressed not simply 
demands of decentralization to the local (settlement) level, it was also indicative of a 
general discredit for county-based intervention and resource distribution under 
"actually existing socialism" (Ace, η d , ILLNER, 1999, SURAZSKA et al, igg?) Furthermore, 
the establishment of local government as the collective right of citizens living m the 
same settlement was seen also as a means to fend off the 'socialist' practice of 
enforcing village integration" 
While there was convergence across the party political spectrum concerning the 
importance of municipal autonomy and democracy, claims regarding the relation 
between municipalities and the meso (county) scale were conflicting It goes beyond 
the scope of this study to give a detailed account of the county debate, only some 
insights of FOWLER'S (2001) thorough analysis are discussed here Briefly, m the 1990 
parliamentary debates about the role of counties, more specifically about the issue 
of county-level government, t w o mam positions were formed As to the opposition 
parties, 1 e the MSZP, the SZDSZ and the FIDESZ, they were all against the retention 
of county governments, which they saw as a potential threat to local (settlement) 
autonomy (The SZDSZ would have accepted a bottom up county assembly, composed 
of mayors of settlements) In contrast, the government, made up of three right wing 
parties (1 e theMDF, the FKgPand the KDNP), advocated not only the retention of the 
33 As PFFII (1999) notes village integration occurred not only during socialism between 1924 and 1949 more 
than 200 village unifications took place 
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county as a tier of government, but also the direct election of the county assembly. 
Following the government's proposals, a county assembly was needed precisely as 
a means of representing settlement interests, especially in the face of cities with 
county rights that were to be excluded from county assemblies. As FowitR (ibid.) 
notes, the government's speakers were in fact drawing on both sides of the municipal/ 
centralist debate of the 1840s mentioned above: they aligned with the municipalist 
notion of popular sovereignty on the one hand and some acknowledged themselves 
as centralists on the other (see also KALTENBACH, n.d.). References of governmental 
speakers to counties as historical bastions against foreign authoritarian rule allowed 
the counties to be constructed as 'national' rather than simply as a heritage from 
socialism. Furthermore, with suggestions that a meso-tier government was a 
'European norm', government language reconciled alleged European standards with 
Hungary's historical traditions (FOWLER, 2001). 
Next to the issue of county-level government, the second meso-related argument 
concerned thetask of coordinating state administration and the state supervision of 
the local government sector. The government proposed appointing government 
state secretaries - ideally taking the historical t i t le of foispan (the designation of 
county-level royal appointees in the pre-war per iod)-who would monitorthe legality 
of local government operations and perform some public administration duties. 
Members of the governing parties expressed fears about the prospect of creating 
over 3000 'mini-republics' and argued that the country's transitional state required 
the formation of strong central power. Not least because of the suggested tit le, the 
opposition considered the proposals unacceptable and argued that institutions such 
as the proposed/o'/spdn were more dangerous precisely where civil society was weak 
(FOWLER, 2001). Eventually, the two sides compromised on retaining the county, but 
with an indirectly elected assembly, elected by representatives of the county's local 
governments. Concerning meso-level state administration and local government 
supervision, the institution of the commissioner of the republic was introduced. 
As mentioned previously, the commissioners were appointed by the President of the 
Republic and had regional (rather than county-level) areas of responsibility. As FOWLER 
(2001) notes, this meant the institutionalization of a regional tier as a level of general 
administration (the only time in post-socialist Hungary). On the other hand, the 
commissioners' respective areas of responsibility did not receive a 'regional label'; 
their designations contained the names of the counties they covered (Ace, n.d.). Also, 
the approval of the regional division occurred not as a result of the 1990 Act, but by 
parliamentary resolution. According to Ace (ibid.), the opposition was not will ing to 
take responsibility for the unprecedented county combinations. 
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S 2 s Concluding remarks 
From the perspective of the PSA, self government i s - d u e to its relative stability (the 
Local Self Government Act can only be amended by a two-thirds parliamentary 
majority) - a fundamental discursive formation of nation-state space in post-1990 
Hungary What is relevant m view of this study is that the discursive formation of 
self-government made it hardly possible to address the issue of territorial (as opposed 
to settlement focused) development issues (see e g PALNE KOVACS, 1999, ZONCOR, 1999) 
While the counties' (county councils') previous other functions (such as legal and 
professional supervision) were assigned to either the commissioner of the republic or 
to newly created state deconcentrated bodies, the task of spatial development (funds 
allocation) - in which respect counties evoked a particularly negative image - was 
not taken care of (Ace, η d ) 
Based on the insights of the overview above, we can reinterpret the scalar 
relations instituted by the 1990 Self-Covernment Act (and its 1994 modification) as 
produced by the interplay of the above-discussed, structurally inscribed discursive 
selectivities of Hungarian nation-state space on the one hand and the structurally 
informed claims of party political actors on the other The sociological institutional 
anchorage of political forces in the reactivated nepies-urbanus debate, as well as 
available understandings of the county (as the meso-level institution of 'democratic 
centralism' or as a traditional 'Hungarian institution') played an important role in 
shaping the claims made In other words, although the state spatial order of "actually 
existing socialism" was dislocated, the decisions remstitutmg a new order were not 
formulated in a vacuum, but were informed by relatively stable structurally inscribed 
discursive selectivities As the overview above suggested, the struggle concerning 
decisions over scalar relations was not simply about state territorial organization but, 
at the same time, also about redefining (the continuity of) national identity In fact, 
claims that the county embodies the continuity of Hungarian statehood prevented 
the county from being completely abolished'4 -as was the case m other post socialist 
countries (FOWLER, 2001) It is important to note that the change of electoral rules -
the institution of direct, list-based county assembly elections and the enabling of 
cumulative mandates-reset the signification of the county as a structurally inscribed 
selectivity of state spatiality As we will see, after 1994, claims regarding the role of 
the counties became greatly shaped by the partisan links between national parties 
and county politics 
34 The complete abolition would have only been possible with an amendment of the constitution that needs 
a two third majority in parliament (Act, η d ) 
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5.3 Reordering Hungarian state space on the way to 'Europe' 
With the imperative task of the "liberation" of settlements (ZONCOR, 1999) being 
accomplished, a senseof discontent spread among the originatorsof the i990 Act. As 
one of the architects of the 1990 reform, official of the Ministry of the Interior Imre 
Verebélyi, acknowledged in 1993: "as the negation of the previous dictatorial system, 
the reform went too far in the correct direction" (cited by FOWLER, 2001, p. 16). In 
particular, the fragmentation at the municipal level and the lack of an integrative 
meso-level - that, among other things, makes it possible to address issues of supra-
municipal development - soon became the object of criticism from across the 
political spectrum. In fact, by the time the reform of the 1990 Act was put on the 
agenda in 1994, consensus had formed that the issue of meso-level spatial 
development competencies had to be addressed (FOWLER, 2001). 
At the same time, awareness grew of the necessity of addressing larger scale 
spatial disparities. 'System change' induced considerable changes in the patterns of 
spatial development in Hungary. To a great extent, it reinforced development 
tendencies that were observable from the 1980s: the increasing depression In areas 
of traditional heavy industry (NEMES-NACY, 2003) and the start of an increase in 
urban-rural income differences (ANDORKA, 1993). The transition from a dominantly 
state-owned and planned economy to a privatized market economy, the sweeping 
decline of traditional industrial sectors, and the increased exposure to external, 
'globalizing' pressures reinforced these tendencies (ENYEDI, 2005) and generated new 
ones. Crowing spatial disparities were not dealt wi th in any consistent manner in the 
first years of post-socialist transformation (e.g. ILLÉS, 1992). As planning (tervezes) 
became a discredited activity - the National Planning Office (Orszagos Tervezesi 
Hivatal) was abolished In 1990 - , regional planning and urban planning were 
effectively done away with as well'5. Spatial development was acknowledged as a 
policy field, but it fell prey to inter-ministerial conflicts, in particular between the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of the Interior (supervising local authorities). 
The newly established Ministry of Environmental Protection and Spatial Development 
(Környezetvédelmi es Területfejlesztési Minisztérium) had relatively little influence 
(ILLÉS, 1992; PAL KOVÄCS, 1999). Actually, in the first half of the 1990s, besides ad hoc 
35 It has to be noted that although 'even'spatial development was recurrently proclaimed as a mam objective 
during socialism, choices of industrial locations were not orientated bythe knowledge of prevailing spatial 
development patterns. Instead of targeting less developed regions, the choice of industrial locations was 
greatly determined by military and political considerations, as well as by the proximity of raw materials 
and workforce. On the whole, the objective of development concentration counteracted the objective of 
levelling out disparities (CERMUSKA, 2002). 
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measures of crisis management m the most deprived areas, funds continued to be 
spent largely- just as in the second half of the 1980s - o n communal mfrastructural 
developments'6 of small villages (ILLES, 2002). 
Ultimately, it was the 1996 Spatial Development and Land Use Planning Act 
{A teruletfejlesztésröl és teruletrendezésröl szóló torvény) that was to address both the 
issue of meso-level spatial development and the problem of large scale disparities 
On the one hand, the 1996 Act could be seen as part of the package including the 
1994 revision of the Local Self-Government Act (FOWLER, 2001) On the other hand, the 
key ministerial actor instituting the 1996 Act was not the Ministry of the Interior that 
handled the 1990-1994 reforms, but the ministry responsible for spatial development, 
1.e (m the 1994-98 government) the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Spatial 
Development Furthermore, in contrast to the legislation on self-government, that 
on spatial development is 'ordinary legislation', requiring not two-thirds, but a simple 
parliamentary majority for passage (and modification). Also, as several analysts 
argued, the 1996 Act belonged to the "second round" of post-socialist Hungary's 
territorial restructuring, a 'round' prompted not simply by the recognition of the 
prevailing shortcomings of spatial development regulation The motivation to 
re-engage with issues of spatial development had also greatly to do with prospective 
EU accession, especially wi th expected EU structural aid Knowing that transfers 
would depend on the establishment of particular administrative units and procedures 
for the management of funds, CEE countries more broadly recognized that not to 
have viable regions would mean losing part of the cake (HUGHES, SASSE and CORDON, 
2001, SURAZSKA et al, 1997) The preparation of government strategies on spatial 
development was supported already from 1992 on through the Phare" programme 
(RECHNITZER, 2001) The Phare programme also funded 'Western' specialists involved m 
the drafting of the 1996 Act (FOWLER, 2000) and ultimately, 'Brussels' did more than 
'guide' policy-making leading to its adoption (HUGHES, SASSE and CORDON, 2001) As 
shown below, the EU, both as an institutional actor wi th pragmatic requirements 
regarding funds management, and as a perceived ideal of conformation for domestic 
actors, has played an important role m shaping the understanding of spatial 
development 
36 According to ILLÉS (2002), such mfrastructural investments had a larger share than investments into 
job creation (between 1991 and 1994, 71% and 29%, respectively) because central government was 
'predisposed' to communal mfrastructural developments, and it was common to consider it "risky" to 
support entrepreneurs 
37 The Phare programme is one of the three pre-accession instruments financed by the European Union to 
assist the applicant countries of Central and Eastern Europe in their preparations for joining the European 
Union 
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The fol lowing section interprets the 1996 Act as laying the foundations for a new 
discursive formation of Hungarian nation-state space, that of spatial development 
(területfejlesztés). Starting from the debates that preceded the Act's stipulations, 
I will consider the shaping of this discursive formation until the first months of 
Hungary's EU membership. 
5.5.7 Open-ended regionalization and solidifying county power 
Debates preceding the 1996 Act - that showed continuities wi th previous sub-state 
reform debates in several respects (FOWLER, 2001) - are considered here with a focus 
on claims relating to the issue of meso-level development competencies. More 
specifically, claims made about the role of counties in spatial development are 
discussed, claims linked to the establishment of regional units, and claims concerning 
the relation between counties and regions. 
Considering the recognition of the lack of an integrative, meso-level development 
regulation, county governments - as bodies having democratic legitimacy - were 
seen by many as the logical recipients of development competencies. On the other 
hand, the prospect of county governments distributing development monies evoked 
fears that their superiority over municipal governments might be restored. Finally, 
the creation of separate county-level development bodies, to include representatives 
of municipal as well ascountygovernments.andof cities with county rights, appeared 
as an acceptable solution. The 1994 revision of the Local Self-Government Act 
included the provision that spatial development was to be the responsibility of 
county development councils, to be created under future legislation (FOWLER, 2001). 
Accordingly, the 1996 Act stipulated that county development councils (megyei 
területfejiesztési tanàcs) (CDCs) have to be established in every county. 
As to the question of regionalization based on supra-county regional units, it 
was embraced across the political spectrum, with a perceived association wi th 
'Europeanness' in general (FOWLER, 2001). The prospect of regions capable of 
establishing cross-border links was especially appealing to the Right because of the 
benefits these I inks cou Id off er for contacts with Hungarian minorities in neighbouring 
states. As FOWLER (2001) notes, views differed, however, on whether the larger regions 
should be based on (aggregates of) counties or not. The county-based approach was 
opposed on the grounds that counties were not functional, but only administrative 
units. County-based regionalization offered, however, a means of constructing 
regional units relatively quickly, on a scale sure to fulf i l the EU's NUTS2 criteria. 
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Furthermore, it enabled building on the counties' spatial development experience, 
as well as on existing administrative structures and institutional relationships 
In addition, for the MSZP, county-based regionahzation made it possible to match 
its partisan interests m the counties Awareness of this link contributed to a view of 
county-based regionalization m the mid-1990s as top-down. An additional reason for 
considering county-based regionahzation as top-down was that county-based regions 
were seen by some as counteracting bottom-up, 'organically developing' municipal 
government groupings that often transcended county boundaries (FOWLER, 2001). 
Eventually, the 1996 Act introduced two concepts of regions The term 'plannmg-
statistical region' (tervezési-statisztikai regio) was defined "as an integral and 
statistical territorial unit including more than one county (or the capital) and 
contiguous to the territories thereof". A 'development region' [fejlesztesi regio) in 
turn was defined as "including one or more counties or parts of the counties that is 
to be treated as one territorial unit from a social, economic, or environmental point of 
view"38. Regional (supra-county) development councils" {regionalis teruletfejlesztési 
tanacs) (RDCs) could be formed voluntarily by county development councils, just as 
mter-mumcipal associations for spatial development (teruletfejlesztési onkormanyzati 
tarsulas) could be set up freely by municipal self-governments. At the same time, the 
Act prescribed (in addition to CDCs) the establishment of the National Development 
Council (Orszagos Teruletfejlesztési Tanacs), the institution of the Development 
Council for the Agglomeration of Budapest {Budapesti Agglomemao Fejlesztesi 
Tanacs), and the Development Council for Lake Balaton (Balaton Fejlesztesi Tanacs) 
The mam task of development councils and mter-mumcipal associations was to 
elaborate development concepts Following the 1996 Act, the former Spatial 
Development Fund Allocation (Teruletfejlesztesi célelöirónyzat) was supplemented 
with new funds m order to enlarge the financial resources of the newly created 
institutions (KALMAN, n.d.) 
Actually, the two region concepts created confusion, as 'development regions' 
(regional development councils), formed by voluntary associations of the mandatory 
county development councils, did not overlap with the plannmg-statistical regions 
(see PALNE KOVACS, 2000) As multiple memberships of CDCs m RDCs were not restricted, 
Zala County made part of two development regions simultaneously. In contrast, the 
areas of Pest County not included into the Development Council for the Agglomeration 
38 Act XXI/1996, Article 5e 
39 The designation 'council' was somewhat unfortunate as the Hungarian 'tanacs' was also used during 
socialism, as a translation of'soviet' (see FOWLFR, 2001) 
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of Budapest did not belong to any regional body (FOWLER, 2001). In addition to the 
above, the duplication of organizations on county-level (i.e. the establishment of 
county development councils next to county self-governments) was criticized (PFEIL, 
1999; SoMLYODYNE PFEIL, 2003). On the whole, the 1996 Act was regarded by analysts as 
not giving any clear answer to the question of how the meso-level should be 
organized; the meso-level was 'f loating' (PAL KOVACS, 1999). Newly formed RDCs lacked 
their own resources and a scope of authority; they were entitled to perform tasks 
that were transferred to them by CDCs (HORVATH, 1999). At the same time, given that 
the formation of county development councils was mandatory, the position of the 
county was strengthened. This was reinforced by the fact that the presidents of 
county general assemblies assumed the presidency of CDCs. In addition, the 
presidency of the RDCs rotated among CDC presidents. 
On the whole, the 1996 Act did not (could not) redefine the relations between 
scales and the relations between settlements as constituted by the Local Self-
Govern ment Act. As to scalar relations, with the system of development councils, the 
nested character of scales became restored: micro-regional associations were namely 
to delegate members to county development councils and county development 
councils to regional development councils. Also, from the perspective of the 1996 Act, 
cities w i th county rights were "part of" the counties in the territories of which they 
were embedded as the mayors of cities with county rights all received a seat in 
county development councils. 
As to inter-municipal relations, the 1996 Act introduced, on the one hand, the 
notion of'micro-region' {kistérség), referring to "a voluntary development association 
of municipalities" and, on the other, that of 'urban area' [varoskörnyék], signifying a 
"self-organizing territorial unit with an urban centre". At the same time, however, the 
link between the two was not clarified and no special incentives for cooperation in 
urban areas were proposed (PFEIL, 1999). Furthermore, the 1996 Act explicitly stated 
that settlement development and land use planning in settlements fall beyond 
the Act's scope (concerning land use planning on county level, plan-making was 
stipulated to be the task of county assemblies). In fact, settlement development 
{településfejlesztés) and land use planning in settlements {településrendezés) were 
identified by the 1990 Act as tasks belonging to municipal self-governments. 
Subsequently, the duties of municipal self-governments with regard to land use 
planning were specified by the 1997 Formation and Protection of the Built 
Environment Act (Az epiteti környezet alakitasaról és védelméröl szóló törvényY". 
40 It was, however, only with the modification in 2006 of the 1997 Act that the elaboration of settlement 
development concepts became mandatory. 
H? 
As several analysts critically pointed out, the evolution of regulatory frameworks 
actually reproduced the division between larger scale (regional) development 
planning and smaller-scale, physical (urban) planning This division already 
characterized the period of socialism As to regional development planning, it was 
under the supervision of a section of the National Planning Office, together with the 
Ministry of Finance and the Council Office of the Council of Ministers (Mmiszter 
tanacs TanacsiHivatala) Concerning physical (urban) planning, it wasjomtly managed 
by another section of the National Planning Office and the Ministry for Construction 
and Urban Development (Epitesugyi es Varosfejlesztesi Mmisztenum) The tension 
between these authorities responsible for regional planning and urban planning 
caused discrepancies between plans about economic districts and plans about the 
settlement network (ILLES, 1992, SOMLYODYNE PFEIL, 2005) 
Asa legacy of the above mentioned divide-and as a striking contrast to'Western' 
practice - m the post-1990 period, regional (development) planning and urban 
planning continued to be treated m Hungary as separate fields, rather than as being 
closely interlinked (see e g FARACÔ, 2002, 2006, PFEIL, 1999, 2005) This was backed by 
the way tasks were distributed among ministries Matters related to self government 
came under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior f rom 1990 (until 2006), 
a ministry for which development issues did not constitute the mam orientation 
At the same time, m other central organs responsible for (subfields of) spatial 
development, no unit for settlement development existed (FARACO, 2006) 
532 Europeamzation as the centralization of regions 
With the EU's requirements regarding administrative capacity gaming momentum, 
it became increasingly pressing to address some of the perceived ambiguities of 
the 1996 Act In particular, the Act's 'dual regionalization' (FOWLER, 2001) approach, 
based on the seven planning statistical regions and the five 'voluntary' development 
regions, needed to be dealt wi th In contrast to the rather positive tone of 1997 
European Commission opinion, the Commission's Report on Hungary's Progress 
Towards Accession m 1998 noted the following 
Hungary has not adequately addressed the short term Accession Partnership priority 
relating to reinforcement of institutional and administrative capacity in regional 
development Despite advances made in legislation and in developing concepts and 
structures concrete implementation of regional policy objectives and the accompanying 
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structures and institutions is still weak and has led to important delays in the management 
and implementation of Community assistance. These problems need to be addressed 
before Hungary is ready to participate in the EU structural policy" (Commission of the 
European Communities (CEC), 1998, p. 33). 
The National Spatial Development Concept (Orszagos Területfejlesztési Koncepció), 
approved in igg8, was a step towards "resolving" the issue of dual regionalization. 
The Concept stipulated the establishment of seven NUTS2 regions, whereby each of 
the regions (except the Central Hungarian Region4' that is coterminous with Pest 
County) is made up of three counties (see Figure 5.3). The parliamentary acceptance 
of this division was facilitated by the fact that the end of the parliamentary term was 
nearing and that it was known that the legislation would take the form of a 
parliamentary resolution (FOWLER, 2001). 
Prior to the actual amendment in iggg of the iggö Act, that prescribed that the 
statutory areas of regional development councils (RDCs) should become those of the 
NUTS2 regions, debates resurfaced about the 'optimal' delimitation of regions. In 
particular, members of the opposition parties insisted on the division being reviewed. 
Etele Barâth of the MSZP proposed a threefold division of Hungary with the 
subdivision of those three larger regions into functional regions; he argued that the 
government's proposition failed to make the notion of the region approximate 
today's 'European practice' (Barâth, 8 September iggg/ig64J). Similarly, MSZP's Ferenc 
Baja (8 September iggg/300) stressed that the government's amendment wrongly 
established functional institutions on statistical units. The government attempted 
to counter criticisms by arguing that the proposed bill would aid Hungary's accession 
process (FOWLER, 2001). 
Parallel to parliamentary debates, scholarly attention to the issue of regionalization 
grew in the second half of the iggos. In particular, scholars from the Centre for 
Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences took the lead in endorsing 
the idea of regionalism (FARACO, 2006). As one scholar noted: 
"Regionalism is today's and tomorrow's new intellectual, economic and political t rend" 
(RECHNITZER, 1996, p. 1356). 
41 The Central Hungarian Region is often referred to briefly as 'Central Region'. 
42 Speeches in parliamentary debates were retrieved from the homepage of the Hungarian Parliament. 
www.parlament.hu and are referenced hereafterasfoliowsinameof deputy, date/number of the speech 
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F i g u r e 5-3 Hungary 's NUTS2 regions 
Region name translations: Κόζέρ-Magyarorszag: Central Hungary; Kózép-Dunàntùl: Central Transdanubia; 
Nyugat-Dunantul: Western Transdanubia; Dél-Dunóntul: South Transdanubia, Del Alfold: Southern Great 
Plain; Észak-Alfòld: Northern Great Plain; Észak-Magyarorszag: Northern Hungary 
Several p r o m i n e n t scholars agreed on seeing the meso-ques t i on as yet unresolved 
and suppor ted t h e v iew t h a t decent ra l iza t ion to t h e regions is the key to Hungary's 
modern i za t i on and t o t he s t ra tegy o f 'catching up' w i t h Western Europe (e.g. ACH, 
2001; HORVÂTH, 1999; PALNE KOVACS, 1999). Whi le academic in terest focused on 
( the s t r e n g t h e n i n g of) regions (FARACO, 2006) , u rban p lann ing - bo th as a f ie ld o f 
academic research and o f po l i cy -mak ing - was pushed in to t he background (BARTKE 
and KöszèCFALvi, 2 0 0 0 ) . 
Opin ions on t h e concrete f o r m and ex ten t o f decent ra l i za t ion var ied. Scholars 
t ak i ng a more modera te v i e w p o i n t stressed t h a t t h e te r r i t o r ies o f reference o f var ious 
regional publ ic admin i s t ra t i ve bodies do not (cannot) over lap and argued t h a t a 
s t ronger coopera t ion o f e m p o w e r e d count ies in spat ia l deve lopmen t issues wou ld be 
su f f i c ien t (PÀLNÉ KOVÀCS, 1999; RECHNITZER, 2001). Also, t h e same scholars po in ted to t he 
f a c t t h a t people do no t feel any al legiance to NUTS2 regions. To refer t o Rechnitzer: 
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"[p]eople do not understand or know what the region is, whom it serves, how to access it 
and why it provides something else, more or different than the local self-government or 
the county" (RECHNITZER, 2001, p. 11). 
Others (HORVÂTH, 1999; ACH, 2001) argued in favour of directly elected regional 
governments and substantial financial resources. Proponentsof supra-county regions 
also argued that counties are too small to serve as a base for a competitive and 
diversified economic structure (e.g. HORVÂTH, 1997; 1999) 
Finally, as noted above, a regional division based on county groupings was 
enacted in 1999 underthe FIDESZ-led government, in powerfrom 1998. County-based 
regionalization was building on existing administrative structures and data collection 
systems and was regarded as most likely to fulf i l EU requirements. Even more than 
its consolidation of county-based regionalization, the 1999 amendment was criticized 
for the changes it brought to the make-upof development councils at all tiers (FOWLER, 
2001). The composition of statutory RDCs was changed in favour of ministerial and 
central state representatives; their number increased from nine to ten, and three 
others were given the right of consultation. The number of representatives of 
micro-regional development associations formed voluntarily by local governments 
was reduced, and representatives of economic chambers were entirely excluded 
(theycouldonly be permanently invited participants). These changes were condemned 
by the opposition as the "nationalization" of the new regional tier (FOWLER, 2001). 
Scholars were also arguing that RDCs were representing a special deconcentrated 
form of central government control (e.g. ACH, 2004; PALME KOVACS, PARASKEVOPOULOS and 
HORVATH, 2OO4). 
As a result of centralizing tendencies, a regional (territorial) perspective on 
development issues remained undermined. Although from 2001, RDCs in particular 
could make spending decisions about an increasing share of decentralized spatial 
development funds, funds aiming at territorial equalization have remained rather 
insignificant compared to the development monies spent by sectoral ministries (PALNE 
KOVACS, 2003). In general, there has been hardly any coordination of sectoral programmes 
managed through the deconcentrated agencies of different ministries (KÂLMAN, n.d.). 
In addition, responsibility for spatial development at central governmental level 
became split as new centres of decision appeared (the Prime Minister's Office and the 
Office of the Minister without portfolio for Phare coordination), without it being 
specified how they should cooperate (RECHNITZER, 2001). 
In connection with the accusation of centralizing measures, it has to be noted 
that the FIDESZ-led government was more generally criticized for centralization. 
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especially for the centralization of executive power via the Prime Minister's Office 
that was developed into a state chancellery The government argued that the 
strengthened position of the Office was to ensure that the government did not fall 
victim to lobby interests and could realize its strategic aims (BRUSIS, 2006) As to the 
role of sub-national government, Prime Minister Orban suggested that it should 
ideally function to further the political goals of its national counterpart Orban called 
for cooperation between the two tiers of government in the interests of achieving 
the aims for which citizens were said to have voted in the national polls (FOWLER, 2001) 
Although the government undoubtedly favoured strong central state power, the 
actual centralization of regional policy in Hungary - and m other CEE candidate 
countries - has to be seen in terms of a triadic engagement between the EU, the 
central state and sub-national actors (HUGHES, SASSE and CORDON, 2001) While initially, 
the EU seemed to push for a more significant role of the regional level in candidate 
states, from 1998 onwards the Commission's zeal for regionalization became 
tempered and gave way to a more pragmatic approach (ibid ) This pragmatism was 
greatly linked to the recognition that the following round of enlargement would 
bring about a new situation Previously, from a particular member state, only one 
region or a few regions were benefiting from EU funds, and the application for funds 
(in the form of a Single Programming Document) was elaborated by the region(s) 
concerned This way of working presupposed strong decision making capacity and 
financial resources at the regional level Prospective member states (with some 
exceptions), however, were expected to fall entirely under the scope of Objective 1 
The EU would have become clearly overburdened by the radical increase m 
administrative procedures if it were to deal with regions individually (FORMAN, 2004) 
In fact, a tension emerged between the EU's objective of decentralization on 
the one hand, and its aspiration for control and the fast and efficient implementation 
of the acquis on the other Ultimately, quick legal harmonization was given priority 
(GRABBE, 2001) It thus seemed that the EU's emphasis on decentralization was only 
rhetoric and that finally - contrary to the expectations of some (e g ILLES, 2002) - , the 
EU did not consider structural policies as a means to induce decentralization m CEE 
countries In the end, the accession process had a threefold centralizing effect first, 
it favoured a concentration of resources and power in the executive, while the 
legislature was marginalized, second, it encouraged the emergence of a 'core 
executive', 1 e a strong, central team to manage the accession process, third, and 
somewhat inconsistently, while providing incentives for the creation of new regional 
bodies, it excluded sub-state elites from processes of sub-state reform (GRABBE, 2001, 
pp 1028-1029) At thesamet ime, m Hungary, for the pragmatic sub-state-1 e county 
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- elite, Europeanization through a 'light', county-based version of regionalization 
offered the opportunity of carving out new functional areas and responsibilities for 
themselves (HUGHES, SASSE and GORDON, 2001). 
5.3.3 Regional development as local development 
With the enactment of the 1999 amendment of the Spatial Development and Land 
Use Planning Act, the most important - and enduring - parameters of post-1990 
Hungarian state spatiality had gained their form. Certainly, wi th state spatial 
restructuring being an ongoing process, Table5.1 is but a snapshot, showingthe state 
of affairs at the end of 2006 (delimitations introduced and bodies established 
between 1999-2006 are indicated in italics; these will be discussed later on in this 
chapter). Nonetheless, the table is helpful as it allows us to consider the scalar 
relations wi th in and between those dimensions of state spatial ordering that had 
become established by 1999 and that have substantially shaped the course of state 
spatial reorganization and intervention to date. These 'dimensions' are in fact 
discursive formations of nation-state space. 
The (persisting) divide between (strategic) development planning and urban 
(land use) planning was already mentioned above. This divide was reinforced when 
next to county assemblies, which are responsible for mandatory county-level land 
use plans, separate bodies (i.e. county development councils) were established for 
county-level development planning (SOMLYÔDYNÉ PFFII, 2005). At the same time, 
municipal self-governments became the repositories of both municipal development 
and land use planning. Actually, the omnipotence of municipal self-governments in 
both development and land use planning matters undermined the possibility of 
addressing supra-municipal development coordination. Municipal self-governments, 
facing constant - and due to fiscal recentralization, increasing - resource scarcity, 
subordinated the management of their territories to the dictates of the speculative 
property market. Land use "planning", instead of guiding development intervention, 
has come to legitimate actual development processes in the post-1990 period (RAAB, 
n.d.). With the (hierarchical) relations between various development concepts and 
land use plans being poorly regulated (FARACO, 2002; SOMLYÔDYNÉ PFEIL, 2005), short-term 
local interests continued to shape development actions. 
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Table 5.1 Dimensions of Hungarian state spatiality 
Scales 
Common 
(Hungarian) 
designations 
country 
{orszag) 
'part of the 
country' 
{orszagresz) 
region 
(regio) 
county 
{megye) 
statistical data collection 
Eurostat 
categories 
(number of 
units as of 
Dec 2006) 
additional 
national 
categories 
(number of units) 
NUTS 1(3) 
NUTS II (7) 
NUTS III (19) 
public administration 
state 
administration 
• ministries 
• government 
offices 
• central offices 
regional level 
state 
administration 
organs 
(not all basedon 
NUTS2) 
county level 
state 
administration 
organs 
r 
J 
1 
• 
1 
spatial development 
local • development 
(self) 
government 
(not 
applicable) 
-
-
• county ' 
general 1 
assemblies 
• assemblies | 
of cities 
w i th county ' 
rights (23) | 
planning 
• · Parliament 
' • Government 
regional 
development 
councils 
(7forNUTS2 
+2 for special 
development 
regions«) 
county 
development 
councils 
land use 
planning 
Parliament 
-
_ 
Parliament 
for 2 special 
development 
regions 
county 
general 
assemblies 
υ 
O 
e 
5 
o 
CL O 
E 
micro-region 
(kistérség) 
municipal 
settlement 
[települês] 
LAUi 
(former NUTS 
IV) 
068) 
LAU 2 
(former NUTS 
V) 
(3152) 
: : : : . : ' • : • 
• agglomerations 
(4) 
• agglomerating 
areas (4) 
• groups of 
settlements (13) 
(2003) 
Micro-regional 
level state 
administration 
organs 
(notal l basedon 
LAUi) 
municipal 
state 
administration 
organs 
1 
1 
Ρ 
J 
1 
• I 
1 
• 
L 1 
• 
• 
• 
1 
1 
_ 
municipal . 
self- 1 
governments . 
j 
micro-regional 
development 
. councils 
1
 (2004J 
_ 
1 
municipal 
self-governments 
_ 
_ 
municipal 
self-
governments 
Key: regulated by (in brackets enactment and modif ications) • parl iamentary and governmental decrees • EU regulations and parl iamentary 
and governmental decrees • Local Self-Government Act (1990,1994) • Formation and Protection of the Built Environment Act (1997, 2006) 
G Spatial Development and Land Use Planning Act (1996,1999, 2004) _ _ _ modif icat ion by a 2/3 parl iamentary major i ty 
Source, compiled by author 
43 Development Council for the Agglomeration of Budapest (BAFT) and Development Council for Lake 
Balaton; the BAFT was abolished by the 1999 amendment, and re-established by the 2004 amendment 
of the 1996 Act 
It is important to note that the narrow municipal perspective on development 
interventions was reinforced by the fact that the beneficiaries of decentralized 
development funds (of both county and regional development councils) have mostly 
been municipalities (IIIES, 2002) Actually, the 1996 Act put local governments and 
some other spatial development actors into key positions with regard to fund 
redistribution With EU funds becoming increasingly available through these channels, 
local governmental positions and connections became more attractive Local elites 
soon learned how to use this system to support community development that was 
consistent wi th their interests (KULCSAR and DOMOKOS, 2003) Regional and county 
development councils became arenas of bargaining for funding, the former for 
county representatives and the latter for municipalities and their micro-regional 
associations (BRODORITS, JUSZTIN and NACY, 2004, PFEIL, 2001) 
The competition for additional funding among municipalities was strongly 
related to the increasing financial dependence of municipalities on the central state 
At the beginning of the 1990s, municipal self-governments could keep most of the 
locally collected taxes However.dueto gradual budgetary recentralization, municipal 
self-governments had lost their financial autonomy by the end of 1990s and became 
increasingly reliant on centrally administered grant schemes (see eg ACH, 2004, 
2006, HORVATH, 2002) At the same time, the financing system of Hungarian self-
government did not take into consideration mterdependencies within the settlement 
structure, m particular that some settlements play a central role in service provision 
The spatial organizing role of cities - including spill over effects - thus remained 
unaddressed In fact, m policy discourse, no explicit reference was made to issues of 
urban development and to the urban or settlement network until the turn of the 
millennium The notion of 'spatial structure' was absent from both the 1996 Act and 
the National Spatial Development Concept of 1998 It appeared only m the Report on 
the Evolution of Spatial Processes, on the Realization of Spatial Policy, and the 
Implementation of the National Spatial Development Concept that was accepted by a 
parliamentary resolution in 2001 (BEREY, 2000) 
The dominance of municipal self-government actors "on the scene" favoured an 
emphasis on the development of (communal) infrastructure and public services in 
settlements The fact that developments were primarily municipal in focus and that 
the 'success' of municipalities became largely defined in terms of accomplished, 
publicly financed developments (PALNE KOVACS, 2008) has been closely linked to the 
anti-territorial character of the Hungarian electoral system Parties' local candidates 
are expected first and foremost to contribute to their parties' national electoral 
success and they do not act as defenders of collective local interests Considering the 
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increasing dependency of the local scale on central financing, the room for debates 
on local issues has shrunk. Local politics have thus been rather empty in Hungary and 
have been mostly derived from national politics (POCATSA, 2005). In the period under 
study, no government seriously considered a radical reform of local self-governments, 
as this would have also undermined the public administration hinterland including 
the government's own local support base (HORVATH, 2002). 
5.3.4 The revival of the debate about the Budapest-vidék divide 
As in other post-socialist countries (seeTHERBORN, 2006), incoming foreign investment, 
the pull of domestic market forces and the capital city core base of the new political 
power have converged in singling out Budapest as the main beneficiary of the new 
socio-economic system. 
While Budapest's enhanced dominance remained unaddressed in the early iggos, 
the 1996 Spatial Development and Land Use Planning Act set the objective of 
diminishing substantial differences between the capital and the vidék wi th regard to 
economic, cu Itural.infrastructural and li ving conditions. This objective was confirmed 
in 1998 by the first National Spatial Development Concept. Actually, none of the 
above-mentioned documents specified the meaning of the term vidék, but as both 
spoke of the "fövaros es a vidék", it was clear that "the capital and the rest of the 
country" was meant. At the same time, both documents formulated the aim of 
diminishing the substantial differences between cities and villages, and between 
developed and less developed areas, in order 'to assure social equality'. Although the 
documents in question used vidék only as an antonym of 'the capital', vidék can also 
referto underdevelopment. Furthermore, it can also mean 'rural'. The term vidék then 
is clear in its meaning in the sense that it is never Budapest; at the same time, to 
what it refers outside Budapest is not always evident. As shown below, the 
Budapest-Wde/t divide became central to framing views on whether and how 
Budapest might pull the whole country with itself, i.e. whether investments in the 
capital would engender local and/or national development as well. In more general 
terms, the Budapest-Wdé/r divide became a basis for formulating claims about how 
different spaces (should) relate to each other in constituting national space. 
In order to have a better grasp of the reviving debates about the development of 
Budapest vis-à-vis the vidék (both in terms of 'the rest' and 'the rural'), we need to 
consider the changes in Hungary's party political landscape in the second half of the 
1990s. First of all, the previously existing threefold division of the political arena into 
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a conservative, a liberal and a socialist camp dissolved at the 1994 elections In 
particular, the liberal camp broke up FIDESZ joined the conservative Christian-
national camp and the liberal SZDSZ became a coalition partner of the victorious 
Socialist Party (MSZP) As to the SZDSZ and the MSZP, they had common ideological 
roots and shared a common vision of a liberal economic policy, members of the SZDSZ 
had been steering the Kadanst regime of the 1980s towards a Thatchente economic 
policy, rather than a social democratic model (PALONEN, 2009) FIDESZ in turn, by 
undergoing what some analysts refer to as a major identity change, moved away 
from his originally liberal position and emerged to lead the centre-right opposition 
from 1994 on (see FOWLER, 2004b) It is important to note that after acquiring the 
'natural' voting base of the conservative parties between 1994 and 1998, the 
distribution of FIDESZ votes by settlements shifted in the 1998 elections, and the 
dominant part of party support came from the countryside With the formation of 
two new camps, that of 'the Right' and 'the Left', the search for fixed political 
frontiers - signs of which were already observable between 1990 and 1994 - gained 
new momentum from 1994 
After incorporating the newly-divided Christian Democrats m 1997, FIDESZ 
emerged to lead the government, with the FKgP as junior partners in 1998 FIDESZ 
came to reject neoliberal economics - embodied notably m the 1995 'Bokros'44 
austerity package - which it saw as "serving the interests of Hungary's ex-
nomenklatura elite and its foreign sponsors" (HANLEY et al, 2θθ8, ρ 428) After turning 
away from liberalism, FIDESZ developed a new ideology whose key concepts are 
normally translated as'CIVIC' (polgan) and 'citizen' {polgar), although, as some pointed 
out (FOWLER, 2004b, HANLEY et al, 2θθ8), 'bourgeois' is a legitimate and perhaps more 
helpful rendering Accordingly, m 1995 FIDESZ changed its name to'FIDESZ-Hungarian 
CIVIC Party' {FIDESZ - Magyar Polgan Part) Hereafter, FIDESZ will be used for simplicity 
As HANLEY et al note "[t]he polgan ideology located Hungary's post-1994 socialist-
liberal administration m a sweeping critique of 'transition' integrated into a longer 
historical narrative of Hungarian nationhood However, it also offered a vision of 
post-socialist transformation, making it a more aspirational, Western and forward-
looking appeal than many traditional forms of Hungarian conservatism" (HANLEY etal, 
2008, ρ 428) While initially, there was a division between the more moderate 
FIDESZ-led centre right on the one hand and a more radical FKgP centred strand on 
the other, they became united in opposing government plans that would have 
allowed corporate and foreign land ownership (FOWLER, 2004b) 
44 The austerity package was named after Laps Bokros then Finance Minister 
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Parties have also diverged in their conceptualization of Hungary's link to the EU/ 
Europe. While all supported pro-membership policies, the mainstream parties 
developed different positions on the desirable negotiation strategy to be employed 
vis-à-vis Brussels in the second half of the 1990s. As to the MSZP, it adopted a 
technocratic stance and the commitment to modernization. The SZDSZ, most strongly 
emphasizing their support for European integration, have also embraced the notion 
of Europe as a synonym of modernization. In contrast, FIDESZ, although seeing 
European integration also as a top foreign policy objective, placed great emphasis on 
defending 'the national interest' in the accession negotiations. FIDESZ politicians 
viewed Hungary's membership as a natural claim to harmonize the country's position 
on the cultural map of Europe with its position in the European economy. Prime 
Minister Orbân even argued that "there [was] life outside the Union" (see BATORY, 
2002, pp. 3-6) and under his government, the cabinet committee on European 
integration was dissolved (BRUSIS, 2006). 
The increasingly manifest bipolar configuration of Hungarian politics reproduced 
the traditional opposition between a more particularist camp emphasizing national 
specificities and a more pro-integrationist camp stressing the imperative to 
modernize and catch up with Europe. This old-new opposition substantially shaped 
the way the Budapest-Wde/f divide was understood and addressed from the end of 
the 1990s. The amendment of the 1996 Act, in particular concerningthe regulation of 
the development of the agglomeration of Budapest, was an important moment in 
the overall debate. The government proposed to dissolve the mandatory Development 
Council for the Agglomeration of Budapest and to merge it into the Central Hungarian 
Regional Development Council. This move was greatly disapproved by the opposition, 
especially because the other special development council, for Lake Balaton, was 
retained. As one SZDSZ deputy argued: 
"We all know that in the process of Union integration, Budapest is that pulling force that 
joins Hungary to Europe. [...] At the same time, the instruments that would or should allow 
Budapest to play this role in the process of our accession to Europe's regions and prevent 
Budapest from losing the advantage it gained in the past time in face of other Central 
Eastern European capitals, the scope of these instruments is becoming restricted. [...] [ i ]t is 
obvious that Lake Balaton is an area in need of special regulation, I fully agree with that. 
But I think that so does Budapest, and that's why I don't understand why Budapest and its 
agglomeration [...] is treated as It was not one entity from a spatial development point of 
view" (Kóródi, 8 September 1999/230). 
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Opposition members saw the - for Budapest, unfavourable - change to the 
institutional framework of regional development as an element of the unfolding 
broader anti-Budapest government strategy As MSZP's Barath argued 
"[Y]es in the past year, it appeared in the government s every day politics and also in the 
present amendment, that the country has to shame itself for Budapest, that Budapest has 
to be treated in some respects in a subordinate way, because it is overdeveloped and so on 
Anyone who knows Budapest's inner state of development and structure, and the 
agglomeration's state of development, or rather underdevelopment, knows exactly that 
yes, in a developed Europe the country needs a developed Budapest Thus there mustn't 
be a contradiction created with such an Act and that s what this amendment is doing' 
(Barath, 8 September 1999/232) 
With SZDSZ's Gabor Demszky elected as Budapest's Mayor for the third time in the 
autumn local government elections of 1998, it seemed that the governing centre-right 
became united through its mistrust of 'cosmopolitan' Budapest (PALONEN, 2006) 
According to Palonen's study (ibid ), it is indicative of the government's hostility 
towards Budapest that Prime Minister Viktor Orban, m his speeches between 1999 
and 2002, made only a dozen - and rather negative - references to the capital 
Tensions between the newly established Central Hungarian Regional 
Development Council and Budapest prevented a coherent treatment of the 
agglomeration's development The former was presided over by the president of Pest 
County's assembly, a member of FIDE5Z, and it included ministerial delegates 
The latter was led by SZDSZ's Demszky (KERESZTELY, 2002) Also, in the run-up to 
accession, debates resurfaced on whether to divide the Central Hungarian Region 
into a Budapest city-region and the rest of Pest County The mam reason for 
considering a divide (in which case a region with a hole -1 e Budapest - in the middle 
would have been created) were fears that Budapest's high GDP performance could 
possibly jeopardize the eligibility of the Central Hungarian Region for Objective ι 
status Regions qualified for Objective 1 status of the EU Structural Funds if their GDP 
was below 75% of the EU average, and the Central Hungarian Region already reached 
72% m 1997 It was anticipated that the region would actually surpass the 75% 
threshold, especially considering the overall decrease of the EU average after the CEE 
enlargement round It is important to note that falling from Objective 1 status also 
meant that m the area m question no domestic subsidies (including tax allowances) 
could be accorded (ILLES, 2002) The president of the Central Hungarian Regional 
Development Council was in favour of a separation 
160 
"As for my part, I think "the region with a hole", i.e. the region without Budapest would be 
the luckier solution. [The Central Hungarian Region] can satisfy all the criteria of a European 
statistical-planning region itself. Forty thousand people move out from Budapest each 
year, and between thirty and forty-thousand move to Pest County. This is the only region of 
the country where population growth is continuous" [Falu, Väros, Regio, 2002, p. 13). 
Concerning Budapest's Mayor Demszky, he f irmly opposed a separation because that 
would have clearly deprived Budapest from Objective 1 funding. He proposed the 
inclusion of further territories (counties) from beyond Pest County, in order to 
produce a region that has a low enough GDP figure. Finally, regional borders remained 
unchanged. The Court of Pest County cancelled the resolution of the Assembly of 
Pest County about a referendum to be held about the separation, on the grounds 
that in this question there are no legal possibilities to order a county referendum. The 
idea of extending the region's territory was in turn discarded on the grounds that 
that would create a mega-region comprising 40% of Hungary's population, doom the 
rest of the country to peripheral status at the same time and undermine the role of 
videki regional centres as potential counterpoles (ILLÉS, 2001). 
While the Prime Minister was rather silent about Budapest, he made positive 
references to the vidék and prided himself on the fact that the government was 
investing outside Budapest (PALONEN, 2006; see also KORKUT, 2007): 
"If we look at the distribution, the geographical distribution of the applications fortender 
of the Szechenyi Plan, then what I can tell you today is that in every second settlement in 
Hungary, in every second settlement in Hungary [sic] investment related to the Szechenyi 
Plan is taking place. In the history of Hungary, that is, as it is well known, Budapest-centric, 
such a case occurred a very long time ago, if ever" (ORBÄN, 2002) 
The 'Szechenyi Plan', a medium-term national development plan (see 80x5.7), was 
named after Count Istvân Szechenyi (1791-1860), a prominent politician of the 
Hungarian Reform Era. A firmly established figure in public consciousness as 'the 
greatest Hungarian' who, among other things, founded the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences and initiated the construction of a bridge between Buda and Pest (that 
bears his name), Szechenyi decidedly became the emblem of FIDESZ. As PALONEN 
(2002) notes, the choice of political idols (in particular from the t ime of the 1848-49 
revolution) co-constituted the process of polarization in Hungarian party politics. 
While moderate reformer Count Szechenyi cameto stand for FIDESZ, Budapest Mayor 
Demszky conspicuously omitted Szechenyi from his speeches and referred to 
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conservative Battyhany (the first Prime Minister), liberal Kossuth (the leader of the 
group of mumcipalists), radical poet Petofi and Left-wing Tancsics Going even 
further, Demszky, in an attempt to overwrite Szechenyi's role in 'founding Budapest', 
referred to Frigyes Podmamnczky (1824-1907), the (relatively unknown) first president 
of the Capital's Public Works Council {Fovarosi Kozmunkak Tanacsa), as the 'Greatest 
Budapestian' (PALONEN, 2006) Budapest's medium-term urban development 
programme launched m 2005 was also given the name 'Podmamnczky Programme' 
With the Szechenyi Plan becoming its mam concern, the Ministry of Economy 
accorded little attention to the National Development Plan (NDP) The NDP was to be 
submitted to the European Commission by September 2000 and, following some 
mter-mimstenal rivalry with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and 
the Office of the Minister without portfolio for Phare coordination matters (see 
KALMAN, η d , ρ 41). the Ministry of Economy was designated as the coordinator of 
its elaboration The Szechenyi Plan was heavily criticized by Hans Beck, then Head 
of the Representation of the Regions of Hungary to Brussels, as being clearly 
centralizing and opposing Brussel's policy As a response, the Ministry declared that 
the objective of the Plan was exactly to contribute to the regions'efficient functioning 
by remedying the dual spatial structure 
Box 5.1 The Szechenyi Plan 
The 'Szechenyi Plan' included a public spending initiative amounting to some 3 5% of 
Hungary's GDP over the following two-three years and wished to address Hungary's 'dual 
economy'The term'dual economy'refers to the fact that Hungary's post-transition economy 
split into two sub-systems without significant production or labour market linkages 
The first and dynamic sub-system is located mainly in Budapest and parts of Western 
Hungary, where approximately 50 multinational firms concentrated m the machine-building 
sector generate a large part of the GDP, produce the bulk of exports and conduct most R&D 
activities The second sub-system is that of domestic small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), lagging behind m terms of productivity but generating the bulk of private sector 
employment The authors of the plan argued that whereas the more developed regions have 
reached a self-sustaining growth path, the less developed regions need the government's 
assistance The plan consisted, therefore, of building motorways to less developed regions, 
promoting domestic R&D, subsidizing housing construction and tourism activities, promoting 
sub-contracting relations between multinational corporations and Hungarian SMEs, and 
supporting the establishment of SMEs in poorer regions (see OECD, 2000, pp 71-72) 
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5.35 ^ e vidék as 'the rural' 
The notion of the vidék, in addition to its broader signification as 'the rest of the 
country', has also entered discussions on state spatial intervention as the equivalent 
of the English term 'rural'. The 1996 Act contained a definition of'areas of agricultural 
rural development (rural areas)' (mezögazdasagi vidékfejlesztés térségei (ruràlis 
térségek}). These areas were identified as "areas where the proportion of employment 
in the agricultural sector, or those dealing with agriculture, is substantial, or where 
the proportion of the population living in villages or small towns is substantial"45. 
The growing attention to rural development in Hungary was greatly induced by the 
administrat ive-inst i tut ional requirements related to the reception of ED rural 
development subsidies. 
Defining the vidéklrwà\ in a way that captures the specificity of Hungarian 
rurality (vis-à-vis that of rurality in 'Western Europe') and is aligned with the way EU 
policies designate rural areas as spaces of intervention was, however, far from 
straightforward. The EU has relied namely on a definition of rurality based on 
population density46, established by the OECD for the designation of areas of 
intervention. However, taking low population density as an indicator of rurality is 
problematic in Hungary and, more generally, in Central Eastern Europe (KOVÂCS, 2003). 
Based on the OECD definition, on the NUTS3 level 0.6% of Hungary's territory (in fact 
Budapest) qualified as predominantly urban, while 58% was predominantly rural, and 
41.5% intermediate47 in 2000 (CEC, 2007, pp. 61-62). (In fact, following this definit ion, 
the vidék in terms of 'the rest of the country' and vidék as rural can be seen as largely 
overlapping in the case of Hungary (NEMES, 1999)). Some have suggested that one 
should apply the 120 inhabitants per square km threshold in order to overcome the 
distortive effects of the OECD methodology and to obtain a 'realistic picture' of 
Hungarian rurality (CSATÀRI, 2001). However, some of the neediest rural areas in North 
Eastern Hungary have a population density above 120 inhabitants per square km and 
would have been excluded from subsidies on the basis of the above delimitation (ILLES, 
45 Act XXI/1995, Article 5p. 
46 According to that definition, local units (e.g. municipalities) are identified as rural if their population 
density is below 150 inhabitants per square kilometre. Regional units on NUTS3 or NUTS4 level are 
considered as'predommantly rural'if more than 50% of the population of the region is living in rural local 
units, 'predominantly urban' if less than 15% of the population of the region is living in rural local units 
and intermediate if the proportion of population living in rural municipalities is between 15 and 50%. 
As from 2005. the OECD introduced changes in the methodology to take into account the existence of 
urban centres (see CEC, 2007, p.3). 
47 To compare: in the case of the United Kingdom, the corresponding figures are 21,6%, 24.2% and 54.2%, 
respectively 
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2002) Analysts expected that the prospective intensification of agricultural 
production would even aggravate the situation of rural areas by increasing the rate 
of agricultural unemployment In addition, the implications of EU accession 
(environmental, animal health and other regulations, the cessation of domestic tax 
allowances) were seen as threatening the existence of small-scale self-supporting 
producers (NEMES, 2000) Finally, as a corrective to the 120 inhabitants per square km 
population density indicator, another indicator was introduced for rural grant 
disbursement, namely population size (for settlements wi th less than 10,000 
inhabitants) (KOVACS, 2003) 
Parallel to the difficulties of defining 'the Hungarian rural', the EU's Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) itself became subject to redefinition m the run up to Eastern 
enlargement' More particularly, plans appeared about shifting the CAP towards a 
comprehensive rural development policy However, defining what 'rural development 
policy' should signify in an enlarged Union was far from straightforward, and 
different interpretations existed depending on the weight given to agriculture, 
structural policies, social policies or community development (NEMES, 1999) 
The Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development 
(SAPARD), one of the pre-accession assistance programmes'18 that became 
associated most prominently with rural development in Hungary, became dommantly 
agricultural m focus On the one hand, the focus of SAPARD m CEE countries was 
increasingly narrowed down to agricultural restructuring, losmgthe scope of a wider 
rural development perspective (NEMES, 2003) On the other hand, the outcome of 
domestic party political deals and of struggles between lobby groups also contributed 
to the strengthening of the agricultural focus m Hungary After winning the elections 
in 1998, FIDESZ ceded the supervision of the newly created Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development (Foldmuvelesugyi es Vidékfejlesztési Mmisztenum) to its 
coalition partner FKgP, seen as a party of rural areas and of (former and new) small 
and medium-sized land owners (see KOROSENYI, 1999) 
It has to be noted that the official English translation of the Ministry's name was 
'Ministry of Agriculture and Regional Development' (NEMES, 2000) In fact, the Ministry 
was responsible for what the present case study refers to as spatial development 
(teruletfejlesztes), m negotiations about regional policy with the European Commission 
With the Ministry of Economy assuming responsibility for the overall National 
Development Plan, tension arose between the two Ministries As analysts pointed out, 
this set up actually institutionalized the unclear regulation of relations between 
48 Pre accession programmes have Ihe objective of helping applicant countries adoption of the acquis and 
of preparing them for future EU policies 
164 
economic and spatial development policy (FARACO, 2004; PAPANEK, 2006; SOMLYODYNE PFEIL, 
2003). To return to the Ministry's Hungarian name (see above), it actually contained 
vidékfejlesztési, literally 'of the development of the videk', in addition to 'agricultural'. 
In fact, the Ministry used 'vidékfejlesztés' principally in the sense of rural development 
and vidék(i) in the sense of'rural'. In an overview of the Ministry's activities in one of 
the professional planning journals, it was stated that the expansion of the scope of 
authority of the Ministry made it possible "that spatial development, rural development 
[Wdé/c/e/Vesziés] and agricultural development subsidies would al I serve the development 
of vidéki areas" (Falu, Vóros, Règio, 2001, p. 29). The way these various fields of 
interventions (should) relate to each other became a matter of intense debate among 
policy-makers and academics (KOVACS, 2003). The actual content of rural development 
was shaped by intra-ministerial struggles over the scope of authority over rural 
development funds, finally won by the agricultural lobby against the spatial 
development lobby. Once they were sure of being able to preserve their identity and 
integrity in their new home ministry - signalled, according to NEMES (2000), by the 
official English name of the Ministry - , departments of spatial development actually 
lost interest in rural development. At the same time, the 'winning' departments of 
agriculture remained interested in rural development asfar as it concerned agricultural 
restructuring and showed little interest in a 'new type'of integrated rural policy (ibid.). 
The head of the Ministry, József Torgyén - the widely known and populist-inclined 
leader of the FKgP - also stressed the core importance of agriculture to rural 
development, and went even further: 
"[It] is often questioned why we need rural development [vidékfejlesztés] at all, what place 
it has in Hungary's political and economic life. Here I would like to point to the fact that the 
European Commissioner is not only a Commissioner for Agriculture, but also for Rural 
Development, and [that] the Western half of the world has already recognized that the 
development of agriculture is unthinkable without rural development. [...] But no one 
should misinterpret the notion of rural development! From this place I have to state, aware 
of my responsibilities, that agricultural development is unthinkable without rural 
development, just as rural development is unthinkable without regional development, and 
all development can be summarized under one word: nation development [nemzetfejiesz-
tés]" (Torgyàn, 14 June 1999/4). 
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Delegates of the opposition argued in contrast that 
I think that the key to all that [ι e the undue treatment of Budapest] is in what is called the 
Rural Development Strategy [Videkfejlesztesi Strategia] issued by the Rural Development 
Ministry [Videkfejlesztesi Mmisztenum], and which I would call many things but the least a 
strategy, a country building strategy' (Korodi 8 September 1999/230) 
As the head of the Chief Department for Rural Development Programmes (Videkfej­
lesztesi Programok Foosztalya) argued, the most important territorial unit for rural 
development is the 'small settlement', and it is on the local level that settlements 
have to examine their endowments, exploit the opportunities and remedy the 
problems (see LORINCZ, 2001, ρ 42) Finally, however, in spite of the emphasis on the 
local and on the country outside Budapest, decision-making regarding rural 
development took a centralized form and thus remained firmly attached to Budapest 
Just as m the previously discussed case of spatial development funds, the EU's 
aspiration for control and the fast and efficient implementation of the acquis proved 
stronger than its support for decentralized funds administration m the candidate 
countries According to NEMES (2000), when representatives of the Department of 
Rural Development of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development proposed a 
strongly decentralized SAPARD programme, high-level EU officials said that planners 
had misinterpreted the concept and that SAPARD had to be much more under central 
state control (and much more agricultural m orientation) 
S 3 6 'Modernizing' state spatial organization in the run-up to EU membership 
Although it was clear that the post-2002 government 'would take Hungary to the EU', 
EU issues did not figure centrally m the electoral campaign Instead, the 2002 
campaign evolved around the issue of the 'completion of system change' Both 
leading parties tried to monopolize the concept FIDESZ claimed that the change 
would be complete when citizens, satisfied with the course of events, vote the 
government confidence for a second term MSZP m turn claimed that system change 
is not complete until a higher level of welfare is reached Accordingly, the t it le of 
MSZP's manifesto [Joleti rendszervaltast1) was 'Change For Welfare1' or '(Let us) 
Extend the System Change to Welfare Actions1' or '(We want) a System Change -
Promising Welfarei' (see MIHALYFFY, 2005) One of the underlying principles of the 
MSZP manifesto seemed to be 'equal opportunities' (ibid ) As MSZP's Prime Minister 
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candidate Medgyessy noted in an interview the year before the elections: 
"The state has to spend much more on the levelling of regional differences than it has done 
so far. No matter how much improvement economic development has brought to the 
bigger cities, in some regions people do not perceive any change. [...] If we take the notion 
of equal opportunities seriously, then we cannot allow that people in less developed 
regions find themselves in a bad situation because of where they were born. That is why for 
the M5ZP the issue of the countryside [vidék], and that of the youth of the countryside, is 
among the most important programmes. [...] In contrast to the FIDESZ, we would grant tax 
allowances not only to a few thousands of family businesses, bu t to at least 500 thousand 
family businesses. Our rural development policy [vidékfejlesztési politlka] differs from the 
current one in that it does not differentiate between small and large farms. I think it will be 
decisive in the elections which party can offer an answer that corresponds better to the 
aspirations of the people of the countryside [vidék]" (Medgyessy in Esély, 2005, p. 113). 
The 2002 Parliamentary elections actually marked a high point of the ongoing 
'blpolarization' between the FIDESZ-led Right and the MSZP-SZDSZ Left-liberals 
(FOWLER, 2002b; PALONEN, 2009). Participation in the 2002 election was the highest 
since 1990. The Left-liberal MSZP-SZDSZ coalition - having the smallest majority 
since 1990 - replaced the Right in power. The elections consolidated a two-party 
parliamentary dominance (three forces entered parliament, from six in all previous 
elections). As to the territorial patterns of vote distribution, the MSZP held Budapest 
and former industrial areas in the North and South, while FIDESZ made a sweep in 
the relatively rich West, and took Pest County and poorer Eastern agricultural areas. 
On the whole, the constituencies split on Budapest/provinces (vìdék) lines: the 
Left-liberals took 28 Budapest seats, confining the Right to four in wealthy Buda, but 
the Right took 91 of 144 provincial constituencies (see FOWLER, 2002b). 
Regionalization became high on the agenda of the MSZP-led government, with 
two main reasons being advanced for regional reforms: public administration 
modernization and administrative capacity building for EU structural aid management. 
How these two were related to each other, especially in terms of being an 'imperative' 
implied by EU membership, remained a matter of discussion. Before briefly considering 
the claims made in this regard, it has to be noted that in contrast to the previous 
FIDESZ-led government, the MSZP-led government showed an attitude of cooperation 
and conciliation towards the EU (BATORY, 2002). The pro-Europe attitude of the MSZP-led 
government actually manifested itself in the institution of various bodies for the 
management of the accession negotiations; most notably, the cabinet committee on 
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European integration was restored (AGH, 2006) Control over spatial development 
policy was transferred from the Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Development to the 
newly created National Spatial Development Office (Nemzeti Teruletfejlesztesi Hivatal) 
within the Prime Minister's Office Parallel to that, another Office was created within 
the Prime Minister's Office, the Office for the National Development Plan and EU funds 
{Nemzeti Fejlesztesi Terves EU tamogatasok Hivatala) 
Concerning the imperatives of regionalization, the Minister of the Interior and 
experts of the IDEA programme - a Reform Programme for the Modernization of 
Hungarian Public Administration''9, initiated by the Ministry of the Interior m 2002 -
continued to stress that as public administration is the competency of member 
states, there are no concrete EU requirements m this regard Rather, they stressed 
that what is at stake is the efficiency of the system of public administration and that 
the success of membership will largely depend on this efficiency (eg ACH, 2005, 
Nemeth in Onkorkep, 2003) Actually, the MSZP already committed itself to a radical 
reform of public administration in 2001, including regionalization through the 
creation of self-governing regional units in the next governmental cycle until 2006 
(ACH, 2004) The same commitment was repeated by Peter Medgyessy, the MSZP's 
Prime Ministerial candidate, between the two rounds of parliamentary elections in 
April 2002, at a meeting of the various associations of local and territorial self 
governments The programme of the new MSZP-led government, m office from May 
2002, already contained explicit references to the establishment of elected regional 
governments Also, the programme mentioned that local governments should be 
given greater autonomy, associations of local governments should be set up to 
improve service provision and that bodies of deconcentrated public administration 
should decrease m number (GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY, 2002) To the 
question whether the envisioned decentralization would make ministries more 
weightless, the Minister of the Interior answered the following 
[Y]es it does [make them more weightless] However, the modern, European Republic of 
Hungary is not brought forward by a paternalist approach, but by sovereign democratic 
bodies that are thinking and deciding autonomously Be it elected regional or the municipal 
governments' (Monika Lamperth m Uj Dunantuli Naplo, 200350) 
49 The acronym IDEA stood for Integraao - Integration Decentrahzoao - Decentralization Autonomia -
Autonomy) 
50 The interview was actually published under the title The countryside (videk) becomes stronger with 
the regions 
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With the 'Europeanness' of Hungary being unquestioned (BOROCZ 2001; Medgyessy, 13 
November 2002/18), the regionalization of public administration was thus presented 
as the condition of the reassertion o f tha t Europeanness and of becoming a modern 
European state. 
The imperative of administrative capacity building for EU structural aid 
management appeared in turn in a much more explicit form. The new Hungarian 
government came under increasing pressure. First of all, the elaboration of the National 
Development Plan, started in January 2001, was substantially delayed (at the time of 
the change of government in May 2002, only the first chapter of the obligatory seven 
was completed). In addition, the 2002 Regular Report of the Commission was decidedly 
critical about Hungary's progress in the field of regional policy. As it was stated: 
"[t]he capacity of regional and local actors as well as other relevant partners to prepare, 
implement projects, needs to be considerably strengthened" (CEC, 2002, p.102). 
"Overall, Hungary has met the prioritiesof the Accession Partnership in the area of Regional 
Policy only to a very limited extent. It has accumulated delays in the time schedule set in 
the Action Plan for the implementation of the measures foreseen" (CEC, 2002, p. 144). 
The severe setback notwithstanding, in July 2002 the Medgyessy government 
confirmed that it would submit the National Development Plan (NDP) by the end of 
2002, including the five operational programmes (PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, 2003). 
It is important to note that the decision made by the previous government that 
there would be five operational programmes (OPs), i.e. four sectoral5' and one 
'umbrella' Regional Operational Programme (ROP) for the seven regions, was not 
simply indicative of that government's neglect of regional administrative capacity. In 
fact, the FIDESZ-led government decided to have a single ROP (with seven regional 
priorities) due to pressures from the European Commission that feared bureaucratic 
overburdening following the greatest enlargement round ever. Paradoxically then, 
the Commission was actually (at least partly) implicated in the alleged lack of 
administrative capacity that it was criticizing. 
Due to the t ight time schedule that the new government faced in 2002 - for 
which the previous government was blamed (e.g ACH, 2006) - a pragmatic att i tude 
to regionalization (especially characteristic of the MSZP) was affirmed. The remarks 
51 The four sectoral OPs were: the Agricultural and Rural Development [vidékfejlesztési) OP, the Economic 
Competitiveness OP, the Human Resource Development OP, and the Environmental Protection and 
Infrastructure OP 
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of Sândor Nagy, the Secretary of State of the National Spatial Development Office, 
on the issue of redrawing NUTS2 regional boundaries, are illustrative here 
"Regionalism can become reality if the inhabitants of the different regions identify with 
their regions [ ] But that is not the question at the present We have t ime to think about 
that later [ ] For the long term, it would be practical to think in terms of regions that 
supply their inhabitants wi th regional identity [ ] But what we have to avoid m any case is 
to think about the practical modifications of the future instead of the urgent preparations 
of the present In the field of spatial development, we have to prepare for the reception of 
subsidies due after accession, so it is necessary to elaborate project tenders that make a 
chance for subsidies But, at the same time, we can start thinking about a regional division 
that takes several aspects into account" (Sandor Nagy in Falu Varos. Regio, 2002b, ρ i6 ) 
This pragmatism appeared as rational because 'the reception of subsidies' became 
commonly pictured as vital to the reassertion of 'Europeanness' As the Prime Minister 
stressed 
For Hungary, Community resources amounting to some 1,360 billion forints will be available 
until 2006, so that the clever and courageous tendering of businesses and people can help 
the catching up of our country with those who have had a luckier history' (Medgyessy m 
Nepszava, 2004 ρ 2) 
Simultaneously, t ime pressure negatively affected administrative capacity building 
in the regions and also undermined the shaping development strategies of the 
regions The MSZP-SZDSZ government moved further - wi th the consent of the 
European Commission - towards a hybrid ROP containing three thematic (sectoral) 
priorities, from which the first t w o were supposed to be implemented by region-
specific measures Finally, the single ROP that was elaborated by the end of 2002 had 
a thematic structure, which means that it was m fact sectoral The ROP m its final 
form did not contain the development objectives of the regions, it was 'regional' only 
m the sense that projects were to be selected on a regional basis 
The issue of public administration modernization and that of administrative 
capacity building for regional policy became fused not only w i t h regard to the 
regional scale, but also to that of the micro regional scale that the government 
wished to re organize Micro-regions were presented as the 'smallest building blocks' 
of regions, and the objective was to establish a uniform system of micro-regions, m 
order to overcome the discrepancy between the 150 statistical micro-regions (NUTS4 
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level) and the 270 micro-regional associations of municipalities. Although under the 
previous FIDESZ-led government, the appointment of micro-region managers was 
criticized for being politically biased, the new government did not abolish the posts, 
but refilled them following a similar logic (HVG, 2002). The already quoted State 
Secretary defended the centrally steered, old-new network of micro-regional 
managers by stating that the network is essential to the institutional capacity of EU 
funds management: 
"From the central funds that are to serve spatial development, a due amount has to be spent on 
the micro-regions' capacity for tendering. The network of micro-regional managers will serve 
this end. [...] A large part of the countryside {vidék) does not have the expertise in presenting its 
development ideas and plans" (Sandor Nagy in Falu, Varos, Regio, 2002b, p. 16). 
The role of micro-regions as 'the building blocks'of modernized public administration 
was central to the work of one of the three expert groups of the IDEA programme, 
dealing wi th micro-regional reorganization52. As the head of the group argued: 
"Hungarian public administration has arrived at a crossroads. The construction of the 
system of public administration that was started with system change has to be finished. 
For more than a decade, no significant modifications have been made and this is why there 
are still many tasks to resolve This cannot be postponed. When the system of self-
government was founded, settlement autonomy and identity creation were the main tasks, 
leading to a very fragmented settlement structure. Issues of efficiency and modernization 
were pushed In the background; in that field we cannot present many results" (Nerneth in 
Önkorkép, 2003). 
As a first step to micro-regional reforms, the Central Statistical Office revised the 
micro-regional division of the country and delimited 167 micro-regions. The two most 
densely populated cities of Hungary, i.e. Budapest and Debrecen, were not covered by 
the regulation; they were not part of any micro-region (SOMLYÔDYNÉ PFEIL, 2006; VARCA, 
2005). This was a disadvantage insofar as the two cities were thus automatically 
excluded from grants for micro-regions. As FIDESZ's Lajos Kósa, Mayor of Debrecen, 
recalled in 2007: 
52 The two other expert groups were focusing on reglonalization and on the financing of self-
governments. 
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"[In the case of] the capital it is maybe understandable, but in the case of Debrecen not at 
all Because no one doubts that the capital has a special position in the country but that 
every city with county rights, from CyOr to Miskolc, to Szeged could set up a micro region, 
and Debrecen as the only one not, it was more than clear that this is the type of government 
logic of the Socialists that [says] let us harm where we can, if a city was shameless and 
courageous enough [ ] and dared to elect oppositional leadership" (Kosa 10 September 
2007/276) 
As an official of the Ministry of Self Government and Spatial Development 
(Onkormanyzati es Teruletfejlesztesi Mmisztenum) noted in an interview with regard 
to the way the micro-regional division came about 
"I would say that the Central Statistical Office delivered the [statistical] formula for the 
[definition of the] politically desirable spatial structure' 
Finally, the government was not given support from the opposition (to achieve a 
two-thirds majority) for instituting an overall reform of public administration and for 
making regions and micro-regions self-governing As to the micro-regional scale, m 
2004 there were nonetheless two noteworthy regulatory changes introduced, 
building on the newly established micro-regional division First, the formation of 
multi-purpose micro-regional associations, cooperating in municipal public service 
provision, was encouraged via a centrally established grant scheme Local actors 
acknowledged the government's aim of rationalizing public administration and 
providing a uniform level of public services (see also SOMLYÓDYNE PrriL, 2006) However, 
as the Secretary of the Association of Villages cautioned 
"[w]e have to look out that we do not go too far and that there is no wave of enforced 
district creation evoking the 1960s and 1970s that (among other things) lead to the tragic 
fate of the country's small villages" (CSEFKO, 2004, ρ 14) 
The Minister of the Interior expressed her understanding for such concerns, but 
assured that she 
' [wjould never table a bill to the parliament of the Hungarian Republic that curtails the 
autonomy of self governments in any way' (Lamperth 24 March 2004/129) 
That forced mergers between municipal self-governments were definitely out of the 
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question also appeared from the answer of a research group leader of the IDEA 
programme; 
"If we do not want to merge self-governments - because that is at the root of the issue! -
then we have to f ind another solution. [- Is it sure that we do not want to merge them?] 
We don't! I don't say the settlements would not survive it, but it would be an immense 
shock for them and for that there is no political will or force" (Németh in Ûnkorkép, 2003). 
Nonetheless, concerns around micro-regions persisted. As the Secretary of the 
Association of Villages noted: 
"[The fundamental problem is] the following: now, for the hoped-for grants, some sort of 
forced marriages, or, in any case, inadequately elaborated and founded co-operations are 
taking shape. The question is: what will happen to these in 2005, 2006, that is, what 
guarantee is there for future central budget support?" (CsrrKö, 2004, p. 14). 
Parallel to the new regulation on multi-purpose micro-regional associations (in the form 
of a government resolution and subsequently, an act of parliament), the 1996 Spatial 
Development and Land Use Planning Act was amended in 2004. The amendment 
prescribed the establishment of micro-regional development councils forthe coordination 
of spatial development tasks, the adoption of a micro-regional development concepts 
and the elaboration of spatial development programmes53. As analysts noted, the main 
shortcoming of the new regulations was that they failed to apply a differentiated 
approach and to recognize the spatial organizing role of cities and towns. This was 
the case in spite of experts of the IDEA programme clearly stressing this aspect and 
the Central Statistical Office providing new data about agglomerations and about 
functional settlement groups (SOMLYÒDYNE PFEIL, 2006; VARCA, 2005). In fact, with urban 
functions being ignored, the new micro-regional regulatory framework's emphasis came 
to lie on the integration of basic public service provision. As such, the framework was 
geared to the needs of rural micro-regions (SOMLYÒDYNE PFEIL, 2006). 
As to the institutional framework at the NUTS2 regional scale, the proposed 
amendment of the 1996 Act that was introduced to parliament contained, among 
other things, a radical reconfiguration of regional development councils. The number 
of central ministerial representatives was to be reduced from a dozen to one, and 
53 It was stipulated that in micro regions where the above-mentioned multi-purpose association was formed 
with the participation of all municipalities from the micro-region, then the micro-regional development 
council and the council of the multi purpose micro-regional association could be one and the same body 
-falling, nevertheless under different procedural rules. 
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seats offered to delegates from counties and cities with county rights Finally, 
however, lacking not only the opposition's support, but also that of its coalition 
partner, MSZP could not push through its proposal In the parliamentary debate on 
the amendment of the 1996 Act, MSZP's Sandor Nagy strongly criticized FIDESZ's 
chief speaker who argued that the Spatial Development Act in force was satisfying 
the minimum of EU requirements As Nagy (18 May 2004/124) noted, if that was the 
case, then the previous government would not have been forced to accept the 
European Commission's standpoint that there would be one regional operational 
programme for Hungary MSZP's coalition partner SZDSZ, although in principle 
agreeing with the necessity of institutional reforms as laid down in the Government 
Programme, expressed serious discontent with the way the amendment of the 1996 
Act was actually introduced As SZDSZ's chief speaker Ferenc Wekler put it, there 
were conceptual differences between MSZP's and SZDSZ's standpoint Wekler 
stressed above all that according to the SZDSZ, the reform of public administration 
and that of spatial development could not be separated, especially because following 
the proposal, institutions of spatial development would be clearly dominated by 
actors from the self-government sector According to the SZDSZ, the proposal went 
too far in decreasing the number of central state delegates to the RDCs (From the 
side of FIDESZ, Balsay (18 May 2004/58) argued that the representatives of "well-
prepared" ministries do have a place m RDCs) Also, SZDSZ saw the proposal opening 
up the way for the strengthening of counties, first, by increasing the number of 
delegates from counties and cities with county rights in RDCs, and second, by 
suggesting that a representative of county development councils would become a 
member (with the right of consultation only) of micro-regional development 
councils" As Wekler stated 
"The SZDSZ continues to argue that the scales of spatial development are the national the 
regional, and the micro regional scale, and there is no need for reinforcing the county scale, 
or even letting it expand outside the county scene" (Wekler, 11 May 2004/214) 
54 This latter proposition was actually enacted 
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Finally, it has to be noted that - in line wi th the recommendations of IDEA experts 
(e.g. PERCER, 2003) - the amendment of the 1996 Act reinstituted a development 
council for the agglomeration of Budapest. The Development Council for the 
Agglomeration of Budapest was to be set up jointly by the Assembly of the Self-
government of the Capital and the Central Hungarian Regional Development Council, 
in order to harmonize development actions for the territory of Budapest and the 
agglomeration. 
5.5.7 Concluding remarks 
This third section of C/iopier 5 discussed the shaping of a new discursive formation of 
state space, that of spatial development. Two issues need to be emphasized here. 
First, the 1996 Act shifted the debate and source of sub-national reform for several 
years from the general sub-state public administration into the spatial development 
policy arena. This had, as FOWLER (2001) noted, consequences for the new development 
bodies created: in particular, these bodies were not set up as a part of a process of 
general state decentralization or democratization. The way the discursive formation 
of spatial development became connected to that of self-government explains why 
the formation of effectively supra-municipal (regional) spaces of intervention was 
prevented. A second important development was that the shaping of the discursive 
formation of spatial development re-opened new dimensions of the struggle over 
nation-state spaces. Most notably, struggles resurfaced about the signification of 
Budapest vis-à-vis the rest of the country, about the meaning of the vidék and also 
about the 'Europeanness' of Hungary. The sociological-institutional anchorage of 
political parties in the nepies-urbanus debate and the (shifting) geographical pattern 
of their support base considerably shaped the parties' claims on these issues. 
Furthermore, the ED (Commission) became part of the power relations shaping these 
struggles. With Budapest historically being the alter-ego of central state power 
(HoRvÄTH, 2002), the centralizing tendencies in the run-up to membership also implied 
that the dominance of Budapest was reinforced vis-à-vis the rest of the country. 
Before we move on to discuss post-accession developments, it is useful finally to 
have a closer look at how the signification of regions as state spaces underwent a 
change in the years prior to accession. With the increasing (but still modest) 
decentralization of spatial development funds, regions appeared as (weak) subjects 
of (nationally financed) spatial development. The plan of the Medgyessy government 
to turn regions into self-governing units actually envisaged the reconfiguration of 
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the system (discursive formation) of self government and that regions could assert 
themselves as subjects of spatial development Furthermore, the plan implied that 
the discursive formations of spatial development and self-government cease to 
operate as largely parallel systems of spatial ordering At the same time, regions 
became gradually subjected to the institutions established m view of (prospective) 
EU funds management - a system that we can actually regard as the newly shaping 
discursive formation of (EU-fmanced) 'development policy' [fejlesztespolitika) Within 
this discursive formation, regions appeared as the sites where EU monies are 
disbursed The various understandings of 'the region' manifested themselves m a 
threefold division of tasks at the national level, wi th the newly created National 
Spatial Development Office being in charge of spatial development, the Ministry of 
the Interior being m control of the system of public administration, and the newly 
established Office for the National Development Plan and EU Funds overseeing 
development policy 
It was clear from the onset that following accession, spatial development could 
rely on less national funding because national resources would be increasingly 
needed for the matching of EU funding During the period of preparation for EU 
membership, the position of the highly centralized formation of development policy 
was strengthened vis-a-vis that of spatial development The centralizing tendencies 
can be traced to a 1999 government decree that vested the newly established Inter-
mimsterial Committee of Development Coordination (Fejlesztespolitikai Tarcakozi 
Integraaos Bizottsag) wi th the central decision-making role concerning the National 
Development Plan The Committee formed five sub groups, each corresponding to 
one of the operational programmes and including the representatives of different 
ministries It should be noted that the relation of the NDP and its institutional 
framework on the one hand, and the planning documents and development bodies 
as specified by the 1996 Spatial Development and Land Use Planning Act on the other 
remained unregulated In fact, the Committee had a greater competency with regard 
to national strategic development planning than the parliament (FARACO, 2004) 
At the same time, regional actors were sidelined, according to FARAGO (ibid ), in this 
regard the exact role of domestic decision-makers and that of EU bureaucrats is 
unknown The committee uniting the presidents of Regional Development Councils 
and leaders of Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) was consulted only m the 
NDP's planning process, but it had no relevant influence on actual decision making 
According to analysts, regional actors were at best supplying the input for centrally 
taken, sector oriented decisions (FARACO, 2004, PAPAN«, 2006), and the whole social 
consultation process of the NDP fell short of complying with the principles of 
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partnership and subsidiarity (MÄRTON, 2004). In fact, it seemed as if "the new house" 
(i.e. the institutions for the management of EU funds) was built not on, but next to, 
"the foundations" (i.e. the institutions of spatial development) (SZALO, 2006, p. 10). 
As we wil l see, the discursive formation of development policy became further 
solidified in the post-accession period, and its gain in relevance largely explains the 
course of state spatial reorganization after Hungary's 'the return to Europe'. 
5.4 Di lemmas of state reorganization after the return to Europe: 
towards a 'New Hungary'? 
Only a few months after Hungary's EU accession - and, according to some (see ACH, 
2006), closely linked to that - Hungary's Prime Minister Medgyessy resigned in 
August 2004, following disputes with the junior coalition partner over a cabinet 
reshuffle in which the SZDSZ-nominated Minister of Economy was to be dismissed. 
Medgyessy was replaced by Ferenc Cyurcsâny. Inspired greatly by Tony Blair's (and 
Giddens'55) 'Third Way' (see e.g. DESSEWFY and DEAK, 2005; HEJJ, n.d.), Cyurcsâny called 
for a rethinking of Hungary's post-socialist welfare system that was, in his view, an 
unjust, "conservative policy in the disguise of Left-wing solidarity" (CYURCSÂNY, 2004). 
In fact, the revision of the programme of 'system change for welfare' that was 
announced by Medgyessy became increasingly pressing in 2004. As augmented 
public spending (on public sector wages, for example) under Medgyessy was not 
balanced wi th revenues or accompanied by structural reforms, the budget deficit 
became more and more worrying. Restoring the balance of the budget was one of 
the stated objectives of Cyurcsâny's government: 
"We maintain investment- and development-led growth by striving after a balanced budget, in 
order to lay the foundations for a prosperous and successful future, so that in 2010 "every-day 
Europe" can arrive to Hungary, and the forint be replaced by the common European currency, 
the euro" (GOVERNMENT OE THE REPUBLIC OE HUNGARY, 2004, p. 7). 
As referred to already, following the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, accession countries 
have no choice to opt-out of the European Monetary Union (EMU), because 
membership is a condition of their entry into the EU. Although entry into the EMU 
can, in principle, be postponed indefinitely if the criteria for entry are not met, the 
55 It was a company owned by Cyurcsâny, Agora Kft, (Ltd.) that actually published Giddens's The Third Way 
in Hungarian. 
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accession countries had all indicated that they would like to join the EMU as soon as 
possible There has been a strong sense that those who meet the Maastricht criteria 
and join EMU earlier will have the upper hand m competition for inward investment 
(CLARKE, 2005) In line wi th the above, the Government Programme announced a 
competitiveness-oriented transformation of the state budget At the same time, the 
Programme mentioned 'fairer social policy' among its objectives Prime Minister 
Gyurcsany, in his book 'Mid-Journey' {Utkozben) published m 2005, restated his view 
that 
"[ ] competition is one of the engines of social existence [ ] But life is not all about 
competition Co-operation is just as important an element of the existence of human 
communities Competition and co operation, competition and solidarity, competition and 
mutual responsibilities - they have to shape our lives together' (GYURCSANY 2005, pp 33-34, 
emphasis original) 
With his eyes already on the 2006 elections, Gyurcsany actually - contradicting his 
previously published standpoint-continued ratherthan revised the welfare spending 
of his predecessors during his first term The campaign preceding the 2006 elections 
was yet again polarized Finally, four parties (the MSZP, the SZDSZ, the FIDESZ and the 
MDF) made it to parliament and - as the first prime minister m post-1990 Hungarian 
politics - Gyurcsany was re-elected According to KORKUT (2007), the victory of the 
MSZP m the 2006 elections can be interpreted as Hungarian voters preferring a sort 
of solidarity without nationalist and patriarchal undertones Gyurcsany asserted his 
ambition of maintaining cohesion while increasing competitiveness and announced 
a series of reforms As he noted m the preface of the programme of his second 
government, entitled 'New Hungary Freedom and Solidarity' 
"There is no need for another system change It is not necessary and also not possible What 
is necessary is the smart, courageous, but nonetheless moderate adjustment of the 
relations that formed under system change [What is necessary is] a new Reform Era With 
a country reform, a reform parliament, a reform government ' (Gyurcsany m GOVCRNMENT OF 
THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY, 2006b, ρ 4) 
The opposition argued that the government was not proposing reforms, but -
contradicting electoral promises-smuggling in austerity measures m its Programme 
In fact, the second government of Gyurcsany faced even more severe budget deficit 
problems than when it took office m May 2006, and it could not postpone such 
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measures any longer. As Gyurcsâny's first government failed to meet budget deficit 
targets and present a convergence programme56 backed with concrete measures in 
2005, the European Council asked the second Gyurcsâny government to work out an 
adjusted convergence programme update by 1 September 2006. 
With the pressures of the 'second neoliberal shock' generated by the 'inescapable 
Maastricht criteria', the rethinking of Hungary's spatial organization and development 
arrived at a yet another episode. This last section of Chapter 5 will analyse this 
post-accession episode until the approval, in December 2006, of the 2nd National 
Development Plan (NDP) (entitled New Hungary Development Plan), which is the 
framework for development interventions co-financed by the EU for the programming 
period 2007-2013. As it is shown below, decentralization continued to be a key issue 
around which debates on spatial reforms unfolded, with various actors reformulating 
claims regarding the meaning o f ' the county', Budapest and the videk, as well as 'self-
government' and 'region'. A new concept arising and structuring the struggle over 
the meaning of Hungary's state spaces in the above-mentioned period was the 
concept of 'development pole' (fejlesztési pólus). The objectives of this section are 
first, to investigate the evolution of the concept of 'development pole', and second, 
to examine how the institutional differentiation of cities and city-regions failed to be 
realized in Hungary. In line with the PSA's notion of discursive selectivity, the debate 
about development poles will be analysed below as a struggle over the meaning of 
nation-state spaces. The claims and actions of the various actors engaging in the 
debate are regarded as attempts to fix development poles as object-spaces on the 
basis of particular differentiations and particular relations of equivalence. What is 
especially relevant in view of the concerns of this study is how claims in the debate 
have embodied demands for the recognition of particular spaces against the horizon 
of national space. 
5.4.7 'Making self-government impossible' 
Decentralization was a key notion of the vision of the first Gyurcsâny government's 
programme of "active government", referring to a strong, efficient and providing 
state. The notion of decentralization appeared above all in connection with the 
56 Convergence programmes - prepared by each member state and submitted to the Council for 
agreement - are part of the Stability and Growth Pact and detail the economic measures the country 
will take to ensure price stability, sound public finances and strong sustainable growth conducive to 
employment creation (CEC 2006). 
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issue of public administration reform According to the Government Programme, 
self-government {onkormanyzatisag) was one of the greatest achievements of 
system change but nonetheless, after 15 years, the transformation of the system of 
public administration could not be postponed any longer As it was put 
"Our accession to the European Union also requires the transformation of public 
administration The direction of the transformation of public administration can be that of 
decentralization and regionahzation [ ] The decentralization of decision making, the 
strengthening of self government entails at the same time the extension of opportunities 
and responsibilities In line wi th that, public administration in Hungary has to be reformed 
in a way that gives a central role to regions In the long term, elected regions are needed [ ] 
Tasks, resources for their realization and also responsibility needs to be ceded to those who 
are the most competent, to smaller and more extended local communities" (GOVERNMENT OE 
THE REPUBLIC OE HUNGARY, 2004, ρ 15) 
In view of the Government Programme, expectations in the self-government sector 
regarding a comprehensive financial reform were high Following the government's 
budget proposal of 2005, however, the representatives of seven self-government 
associations" voiced their criticism m a statement about the apparent lack of such a 
reform The associations argued that the budget proposal does not guarantee the 
conditions of operation necessary for assuming compulsory self-government tasks 
and that there is a real danger of self-governments becoming incapable of f unction mg 
(ONkormanyzat, 2004, pp 5-7) 
For its 2005 annual convention of delegates, the National Association of 
Municipal Self-governments {Telepulesi Onkormanyzatok Orszagos Szovetsege -
TOOSZ) - a self-government association founded in 1989 wi th the highest number of 
member municipalities (more than 1700 ranging from self-governments of the capital 
to those of small villages) - issued a discussion note The discussion note, bearing the 
t it le After one and a half decades (referring to the post-iggo period), argued that it 
was solidarity and professionalism that helped TOOSZ to act as an organization to 
integrate various self-governments, despite diverging party political affiliations 
As it was stated, TOOSZ was unmatched in the sense that it united more than the half 
57 The National Association of Small Towns [Ktsvarosi Onkormanyzatok Orszagos Erdekszovetsege) the 
National Association of Villages, Small Settlements and Micro regions (Kozsegek, Kistelepulesek, Ktstersegek 
Orszagos Szovetsege) the Hungarian Village Association {Magyar Faluszovetseg), the Association of 
Hungarian Self governments (Magyar Onkormanyzatok Szovetsege), the Association of Cities with County 
Rights [Megyei Joga Varosok Szovetsege) and [he National Association of Municipal Self governments 
(Telepulesi Onkormanyzatok Orszagos Szovetsege) 
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of the country's population and more than the half of municipal self-governments. 
Furthermore, it was noted that members were locally elected and aspired to 
represent the interests of their voters in villages, small towns, large cities, counties 
and the capital, by being critical partners of the government (ÖNkormanyzat, 2005, 
p.8). 
The discussion note was accompanied by a manifesto containing TÖOSZ's main 
requirements from the government. Recalling the 12-point manifesto of the 1848 
revolutionaries (see Figure 5.4a) - because "self-governments are the country itself" 
{ÖNkormanyzat, 2005, p . i ) - the TÖOSZ manifesto also contained 12 points under the 
heading 'What the Hungarian nation wants' (Figure 5.4b). The points were the 
following: 1) economic autonomy to self-governments; 2) state resources for state 
tasks, calculable financing; 3) accessible and satisfying public services everywhere; 4) 
equal chances for development; 5) a transparent and non-discriminatory tendering 
system; 6) state-supported local planning; 7) a stronger decentralization and social 
control of spatial development; 8) co-ordinated legal regulation, laws that can be 
adhered to; 9) reasonable support for associations instead of forced associations; 
10) the regulation of the relations between elected officials and public servants; 
n) rural development {vidékfejlesztés) supporting disadvantaged settlements and 
areas; 12) state support for a 'House of Self-governments' in Budapest {ÖNkormanyzat, 
2005, p.i). 
Prime Minister Gyurcsâny, who held a speech at the 2005 TÖOSZ convention, 
stressed that the "noble idea of self-government", an enduring value of Hungarian 
constitutionality, is not questioned. He asserted that nonetheless, municipal 
financing and task regulation had to be rethought and that the partnership between 
the central and municipal governments needed to be strengthened, meaning equal 
responsibilities for both. As he noted: 
"Today, direct solidarity between settlements and self-governments does not have an 
institutional f rame work. The state, as a mechanism built in-between them, has undermined 
the possibility of institutionalizing the links of solidarity between municipal communities 
and self-governments. [...] During the past f i f teen years, a complex and non-transparent 
system of tasks, of financing, of rights and responsibilities has come into existence that 
cannot, or cannot fully, satisfy the principles of efficiency, justice and solidarity. In every 
respect, the ti me has come to take a big breath and to say that this has to be done differently. 
TÖOSZ needs partnership. [...] The basis of partnership is, however, the acceptance of equal 
responsibilities. That means that self-governments do not stand against the state as 
buyers, but that the legislative and the executive power representing the national 
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community stands in an equal and coordinated relationship with the self governments 
representing local communities If however this is an equal and coordinated relationship 
then responsibilities [between the two] are shared Shared in the sense that it is not the 
part that has to be made optimal - the parts can be made optimal only at each other s 
expense-but the whole [ ] The government is willing to revise the constitutional written 
and non writ ten agreements between self governments and the executive I encourage 
you to start and change it But there is a limit I have to admit honestly There will not be 
more money [following those revisions] When I say that we have to be more efficient then 
I mean that we have to deliver more and better quality public services to our citizens for the 
same amount wi th greater freedom and responsibility [ ] the reorganization of the status 
quo is the only way to do it (Gyurcsany in ONkormanyzat 2007 pp 8-9) 
Finally, the government's budget proposal for 2006 was attracting the same kind of 
criticisms from TOOSZ as before namely that it does not assure adequate conditions 
of operation for self governments One of the few positive remarks of TOOSZ 
concerned the loan guarantee for self governments put in place m order to assure 
that resource scarcity does not undermine self governments' necessary contribution 
to projects financed from EL) Structural Funds (ONkormanyzat, 2005b) In line with 
the principle of additionahty, subsidies from the Structural Funds have to be additional 
to national structural expenditures, and self government resource scarcity would 
have seriously jeopardized funds absorption Still, delays of payment of subsidies 
already assigned m 2005 - linked to the cosmetic adjustment of the budget (HVC, 
2005) - were causing serious problems for self governments 
The structural transformation of the system of self-government was also 
central to TOOSZ's annual convention m June 2006 In his speech, Gyurcsany 
reiterated several points of his speech of the previous year on questions of efficiency, 
responsibility and solidarity Finally, in the autumn of 2006, the same criticisms 
were repeated m connection wi th the second Gyurcsany government's budget 
proposal for 2007 that reflected the commitment of the adjusted Convergence 
Programme to achieve a durable reduction in the budget deficit Without closer 
scrutiny, it seemed that the 2007 budget proposal earmarked a larger amount of 
state grants for municipal self-governments and micro regions compared to that of 
2006 In fact, however, the apparent expansion of municipal self-government 
resources was linked to the increase of state subsidies for the fourth metro line in 
Budapest (a project halted by the FIDESZ led government in 1998-2002) 
Subsequently, self government associations issued a common declaration disapproving 
the fact that central state transfers to self-governments decreased m real terms 
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Figure 5.4a Figure 5.4b 
The 12 points of the manifesto The 12 points of TÖOSZ declared 
of the 1848 revolutionaries58 at the 2005 convention of delegates 
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from 2006 to 2007. Also, they disapproved of the government changing the 
percentage of personal income tax remaining in its place of origin from ten to eight 
per cent (ÖNkormanyzat, 2006b, pp. 8-9). 
58 The 1848 manifesto reads as follows What the Hungarian nation wants. Let there be peace, freedom and 
consensus. 1. We wish for freedom of the pressano the abolition of censorship. 2. Responsible government 
in Pest. 3. Annual meetings of the parliament in Pest. 4. Equality before the law in civil and religious 
matters. 5. A national guard. 6. Equality of taxation. 7. Abolition of feudal burdens. 8. Jury system on the 
basis of representation and equality. 9. A National Bank. io. The armed forces should swear allegiance to 
the constitution. Our Hungarian soldiers should not be removed from our soil. n. Political prisoners should 
be freed. 12. Union with Transylvania, Freedom, equality, brotherhood! 
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5-4 2 Defining the interests of the 'vidék' 
With the 'underfinancing' of self-governments becoming especially grave for small 
settlements in rural areas (the videk), debates on the reorganization of self-
governments were closely interlinked with those on the future of the vidék In the 
programme of the first Cyurcsâny government, it was stated that: 
"In Hungary, many attempt to create an artificial division between the country's Eastern 
and Western part, between the Budapest and the videk, and between small and big 
settlements The government of the Republic does not accept this There is only one 
Hungary, and the capital, the county seats, smaller towns and villages are all part of it 
Every citizen of Hungary is equal - regardless of where they live That is why for the 
government, the development of the capital, of every area and of every settlement is of 
equal importance" (GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY, 2004, ρ 15) 
The programme of the second Cyurcsâny government made also reference to 
EU-subsidies f lowing m from 2007, with the support of which 
"[n]ot only the dynamic development of developed regions and that of large cities can be 
assured, but also areas lagging behind so far, "the Hungary of the vidék" can be brought to 
a European standard" (GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY, 2006b, ρ 46) 
The opposition, however, strongly questioned the government's commitment to 
addressing the problems of the videk. In contrast to the concerted action of self-
government actors of diverging party affi l iations via different associations of 
self-government, parliamentary debates remained polarized between speakers 
of the governing parties and speakers of the opposition One FIDESZ deputy addressed 
the Minister of Interior as follows 
"Do you agree that the closure of primary schools leads to the depopulation and death of 
villages? Why does the Socialist government give up on the people living m villages, why 
does it, wi th its measures, want to make life impossible for them? What do you think of 
people living m villages? What is your opinion of small settlements? On the basis of what 
interests does the government turn against the Hungary of the videk, the thousands of 
people living m small sett lements'" (Mormg, 6 December 2004/78) 
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Some months later, in early March 2005, as he supportively referred to a call for a 
'Dialogue for the rural' [Parbeszéd a vidékért), launched by academician Ferenc Glatzw, 
it seemed that Prime Minister Gyurcsâny was very much aware of the problems of 
the small settlements of the vidék. As he argued: 
"The great developments of the past f i f teen years in Hungary were concentrated around 
the large cities. The further we get from these centres of development, and the further 
away we are from large cities, and often, the closer we are to the borders, the more it is 
necessary, the more there is the demand that the national community, the whole of 
Hungary helps bringing about change in the villages. [...] We do, of course, have prosperous 
villages. [...] but this is not common. What is common is that schools depopulate, what is 
common is that a village has a hard time to keep the teacher, often the general practitioner, 
the pastor" (Gyurcsâny, 7 March 2005/2). 
In response, the opposition's speaker accused the Prime Minister of only speaking, 
but not acting, and of giving the impression that he had just discovered the 
long-standing problems of rural areas (vidék) (Ader, 7 March 2005/18). Arguably, the 
Prime Minister's distinctive attention was linked to the farmer demonstrations in 
early 2005, generated by the negative effects (such as increased uncertainty, a 
liquidity crisis and an import boom) of EU accession. With this link made, the 
discussion slipped -once again - towards a discussion of the problems of the vidék in 
terms of the problems of agriculture, wi th the opposition's speaker ending up 
confronting the Prime Minister with the fact that the guaranteed price of corn and 
pork were lower than the government promised (Ader, ibid.). 
In other cases, however, the discussion remained firmly focused on the problems 
of liveability of vidéki areas. In one of these discussions, a round table debate wi th 
public figures on the economic role of the state, SZDSZ's advisor Péter Mihâlyi 
made a controversial comment on the future of villages that has since been much cited: 
"As to education, rationalization has no alternative. Should we not close down schools in 
small settlements? Doctors' offices have to be closed down and post offices too. Insurance 
companies and banks have already left. Social dynamism comes from urbanization or from 
the transformation to townships. The task of the state is to encourage people to move from 
where they are. If they stay in villages, they decrease the opportunities of their children, 
because in villages there won't be any ordinary health care, any ordinary transport. Anyone 
59 Ferenc Glatz, a historian, was Minister of Education and Culture in 1989-1990 and Secretary of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1996-2002. 
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defending the interests of small settlements is, in fact, speaking against those living there 
and against their children [ ] [-Should villages stop to exist'] Of course They are a 
tradition from the Middle Ages, so why sustain them' In whole Western Europe there are 
no villages The majority of Hungarian villages have less than 300 inhabitants, they are 
incapable of existing" (Mihalyi 2006) 
To be sure, the impact of the government's commitment to achieve a durable reduction 
in the budget deficit was not restricted to small settlements exclusively In fact, the 
realization of one of Budapest's major development projects, a fourth metro line, was 
affected as well In order to keep to the targets set m the Convergence Programme 
delivered to Brussels, the government changed the metro line's financing scheme 
instead of grounding it on a loan from the European Investment Bank, it decided to 
look for EU funding in order to remove it from the budget In connection with this 
move, an SZDSZ deputy and member of the Assembly of the Capital noted that it 
possibly entails that the metro line construction will take away ED funds from other 
projects As he stressed, however, at the same time Budapest gave m to a more risky 
solution m order to contribute to the improvement of the budget deficit, which is 
"[a] question of disposition, but an important one, because this is one of the most important 
investment projects of the country" (Böhm, 12 December 2006/206) 
With this remark, he m fact echoed what Budapest Mayor Demszky stated some t ime 
earlier 
"The development of Budapest - and the government has recognized this - is not of local 
interest it is not only in the interest of the two and a half million inhabitants of Budapest 
and its agglomeration, not only a fair step towards the inhabitants of Budapest capital 
who generate more than 35% of the state's income I am convinced that this is also m the 
interest of the less developed regions of the Hungarian vtdek Because if we produce more 
here, then more can be distributed more can be spent on the development of 
underdeveloped regions (Demszky, 8 June 2006/66) 
S 4 3 Rediscovering cities - the debate about development poles 
The decreasing fiscal discretion of municipal self-governments and complaints that 
they would become "unable to function" also affected discussions concerning 
settlement network development A rather neglected subfield of spatial development 
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policy in the post-1990 period, settlement network development policy/urban policy 
was rediscovered in the course of planning for the 2007-2013 programming period 
that officially started in July 2004 with a government resolution on The elaboration 
of the framework of content and organization of the Europe Plan ('2007-75J 6°. 
It has to be noted that, before the 'rediscovery' by policy-makers, a number of 
scholars had already called for the consideration of settlement network/urban 
development issues. They criticized legislation for ignoring "the theory of growth 
poles" (PFEIL, 2001, p. 19). Furthermore, they stressed, referring to the European Spatial 
Development Perspective's (ESDP) (CEC, 1999) notion of polycentric development, 
that specific functions that affect the whole spatial structure have to be assigned to 
some settlements (cities) (PFEIL, 2001b; see also FARACO, 2003). The reappearance of 
considerations of the role of cities in Hungary's spatial development policy was 
closely linked to the reshaping of EU cohesion policy. This reshaping was partly 
induced by the ('Eastern') enlargement of the Union and entailed an enhanced 
emphasis on the promotion of the competitiveness of cities (see 60x5.2). 
Box 5.2 Community guidelines for cohesion policy, 2007-2013 
In 2005, the Commission published a document entitled Cohesion Policy in Support of Growth 
and Jobs: Community Strategic Guidelines, 2007-2075 (CEC, 2005) that was supposed to 
form the basis for preparing National Strategic Reference Frameworks. With regard to the 
contribution of cities to growth and jobs, the document noted the fol lowing: "I η urban areas, 
the focus should be on improving competitiveness (through clustering and networking), and 
on achieving more balanced development between the economically strongest cities and the 
rest of the urban network" (ibid., p. 29). In connection with clustering and networking, the 
Guidelines used of the notion of'pole' in various combinations (poles of excellence, innovation 
poles, regional poles of economic activity). At the same ti me, it was the concept of development 
pole' that figured in the section entitled 'Supporting the economic diversification of rural 
areas'. As it is noted in this section: "[ejnsuring universal access to all services, particularly 
in very sparsely populated areas, may be achieved by investing in development poles in rural 
areas (for example, in small and medium-sized towns) and by developing economic clusters 
based on local assets combined with the use of new information technologies" (ibid., p. 31). 
60 Government resolution 1076/2004 (VII.22) 
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With debates about the role of cities in Hungary being, in fact, part of the planning 
process for the programming period 2007-2013, it is necessary to briefly discuss the 
mam outputs expected from that process, as well as the institutional setting m 
which it unfolded A key document required by the European Commission for the 
2007-2013 period was the National Development Concept (NDC) [Orszagos Fejlesztesi 
Koncepcio) This Concept was supposed to contain Hungary's long-term development 
objectives (both those to be co-financed by the EU, and those not) and, as such, be 
the first preparatory step for the (second) National Development Plan (the framework 
for co-financed development actions in 2007-2013) The NDC's elaboration was 
supervised by the National Development Office, the successor of the Office for the 
National Development Plan and EU funds mentioned m section 5 3 6 Parallel to the 
preparation of the NDC, the elaboration of the National Spatial Development Concept 
(NSDC) was started at the National Spatial Development Office [Orszagos Teruletfej 
lesztesi Hivatal), which was under the supervision of the newly instituted Minister 
without portfolio responsible for spatial development6' In line with the stipulations 
of the 1996 Spatial Development and Land Use Planning Act (according to which a 
revision has to take place every five years), the elaboration of a new NSDC (after the 
first one of 1998) was already overdue and was pushed especially by the Minister 
without portfolio responsible for spatial development The duplication of strategic 
plans - confusing even the European Commission - was partly rooted m a prestige 
struggle between the Office and the Ministry - a struggle that we can interpret as 
being part of the shifting relations between the discursive formations of spatial 
development and that of development policy Respondents, however, also commonly 
stressed that the NDC and the NSDC were worked out in tandem, with ongoing 
consultation between the responsible bodies, making sure that major mconsisten 
cies were eliminated Eventually, m late December 2005, both the NDC (National 
Development Concept, 2005) and the NSDC [National Spatial Development Concept, 
2005) were accepted by Parliament 
With a separate thematic workgroup dedicated to it - from the total of eight set 
up by the National Development Off ice-the issue of settlement network development 
was given a rather prominent place m the planning of the NDC The workgroup 
entitled 'Dynamic settlement system' (Dmamikus telepulesrendszer) came into being 
61 The National Spatial Development Office (the first word of the Hungarian designation refers to country 
and not nation) in place from 1 September 2005 was the successor of theHunganan Spatialand Regional 
Developmenl Office [Magyar Terulet es Regtonalts Fejlesztesi Ηιναίαή This latter Office in turn was the 
successor from 1 January 2004 of the National Spatial Development Office mentioned in section 536 
The post of the Minister without portfolio responsible for spatial development was created under the 
Gyurcsany government in 2004 
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in 2004 and was given the task of supplying the NDC with insights and suggestions 
relating to questions of settlement network development. In connection wi th that, 
the workgroup was asked to prepare a Settlement Network Development Concept. 
The planners of VATI Hungarian Nonprofit Company for Spatial Development and 
Town Planning6 ' (hereafter VATI) supplied the workgroup with various analyses. As 
one of the respondents noted, various approaches emerged among VATI planners 
with regard to the settlement structure. In particular, two different strands of 
thought became dominant. One focused more on the distr ibutionoffunctions among 
middle-range towns; the other was thinking rather in terms of a few foci of 
concentrated development that provide a 'critical mass' of services and are easily 
accessible from other areas. Both approaches seemed to stumble, however, over the 
recognition that: 
"[i]n fact, cities with county rights within one [NUT52] region do not carry any meaning for 
each other at all. Above a certain size, it is only Budapest that has a complementary 
meaning [for cities]. External conditions [for the establishment of inter-linkages between 
cities] are not given either; there are no infrastructural opportunities of inter-linkages". 
The focus of planners then became the dominance of Budapest: 
"[b]ecause pole theory - that builds on polycentricity, decentralization and many other 
things - would say that the counterpoles of Budapest have to be established. That cities 
have to become more independent and that there should be a healthier, more harmonious 
spatial structure". 
Finally, VATI p lanners suggested t h a t f i v e regional c i t ies-Cyó ' r , Pécs, Szeged, Debrecen 
and Misko lc - cou ld potent ia l ly act as a counterba lance t o t he cap i ta l . As ano the r 
planner reca l led: 
"[...] every research suggested that these are the ones that can be poles. The Centre for 
Regional Studies was more bold and argued that the functions of Miskolc and Gyor were 
not so significant [...] We [at VATI] thought, on professional grounds, that it is these five 
large cities that can exert an effect of counterbalancing Budapest...regardless of where 
[NUTS2] regional boundaries lie." 
62 VATI is owned by the state; its main role is to offer guidance for spatial policy formulation 
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Being also involved in the elaboration of the National Spatial Development Concept, 
VATI planners tried to channel considerations about the settlement structure into 
that document as well At the same time, another strand of thought appeared 
concerning the role of cities in the spatial structure, inspired by the new industrial 
policy based on 'poles of competitiveness' that was launched in France in 2004 The 
aim of this approach has been to encourage and support projects initiated by 
partnerships of companies, research centres and educational institutions in a given 
local area The partnerships are expected to develop into internationally visible com­
petitiveness clusters and generate synergies through innovative projects m one or 
more given markets (see DIACT, η d ) The head of the National Development Office, 
Etele Barath6', whose French orientation was widely known, suggested adapting the 
French model at an informal government meeting in November 2004 
Once extended beyond the narrow confi nes of ministerial and planners'meetings, 
and a few 'public debates' (see HORCHER, 2005), the discussion on how the development 
of the settlement structure should be addressed took a new turn, and the designation 
of the above-mentioned five cities as development poles came under heavy attack 
Criticisms of the five city concept and aspirations to extend the number of privileged 
centres were formulated above all on the basis of the NUTS2 regional division of 
Hungary First of all, fol lowing the five city plan, no development pole was designated 
in the Central Transdanubian Region As VATI planners noted, this was no accident 
The planners interviewed stressed that the underlying aim of their proposition was 
not to select a city m each NUTS2 region, but to consider which cities have the 
potential for creating their own region, based on functional inter municipal links and, 
finally, the potential for counterbalancing Budapest Actually, due to the extensive 
lobbying of the Regional Development Council of the Central Transdanubian Region 
and of its operational supporting body, the Regional Development Agency, the cities 
of Szekesfehervar and Veszprem were selected as partner centres Also, Budapest 
became designated as a priority pole Planners found that through these modifications, 
their original concept was becoming undermined 
[Budapest] but this is not a pole and from this point on to define what we expect from 
Budapest as a pole it is completely different from the other cities 
[i]f one really has to designate a pole in Central Transdanubia then we would have rather 
supported Veszprem because Szekesfehervar is so close to Budapest that it cannot really 
play this [counterpole] role 
63 Baratti s background is actually in town planning and he himself worked for VATI for a decade from the 
mid 1970s 
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At the end of October 2005, a government resolution (GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
HUNGARY, 2005) was passed, listing the f ive+two cities next to Budapest that should 
become internationally relevant development poles and receive 100 million HUF64 to 
develop their programmes. This decision fuelled further debates. Interpreting the 
government's plans as being about the designation of the centres (seats) of NUTS2 
regions, the mayors of three cities wi th county rights in the Western Transdanubian 
Region6'» questioned why a fourth, Gyo'r, had been chosen. Not denying Gyó'r's primacy 
in terms of economic strength, the protesting local politicians argued that Gyór's 
location at the North Eastern end of the lengthy-shaped region (see Figure 5.3) 
prevented it from fulf i l l ing a centre role (see e.g. Sâgi, 28 November 2005/406). As a 
municipal government deputy from the city of Szombathely argued; 
"Anyone who has seen the map knows that the region does not and cannot have a centre; 
the decision was made by lazy officials in Budapest; Gyó'r is only one hour on the highway" 
(HVC. 2005b, ρ 133.) 
The parliamentary deputies and mayors of cities with county rights in Vas and Zala 
counties declared that the spatial structure of the region is based on a polycentric 
urban network and that a development policy prioritizing any of its elements over 
others did not serve the region's interests. 
In the parliamentary debates about the NDC and NSDC in November 2005, 
several criticisms were raised in connection with the poles. One of them concerned 
the way it would be assured t h a t t h e concentrated development of'pole cities' would 
have a beneficial, pulling effect for their wider region. Etele Baratti stressed that pole 
status was not solely dependent on settlement size, but was strongly linked to a 
critical mass of knowledge, production and infrastructure, and to the capacity to 
innovate. As he further noted: 
"Of course, it is the duty of these poles to make sure that their developments radiate into 
their wider environment" (Baratti, 14 November, 2005/44). 
Nonetheless, doubts concerning such a radiating effect prevailed, and various 
arguments were raised - predominantly, but not exclusively, by the opposition -
against the selective privileging of a few urban centres. Several deputies argued that 
64 Calculating with the euro exchange rate of HUF 252,56 at the end of November 2005 (see http;//www2. 
pmgov.hu), this equalled approximately 400 000 euros. 
65 It should be noted thatthe English designation used on the Region's homepage is'West Pannon Region' 
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there were certainly no six cities capable of assuming the role of a pole next to 
Budapest, but a maximum of two (Mikes, 28 November 2005/426, Sagi, 28 November 
2005/406) Furthermore, as some pointed out (Mikes, ibid ), there was a great danger 
of the selected poles focusing on settlement development, w i th radiating effects 
to the wider region remaining minimal Referring to the case of the Western 
Transdanubian Region, a deputy noted that the region's designated pole, Cyor, is 
closer to the poles of the other regions than to the cities m the same region on the 
development of which it should have an effect 
"Zalaegerszeg is 130 km and Szombathely is 120 km away from Gyor How can Gyor have an 
impact on cities 100 130 km away if there is another centre 80 kms away? It does not matter 
if it is going to be Szekesfehervar or Veszprem because both are 80 km from Gyor ' (Ivamcs, 
5 December 2005/346) 
Deputies from other regions also raised the question of why only one city was 
selected As a deputy from the Region of the Southern Great Plain, where the city of 
Szeged was designated as a pole, put it 
"Let us just think of it looking from Bekescsaba or Gyula or from Szarvas, [for them] their 
problems are of national significance" (Domokos, 28 November 2005/436) 
Actually, several deputies backed a proposal of modification The proposal suggested 
that next to development poles, the role of urban networks and urban axes in 
strengthening regional and national competitiveness should be included in the NDC 
Furthermore, the proposal noted that the NDC should mention other relevant cities 
as well As an MSZP deputy argued, these modifications are necessary so that 
" [ ] these cities, these important settlements do not get the feeling that there are only 
some privileged cities in this country, but that when we talk about enhancing regional 
competitiveness then, next to the privileged poles, poles of competitiveness other cities 
that have a significant potential have to be given a role as well" (Balogh, 22 November 
2005/81) 
From here, it was one step to make the case for all the settlements 
"What will happen to those 3200 settlements that are not poles? Of course, the designated 
development poles are more developed and are economically more advanced than the 
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surrounding towns and settlements and that's why it is very important [to ask] how the 
radiation of development into that wider area will take effect" (Balogh, ibid.). 
Disapproval of the selection of a few urban centres was also linked - often in 
contributions of FIDESZ deputies - t o criticisms regarding the appropriate treatment 
of rural (vìdéki) areas and of the problems of small settlements: 
"[The NDC] does not deal with the fate of the videki population that makes up some 
60% of the country Principally, in the NDC, it is an urban perspective and, in particular, a 
Budapest-centredness that appears. A perspective on villages, a perspective on the videk is 
missing from the document, and this is a great shortcoming" (Sagi, 28 November 
2005/406). 
"[t]he capacity of small settlements to function and to keep their population is not 
adequately addressed in the documents" (Mikes, 28 November 2005/426). 
"None of the proposals considers the vîdék as a relevant factor. My opinion is that if the 
settlements of the vidék join forces and organize themselves, then by building on those 
energies we could advance much more in the field of spatial development. If the set-up 
figuring in this proposal will be implemented, i.e. Budapest, development poles, large cities 
and so on, then we solidify a centrally orchestrated and arbitrarily chosen hierarchy in 
spatial development, which is, I think, contrary to the principle mentioned in the proposal 
that subsidiarity and decentralization are key aspects of spatial development policy" (Endre, 
28 November 2005/412). 
Similarly, SZDSZ's Ferenc Wekler argued as follows: 
"The text speaks of six pillars, but let us not leave out the settlements, the small settlements. 
The text stops at cities. [... let us list] settlements as a seventh pillar. I mean here small 
settlements and this way the vidék, the videk of villages receives a different emphasis" 
(Wekler, 22 November 2005/293) 
The point that the terms of the debate were not clear was mentioned by several 
deputies. Istvân Kolber (19 December 2005/219), Minister without portfolio for 
spatial development, accused a speaker from the opposition of confusing rural 
development (vidékfejlesztés) with spatial development. A FIDESZ deputy cautioned 
that issues of spatial development and public administration should be separated 
193 
(Domokos, 28 November 2005/436) Concerning the notion of development poles in 
particular, another deputy of FIDESZ stressed that a distinction should be made 
between the centres (seats) of a region and spatial development poles As she argued, 
within the NSDC, the objectives concerning a balanced settlement structure on the 
one hand and those concerning the designation of development poles on the other 
are conflated (Mikes, 28 November 2005/426) Head of the National Development 
Office Etele Barat h repeatedly stressed that the key guideline m selecting development 
poles was that they were capable of becoming centres of knowledge production and 
that from this perspective, it is unambiguous how many poles there can be 
' There are no more such development poles than Budapest and the five+two cities and in the 
coming ten fifteen years there will not be more in Hungary [it is] unreal impossible If one 
reads the criteria reads what the objectives are [ ] the Concept s definition is that a pole is 
where science research and development the economy and the innovative processes within 
these that is knowledge production [takes place] (Barath 5 December 2005/316) 
Finally, Parliament gave m to the claims of 'non pole' cities Echoing the agreement 
reached m the Western Transdanubian Region, where Cyor's pole status was accepted 
under the proviso that it would involve the other three cities m designing its 
programme, for each NUTS2 region a number of other cities were mentioned m both 
the NDC and the NSDC These cities figured as 'sub-centres' [alkozpont), wi th which 
the pole city of the region - itself expected to mediate innovation, to organize and 
serve its 'broader region', and to generate economic dynamism - has to cooperate in 
the implementation of the pole programme In December 2005 contracts were signed 
with each pole city and the elaboration of pole strategies was started A ministerial 
commissioner was appointed to coordinate pole strategy development 
Overall, the National Spatial Development Concept (NSDC) aligned clearly with 
the post-Lisbon EU spatial development policy discourse It acknowledged "the 
law-like nature of uneven territorial (and economic) development" (National Spatial 
Development Concept, 2005, ρ ig), promoted 'balanced' (as opposed to 'equalized') 
development and regarded the strengthening of (relative) competitiveness as a tool 
to tackle backwardness As such, the NSDC marked a distinct shift wi th regard to the 
vision of the first National Spatial Development Concept (1998) Especially, the new 
NSDC's stronger emphasis on competitiveness and on the role of regional centres as 
poles of growth is distinctive (for a discussion, see SALAMINI, PETI and CZIRA, 2005) 
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5.4-4 'The greatest decentralization in Hungarian history' 
As n o t e d above, t he p r o g r a m m e o f t h e f i r s t Cyurcsany g o v e r n m e n t set t h e ob jec t ive 
o f r e f o r m i n g publ ic admin i s t ra t i on by g iv ing a cent ra l role t o regions, and it s ta ted 
t ha t in t h e long t e r m , e lected regions were needed. The NDC and t h e NSDC were 
bo th i n t ended t o c a r r y f o r w a r d t h e plans o f regional iza t ion. In fac t , several oppos i t i on 
speakers remarked t h a t in bo th t h e NDC and t h e NSDC, the re was a h idden publ ic 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n re fo rm agenda. As t o t h e f i na l d o c u m e n t s , t h e NDC s ta ted 
op t im i s t i ca l l y t ha t : 
"Regionalism becomes rooted with the establishment of elected regional self-governments. 
The sharing of resources and power narrows the scope of central government and municipal 
autonomy, but it enhances the role of regions and micro-regions" [National Development 
Concept. 2005, p. 80). 
In con t ras t , t h e NSDC was less amb i t i ous and s ta ted t h a t t h e real ist ic ob jec t ive at t h e 
m o m e n t was the s t r eng then ing o f de legated regional bodies and o f deconcen t ra ted 
organs (NSDC, 2005, p. 27). 
Before t h e 2 0 0 6 e lect ions, head o f t h e Nat iona l Deve lopmen t Of f i ce Etele Barath 
noted t h a t t h e gove rnmen t , i f i t stays in power, w o u l d proceed w i t h t h e es tab l i shment 
of reg iona l gove rnmen ts . As he n o t e d : 
"We dedicate 50% of the resources of the Structural Funds assigned to spatial development 
to the regions, which is the greatest decentralization in Hungarian history" (Barath in 
Localinfo, 2006, p. 8). 
Accord ingly , in 2 0 0 6 t h e p r o g r a m m e o f t h e second Cyurcsany g o v e r n m e n t reasserted 
its ob jec t i ve o f reg iona l iza t ion . As it was s ta ted : 
"With the reform of public ad m in ist ration, the tasks of spatial development will be assigned 
to regional self-governments. County development councils and their operational bodies, 
just as county self-governments, will cease to exist. [...] Development (action) belongs to 
the region; the county as a level of development will cease to exist" (GOVERNMENT OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY, 20o5b, p. 47). 
Unsurpr is ing ly , t he plans regard ing the abo l i t i on o f count ies m e t heavy oppos i t i on . 
For e x a m p l e , t h e Associat ion o f t h e Se l f -Governments o f Vas County issued a 
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dec lara t ion inc lud ing t h e f o l l o w i n g 
"Our association supports an independent county system that has to be supplied wi th 
adequate competencies, tasks, and budget resources1 [ ] In our reading, the county system 
means province, or if you like, the regional level (That is county = regioni)" (ONkormanyzat, 
2006, pp 6-7) 
Eventually, the proposal of the new MSZP-SZDSZ government to modify the Local 
Self-Covernment Act and to hold regional government elections in 2009 did not 
receive the necessary two-thirds parliamentary majority m July 200666 Considering 
the persisting 'bipolanzation' of Hungarian politics around the two largest parties, 
1 e the governing MSZP and the oppositional FIDESZ - MPP, this was no surprise As 
SZDSZ member and Budapest Mayor Demszky put it 
"Now there would have been an opportunity to establish regions in Hungary that are 
competitive, competitive in Europe [sic], and we missed this opportunity" (Demszky 11 July 
2006/14) 
The opposition was accused of not delivering constructive propositions and of 
deliberately misinterpreting the government's plans as plans that would deprive 
municipalities of their autonomy Actually, the opposition was blamed for blocking 
the process of building an efficient, decentralized and modern public administration 
system that is capable of using EU development resources in the interests of the 
country (Ujhelyi, 11 July 2006/26) Oppositional speakers questioned in turn the 
sincerity of the government's intentions about genuine decentralization, and they 
stressed that the government's propositions were insufficiently elaborated (see Kosa, 
9 October 2006/10) and that they would have introduced elected regional bodies 
only from 2009 
Following the 2006 vote, the government asserted that it would exploit all 
remaining opportunities m order to reinforce the regional level As MSZP's Katalm 
Szili noted m an interview entitled 'FIDESZ said no to several billions of Forints', the 
government was planning modifications to the institutional framework of spatial 
development and to that of state administration, both requiring only a simple 
majority (eg Regiostart, 2006b) In fact, Prime Minister Cyurcsany declared long 
66 Intact the opposition voted against the modification of the Constitution on 10 July 2006 and with that it 
effectively blocked the modification of the Local Self Government Act that was subjected to a vote some 
weeks later 
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before the actual parliamentary vote that 
"[_] as a part of the state, the government wil l , within its own competence, and regardless 
of what can be agreed on in parliament, or [...] with the self-governments, bring déconcen-
tration to the regional level" (HVG. 2006). 
One main expected benefit of public administration reorganization was to cut state 
expenses, in line with the objectives of the Convergence Programme. In order to 
reshuffle and rationalize public administration, the government embarked on a 
'creeping regionalization' project (HVG, 2oo6d), entailing the regionalization of 
county level deconcentrated organs. This was, however, not unproblematlc. 
County-based MSZP deputies were opposing it; as the President of the National 
Association of County Self-Covernments put it: 
"Let the faith in our county lead us" (see HVC, 2006b, p. 89) 
The government encouraged counties to agree on the distribution of regional 
deconcentrated head offices themselves. Mayors and county assembly presidents 
started extensive lobbying at the newly formed Ministry of Self-Government and 
Spatial Development67. At the same time, cities led by the FIDESZ - MPP were 
marginalized from formal and informal negotiations, and the government seemed to 
defer decision until the municipal and county elections in October 2006 (see HVG, 
20o6d). 
The municipal and county government elections in October 2006, however, 
brought a sweeping victory for the opposition: in 17 county assemblies the alliance of 
the FIDESZ and the KDNP (Christian Democratic People's Party) acquired an absolute 
majority; in addition, from the possible 23, in 16 cities with county rights a candidate 
of the same alliance was elected mayor. As a consequence, fears arose in governmental 
circles that the majority of governmental actors in regional development councils 
(RDCs) - and thus central government's say in funds redistribution - would become 
undermined (see HVC, 2006e). Finally, not only was a governmental majority secured, 
but, fol lowing the modification of the 1996 Spatial Development and Land Use 
Planning Act, the presidents of RDCs became elected by the RDC (replacing the 
previous practice of rotation among county development council presidents). The 
67 The Ministry of Self-Government and Spatial Development was created in July 2006, with the task of 
supervising local self-governments after the abolition of the Ministry of the Interior. It should be noted 
that the English version of its homepage referred to the Ministry as 'Ministry of Local Government and 
Regional Development' 
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governmental majority m RDCs actually elected a president who was a member of 
one of the governing parties68 (HVG, 2007) The opposition strongly disapproved of 
this centralizing move As one speaker noted 
"[ ] Brussels stresses towards us that decision making competences should be transferred 
to the regional level, that there is subsidiarity, there is decentralization" (Kosa, 9 October 
2006/44) 
The Minister of Self-Government and Spatial Development m turn referred to the 
opposition's veto and argued that the governmental majority m RDCs was introduced 
during the FIDESZ-led government and that the current government used the 
opportunity to delegate its representatives to the RDCs (Lamperth, 9 October 
2006/8) 
Next to the reorganization of RDCs, the government initiated the regionahzation 
of state administration bodies As a result, from 1 January 2007, Public Administration 
Offices and Tax Offices started to operate on a regional basis While state 
administrative branch offices continued to exist at county level, the relevance of 
counties clearly decreased Due to diminished levels of funds and especially following 
the change of rules concerning the election of RDC presidents, county councils 
became practically weightless 
5 4 5 The (further) strengthening of development policy 
Parallel to attempts at decentralization, increasing centralization took place in the 
management of the 2nd National Development Plan In fact, as the first centralizing 
steps took place way before the July vote, decentralization (and the government's 
commitment to it) was questionable Although a government resolution69 was 
passed in 2004 on the equal weight of regional and sectoral aspects of the NDP, it 
was already apparent in the course of the elaboration of the National Spatial 
Development Concept that regional actors would not be given as much room in the 
planning process as they hoped for According to the director of one of the Regional 
Development Agencies, the fact that the final version of the NSDC (that actually 
68 This brought about the paradox situation in which the SZDSZ barely had a seat in county assemblies but 
delivered four RDC vice-presidents and even one president Ministries often delegated politicians as their 
representatives who were defeated at the elections (see HVG, 2007) 
69 Government resolution 1076/2004 (VII 22) 
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conta ined on ly one page for each region) was not even subject t o publ ic consu l ta t i on 
was i l l us t ra t i ve o f t h e cent ra l iza t ion o f deve lopmen t pol icy (MÄRTON, 2005). As a VATI 
planner reca l led: 
"We did plan to give greater room to the regions...that is, one chapter for each. The problem 
was that while the regions, that is the Regional Development Agencies, agreed with our 
suggestions, or expectations, for example that they should align with the objectives of the 
National Spatial Development Concept...but the Regional Development Councils did not 
always agree...and because the Councils are the employers of the Agencies...we could not 
give a standard form to these chapters [...] if we consider that if each of the seven regions 
writes ten pages, then that is already 70 pages, which...makes the material unreadable". 
Similarly, an o f f i c ia l o f t he M in i s t r y o f Se l f -Government and Spatial Deve lopmen t 
noted; 
"Let me add that it was a great dilemma for us as to how specific the regions, the regional 
programmes should be...because if they run separately, then the ministries go crazy, so the 
system does not work, because one cannot ask a ministry to implement a different 
transport policy for each region, this is nonsense...[...] and the Union goes crazy as well if it 
does not see the operational programmes of the Hungarian Republic, harmonized, but, 
instead, seven operational programmes with a completely different philosophy". 
As a resul t , in sp i te o f h igh expec ta t ions , t he regional opera t iona l p rog rammes o f t he 
2nd NDP w e r e less expressive o f t h e comprehens ive s t rategies o f t he regions and 
conta ined (s imi lar t o t h e f i r s t NDP, a l t h o u g h to a lesser ex ten t ) w h a t was " l e f t o u t 
f r om t h e sectora l p rog rammes" (PAINE KOVACS, 2008) . 
Ac tua l l y , j us t b e f o r e t h e July par l i amenta ry v o t e o n e lected regional gove rnmen ts , 
the g o v e r n m e n t under took , t h r o u g h a series o f reso lu t ions, a f u r t h e r cent ra l i za t ion 
of dec i s ion -mak ing in deve lopmen t policy. First, a g o v e r n m e n t commiss ioner was 
appo in ted 7 0 , charged w i t h t h e respons ib i l i ty o f deve lopmen t pol icy and w i t h t h e 
tasks o f t h e head o f t h e Nat ional Deve lopmen t Agency (Nemzet/Fey/eszfés/Üiy/no/rsec? 
- Ν DA). The Ν DA w a s actual ly born o f a merger o f t h e f o r m e r N a t i o n a l D e v e l o p m e n t 
O f f i c e a n d t h e t e a m s t h a t had been m a n a g i n g o p e r a t i o n a l p r o g r a m m e s in var ious 
min ist r ies. The n e w l y a p p o i n t e d c o m m i s s i o n e r G o r d o n Bajnai replaced t h e Of f ice 's 
f o r m e r h e a d Etele Baräth. In add i t i on , t w o o ther reso lu t ions were issued on t h e 
70 Government resolution 1062/2006 (VI.15.) on the appointment and tasks of the government 
commissioner responsible for development policy. 
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establishment of two advisory bodies to government the National Development 
Council (Nemzeti Fejlesztesi Tanacs) and the Management Body for Development 
Policy (Fejlesztéspolitikai Irónyitó Testulet- FIT)7' The National Development Council 
had the Prime Minister as its president and was made up of the following members 
one representative from each of the seven regions, seven persons delegated by the 
Economic and Social Council, five experts and a vice president invited by the Prime 
Minister The FIT was given the following tasks supplying advice, formulating 
propositions, preparing decisions and coordinating, it comprised the presidents of 
the Managing Authorities of the Operational Programmes (all former ministers of 
MSZP-led governments), the government commissioner for development policy and 
the government commissioner for state reform From the members of the FIT, a 
vice-president was chosen, acting also as a vice-president for the National 
Development Council With the centralization of development policy, spatial 
development institutions at sub-national levels gradually lost their significance m 
decision-making and so did the National Development Council and Parliament (see 
LORINCSIK, 2007) Centralization was pictured, however, as being necessary In the 
words of development commissioner Bajnai 
"From next year, the country will have to spend Ft 1,000 billion a year for the next seven 
years This is a huge sum and if we want to spend this money in a way that triggers economic 
growth, we will need a carefully designed structure of operati ve programs and a stream lined 
executive body" {Budapest Business lournal, 2006) 
Similarly to the overall process of the accession negotiations and to the elaboration 
of the isl NDP, centralizing tendencies during the elaboration of the 2nò NDP were 
strongly backed by the EU Commission As Danuta Hubner, the EU Commissioner for 
regional policy noted 
'I could imagine that regions have their own programmes in Hungary, however, the 
executive coordination has to belong to central government" (HVC, 2006b, ρ 65) 
Furthermore, from 2001 on, Progress Reports about candidate countries started to 
show more concern with the institutional absorption capacity of candidates than wi th 
basic principles of regionahzation (ACH, 2004) This approach by the Commission not 
71 Government resolution 1064/2006 (VI 29 ) on the establishment of the National Development 
Council and Government resolution 1065/2006 (VI 29 ) on some organisational issues relating to the 
implementation of development policy 
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only continued beyond the 2004 enlargement round, but became even more apparent 
and supported a shift of emphasis towards the discursive formation of development 
policy (vis-à-vis that of spatial development). Recurring comparisons of candidate 
countries regarding general 'preparedness' in the pre-accession period were replaced 
by comparisons of absorption capacity. As the ED Commissioner noted: 
"Considering the proportion of payments, Hungary has a good position; it has spent 
one-third or so of the available 'national envelope'. It is true that Slovenia and especially 
Estonia, with their 50 per cent, have bypassed it, but we know that bigger countries have it 
more difficult" [HVC, 2006b, p. 65). 
In line wi th the above, although for the 2nd NDP, each of the seven NUTS2 regions had 
its own ROP, and regional development agencies saw their role as intermediate 
bodies strengthened, ultimately, the government took on the responsibility of 
implementing the ROPs by setting up a single Managing Authority for all the regions 
within the National Development Agency. 
5.4.6 Debating the spatial development of'new Hungary' 
Following the approval of the National Development Concept in December 2005, 
the elaboration of the 2nJ National Development Plan - Hungary's National Strategic 
Reference Framework for the programming period 2007-2013 - could finally proceed. 
According to an independent report, the transformation of the NDC into the 2nd NDP 
was not transparent, and as the whole planning process was in constant delay, public 
consultation remained of an ad hoc nature. The same report also noted that during 
the campaign of the parliamentary elections in spring 2006, the previously used label 
'National Strategic Reference Framework' was replaced by the tit le 'The Programme 
of New Hungary', to which the MSZP confusingly referred as (a part of) its own 
electoral programme (TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, 2006). The elections actually brought 
about a further delay as during the campaign the planning process was practically 
suspended. The public consultation debates on the 2nd NDP and its operational 
programmes (OPs) took place in August and September 2006. 
In what follows, this section first considers how the 'pole programme' evolved 
and second, it discusses the parliamentary debates before the approval of the 2"d NDP 
in October 2006, especially with regard to views on the pole programme. Following 
the decision of the parliament at the end of 2005 and the signing of subsidy contracts 
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between the National Development Agency (NDA) and the pole cities, the elaboration 
of pole programmes started, with the municipal governments of pole cities taking 
the lead m strategy-building Management bodies of different forms were established 
in line with the guidelines of the NDA, uniting public bodies and actors from the 
business and academic sectors Especially business representatives, marginalized in 
spatial development decisions since the 1999 reshuffle of RDCs, welcomed the pole 
initiative The president of the Hungarian Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
officially expressed his support for the pole programme 
In the early stages of pole strategy formulation it became clear, however, that 
the adaptation of the French 'poles of competitiveness' model m Hungary was far 
from straightforward Problems were manifold First of all, the weakness of the 
business sector, low levels of (business) infrastructure and the absence of either a 
dominant industrial branch or strong R&D capacities (or both) made it difficult to 
turn the selected cities into poles of the knowledge economy (see HVG, 2007b) 
Conflicts among different actors in the region - the regional development agency 
(RDA), the county, the municipality - emerged as well In addition, although the pole 
programme was designated a 'flagship' programme and was, as such, supposed to 
overcome sectoral divisions, (some) pole partners saw themselves constrained when 
it came to entering partnerships This was especially the case for universities and 
clinics that are dependent on different central ministries or other central organs 
(see Box 5 3) 
Box 5.3 Developing a strategy for Pecs Pole 
The various problems encountered during the elaboration of the pole programme can be well 
demonstrated by the example of'Pecs Pole' Pecs Pole ('Pecs Development Ltd') was set up 
as a joint company by the Municipality of Pecs, Baranya County, the Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry of Pecs-Baranya, the University of Pecs, and the Transdanubian Institute of the 
Centre for Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
The economy of Pecs, which, with around 160 000 inhabitants, is the fifth city of Hungary, 
was based on heavy industry until the late 1980s Due to its peripheral location, missing 
transport links (it was the only one of the five larger regional centres without motorway 
access to Budapest m 2008) and resulting low levels of foreign investment, its economy 
has been stagnating the past decades The pole programme was welcomed by many as an 
opportunity that might reverse this tendency As the Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry of Pécs-Baranya County noted in an interview entitled 'Instead of political tales we 
need pole strategy' " the establishment of [NUTS2] regions has nothing to do with economic 
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development [_] the application of the Pole Strategy wil l make real regional development 
possible" (Régióstart, 2006). 
Due to the lack of a dominant industrial branch in the Pecs region, three industries 
were designated as the main pillars of the strategy: the cultural, health and environmental 
industries. Cluster and innovation chain development, and cooperation between business and 
academia were to become key priorities of Pecs Pole. However, the dependence of some actors 
on central bodies proved to be an obstacle early in the planning phase. As one respondent 
noted:"[...] the clinics are depending on the National Health Insurance Fund Administration, 
on theMin is t ryo f Health, and on the university; the university in turn depends on the Ministry 
of Education...so everything is decided up there [in Budapest]". 
On the other hand, in view of the similarities wi th other pole strategies-environmental 
industry was figuring in four of the seven pole strategies - more guidelines were expected 
from 'above'. As the managing director of Pecs Pole argued: "At the central governmental 
level they do not want to make a distinction between the cities...and this is not good...I mean 
sectoral distinction...so they let us include environmental industry [in our plans], and they 
also let the others include it..[...] at some point they wil l have to decide that this Is here, 
full stop." 
Conflicts were also appearing among various pole actors, for example between the 
Self-government of Pecs and the Self government of Baranya County. With Pecs having a 
rather weak business presence, the Self-government of Baranya County, owner of hospitals 
and various cultural-educational facilities, could not be ignored. This led to tensions in the 
relations between the county government and the pole city munic ipal i ty- as a county official 
noted: "Pecs ... should wri te a letter that it wants to take over the operation of the Direction 
of Museums of Baranya County.there is no obstacle, we would hand it over, they can have 
it...But they would commit hara-kiri. But they would like to tell the county what to spend its 
money on...this is not possible...". 
Tension also arose between South Transdanubian Regional Development Agency (RDA), 
and Pecs Development Ltd. In fact, central prescriptions for strategy-making being absent, 
the managing bodies of pole cities commonly tended to work out their strategies wi thout 
consulting RDAs (see SOMLYODVNE PFEIL, 2007) that were charged wi th the elaboration of ROPs. 
As a chief official of the South Transdanubian RDA noted, "[...]it is a bit unlucky that we 
were outside the planning process, because maybe the Agency has the most experience". 
The Agency's view on the pole strategy also differed from that of the Chamber: "[...] the 
Chamber is very eager to sell this as a regional programme, a regional development 
programme...but this would dilute it...one has to recognize that it is in the larger cities that 
there is a critical mass...". The Chamber's Secretary was in turn rather negative about "the 
so-called'institutions of regional development'" (including the RDA) (SÌKFÓi,n.d.). As he argued, 
the scope of the pole programme reaches in a way beyond the [NUTS2] regional boundaries 
and Is of a relational character "to which no geographical boundaries should be applied". 
Furthermore, "developing poles is not urban development, but one of the most efficient 
ways of developing the vktik [vidékfejlesztés]" (SIKFOI, n.d.). 
203 
In the early phase, the implementation of the pole programme also suffered from the 
persisting vagueness around the conditions of financial support for poles The NDA's 
view that pole development was primarily about economic, rather than urban, 
development, fuelled discussions as to what belongs to the one and what to the other 
The NDA's push towards an understanding of pole development as knowledge centre 
and cluster development (following the French model) was especially difficult to 
accommodate for pole cities without a clear-cut economic profile Acknowledging that 
in order to become attractive business locations, Hungarian cities need serious 
upgrading in terms of urban development (urban infrastructure, service provision etc ), 
pole subsidy contracts also allowed poles to elaborate projects related to urban 
development and to the development of regional centre functions The NDA emphasized, 
however, that projects would only be eligible for funding if they were closely linked to 
economic development, innovation and R&D As officials of the NDA reported, 
municipalities were rather inventive m making a case for certain developments 
"The French pole programme is a purely economic development programme, which means 
that no mfrastructural investments are subsidized Then the Hungarian pole cities came, 
[saying] that "We have no roads, no trams and no bridges, nothing so we have to start 
with infrastructure We first have to create an attractive environment for investment, an 
attractive living environment, so that researchers move and stay here So we need 
kindergartens and schools as well, because without these, they will not settle down here" 
As another official of the Ministry of Self-Government and Spatial Development 
recalled 
"When Szeged learned that they had become a pole and received 100 million, like the other 
poles, then they were thinking, we will give a boost to the development of the city and 
build a 4000 bed clinic 4000 beds it was nonsense that started to play in some heads 
This is not what being a pole is about [ ] it is not about the city building three bridges and 
replacing the tram network it is about how the city can appear on the international scene, 
and attract capital" 
Struggling with financial problems, municipalities were certainly attracted by the 
prospect of upgrading urban infrastructures In connection with that, the 800-1000 
billion HUF72 that was allegedly going to be spent on pole cities between 2007 and 
72 The origins of this much cited sum are actually difficult to trace and it subsequently shrank to 400-600 
billion (see e g HVC 2007b) 
204 
2013 became a recurring point of reference. EU funds have represented almost the 
only source of development monies, and municipalities have become dependent on 
tendering; they are adjusting their development goals to tender calls. At the same 
time, municipalities have actually tended to spend their development resources on 
operational expenses (HVC, 2006c). As noted above, considering the EU's principle of 
additionality, resource scarcity was also jeopardizing funds absorption. For this 
reason, a central contribution fund has been made accessible since 2004 to the most 
deprived municipal governments. However, wi th the state budget facing severe 
restrictions, the question of whether the government can guarantee additionality 
became central during the public consultation and the parliamentary debates of the 
2nd NDP. In this regard. Cordon Bajnai, newly appointed Minister of Self-Covernment 
and Spatial Development, repeatedly appeased fears that budget cuts would 
undermine the necessary financial contribution of the government and thus 
Hungary's absorption capacity. As Bajnai noted: 
"The main beneficiaries of the New Hungary Development Plan will bethe self-governments, 
directly and indirectly" (Bajnai. 2006c). 
At the same time, he emphasized that the distribution of 8,000 billion HUF of EU 
subsidies would be a competition, and that: 
"Money should not be invested where it is not worthwhile: we do not want to pour money 
into leaky sacks" (ibid.). 
In line wi th that, the NDA emphasized that pole cities would not automatically receive 
any EU funds, but would have a share of it depending on the quality of the projects 
with which they were bidding for funds. That the pole programme was increasingly 
defined as being about the enhancement of competitiveness and about the 
knowledge economy (Bajnai, 2006) was expressed in the NDP, in which the Economic 
Development OP was accorded a larger share of pole programme financing than the 
Regional OP. As a respondent pointed out, the assignment of pole developments to 
two OPs reflected disputes between the National Development Agency and the 
National Spatial Development Office. Splitting up the pole programme entailed 
actually that in the NDP, the relation between the objective of the demand-oriented 
promotion of city-based knowledge economies and that of the supply-oriented 
development of urban infrastructures remained unclear. In fact, the NDP reiterated 
the lack of clarity that characterized EU guidelines (among other things, the 
205 
Community Strategic Guidelines, see Box 52) concerning the relation between 
various dimensions of urban policy (LENCYEL, 2006) 
With the already mentioned lack of distinct pole city industrial profiles, the 
NDA's emphasis on (knowledge) economic development seemed, however, to bring 
propositions from pole cities that countered the original ambition of promoting a 
combination of educational, production and R&D activities within a given area 
While - as an informant recalled - key NDA officials were desperate to find a way to 
delimit poles territorially, participating partners often engaged m networking beyond 
regional boundaries For example, the Budapest University of Technology and 
Economics became involved in the programme of the partner centres Szekesfehervar 
and Veszprem In addition, it became apparent that the other 'territorial expectation' 
of pole projects, 1 e that they pull their wider region along wi th themselves, would 
also be diff icult to fulf i l In the case of Pecs Pole, for example, the project gathering 
phase barely brought projects from beyond Baranya County Micro regional 
associations were consulted but it was stressed that it was micro-regions' task to 
work out project proposals at a level that would be eligible for funding In connection 
with this, an official of the municipality of Pecs remarked that 
'There are certainly some winners [of the pole programme] in the county but beyond the 
county it has no effect in the region This is not a problem, but then it should not be 
presented as if it had let us admit then that we develop the urban centres and the videk 
will see what will happen to it " 
In fact, it was m Ime with the 'withdrawal' of the pole programme from the ROP that 
the NDA gradually started to advance the view that there was no guarantee that all 
the seven poles would be viable m the long term As NDA head Bajnai noted at a 
public consultation meeting about the NDP 
'This whole plan is a competition And everyone has to compete very seriously, because 
even the 8,000 billion will not be enough for everything Those who can translate their 
wishes into concrete actions will be succesful But there will be limits to the competition 
Those who are in the same league should be made to compete against each other" (Bajnai, 
2006b) 
In order to assure the equality of chances, Bajnai also stated that pole cities should 
compete wi th each other in the "same league" and not wi th other, smaller 
municipalities (ibid ) In November 2006, three types of pole-related tenders were 
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considered: tenders targeting only pole cities; open tenders where the application of 
poles was favoured; and completely open tenders (CSABINA, 2006). With these 
guidelines taking shape, it became clear that the original idea of establishing 
development poles that counterbalance Budapest's dominance was replaced by a 
vision of poles that stand out through their own efforts. 
In the parliamentary debates on the 2"d NDP in mid-October 2006, its impact on 
uneven spatial development was assessed differently by the deputies of the governing 
parties and the speakers of the opposition. While the former were optimistic, the 
latter were rather sceptical. MSZP's Monika Lamperth, Minister of Self-Government 
and Spatial Development, stressed that: 
"The 8,000 billion that Mr Prime Minister mentioned as well has been much talked about 
here in the House; it is a key question of how we spend it. One aspect we have to definitely 
consider is that our country is not a homogenous territory; close to Budapest and to the 
more developed larger cities there are also underdeveloped areas, areas that struggle with 
severe development problems, and it is a very important objective to make them catch up 
w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h i s s u m of money. [...] 1,130 billion can be spent on the six videki regional 
operational programmes and 417 billion on the Central Hungarian regional operational 
programme but the Central Region, because it is more developed, than the six videki 
regions, comes under another Objective of the European Union. [...] in the Central Region, 
the 417 billion include the developments realized as part ot the sectoral operational 
programmes. The conclusion is that in the videki regions, in the six videki regions, in the 
regional operational programme, a considerably higher amount of resources can be spent 
than in the Central Region" (Lamperth, 17 October 2006/66). 
Speakers o f t he major govern ing par t ies f u r t h e r emphasized t h e benef ic ia l e f f ec t o f 
the 2nd NDP fo r ci t ies. Former min is ter responsib le fo r spat ial deve lopment and 
MSZP-member Kol ber argued tha t already t h e i M NDP suppor ted ci t ies: 
"The i " National Development Plan provided already a lot of opportunities to cities. 
To mention one figure: from the 16 thousand winning tenders 11 thousand went to self-
governments of cities, and to businesses and voluntary sector organisations that have their 
seats in cities" (Kolber, 17 October 2006/84). 
As to the 2nd NDP, and the pole programme In particular, MSZP-member Szu'cs, 
ministerial commissioner of the pole programme, argued as follows: 
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"I think that anyone who does not accord enough relevance to that [programme], and 
anyone who does not support it ultimately does not support Hungary becoming truly 
modernized and catching up wi th the world's frontline" (Szucs, 17 October 2006/122) 
Similarly, MSZP-member Laszio Botka, Mayor of Szeged (one of the pole cities), noted that 
"One of the greatest emphases of the New Hungary Development Plan is on the creation of seven 
Hungarian knowledge centres, knowledge poles [ ] the objective is namely that Hungary 
becomes one of the world's centres of innovation, because today, it is innovation that drives the 
world and the economy of nations [ ] It is through growth generated by innovation that we can 
achieve what politics has been talking about for 15 years, we can strengthen the capacity of the 
videk to keep its population, we can stop or even reverse, the migration of the intelligentsia of 
scientists and researchers the brain dram abroad" (Botka, 17 October 2006/56) 
However, oppositional speakers remained sceptical concerning the effects of the 
Convergence Programme on NDP implementation, and also concerning equal 
opportunities in spatial development 
"It is about support for the big and developed cities, that is what the Plan is about, and to 
talk about the whole Hungarian Republic and the small ones [small settlements] is 
misleading the nation [ ] for us small towns and many citizens of Hungary, the Plan is not 
good and acceptable as it is" (Babak, 17 October 2006/68) 
"The second National Development Plan is practically a 160-page programme of how the 
videk['s existence] is made impossible from an agricultural point of view This programme 
is the programme of those who are the domestic servants of global interests that is of 
Ferenc Gyurcsany, Janos Veres [Minister of Finance], Janos Koka [Minister of Economy] 
Gordon Bajnai, Gabor Szetey [State Secretary of the Prime Minister's Office], and I could go 
on The FIDESZ Hungarian CIVIC Alliance wishes to place local interests at the forefront 
instead of global interests For us, Hungary begins where the highway ends, because from 
there one still has to get home on a service road and switch on the lights m the farmsteads" 
(Font, 17 October 2006/100) 
"[ ] the pole programme, about which we heard great speeches, but the multiplier effect of 
which is strongly questionable It is only within a distance of 50-70 km where its result, its 
positive effects will be noticeable I am convinced that micro-regions are unduly put at a 
disadvantage m this National Development Plan" (Pellczne Gall, 17 October 2006/116) 
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Finally, in October 2006, the government accepted the National Development Plan by 
resolution (GOVERNMENT OF HUNGARY, 2006c) and, together with the operational programmes, 
submitted it in December 2006 to the European Commission. In order to speed up 
administration and be able to launch calls for tender with the least possible delay after 
the Commission's approval of the above documents, the National Development Agency 
started to develop draft action plans73 for 2007-2008. Action plans and, in particular, 
calls for tender defining the criteria for eligibility are the key to the implementation of 
national strategic reference frameworks (FINTA, 2007). The following, penultimate section 
of C/iopfer 5 considers briefly the calls for tender which are relevant in view of the thesis' 
focus, as well as some issues that were raised during the first year of implementing the 
2nd Ν DP. 
5.4.7 Epilogue - Developing the spaces of 'new Hungary' 
As noted in the introduction, the end point of this study on state spatial reforms in 
Hungary is the approval of the 2nd NDP. However, I consulted some policy documents 
(including calls for tender) issued between December 2006 and March 2008, in order 
to see how the NDP would actually become realized. The insights gathered during 
this additional phase of empirical research support the overall conclusion and are 
briefly summarized here. 
As for the pole programme, plans for future calls for tender accessible until early 
2008 (NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, 2007; ZOMBORI, 2008) stated that subsidies 
connected to the 'pole programme' would be primarily accessible from the funds of 
sectoral OPs, (to a great extent from the Economic Development OP) and secondarily 
from those of the Regional OPs. It was laid down that pole city status (and alignment 
with existing pole strategies) would be relevant with regard to calls that relate to the 
improvement of the business environment and that only pole management bodies 
would be able to apply to these calls or these bodies would be given extra points in 
the evaluation process74. At the same time, it was specified that the assignment of 
subsidies targeting business development (the other component of the pole 
73 Action plans are detailed programming and implementat ion documents (including financial support 
packages) of the operational programmes for t w o years Following public consultation, they are accepted 
by the government. 
74 The first such call related to the improvement of the business environment was opened in October 
2007; it exclusively addressed companies in which pole city municipalities, their companies and/or state 
institutions of higher education based in the pole city hold at least a five per cent share or five per cent 
of the votes 
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programme) would not consider the geographical location of the tenderer(s) m this 
case, only pre accredited clusters (business networks) would be invited to apply (thus 
the location of the members of the network would not be taken into account) 
At the same time, it was specified that the assignment of subsidies targeting 
business development (the other component of the pole programme) would not 
considerthe geographical location of thetenderer(s) in this case, only pre-accredited 
clusters (business networks) would be invited to apply (thus the location of the 
members of the network would not be taken into account) 
Next to the 'pole programme', another stream of interventions related to the 
strengthening of cities and the cooperation of settlements was planned, under the 
heading of 'urban rehabilitation' Building on the guidelines of the Leipzig Charter on 
Sustainable Cities (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, 2007), which carries forward the competitive-
ness-oriented, city-centred vision of the ESDP, these interventions are financed from 
the (ultimately, centrally managed) Regional OPs of each NUTS2 region To a certain 
extent, calls for tender are selectively targeting different settlements, such as cities 
and towns of less developed micro-regions, and cities with or without county rights 
Concerning urban rehabilitation, cities with county rights actually fall under a specific 
procedure they benefit from extra planning consultations and, provided their 
integrated urban development strategies and action area plans meet certain 
requirements, they have access to dedicated funds Integrated urban development 
strategies (mandatory only for cities with county rights) have to propose actions on 
the basis of an integrated view of the city's characteristics and of its functional 
regional role on the one hand, and of the needs of specific inner districts on the 
other 
On the whole, through the emphasis on cluster development, the pole programme 
became greatly stripped of its geographical aspect Interventions planned for urban 
rehabilitation do work with differentiations, partly based territorial statistical 
schemes (in the case of less developed micro-regions) and partly based on jundical-
admmistrative ones, as m the case of cities with county rights As integrated urban 
development strategies have tended to place more emphasis on the rehabilitation of 
particular (inner) districts, it is questionable to what extent these strategies help 
overcome a perspective on cities as isolated entities On the whole, although 
awareness has risen with regard to issues of settlement structure development 
during the planning process forthe 2007-2013 period, as well as du ring implementation, 
there are not sufficient mechanisms to ensure that development action transcends 
municipal boundaries This is one of the conclusions of the document entitled 
'The state of affairs and perspectives of the Hungarian settlement network' (MINISTRY OF 
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SELF-GOVERNMENT AND SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT, 2007b). This document Isa draft of the National 
Settlement Development Concept {Orszagos Településhalózat-fejlesztési Koncepció) 
that was commissioned by the Ministry of Self-Government and Spatial Development 
and is being elaborated by the Centre for Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences and VATI, based on earlier work undertaken separately by the two 
institutes'5 (see Falu, Varos, Regio, 2008). The Concept is supposed to become a 
supplement to the National Spatial DevelopmentConceptof 2005. As the draft notes, 
it would be a task of the legislative to create a differentiated perspective on different 
elements of the settlement network. This issue also appeared in a discussion note of 
the Ministry of Self-Government and Spatial Development 'On the directions of 
development of the system of local self-government' in February 2007 (MINISTRY OF SELF-
GOVERNMENT AND SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT, 2007). The discussion note argued as follows: 
"Parallel to the abolition of the category of cities with county rights, it could be reasonable 
to include large city in the Local Self-Government Act, [defined] as a settlement with a 
regional area of influence, with large population numbers in the European sense and -asa 
result of the differentiated transfer of competences - with a broad scope of tasks" (ibid., 
p. 16, emphasis original). 
At the same time, the note realistically acknowledges that, given the lack of a 
parliamentary consensus (i.e. a two-thirds majority), no significant modifications 
can be made to the 1990 Act: 
"This ['large city'] would only be a title, and would not result in a different legal status. With 
the absence of the necessary qualified [two-thirds] majority, it is still possible to make 
conditions for the assignment of the city t it le stricter and to assign tasks to cities in a 
differentiated way" (ibid., emphasis original). 
In October 2007, Gordon Bajnai, newly appointed head of the reorganized Ministry of 
Local Government and Spatial Development (the National Development Agency 
became subordinated to the Ministry) talked about reforms necessitating a qualified 
majority because, as he noted: 
"The current system of self-government is not sustainable in the long term" (Bajnai, 2007). 
75 The draft drew, among other things, on studies on the 'Dynamic settlement system' carried out for the 
National Spatial Development Concept. 
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By March 2008, no changes had been instituted to the system of self-governments 
Consequently, as an official of the Ministry of Self-Covernment and Spatial 
Development noted 
'The New Hungary Development Plan builds principally on the exist mg system and attempts 
to assign resources to it so that we can make something of the present system 
5.5 Concluding Temarks 
The study of the process of the elaboration of Hungary's 2,'d National Development 
Plan in this chapter was first of all motivated by the question of why - contrary to 
what much regulationist accounts suggest - the neoliberahzation of Hungary has 
not brought about the strategic regulatory privileging of cities and/or city-regions 
Certainly, the lack of spatially differentiating interventions m Hungary can be largely 
attributed to the very process of neoliberahzation m particular, the (mandatory) 
adherence to EU fiscal discipline implies a severe restriction of Hungary's manoeuvring 
space with regard to the strategic differentiation of particular places and territories 
(see BUDD, 2008) This study started out from the assumption that the above is at 
best part of the explanation In order to gam a more m-depth understanding of 
Hungary's neoliberahzation, the latter has to be examined m terms of the post 1990 
struggles over the meanings of Hungary's state spaces 
The spatial reforms of the post-1990 period were interpreted here m terms of the 
subsequent institution of three discursive formations of nation-state space the 
discursive formations of self-government, spatial development and development 
policy Furthermore, these discursive formations were examined as being produced 
through the interplay of relatively stable meanings of Hungarian nation state space 
on the one hand and the claims of (especially party political) actors on the other As 
to the relatively stable meanings of state spaces (or 'structurally inscribed 
selectivities'), this case study identified the structuring role of four mam, interrelated 
sets of meanings concerning the significations of the county, the nepies-urbanus 
debate, the urban-rural divide and the Budapest-wde/r divide The sociological/ 
institutional anchorage of political parties m the nepies-urbanus debate, the 
geographical pattern (urban/rural) of their support base and their actual position m 
county level politics formed considerably the parties' claims on the mam issues of 
spatial reorganization m the post-1990 period 
By investigating how the above-mentioned three discursive formations have 
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been built upon each other through processes of discursive selectivity, it was possible 
to gain important clues considering the shaping of state spaces and the undifferentiated 
treatment of cities and urban regions more specifically. In the first instance, the 
evolution of the discursive formation of self-government implied the strengthening 
of particular vertical scalar interdependencies (namely partisan links between the 
national and county level, and the national and the municipal level). At the same 
time, it left l itt le if any room to make sense of horizontal interdependencies, 
in particular between municipalities (which it conceived of as fundamentally equal). 
The subsequent establishment of the discursive formation of spatial development 
showed a reinforcement of centralizing tendencies. According to analysts, centralist 
traditions have persisted more broadly across Central Eastern Europe because of the 
fundamental nature of the 1989-90 political turn that, paradoxically, seemed to 
necessitate the retention of strong centralist institutions (WOLLMAN,1997). In addition 
to this, the process of EU integration has further enhanced centralizing tendencies in 
state spatial organization. This was first observable in the discursive formation of 
spatial development; subsequently, supported by the Commission's emphasis on 
absorption capacity, centralization manifested increasingly through the strengthen ing 
of development policy. 
Next to clarifying why the urban-centric rhetoric has not (or barely) translated 
into urban-centric state interventions, the analysis of discursive selectivities 
confirmed that political struggles around state spatial reforms do not simply imply 
the contestation of the state, but also of the nation as a spatial community. 
In Hungary, gradually, two fundamentally opposing understandings of nation-
statehood emerged, expressing a deeper-rooted and more durable ideological 
divergence that in fact reproduced the nepies-urbanus debate. At the same time, 
however, as PALONEN (2006) rightly pointed out, the sedimentation of the frontier 
between a more particularist camp emphasizing national specificities and a more 
pro-integrationist, 'modernizer' camp produced a 'pseudo-political polity' where real 
political alternatives or new concerns are excluded from contestation. Concerning 
spatial differentiation in particular, as party political polarization reinforced thinking 
in terms of the Budapest-Wc/éir divide (where the use of term 'vidék' asserted the 
equivalence between all places and spaces outside Budapest), no meaningful debate 
could be formed about the role of ('large') cities. Such a meaningful debate has been 
largely undermined from the onset by the depoliticization of the system of self-
government that made municipal self-governments appear as the 'natural' units of 
state spatial organization that embody 'system change'. Nevertheless, with the 
emergence of the discursive formations of spatial development and development 
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policy, new spatial organizing concepts have appeared (most notably 'region' and 
'micro-region' within the former, and 'development pole' within the latter) Although 
these concepts have shaped ongoing debates and newly form mg practices concerning 
(the increasingly) centrally orchestrated funds allocation among municipalities, they 
have not reconfigured the patterns of spatial intervention substantially Parallel to 
that, the meso-level (ι e both county and regional) has become principally emptied, 
the increasingly influential and expanding Regional Development Agencies have 
turned gradually into the agents of centrally steered development policy (PALNE KOVACS, 
2008) that do not (cannot) effectively promote an integrative, territorial 
perspective 
Neoliberal rationalities of self-reliance and responsibility have articulated with 
and supported the taken-for-granted notion of self-government At the same time, 
although "in professional circles, settlement hierarchy has become treated almost as 
an axiom, in public debates one is being'wisely'silent about this and is even advancing 
Utopian ideas on the horizontal relationships between equal settlements" (FARACO, 
2009, ρ 26o) The gradual dilution of the pole concept through the inclusion of 
sub-centres in the course of the elaboration of the National Spatial Development 
Concept can be seen as a manifestation of these 'Utopian ideas' On the whole, with 
spatial differentiation being barely thinkable, the neoliberalization of Hungarian 
state spatiahty has unfolded not through the strategic mstrumentalization of state 
spaces, but through the increasing 'de-spatialization' of development interventions 
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City-regions: the answer to 
'the English Question'? 

"Our core cities do not need to become capital cities to succeed. 
We all know that London is a huge asset to this country - we must 
never forget that. But for too long in this country we have been too 
London centric. I think we must aspire to having a number of cities 
that are genuine global leaders as well as being engines of growth 
in their region - a Barcelona of the North, a Milan of the Midlands 
and a Seattle of the West and powerful cities in other parts of the 
country". 
(RUTH KELLY, Secretary of State for Communities and 
Local Government at the 2006 Urban Summit in Bristol) 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the Politics of Space Approach allows us to 
arrive at a more f i t t i n g account of Hungary's changing state spatialities under 
neoliberalism than the regulationist, strategic-relational approach. In order to show 
that added value of the Politics of Space Approach is not restricted to the 'atypical' 
case of a post-socialist state, the current chapter analyses of the politics of space that 
unfolded recently around the reorganization of state spaces in England. 
The above passage from a 2006 speech by Ruth Kelly is an excellent entry point 
for the study of this recent episode of the reorganization of England's spatial 
governance that has evolved around the idea of city-regionalism. Briefly, 'city-
regionalism' in England can be seen as a rediscovery and reformulation of arguments 
in both academic and policy-making debates concerning the need to govern, 
administer and plan various social relations and processes on a city-regional level. 
The concern with city-regions was preceded, as testified by the proliferation of a 
wide range of policy documents issued by the government {Table 6.7), by a growing 
attention to the role of cities as main sites of governance and development in the 
global economy. While already in this foregoing period, cities were often mentioned 
with "their regions", subsequently the emphasis came to lie even more f irmly on 
city-regions as "the key economic building blocks" (ODPM, 2004, p. 24). As a sign of 
the growing momentum of city-regionalism, in December 2004 the Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) commissioned a series of studies entitled Λ Fra/neww/f 
for City-Regions, w i th the purpose of exa mining the possibilities of a move towards a 
clear national policy framework for city-regions. 
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T a b l e 6.1 A g r o w i n g focus o n cit ies and c i t y - r e g i o n s as spaces o f d e v e l o p m e n t 
in g o v e r n m e n t a l pol icy d o c u m e n t s 
2000 Our Towns and Cities: the Future - Delivering an Urban Renaissance 
(the'Urban White Paper') 
"The economy relies on the economic performance of our towns 
and cities [ ] Preserving and strengthening such assets is vital as 
we live in an increasingly competitive world " (DETR 2000, ρ 22) 
zooi Productivity in the UK 3: The Regional Dimension 
"The economic performance of cities is an important driver of the 
UK's overall output, because a significant proportion of the UK 
population lives in a city " (HM TREASURY and DTI, 2001, ρ g) 
April 2002 The Working Croup on Cities, Regions and Competitiveness is 
established w i t h the participation of the government. Regional 
Development Agencies and Core Cities, w i t h the following terms of 
reference 
"To make recommendations for policy changes and practical 
actions to enable the major regional cities to fulfi l their 
potential as drivers of the urban renaissance and the economic 
competitiveness of their regions - and thereby strengthen the 
national economy's capacity for growth " (see ODPM, HM TREASURY 
and DfT, 2003, ρ 3) 
November 2002 Urban Summit in Birmingham 
"I want Britain's cities to be world leaders " (BROWN, 2002) 
June 2003 2",l report of the Working Croup on Cities, Regions and Competitiveness 
Cities, regions and competitiveness dealing w i t h 
"how to raise the profile and performance of the major regional 
cities, and thereby add more cylinders to the UK's economic 
engine while simultaneously creating more space for London to 
further develop its unique flagship role as one of the world's front 
rank cities " (ODPM, HM TREASURY and DfT, 2003, ρ 4) 
January 2004 Report Competitive European Cities: Where do the Core Cities Stand? 
Commissioned by the ODPM 
"If the Core Cities could improve their performance to match 
that of their continental counterparts, the gams to the national 
economy would be enormous " (ODPM, 2004b, ρ 5) 
April 2004 ODPM report Making it Happen: Urban Renaissance and Prosperity 
in our Core Cities. A Tale of Eight Cities 
"Stronger and more competitive cities can, and are, increasingly 
benefiting their surrounding regions by spreading economic 
growth and prosperity more widely" (ODPM, 2004c, ρ 5) 
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In fact, it seemed that city-regionalism might become (part of) 'the answer' to "the 
English Question", i.e. the question of "How can we improve the government of 
England?" (HAZELL, 2006, p. 38). Or, referring back to the regulationist perspective on 
state spatial restructuring, and BRENNER'S (2004) work in particular, one could easily 
interpret the emerging city-regionalism as a new phase of 'urban locational policies' 
that aim at enhancing the competitive advantages of city-regions as new state 
spaces under the continuing dominance of global neoliberalism. Indeed, several 
UK-based scholarly commentators seem to have made such an interpretation. 
GONZALEZ, TOMANEY and WARD (2006) were critical of the way city-regions became 
'articles of fa i th ' for economic development, political governanceand spatial planning 
on the sub-national level. As they noted with concern, "the city-regional agenda risks 
overlooking the importance of the national scale and downplaying the responsibility 
of central government in tackling regional disparities". Finally, the same scholars 
remark that "[t]he debate about city-regions is in danger of becoming reduced to the 
simplistic and narrow view that urban and regional policy should be concerned 
principally with the task of making cities more competitive" (GONZALEZ, TOMANEY and 
WARD, 2006, p. 317). Similarly, Jonas and Ward argue that "the recent revival of interest 
in city-regions has been constructed around a rather narrow set of empirical and 
theoretical issues relating to exchange, interspatial competition and globalization" 
(JONAS and WARD, 2007, p. 169). In fact, we can recognize a parallel between these 
criticisms and Brenner's disapproving comment on the "regressive politics of 
unfettered territorial inequality" (BRENNER, 2004, p. 304). 
But how successful has city-regionalism actually been in England in reifying "the 
city-region as an autonomous political agent of the global space economy" (JONAS 
and WARD, 2007, p. 169)? To what extent has the city-regional 'agenda', as feared by 
the above-mentioned scholars, eventually framed important policy choices? In fact, 
belying scholarly (and other) concerns about the city-regional approach becoming 
dominant, the upsurge of interest in city-regions has finally not translated into a 
straightforward commitment of the government to institutionalize city-regions as 
spaces of state intervention, i.e. as new state spaces. The Review of Sub-National 
Economic Development and Regeneration (or 'Sub-National Review' (SNR) for short) 
(HM TREASURY, BERR and DCLG, 2007), a policy document expected to clarify the 
government's approach to city-regions, preferred to speak of sub-regions in the first 
instance, and mentioned city-regions as a specific form of sub-regions. For example, 
the SNR noted that "[w]e also need to support sub-regions, including city-regions, to 
promoteeconomicgrowth"(ibid., p. 3). The SNR proposed to take forward sub-regional 
governance and development through the voluntary cooperation among local 
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governments via the establishment of Multi-Area Agreements (MAAs) By the end of 
January 2009, ten MAAs were signed, and a number of other partnerships were 
developing (or considering to develop) an MAA Furthermore, as the SNR had already 
indicated, the government decided to bring forward legislation to allow groups of 
local authorities to develop an MAA that includes statutory duties, the 'MAA with 
duties' is also voluntary (DCLG, 2009) On the whole, it appears that the government 
took a more permissive stance and no radical steps to establish city-regions Rather, 
the actual outcome of debates on city-regionalism m England coincides with Brenner's 
already mentioned, more recent, remark, according to which current urban locational 
policies "are generally pursued through more subtle,yet no less pervasive, institutional 
recahbrations, policy reorientations and regulatory experiments" (BRENNER, 2009, ρ 129). 
It is against the backdrop of "[t]he rapid ascent of 'the city-regions agenda'" 
(GONZALEZ, TOMANEY and WARD, 2006, p. 315) and the subsequent, relative 'descent' of 
the same agenda that the current case study examines t w o related questions First, 
this study wishes to investigate why and how "the English Question" became framed 
(partly) in terms of city-regionalism at all In other words, why and how did the 
concept of the city-region become central in discussions about the reorganization of 
England's governance? The second issue that this study deals with is that of the 
actual evolution of what has been referred to as the city-regional agenda The main 
question here is thus why and how the actual institutionalization of city-regionalism 
(1 e ultimately, sub-regionalism) took a particular course 
The previously sketched Politics of Space Approach helps us to appreciate the 
emerging city-regionalism m England not as a coherent policy turn or agenda, but as 
a set of variously connected and often contradictory ideas about how spatial relations 
and processes should be managed by the state Furthermore, the Politics of Space 
Approach's notion of discursive selectivity will help us to understand both how the 
'city-region' has become selected as a central policy concept and also why no radical 
institutionalization of city-regions took place Finally, it will help us acknowledge 
how the understanding of the English nation as a spatial community has been 
implicated - and problematized - m the above processes This latter objective might 
seem misplaced in view of those scholarly accounts according to which nationalism 
is an alien ideology to the English who, instead of nurturing strong feelings of 
belonging to a collectivity, have, if anything, a personal sentiment of devotion to 
their country (TAYLOR, 1993). In this respect, BRYANT (2008) refers to a survey that 
revealed the indifference of the English to the issue of English/British identity and 
concluded that England was an 'ummagmed community'. Although acknowledging 
these accounts, this study is based on the conviction that the understanding of the 
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nation as a spatial community is still very much present in the thinking of the English. 
This is obvious if we consider for example that the question (posed as part of the 
British Social Attitudes Survey'6) of whetherthe government looks afterthe interests 
of all parts of England more or less equally seemed to be a sensible one, as well as 
that people in England were inclined to say that the standard of public services should 
be the same in every part of Britain (for a discussion of the 1999-2003 survey results 
see CURTICE, 2006). 
The focus of this study is the period starting in November 2004, after the 
referendum on elected Regional Assemblies (RAs) in the North East, and ending in 
July 2007, when the SNR was published. This delimitation is not followed strictly, 
however. For a better understanding of the evolution of city-regionalism, the above 
period had to be located within the broader post-1997 period. Furthermore, it was 
indispensable to connect post-1997 developments to processes of state formation 
prior to the 1997 Labour take-over. A concise historical overview was considered also 
important for demonstrating how the structurally inscribed discursive selectivities 
of the state have evolved. As to the end point of the period in question, I consulted 
some documents that were published after the SNR to check whether the actual 
measures taken are in line with the commitments of the SNR, which forms the basis 
for the conclusions I have drawn. 
6.1 Setting the scene: the post-1997 devolution agenda 
In the 1997 parliamentary elections. Labour, led by Tony Blair, achieved a landslide 
victory: the Conservative Party had not only been ejected from office after 18 years, 
but found itself also with fewer MPs than at any t ime since 1906 and with its lowest 
share of popular vote (at 32%) since 1832 (WARD, 2002, p. 172). Devolution, understood 
as a relativetransfer of power and responsibility from the nation-state to other levels 
of government and governance, became a key policy agenda for the Blair 
administration. So what were the motivations for devolution and what did it imply in 
practice? 
Briefly, as to the motivations for devolution, they followed from the Third Way 
philosophy (JONES, GOODWIN and JONES, 2005), which could be seen as Labour's 
perspective on modernizing social democracy. Rooted in a "sweeping interpretation 
76 The British Social Attitudes Survey has been conducted annually by the National Centre for Social Research 
since 1983. The Survey monitors and interprets the British publics changing attitudes towards social, 
economic, political and moral issues. 
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of globalisation which it regards as the single most important factor that has 
transformed our world" (HALL, 2003, ρ 85), the Third Way perspective implied that 
social democracy as propagated by the 'Old Left' and the conservative neoliberalism 
of the 'New Right' have both become obsolete 'New Labour' proposed m fact to 
revive social democracy by radically combining elements of the t w o sides and 
following a 'Third Way' (BASTOW and MARTIN, 2003) 
The Third Way stood for a style of government based on a pragmatic rebalancing 
of responsibilities of state and market It advanced a new, enabling role for government 
(replacing the commanding one), a view of the market harnessing public interests, 
and the objective of establishing a partnership between government and a civil 
society of 'strong communities' empowered by rights and responsibilities (ibid.). 
Devolution appeared m fact as a modernization agenda for the spatial restructuring 
of the state, aiming at safeguarding the economic and political future of the United 
Kingdom" (UK). 
As to the practical implications of devolution, it brought about constitutional 
changes and led to the creation of an elected Parliament for Scotland, a National 
Assembly for Wales and an Assembly for Northern Ireland Responding to the 
aspirations of the Celtic nations for accommodating national and cultural diversity, 
and to pressures for democratization and accountability, devolution brought about a 
significant change m the geography of power and control (MUSSON, TICKELL and JOHN, 
2006) of the union state. Briefly, the latter term refers to a state characterized by its 
compound form, m which different units have been added on, keeping some of their 
old institutions and practices, but without a federal division of powers (KEATING, 2006, 
ρ 23) The constitutional settlement was thus characterized by an asymmetrical 
geometry (MACLEOD and JONES, 2006), with England remaining the odd one out m 
terms of political representation. An exception was London, as the mayor of the 
newly established Greater London Authority also became directly elected Lacking 
substantial bottom-up pressures for regionalism, devolution in England was actually 
dominated by concerns of economic development, evidenced through the 
establishment of Regional Development Agencies in 1999 (HUDSON, 2005, JONES, 2004, 
KEATING, 2006) Being aware of the fact that England's evolving system of regional 
governance suffers from a democratic deficit, from its 2nd term on (i.e. from 2001), 
New Labour showed stronger commitment to the creation of elected Regional 
Assemblies "where there is demand" (TOMANEY, 2002) 
77 This study will follow the common practice of using'United Kingdom'as a shorthand designation to refer 
to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Great Britain comprises the territories of 
England, Wales and Scotland 
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Although the reconfiguration of the union state was indisputably a radical 
change in the spatial organization of the UK state, many critical commentators have 
questioned the extent to which the spatial reforms rooted in the Third Way agenda 
were actually discontinuous with the policies of the previous Conservative 
governments (see e.g. COULSON, 2004; ENTWISTLE and LAFFIN, 2001; CLYN and WOOD, 2001; 
GONZALEZ and TOMANEY, 2006; MASSEY, 2007; RACO, 2003). Also, while some have seen 
New Labour as carrying on core Labour values, in the view of others Blair was 
"attempting to take neo-liberalism even further than Mrs. Thatcher or Major" (JESSOP, 
2002, p. xii). Jessop disapprovingly added elsewhere that "the three successive Labour 
Governments under Blair's continuing authoritarian plebiscitary tutelage have 
deliberately, persistently, and wilfully driven forward the neo-liberal transformation 
of Britain rather than halting or reversing i t" (JESSOP, 2007, p. 282). 
This study acknowledges that by setting high and stable levels of growth and 
employment as objectives in 1997, and by granting operational independence to the 
Bank of England, New Labour undoubtedly committed itself to a neoliberal course. In 
1998, Public Service Agreements (PSAs78) and the Spending Review process were 
introduced. While the former denotes the mechanisms through which the Treasury 
secures the agreement of other departments to'value-for-money'targets in exchange 
for extra spending, the latter is a process in which three-year departmental 
expenditure limits are fixed, as well as the expected benefits from these. To refer to 
Morgan, through the PSAs and the Spending Review process, the Treasury has 
"immeasurably strengthened its grip over other departments" under New Labour 
(MORGAN, 2001, p. 344). Also, this study is aware of the continuities that one could 
observe between pre- and po5t-i997 governments. 
However, this chapter does not wish to engage with a detailed assessment of 
(ideological) continuity between previous Conservative governments and New 
Labour (for an overview, see ALLMENDINGER and TEWDWR-JONES, 2006). Nor does it give an 
exhaustive appraisal of the neoliberal governmental practices introduced after 1997. 
In line wi th the considerations laid out in Chapter 3, the emphasis here is rather on 
the way a neoliberal policy course necessarily entails addressing dilemmas about 
organizing state space. On this basis, this study wishes to highlight that neoliberal 
rationalities can only become hegemonic in shaping state space by articulating with 
existing discursive formations of nation-state space. This articulation is shaped by 
processes of discursive selectivity. 
78 Note that in the present chapter, PSA stands for 'Public Service Agreement' and not for 'Politics of Space 
Approach'. In order to avoid confusion,the latterterm 15 written out in full length in this chapter. 
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Accordingly (and similarly to BASTOW and MARTIN'S (2003) account of the Third 
Way that was inspired by discourse theory), the current study regards the Third 
Way agenda as a discourse that aimed to reset the horizons of socio-spatial 
objectivity On this basis, this study deals with the way the spatial dimensions of the 
state('s operations) have been redefined m post-1997 England To referto Hazell's 
distinction, the focus here is on the "purely English" version of the English Question, 
1 e the question of "How can we improve the government of England?" This version 
is undoubtedly closely linked with the "UK version" of the English Question that m 
turn concerns asymmetric devolution and asks about England's place in the Union 
(HAZELL, 2006) Nonetheless, to the extent that it is possible to separate the two 
versions, this study concentrates on the former, and deals only marginally with the 
issue of how links between the different UK nations and the union state have become 
rearranged, and how the relation between 'Britishness' and 'Englishness' has been 
reshaped in the course of devolution The terms 'state spaces m England' and 
'England's state spaces' are intended to acknowledge that the responses to the 
"purely English" version of the English Question are (partly) about the UK state 
To sum up, city-regionalism m England is examined below as part of the new 
engagement with the "purely English" version of the English Question that was 
generated by the reshuffling of the union state under New Labour The study will 
proceed m three larger steps First, Labour's first term m office is discussed, followed 
by a section on the period starting wi th Labour's second term until the publication of 
the Northern Way strategy Finally, the period after the 'no' vote m the North East 
referendum, and specifically, the growing (and fading) momentum of city regionalism 
in England is investigated m more detail 
6.2 Rethinking state space under New Labour's first t e r m in office 
In this section, first a brief discussion will be provided of the measures through which 
Labour engaged in the reorganization of state spatiahty m England in its first term m 
office Subsequently, I will refer to some recurring interpretations of Labour's new 
regionalist and new localist interventions that see these interventions dommantly as 
steps that the government took m order to secure the realization of neoliberal 
macroeconomie objectives While acknowledging these insights, I propose to 
reconsider New Labour's spatial reforms as a set of incoherent attempts at the 
redefinition of state spatiahty Furthermore, I offer an account of England's emerging 
new state spaces as shaped by the discursive selectivity of the state 
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6.2.7 Repackaging the economy and society in territorial entities 
The t i t le of the present section is borrowed from AMIN (2005, p. 614). It expresses well 
that after its 1997 election victory, Labour embarked on the reconfiguration of state 
spaces through the delimitation of regional and local territories for the pursuit of 
particular socio-economic objectives. Labour's agenda for regional governance was 
already being developed during the pre-iggy opposition years. As SANDFORD (2006) 
notes, the first Labour Party policy papers on the issue, A Choice for England and A 
New Voice for England's Regions, published in 1995 and 1996, approached regional 
governance from the standpoint of enhancing democratic accountability and 
economic growth. As the former document stated: 
"England's regional structures are inefficient, poorly co-ordinated, and unaccountable. 
England is also handicapped by a serious regional economic imbalance. It needs much 
better regional co-ordination of economic development policy to help tackle this" (Straw, 
cited by SANOFORD, 2006, p. 79). 
In linewiththeseconcerns,theLabourgovernmentestablished Regional Development 
Agencies (RDAs) in 1998 with the aim of tackling the 'economic deficit ' in the English 
regions (Figure 6.7), i.e. that the per capita GDP dropped relative to the EU average in 
every English region between 1992 and 1999 (MORGAN, 1999). This 'regional economic 
failure' was seen, among others by the pro-devolution Minister of State of the 
Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR), as "turning Britain 
into a nation of regional haves and have nots" (Caborn, 1996, cited by HARRISON, 2006, 
p. 938). The RDAs were officially set up by the RDA Act as non-departmental public 
bodies in each of the eight standard regions. A ninth RDA was created in July 2000 
with the establishment of the Greater London Authority. RDAs inherited their staff 
and spending from English Partnerhips, the Government Offices of the Regions 
(CORs), as well as from the former Rural Development Commission79 (WARD, LOWE and 
BRIDGES, 2003). RDAs were supposed to assume five statutory tasks: 1) to further 
economic development and regeneration; 2) to promote business efficiency, 
investment and competitiveness; 3) to promote employment; 4) to enhance the 
development and application of skills relevant to employment; and 5) to contribute 
to sustainable development. Furthermore, the Act stipulated that each Agency shall 
79 English Partnerhips is the government's land and property agency. The Rural Development Commission 
was an England-wide government agency charged with responsibility for the socioeconomic development 
of rural areas. 
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formulate and keep under review a strategy (referred to as the Regional Economic 
Strategy, RES) in relation to its purposes. RDA boards have contained local authority 
members chosen to reflect the geography of the region, its overall political balance 
and the types of authority (district or county) present. A more formalized (financial) 
accountability linked RDAs to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. 
Figure 6.1 The regions of England 
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Next to the RDAs, another 'type of' regional actor was designated under the 1998 
RDA Act, namely Regional Chambers (referred to later as Regional Assemblies, RAs), 
with the main task of scrutinizing the work of RDAs (see Figure 6.2). Regional 
Chambers of varying size were set up in each region; typically, the balance of 
membership between local authority members and other stakeholders was 70:30 in 
favour of the former. Chambers were not created as statutory bodies; they were not 
accorded external resources to support their task of scrutinizing RDAs. Furthermore, 
RDAs were not formally required to work within the policy frameworks prepared by 
Chambers, nor did they need the Chambers' formal approval of their strategies 
(HARDING, WILKS-HEEC AND HUTCHINS, 1999). 
Figure 6.2 England's system of regional governance (outside London) in 
the late 1990s 
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Concerns wi th economic performance also instilled a significant rearrangement of 
the UK's regulatory and spatial planning system, in particular its approach to 
development planning (ALLMENDINGER and HAUGHTON, 2007); competitiveness was 
announced as an official objective in 1999 (ALDEN, 2001). While devolution to the 
Scottish Parliament and the Greater London, Northern Ireland and Welsh Assemblies 
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entailed a transfer of decision making powers over land use policies, in England the 
absence of a regional tier ruled out such a solution The government thus took steps 
to reinforce the strategic and spatial content of the non statutory Regional Planning 
Guidance (RPG), dealing with land use issues of regional importance and also with 
issues of economic development, marketing and funding cooperation (see NEEDHAM, 
2006, TEWDWR-JONES and MCNEILL, 2000) In a consultation paper entitled The Future of 
Regional Planning Guidance that was published by the DETR in 1998, it was proposed 
that the RPG should broaden its scope and provide a spatial framework for economic 
development plans, strategies for transport, energy, air quality and local waste, and 
for operational plans for infrastructure and service provision At the same time, the 
planning process was to be shifted from local governments to regional governance 
arrangements, notably to Regional Planning Bodies (RPBs) that were voluntary 
assemblies made up of indirectly elected80 members of the constituent councils and 
government-nominated representatives of business and civil society In addition, a 
formal public examination stage was to be introduced with a rigorous and sustainable 
appraisal process (COUNSELL and HAUGHTON, 2001, CULLINCWORTH and NADIN, 2007, HULST, 
2005, MARSHALL, 2004, PEARCE and AYRES, 2006) 
Gradually, RAs took over the role of RPBs m each region On the one hand, the 
(re-)emerging regional focus of the planning system implied that planning became 
increasingly shifted away from its local government base (MARSHALL, 2004, 2007) 
On the other hand, while RPBs were expected to take more responsibility for economic 
development and environmental protection policies (specifically, responsibilities m 
deciding how best to meet housing need and m setting targets for brown field 
development), this proved to be a thorny issue in practice and central government 
reappeared as a final arbiter This was especially the case m the greatly divisive matter 
of housing development in the South East where, during the 1990s, there was a 
growing anti-growth sentiment, m particular in shire (1 e non-metropolitan) counties 
In line with this anti-growth stance, 5ERPLAN, the South East's regional planning 
forum, challenged the national housing figures and their application to the South 
East of England it proposed a baseline housing provision of 862,000 dwellings 
instead of the 11 million the government suggested were required by 2016 
(CULLINCWORTH and NADIN, 2007) The public examination panel's report (referred to as 
Crow-report, after the Panel's Chairman Stephen Crow) insisted on increasing the 
housing numbers to the level of national projections and justif ied its pro growth 
stance by arguing that while the South East might appear to be a high growth 
domestic region, it is a mere thirt ieth in the European regional growth league 
80 The London Assembly is a directly elected body 
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(MORGAN, 2002). The Crow report's publication brought about a huge media outcry, in 
which contrasting views of sustainable development were pitted against each other 
(COUNSELL and HAUCHTON, 2001). The Council for the Protection of Rural England, shire 
county representatives and the Conservative Party took an anti-growth stance, 
arguing that the levels of growth proposed would lead to a catastrophic loss of green 
belt and countryside. As to the pro-growth position, it was in particular defended by 
the Town and Country Planning Association, arguing that a lack of available housing 
would damp down the economy, resulting in growth being transferred to other parts 
of Europe (and not the less advantaged regions of the UK). Finally, the polarization of 
attitudes left the Secretary of State with little otheroption than to mediate between 
high and low predictions of need. He thus proposed housing figures lying between 
those of SERPLAN and the public examination panel and, importantly, he abandoned 
the 'predict and provide' policy of previous decades for that of 'plan, monitor and 
manage'. The above-mentioned figure was still disputed by SERPLAN and a further 
reduction was proposed; this lower figure was actually retained in the South East's 
RPG (RPC9) (COUNSELL and HAUGHTON, 2001). 
With the establishment of the Greater London Authority (see below), a new 
institutional voice came to stress that facilities supporting growth in London are 
indispensable. In the document Towards a London Plan: Initial proposals for the 
Mayor's Spatial Development Strategy (GLA, 2001) it was noted that London had only 
two strategic choices; 
"The first is to attempt to rein back its economic growth and projected increase in population 
by reintroducing or reinforcing policies of dispersal. This would reduce pressure on 
infrastructure but compromise its future development as a world class city in the era of 
globalisation, and would be contrary to the principles of sustainability required by the 1999 
GLA Act. It would damage the UK's economy and require the UK to seek development outside 
London on green field sites and in more diffuse patterns, increasing journey lengths. This 
would not contribute to the nation's success as no other city in the UK could replace the 
position in the world economy currently held by London. The second choice, recommended in 
this document, is to accept these processes of economic growth, re-centralisation, and 
population increase and create an adequate infrastructure for the city to achieve sustainable 
development. This growth will help to pay for the many improvements in services and 
transport that London needs" (GLA, 2001. pp. 6-7). 
In addition to the steps towards a new framework of regional economic governance. 
Labour also proposed a vision of a modern partnership between central and local 
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government In the words of Gordon Brown, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, this 
partnership meant 
a new localism where there is flexibility and resources in return for reform and delivery -
local authorities at the heart of public services equipped with the freedom they need and 
accountable to the communities whose needs they serve' (BROWN 2002) 
A key reference point of the government's reform plans of local government 
modernization was that of 'community leadership' 
Concerning the concept of 'community', the Labour government propagated it as 
a basis for the development and delivery of social policy (IMRIE and RACO, 2003), as the 
site where the communitarian-inspired objective of coupling social rights and 
responsibilities (BASTOW and MARTIN, 2003, COCHRANE, 2003) can be pursued The concept 
of 'community' came first of all to underpin New Labour's urban policy, one of the 
two new area based programmes launched m 1998 that was supposed to provide 
additional support for deprived areas was labelled 'New Deal for Communities' 
Parallel to community-focused policy initiatives of neighbourhood renewal, 
'community engagement' was to become also the basis of New Labour's modernizing 
agenda for improved public services and the reconstruction of local politics (PEARCE 
and MAWSON, 2002) In particular, community-focused local governance was given 
shape through the stipulation of the 2000 Local Government Act that required the 
elaboration of Community Strategies, generally through a Local Strategic Partnership 
(LSP) LSPs were supposed to bring together public sector agencies (local authority, 
police, health trust) and other stakeholders (voluntary and community groups, 
businesses and local people) to set out the vision for an area Furthermore, they were 
intended to coordinate and drive the delivery of local services, leading to improved 
outcomes that go beyond the remit of one partner The rewarding of local authorities 
became formally managed via Local Public Service Agreements (LPSAs), ie via 
voluntary agreements between the government and individual local authorities, 
under which individual councils agree to a number of 'stretch' targets and are 
rewarded in return for improvements m service delivery LSPAs m particular were 
introduced in the Local Government White Paper Strong Local Leadership - Quality 
Public Services (DTLR, 2001) that emphasized the assured delivery of outcomes 
through a national framework of standards and accountability As the White Paper 
stated 
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"A new, more mature partnership between central and local government must have at its 
heart a single aim - to give people everywhere the opportunities they need to make their 
lives better" (ODPM, 2001, p. 59). 
As to community leadership, it was rediscovered as an ideal following low local 
election turnouts and was Intended to respond to the perceived need of making 
those who are politically responsible for running the council more recognizable. 
Among Labour ministers, concern grew that leaders were in danger of being held 
back as prisoners of their party groups, and there was also the conviction that 
regarding the efficient management of an authority, it would be appropriate to have 
a clear political executive, able to give a strong lead (GAINS, JOHN and STOKER, 2005). 
The idea of an elected mayor in big cities was in particular favoured by Tony Blair 
as it appealed to his sense of personal responsibility, and he believed it to be a 
genuinely popular reform (MORGAN, 1999). In fact, the 1994 Labour manifesto Working 
together for London already made the point that London was the only capital in 
Western Europe that lacked a city-wide government. The 1998 White Paper A Mayor 
and Assembly for London proposed a governance structure centred on a directly 
elected mayor to provide democratic leadership and to bridge the gap between 
community-led and national government (RAO, 2007). Furthermore, a key argument 
of the White Paper was that London needs to be vested with strategic authority in 
order to promote London as a world city. As it was noted: 
"London's economy is a keydrivingforceforthecountryasa whole, with London contributing 
around 15% of the nation's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). GDP per head for the London 
workforce is 25% higher than the national average. As well as being the nation's capital, it 
is a world city which competes in the global economy for finance and business services, 
and tourism. It is also a world centrefor culture, the arts and a major centre of international 
transport services" (DETR, 1998). 
Eventually, elections for the mayoral office were held in 2000 (bringingthe victory of 
Ken Livingstone), followed by the establishment of the Assembly; the two were to 
constitute the Greater London Authority (GLA). The formal case for reform of the 
established systems of local government in England was more broadly expressed in 
two further White Papers of the DETR, entitled Modern Local Government: in Touch 
With the People (1998) and Local Leadership, Local Choice (1999). These relied on a 
mix of accountability, efficiency and leadership arguments, and on the criticism of 
the established committee system as 'inefficient, opaque' and as 'weakening 
233 
accountability' (GAINS, JOHN and STOKER, 2005) Actually, it was the Local Government 
Act of 2000 that concretized the measures that were perceived would remedy the 
shortcomings of the system The Act forced change on all larger authorities (1 e for 
councils with 85,000 or more residents), but allowed councils to choose from three 
possible models of council leadership 1) leader and cabinet, 2) a directly elected 
mayor and cabinet, or 3) a directly elected mayor and council manager 
6 2 2 New regionalism and new localism as a struggle f or hegemony 
So how can we interpret Labour's steps aimed at reorganizing the spaces of state 
intervention? For many analysts, the measures concerning regional and local 
governance embodied New Labour's more interventionist strand of neoliberalism 
(compared to Thatcherism) In particular, the measures m question were seen as 
entailing the centralization of state power m order to secure favourable conditions 
for economic growth JONES (2004), for example, argued that RDAs were set up as part 
of a new mechanism for ensuring national (British) state power, and that they acted 
as sub-contractors to central government Similarly, the critique of centralization has 
been also raised m connection wi th the RAs that gradually took over the role of RPBs 
m each region For many, the episode of RPG9 formation was m particular illustrative 
of the broader reassertion of the central remit of planning that was intended to 
ensure that central government priorities for growth can be channelled into the 
regions m ways that bypass or override local and regional authorities (MORGAN, 2002, 
see also MARSHALL, 2004,2007) Furthermore, the management of the easily overheated 
South East was linked to the Labour government's 'neoliberal' objective of 
macroeconomie stability that was formulated partly m response to anxieties about a 
return to the economic tribulations of the 1970s (ANDREW and STEWART, 2001) With the 
South East being the chief source of inflationary pressures, monetary policy was 
calibrated to the conditions of this growth region, as the Governor of the Bank of 
England once conceded, job loss m the North is an acceptable price to pay for the 
control of the inflation m the South (MORGAN, 2002) According to HUDSON (2005), for 
Labour, the pursuit of regional economic renewal and revival via regional devolution 
became an enabling myth through which it could shift the blame onto the less 
developed regions for those regions' continuing economic problems In the case of 
local government modernization, given that key levers of control over local 
government funding (e g limiting council tax rises), priority setting (e g delivering 
national public service objectives) and performance assessment (eg the 
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comprehensive performance assessment) have remained with central government, it 
has also become seriously questionable whether central and local governments are 
operating as 'partners' (SULLIVAN, 2006). According to Marshall, the government held 
out incentives and autonomy "as possible rewards for those councils will ing to play 
the government's game" (MARSHALL, 2005, p. 403). 
The Politics of Space Approach supplies some important additional insights wi th 
regard to initial 'new regionalist' and 'new localist' measures of Labour. First of all, it 
reinterprets the measures in question as attempts to establish two new discursive 
formations of state space: that of 'regional economic governance' and that of 
'modernized local government'. Second, the Politics of Space Approach highlights 
how the political characterof claims, through which the above formations were given 
shape, became concealed by appeals to a natural state of affairs or some 'given' 
rationality. Third and most importantly, the approach proposed here considers the 
above-mentioned discursive formations as incomplete and internally contradictory 
agendas "in the making" and exposes the discursively selective processes through 
which new state spaces were formed. In this latter regard, the Politics of Space 
Approach allows us to recognize that the new regionalist (and also the new localist) 
reorganization of England had a centralizing character not simply because this best 
ensured the realization of neoliberal state objectives. The first two issues are dealt 
with here only briefly; these remarks are nonetheless crucial for the understanding of 
the subsequent account of the formation of city-regionalism. The third issue will be 
discussed in more detail in the following section. 
Concerning the newly shaping discursive formations of state space, the discursive 
formation of regional economic governance started to take shape as the existing 
framework of regional planning was articulated with an understanding of 
development in terms of competitive growth (on a European scale). To refer to 
Allmendinger, development planning received more economic emphasis in line wi th 
the wider antipathy towards planning from within New Labour that saw it as a 
"burden on business" (ALLMENDINGER, 2003). Also, there was a move towards integrated 
or strategic governance, a move greatly supported by the emerging EU thinking on 
spatial planning (ibid.; ALLMENDINGER and HAUCHTON, 2007; CULLINCWORTH and NADIN, 2007). 
As to the discursive formation of local government modernization, it attempted to 
transform state/citizen relationships (RACO, PARKER and DOAK, 2006) by f ixing the 
meaning of the notion of 'community' as an organic ensemble of individuals and 
organizations that are responsible and dutiful members of a locally (territorially) 
defined collective, and that are in a relation of partnership with the state (AMIN, 2005; 
BASTOW and MARTIN, 2003; IMRIE and RACO, 2003). 'Community' came to represent a site 
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of action to be mobilized, shaped and activated in the pursuit of the broader agenda 
of efficient service delivery 
With regard to the depoliticization of particular policy decisions, both regions 
and places became imagined 
"as a jurisdiction beyond which the actors have no real business or influence, and as a 
political community that, through mechanisms of deliberation, partnership, and shared 
interest, knows what is best for the locality and can deliver solutions that work for the 
common good" (AMIN, 2005, ρ 6ι8) 
In other words, both discursive formations relied on the establishment of relations of 
equivalence between "members" of a particular territorial unit Arguably, this was 
less pertinent m the case of the discursive formation of regional economic governance, 
where arguments of administrative efficiency came into play as well (SANoroRD, 2006) 
and less emphasis was put on collective identity. In contrast, the community-based 
understanding of local government modernization made allusion to the "naturalness" 
of local communities (see RACO, 2003) and suggested that inhabitants of a territorially 
defined entity have common interests. As such, communities appeared as apolitical 
entities (IMRIE and RACO, 2003) and, consequently, the emphasis on the facilitation of 
service-delivery networks through partnerships could turn local politics less 
problematically into a series of debates over instrumental and procedural matters 
concerning service delivery At the same time, wi th broader questions of social 
welfare and local economic development being marginalized from the remit of formal 
local politics, representative local government became increasingly pushed into the 
background (COCHRANE, 2003, COULSON, 2004, RACO, PARKER and DOAK, 2006) 
6 2 3 New Labour's regions as discursively selected state spaces 
So how can we account for the course of regionalization in England? Why have 
regions been established wi th an emphasis on economic development? These are the 
mam questions that this section will focus on by applying the Politics of Space 
Approach Accordingly, instead of seeing regionalization as a state regulatory exercise 
that reorders space rather straightforwardly, it is assumed here that theformation of 
regions as new state spaces is shaped by processes of discursive selectivity The study 
of these processes will proceed in t w o mam steps. First, the structurally inscribed 
discursive selectivities of nation-state spaces m England are discussed These 
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selectivities can be mapped via those, relatively sedimented spatial practices and 
meanings that have shaped the emergence of new (state) spaces. Here, these spatial 
practices and meanings will be considered in terms ofthe following three (interrelated) 
spatial divides (all relying on particular relations of equivalence and difference): the 
central-local, the North-South and the urban-rural divide. In a second step, I will 
discuss how different actors, in particular the Labour and Conservative parties, made 
structurally informed claims in the new situation created by Labour's 1997 victory, 
and how, eventually, the interplay of discursive selectivities on the one hand, and the 
claims of various actors on the other, reshaped state spaces in England. 
6.2.3.; Structurally inscribed discursive selectivities of England's state spaces 
Central-local relations and the contested regional 
The consolidation o f t h e English state differed from that of many other European 
states in that central state capacity in England was based upon a high degree of 
involvement of local ruling elites in the exercise of governance (CORRICAN and SAYER, 
1985, p. 16). As Loades (cited by JoNEsb, 2004, p. 603) noted, "By the end of Elizabeth's 
reign, England was highly unified, but not particularly centralised. [...] Just as a feudal 
monarchy had rested upon the contract of homage between the king and his ten-
ants-in-chief, Tudor monarchy rested upon an unwritten understanding between the 
monarch and the 'political nation'". As a corollary to this settlement, there has been 
no defining moment when the central state set out the principles of territorial 
organization and put it into practice, such as the Napoleonic revolution in Erance 
(JOHN, n.d.);thus, no elaborate central bureaucratic structures have emerged (CORRICAN 
and SAYER, 1985). In line with that, the counties, labelled the "true meso" by SHARPE 
(1993), were no t - as in most continental countr ies- products of central state design; 
in fact, they are the survivors o f the Saxon four-tier hierarchy of local government. 
With central government relying on the monarchy for cohesive symbols, the state 
has not been required to have its sovereign status reflected in field services or 
tutelary institutions (ibid.). According to Sharpe, "[ i ] t is precisely this freedom from 
any necessary enmeshment in non-central institutions" that gave the centre its 
independence from territorial politics (SHARPE, 1993, p. 249). 
Although the centre enjoyed unlimited potential power, its insulation from the 
sub-national system meant that local government enjoyed high levels of operational 
autonomy- hence Britain's reputation as the home of' local self-government' (SHARPE, 
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1993) The laissez-fair strategy continued with the rising imperial dominance of the 
UK, the central state was more concerned with 'high politics' and with sustaining the 
position of London, than with imposing a coherent state territorial arrangement This 
strong government without the state ethos has been labelled the'dual polity' (BULPITT, 
1983) By the late nineteenth century, however, this approach to domestic governing 
came increasingly under pressure as the union state appeared vulnerable to 
international economic competition, urbanization, social change and mass party 
mobilization According to MARLING (2001), the local government reforms that were 
introduced can be seen as the making of the social service state The reforms m 
question entailed a substantial transfer of responsibility from oligarchical control, 
divesting magistrates of most of their traditional regulatory responsibilities and 
putting them into the hands of representative authorities elected on a very broad 
franchise 
From the early decades of the twentieth century, the above mentioned 
settlement has become more and more criticized for being too restrictive to respond 
to the problems of growing cities and the interdependence of cities and surrounding 
areas Increasingly, efficiency arguments, rooted in the utilitarian ideology that 
captured the UK by the late 1890s (SHARPE, 1993), were deployed m debates about 
local government reorganization (JOHN, η d ) Concerns of efficiency were also central 
to the recommendations of the Redcliffe-Maud Commission that was set up by the 
government in 1966 with the task of investigating the structure of local government 
m England The majority report of the Commission stated that the fundamental 
question was the following "what size of authority, or range of size, in terms of 
population and of area, is needed for the democratic and efficient provision of 
particular services and for local self government as a whole?" (see WISE, 1969) 
The debate instilled by the Commission's work was conducted in strongly 
production-efficiency terms (SHARPE, 1993) The Commission argued that both the 
'environmental' (1 e planning, transportation and major development) and the 
'personal' (1 e education, personal social services, health and housing) groups of 
services should be in the hands of the same authority, effectively, this meant a move 
towards the establishment of single tier (unitary) authorities At the same time, a 
dissenting note by one of the Commissioners, Derek Senior, questioned the majority 
view of the commission, arguing that unitary authorities would be too remote from 
individuals for the responsive administration of personal services and too small to 
deal effectively with many problems of planning (WISE, 1969) Proposals were 
modified significantly m subsequent stages of the reform process, m the conurbations, 
changes were made to appease historic counties, to protect national party interests 
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at the local level, and to reconcile inter-area rivalries and incompatibilities (BARLOW, 
1995). Actually, the political furore and a change of government meant that a more 
modest version of the proposal became law (JOHN, n.d.) As BARLOW (1995) notes, a 
combination of national and local political factors diluted a scheme intended to 
apply a set of rationalizing principles to local circumstances. Instead of the institution 
of metropolitan counties as strategic planning authorities covering functional 
regions, the eventual reorganization produced a design that was flawed by the 
boundaries being drawn too tightly around the conurbations, and by the lack of 
implementation powers. According to SHARPE (1993), the production-efficiency focus 
of the reform gave the UK possibly the largest local government units in the world. 
The Local Government Act 1972, which remains the basis of the structure in place 
today, introduced a two-tier system of local government with counties as the 
upper-tier of local government and districts as the lower tier; six of the upper-tier 
units, all in England and representing heavily built-up areas (other than Greater 
London), were designated 'metropolitan counties' and were subdivided into 
'metropolitan districts' (see Table 6.2). 
Table 6.2 The system of local government in England 
county metropolitan non- Greater London 
counties metropolitan 
(shire) counties unitary 
authorities8' 
district metropolitan non- London City of 
districts metropolitan boroughs London 
('single tier' (shire) 
authorities) districts 
parish civil parishes 
(in some districts, the rural area is divided into parishes 
and the urban is not) 
81 Unitary authorities are single-tier administrations with responsibility for all areas of local government. 
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Under Thatcherism, local government became seen as a bastion of Keynesian politics 
and resistance to central government policy (RACO, PARKER and DOAK, 2006) As a 
testimony to the lack of faith m the capabilities of local government (CULLINCWORTH 
and NADIN, 2007), the 1980 Local Government, Planning and Land Act established 
Urban Development Corporations (UDCs), with a broad remit to secure the 
regeneration of their designated areas and, principally, to challenge the non 
entrepreneurial culture associated with public sector initiatives (BAII-PFTSIMFRIS, 2004) 
In addition, again as part of the broader attempt to re-regulate the local state, the 
Greater London Council and six metropolitan councils were abolished in 1986 
(TEWDWR-JONES and MCNEILL, 2000) While the government justif ied this step as cutting 
back bureaucracy and creating more efficiency, for most commentators the original 
motive was political hostility to the Left leadership of the Greater London Council 
(JOHN, n d ) Subsequently, the 1992 Local Government Act established the Local 
Government Commission for England with the task of reviewing the structure of 
local government m England from 1992 to 2002 Following the deliberations of the 
Commission, thirty-two unitary councils were created m place of previous two-tier 
areas This left the rest of the two-tier system intact (see Figure 6 3 for the two-tier 
system as of 2007) 
While, as noted above, democratic local government covering all England was 
introduced at the end of the nineteenth century, no tradition of regional politics has 
developed The literature converges on seeing this as stemming mainly from the 
traditionally centralized character of the English (and latterly British) state (eg 
SANDFORD, 2006, SHARPE, 1993, TOMANEY and WARD, 2000) As SHARPE (1993) further 
explains, the concept of territorially determined collective interests, and the 
representation thereof, has not taken hold in the British political system because 
British politics became rooted m the two-party system that m turn has reinforced the 
role of local parties first and foremost as handmaidens m the task of achieving a 
parliamentary majority and not as defenders of collective local interests (SHARPE, 
1993) According to Sharpe, this characteristic has had a special relevance for the 
meso, "since it automatically undermines the territorial dimension of the democratic 
process by seeking to transform all conflict into t w o non-spatial, nation-wide and 
often abstract uniformities" (ibid , ρ 251) At the same time, with politics being 
focused on the Westminster Parliament, the pre-eminence of London was 
strengthened 
It has to be noted, however, that the general lack of commitment to regionalism 
as an expression of regional particularity and identity had other sources as well, 
for example the widely spread view that the industrial revolution had destroyed 
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Figure 6.3 Government Office Regions, shire counties (upper-tier), metropolitan 
districts. Greater London Authority and unitary authorities In England 
in 2007 
{ S Scottand 
North 
I I Regions 
^ County councils 
Unitary authorities 
Metropolitan districts • \ 
Greater London Authority 
Yorkshire 81 
the Number 
East Midlands 
'•'ï: J ; \ 
-rÏ/ynmm ' 
0"* 
Source: http://www.local.communities.gov-uk/finarce/stat5/lgfs/2007/lgfsi7/mapAia.pdf 
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England's regional geography According to this view, which was especially propagated 
by Marxist scholarship (LANGTON, 1984), the Labour Party was l itt le concerned with 
regional identity. But following DORLING (2004), one can say more generally that much 
of what was wri t ten about England in the 1920s and 1930s did not show an awareness 
of regional disparities A disregard of regional differences by the Labour Party 
extended also to the issue of regional economic inequalities As PARSONS (1986) notes, 
Labour was f irmly committed to the centralism brought about by the mter-war 
'Westmmsterization' of British territorial politics As to the problems of Britain's 
depressed areas in the 1930s, these seemed to matter less for young socialists than 
an abstract proletarian umversalism. As Parsons further notes. 
"Politically powerless and economically reliant upon assistance from the centre, the areas 
of high unemployment represented no challenge to the established order British 
unemployment, concentrated as it was m a number of t ight knit and cohesive communities 
largely assisted in the containment of the political impact of the depression" (PARSONS, 1986, 
Ρ 53) 
The lack of concern with regional disparities did not mean, however, an absence of 
interest in regional particularities In the second half of the eighteenth century, a 
range of literary works dealt with what has come to be seen as the major regional 
divide m England, nurturing a still present "tradition of difference" (TAYLOR, 1993). 
Captured most succinctly in Elizabeth Caskell's novel North and South (1855), the 
North-South divide and the distinctiveness of the North became taken-for-granted 
elements of geographical imagination 
Next to the implicit concern wi th regions m literature, the concept of the region 
remained long the preserve of geographers and committed regionalists. It was only 
by the 1960s that regional analysis of social problems started to get a foothold, 
greatly due to the success of the town and country planning movement in mobilizing 
support for its ideas (PARSONS, 1986) Here it is interesting to consider the remark made 
by Maurice Ash, later Chairman of the Town and Country Planning Association (TCPA), 
in 1964 
"We are agreed that we must take ever more use of the idea of the region, that the term is 
becoming ever more common currency We are agreed that for planning in general, and for 
the TCPA in particular, the future may depend of this concept We are probably not agreed, 
however, as to what we mean by the Region" (cited by PARSONS, 1986, pp 178-179) 
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According to PARSONS (1986), the growing 'industry' of regional research 
(exemplified by the foundation of the Regional Studies Association in 1965, and the 
proliferation of university departments and consultancies) and the government 
developed a symbiotic relationship. The more the government became interested in 
'regional development', the more regional policy analysts became interested in what 
the government was doing. Consequently, the region as the basis for both research 
and policy turned into a common framework of academic analysis and political action. 
The concept of regional balance and the idea of planning regions defined 'regional 
planning'. Coincident with the growth of regional planning, regional self-conscious-
ness grew in Britain from the 1950s. The tradition of regional writ ing bloomed again; 
the new literary regionalism was given considerable momentum with the arrival of 
regional television (ibid.). 
Thatcherism brought about a re-evaluation of the regional problem both from a 
policy and analytical perspective. From the 1980s, the inner city problem was 
perceived as more grave. With traditional regional policy being dismantled, regional 
analysis experienced a crisis as well (see PARSONS, ibid.). From the late 1980s, however, 
there has been a renewed interest in regions, in particular in regional planning. This 
was largely due to the fact that, fol lowing the measures of deregulation under 
Thatcherism (of which the abolition of metropolitan counties was a manifestation), 
central government acknowledged that the planning vacuum In metropolitan areas 
was more and more pressing (TEWDWR-JONES and MCNEILL, 2000). The recognition that 
development questions are often more adequately addressed on a wider scale than 
existing development plans gave an impetus to the rediscovery of regional planning 
and to the elaboration of non-statutory Regional Planning Guidances from the late 
1980s on. In addition, the requirements of the European Union's (EU) European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) had a significant catalyzing effect on regional 
strategy-making efforts, also beyond eligible areas. Local decision-makers realized 
that they could change things by joining forces more proactively at a regional level. 
Steps taken in areas eligible for substantial funds to expand their connections wi th 
the EU were followed by others in the pursuit of "me-too-ism". In addition, following 
the 1988 Structural Funds reforms, there was more room for sub-national lobbying, 
and direct contact between sub-national bodies and EU institutions developed 
rapidly between 1989 and 1994 (BURCH and GOMEZ, 2002). 
Nonetheless, the proposition of regional governments met heavy opposition in a 
parliamentary debate (for all quotes below, see Hansard 1991), in particular from 
Conservative speakers. The initiator of the debate, Joyce Quin (Labour MP and former 
Member of the European Parliament), argued that regional government in England 
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would help addressing the regional imbalances that had grown as a result of the 
dramatic cuts of regional aid and selective assistance under the Conservative 
governments Also, she denied accusations that Labour was only trying to gam 
popularity ι η Scotland by seeking to impose a similar solution on England Conservative 
speakers in turn argued that regional governments would be an extremely costly 
level of extra government What is most interesting from the point of view of the 
present case study is the way m which claims connected regions and regionalism 
with Enghshness, and with the notion of Europe. Ms Quin, m her speech that launched 
the debate, supported her argument about the need of regional governments by 
referring to the general trends towards decentralization elsewhere in Europe. 
Conservative MP David Ashby asserted, however, that 
"[t]hose nations [ι e Germany and France] are made up of regions We are talking about a return 
of local nationalism, which is something that we do not have over here That is the difference 
The hon Gentleman is trying to impose regions here, whereas Europe has regions" 
Conservative MP and Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Department of 
the Environment Robert Keys argued in a similar way. 
"Italy may be what some people have called a geographical expression, but England 
certainly is not, and we have 1,000 years of history to prove it" 
David Nicholson, another Conservative MP, further supported this line of argument 
by referring to the issue of size. 
"England is much smaller in area than united Germany, France or Spam A form of regional 
assembly may be possible in countries of that size, which also have different histories, but 
it would be a ridiculous innovation for this country" 
Next to the arguments stressing the difference of England m relation to other 
European countries, speakers made reference also to the territorial loyalties of the 
English As Robert Keys noted 
"Regional government is un-English, unworkable and unwanted There is no cultural identity 
in a region People feel no loyalty to it They regard themselves as English, and after - or 
sometimes before-they identify wi th their county or city, not some falsely created region 
Our entire culture is built around those loyalties" 
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The above-mentioned views were echoed by Tim Devlin, a Northern Conservative 
MP: 
"England and Scotland are distinct entities, but the north and south of England, or the north 
and the midlands, or the north and north west, are not sufficiently distinct to merit 
separate Parliaments. Similarly, France only recently became a united nation and Germany 
was the most recent of all. in i860". 
As Mr. Devlin concluded: 
"We are a happy, contented, compact little country with 48 million people who live together 
in perfect harmony with their own local, often county, loyalties". 
In contrast, Tony Lloyd, Labour MP for Central Manchester, argued as follows: 
"The concept of England as a unitary nation may make much sense in the south of England, 
but there is a much greater feeling of distance among people in the north. Having grown 
up a northerner, I make no apologies for saying that I do not regard myself as a southerner 
who happens to live a few miles up the road. We are different. On the issue of regional 
government, I do not want to distance myself from English history, but I recognise that 
Whitehall government is a long way from Manchester" 
Similarly, David Trimble, a Member of the Ulster Unionist Part, expressed a similar 
view: 
"The United Kingdom is not and never has been a unitary state. Conservative Members 
think in terms of the closely-knit, integrated society which developed in southern England 
a thousand years ago That society lias been the greatest and most influential element 
within the state which subsequently developed, but it is a particularly southern English 
phenomenon and the same is not true of northern England", 
Fur thermore , re fe r r ing back t o earlier remarks made in connec t i on w i t h t h e necessary 
size o f regions, Mr. Tr imble noted t ha t : 
". .in this context, size-whether geographic or any o ther - is not important. It Isa question 
of natural human units". 
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Eventually, m response to growing concerns with economic governance, the Major 
government established ten Government Offices for the Regions (CORs) in 1994 The 
rationale for setting up the CORs, which reported to the Secretaries of State for 
Employment, Transport, Environment and Industry (and later on to other ministries 
as well), was that business and local government needed to have a 'one-stop-shop' m 
their search for guidance and funding (TEWDWR-JONES and MCNEILL, 2000) The CORs 
enabled central government to push its own priorities m regional strategies (BACHE, 
1999, BURCH and GOMEZ, 2002), giving rise to criticism of a 'creeping executive 
regionalism' (TEWDWR-JONES and MCNEILL, 2000) 
The North-South divide 
As Baker and Billmge remark wi th regard to the concept of the North-South divide 
"[n]ot only has debate raged about the existence and significance of the divide, but 
this has also provoked discussions of its history, origins and evolution" (BAKER and 
BiLLiNCE, 2004, ρ 4) Its contested character notwithstanding, the notion of the 
North-South divide has become central to framing the geographical imagination of 
England (and by extension, that of Britain) In the past decades, the North-South 
divide has been most dommantly linked to economic differences 
According to Morgan-
"The stereotypical picture of the North-South divide - consisting of a swath of prosperous 
and burgeoning regions m southern Englandjuxtaposed to a deprived and declining set of 
regions and nations to the north and west - has its economic origins in the collapse of the 
imperial spatial division of labor in mterwar Britain" (MORGAN, 2006, ρ igi) 
The collapse of this spatial division of labour - in which the South's commercial and 
financial orientation already overrode the interests of Northern manufacturers - hit 
the North more severely, m contrast, the South could successfully expand on its 
long-standing privileged position m Britain's space-economy (ALLEN, MASSEY and 
COCHRANE, 1998). Older industrial areas in the North recovered more slowly from the 
depression of 1932-36, while the South benefited from the rapid growth of 'new 
industries' (such as electrical engineering, motor vehicles, aircraft and others) (HALL, 
2002) 
As noted previously, however, the discursive differentiation between the North 
and the South has more ancient origins Already from the second half of the 
eighteenth century, the North was commonly pictured as a foreign territory, a 
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strange country within England. Following Paxman, the reason for that was that 
"having invented the Industrial Revolution, the English then invented a mental coun-
terrevolution" (PAXMAN, 1998, p. 158). Contrasted with the fi lthy and grim industrial 
North, the tranquil rural image of the Home Counties, the core area of the country in 
the South East, came to be seen as the national ideal land (TAYLOR, 1993). (The 
North-South divide is thus also an urban-rural divide; the latter will be discussed in 
more detail in the following section). The Home Counties82 were a product of the 
second phase in the construction of modern Englishness a t theturn of the nineteenth 
and twent ieth centuries. At that time, the London metropolitan area reasserted its 
traditional dominance of English society and a new view of Englishness was 
constructed around it (ibid.). In fact, the London metropolitan area was a big hole in 
the South East's pastoral idyll, but that was offset by the city's status as capital of 
the Empire (PAXMAN, 1998). The North has become constructed in contrast to, and as 
'the Other' of, Southern England. Lying outside the national ideal land, the North has 
come to be seen as 'Un-English' (PAXMAN, 1998; TAYLOR, 1993). 
The South as the symbol of Englishness has not been challenged. The industrial 
cities in the North were (perceived to be) quite distinct in character. According to 
Langton, instead of destroying it, industrialization strengthened images of regional 
distinctiveness; "nostalgia became a potent source of identity and security in the 
new industrial world" (LANGTON, 1984, p. 159). As Paxman further notes: 
"Manchester and Liverpool may be only thirty miles apart, but they are quite distinct in character, 
Manchester a Protestant seat of heavy industry, Liverpool a more Catholic dock city, the one an 
aggressive mill and trading town, the other a gentler, more wise-cracking port. Manchester has 
more in common with Leeds or Sheffield, Its commercial rivals across the Pennines, and 
Liverpool with Newcastle, than either has with the other" (PAXMAN. 1998, p. 157) 
Because of their mutual rivalries, the Northern cities have been seen merely as 
individual cities competitively challenging both each other and the South; at the 
same t ime, "[t]he south country is based on counties, market towns and villages of 
great age, where rivalries are long dead" (ibid.). 
Interestingly, even with the urban-based Labour Party becoming a solid 
powerbase, still no alternative emerged to challenge the South as the repository of 
Englishness. This had several reasons. First of all, as already noted above, socialism 
82 According to EvERin (1979). the notion of'Home Counties'cannot be traced before the 18705, i.e. beyond the 
early decades of the railway era. 
247 
was, by definition, internationalist8 ', and within Labour, there was no concern with 
regional distinctiveness. Industrial, working-class identity cut across any local 
identity existing in the North, and although 'Northern-ness' and 'working-class' were 
seen as being linked together. Labour appeared as the political expression of the 
latter and not the former (PAXMAN, 1998; SANDFORD, 2006). Also, many Labour movement 
leaders were Scottish or Welsh, and the Party's parliamentary majorities were built 
upon the over-representation of the Celtic fringe in Westminster (PAXMAN, ibid.), 
strengthening the commitment of Labourto Westminster-based centralism. 
From the side of the Conservative Party, it was also not the spatial, but the social 
divisions of industrialization that were addressed. In this regard. Conservative 
politician Benjamin Disraeli's ideas have to be mentioned. They have not only been 
the source of a brand of popular Conservatism, but have been also reinterpreted to 
frame thinking about national politics to date. Disraeli had gained a significant 
reputation as a novelist before he went to Parliament in 1837 (FLAVIN, 2005) and 
became ultimately Prime Minister (in 1868 and between 1874 and 1880). His writings 
exposed the development of his political thinking. In view of the current overview, it 
is his novel Sybil, or the Two Nations that is particularly interesting, in which Disraeli 
wished to draw attention to how the rich and the poor have so l itt le mutual contact 
and understanding that they might be living on different planets (see Box 6.1). 
Box 6.1 Extract from 'Sybil or the Two Nations' 
"Well.society may be in its infancy," said Egremont, slightly smiling; "but, say what you like, 
our queen reigns over the greatest nation that ever existed." 
"Which nation?" asked the younger stranger, "for she reigns over two." 
The stranger paused; Egremont was silent, but looked inquiringly. 
"Yes,"resumed the younger stranger attera moment's interval. "Two nations; between whom 
there is no intercourse and no sympathy; who are as ignorant of each other's habits, thoughts, 
and feelings as if they were dwellers in different zones, or inhabitants of different planets; 
who are formed by a different breeding, are fed by a different food, are ordered by different 
manners, and are not governed by the same laws." 
"You speak of-" said Egremont, hesitatingly. 
"THE RICH AND THE POOR" 
(Cited by DAicHEsand FLOWER, 1979, p. 192, emphasis original) 
83 Commonly. Marx and Engels' statement that "the working men have no country" (cited by SPENCER and 
WoiLMAN, 2002,p. g) has been seen by many as the indication of Marx and Engels lacking an understanding 
of the significance of nationalism (ibid). 
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According to WALTON (1990), Sybil cou\d be read as a plea for the revival of an idealized 
feudal concern on the part of the aristocracy to bridge the gulf and ameliorate the 
condition of the poor. Subsequently, Disraeli became identified with the idea of the 
Conservative Party as the 'national party' and it was in this context that the phrase 
'One Nation' became a familiar formula, used especially to express the Conservatives' 
concern wi th (not redistributive, but ameliorative) social reforms (ibid.). 
The geographical imagination of England as divided into North and South has 
lived on. George Orwell in his 1930s Road to Wigan P/erwrotefor example, that "when 
you go into the industrial north, you are entering a strange country" (cited by TAYLOR, 
1993, p. 146). At the same time, according to PARSONS (1986), regional economic 
disparities were not of a main governmental (and intellectual) concern in the 1930s. 
Gradually, however, this "disinterestedness" with regional inequalities changed, 
peaking in the publication of the Barlow report in 1940. The Barlow Commission - or 
by its ful l name, the Royal Commission on the Geographical Distribution of the 
Industrial Population - was appointed in 1937 to investigate the issue of growing 
regional inequalities and to make recommendations. The 1940 Barlow report reported 
some 20 years after the beginnings of polarization (DORLING, 2004). It advised the 
government to establish a unified national authority to balance the distribution of 
industry in the UK, and to help decentralize people and industry from congested 
areas. According to HAH (2002), the particular contribution of the Commission was 
that it coupled the regional problem with the issue of the physical growth of the 
great conurbations; in other words, the national/regional distribution of industry 
and people was linked to the question of the concentration of population within 
regions. 
Ultimately, the Barlow report had little effect on policy (PARSONS, 1986); responsi-
bilities for land use planning and industrial location were split organizationally 
(WANNOP, 1995). However, as Parsons notes, the Barlow report had 
"a general effect of, in the first instance, an implicit intellectual consensus, and, in the 
second, the employment of a form of policy language which served to underpin the 
acceptability to the coalition government of a more extensive distribution of industry 
policy" (PARSONS, 1986, p. 62). 
On the whole, the Commission's diagnosis did mark a change in the scale and status 
of regional planning in Britain (WANNOP, 1995). It spawned the 'donor-recipient' model 
of post-war regional policy in which prosperous regions like the South East and West 
Midlands would effectively donate surplus growth, in the form of branch plants, to 
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recipient regions in the North and West (MORGAN, 2002) As Parsons notes 
'For better or worse, the concept of 'regional balance' and the idea of planning 'regions' 
defined the 'regional problem' The questions which were generally asked were of the order 
of 'given the 'south-east' dr ift and 'congestion' of the South, and given the necessity of 
moving factories to the North to maintain the regional balance, what techniques are best 
or most appropriate to the problems? Such assumptions were rarely questioned' (Parsons, 
1986, ρ i86) 
The arguments of those few who challenged the doctrine of 'regional balance' and 
the idea of the region as the conceptual basis of planning were seen as quite heretical 
for their t ime (ibid , ρ iSy) It is important to mention that the press had a notable 
role in bringing the issue of 'the' North-South divide to the forefront of popular 
attention in the early 1960s As Parsons notes "it is almost impossible to find much 
contemporary comment wi thout some reference or other to the 'great divide'" (ibid , 
ρ 185), "it seemed to be the case that the country was talking itself into two nations" 
(Chetwynd, cited by PARSONS, ibid ) 
According to MASSEY, the 1960s and early 1970s were not only a period of very 
active regional policy, "but capital itself, in parts, used geographical mobility as a 
means of addressing the crisis that was increasingly overwhelming it (both by moving 
abroad [ ] and by moving within the UK, both from South to North and, increasingly, 
out of the inner cities)" (MASSEY, 2007, ρ 75) The combination of this with increasing 
employment m the public sector led to a reduction of the North-South divide m 
terms of the classic measures, in particular unemployment However, as MASSEY (ibid ) 
stresses, the modernization projects also involved an increasing centralization of 
control over accumulation and a significant expansion of 'high-technology' sectors 
and employment Together, these developments implied that, while the old regional 
problem (defined m terms of unemployment) became temporarily more muted, a 
different form of inequality between North and South - that between control and 
execution - was intensified 
The donor-recipient model of the post-war period became, however, untenable 
when donor regions began to suffer their own unemployment problems in the 1970s 
(MORGAN, 2006) The Thatchente period, beginning from 1979, is commonly seen by 
analysts as initiating a radical break with the political consensus favouring regional 
development and equality It was not only the government's cuts in regional aid that 
affected the North negatively and contributed to a reopening of the North-South 
divide Under Mrs Thatcher, government actions became broadly conceived along 
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neoliberal lines: they included measures which fall under the general heading of 
'privatization' (the financial deregulation and the liberalization of money markets, 
the privatization of previously state-owned industries, the sale of public housing and 
the promotion of house ownership) and entailed changes in the tax regime (reduction 
in the rates of income tax and adjustments to mortgage relief). As ALLEN, MASSEY and 
COCHRANE (1998) note, the removal of exchange controls and the deregulatory 
measures that followed resulted in an increase in overseas lending by UK banks and 
foreshadowed a general rise in financial lending. The actual rapid growth in mortgage 
lending, credit-card debt and other forms of personal debt in turn fed the booms in 
the housing and consumption markets in the late 1980s. As ALLEN et al. (ibid.) further 
remark: "[a]s a region privileged by finance and private services and arguably the 
most open of all the regional economies, the south east was well placed to take 
advantage of what Thatcherism had to offer" (ALLEN, MASSEY and COCHRANE, 1998, p. 15). 
Employment growth fed by the expansion of the financial services industry was 
especially notable in the South East and as a consequence, "the credit boom itself 
was very much a phenomenon of the 'southern economy'" (LEYSHON and THRIET, 1993, 
p. 231). 
What is particularly interesting from the point view of the current study is how 
the above measures became grounded in a reshaping of the geographical imagination 
of the North-South divide. According to ALLEN et al. (ibid), Thatcherism entailed a 
replacement of the assumption of regional equality by a view of regional relations in 
terms of 'winners and losers'. The South East and its success were taken to be 
emblematic of the neoliberal political project. This implied that the North needed to 
rethink itself and find ways to help itself out of recession with little or no cost to the 
government. Or as Mrs. Thatcher put it on a visit to the North East in 1988, people of 
the region should stop being "moaning Minnies" (TAYLOR, 1993, p. 143)· For many, this 
was interpreted as Thatcherism justifying an implicit 'Two Nations' strategy (JESSOP et 
al., 1984; see also ALLEN et al., 1998). 
Thatcherism has been indeed commonly seen as a distancing from, and a 
challenge of, the 'One Nation' politics of traditional Conservatism (although see 
EVANS, 2009). The One Nation Group, founded in 1950 to carry on the Disraelian legacy, 
increasingly lost ground within the Conservative Party (TYRIE, 2006). Mrs. Thatcher's 
collected speeches contain no invocation of Disraeli's name. Actually, coded 
references to Disraeli and to 'One Nation' politics were used at party conferences and 
elsewhere to indicate dissent from the main lines of Thatcherite policy (WAITON, 1990). 
Thatcherite policy challenged the institutions traditionally acting as the repositories 
of One Nation Conservatism, i.e. the Church, the Monarchy, the Civil Service, 
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the BBC, and the 'old' professions around law and medicine Once regarded as bastions 
of the status quo by Conservatives across the country, Thatchentes considered these 
institutions to be anti enterprise and therefore blocking the path to radical change 
(ALLEN et al, ibid ) On the whole, Thatcherism challenged the identity of the middle 
class grouping that attempted to speak on behalf of the nation As such, "it took issue 
with the 'Englishness' of the Home Counties and the metropolitan elites" This was, 
however, a challenge to the middle class' cultural and political dominance, and not to 
its economic dominance (ibid , ρ 29) 
Eventually, the credit boom made the South East overheating, making a rapid 
response imperative Early notice by the Chancellor of the Exchequer of a change m 
taxation policy (implying a l imitation of tax relief to £30,000 per property rather 
than taxpayer), triggered another 'mini-boom' as people hurried to purchase a house 
in order to qualify for double tax relief m a three-month period m 1988 Finally, this 
boom was unsustainable and contributed to the circumstances that caused 
unemployment to rise and an economic recession to develop After 1988, house prices 
fell, leading to bank repossessions and the emergence of negative equity, also, a 
massive balance of payments deficit followed at the start of the 1990s (ALLEN et al, 
ibid, MuLLiNs and MURIE, 2006) It was not only m financial terms, however, that the 
growth m the South East turned out to be unsustainable, the lack of an appropriate 
framework for regional strategic planning (originating m the late 1970s) was 
increasingly recognized as a shortcoming (HULST, 2005, MURDOCH and TEWDWR JONES, 
1999, TEWDWR JONES and MCNEILL, 2000) 
The urban-rural divide 
As WOODS (2005) notes, the use of social networks and of exclusive elite spaces for 
lobbying and informal decision making helped to extend the dominance of the 
landed establishment over local governance, rooted m feudal times, well into the 
twentieth century According to SHARPE (1993), the strength of the English (and Welsh) 
county asterritonal and political entity wastheextentto whichthecountyanstocracy 
and gentry provided social leadership This link with the social elite actually gave 
county government a status that most urban government lacked (ibid ) From the 
1920s, the landed elite gradually lost power at local and national levels At the same 
time, the National Farmers Union, the Country Landowners Association and the 
Conservative Party (which moved into a clear majority position m most rural 
constituencies during the 1920s and 1930s) forged an alliance to promote a particular 
understanding of rurality (WOODS, 2005) The shaping discourse of rural Conservatism 
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became organized along three main elements: the protection of the agricultural 
economy from urban influence, the maintenance of the rural Organic society', and 
the conflation of British (English) identity with a vision of rural England (ibid.). Within 
this discourse of the "apolitical countryside", the rural has appeared as "characterized 
by a stable and ordered society, by the natural leadership of a landed elite, and by 
natural, informal, and consensual governance" (ibid., p. 4). 
According to WARD (2004), the impact of town and city life on physical and 
spiritual health was roundly criticized throughout the twentieth century. Actually, 
as Ward further remarks: the "association of urban life with national ill health has 
become supplemented with a view that the nature of modern cities has inflicted 
fundamental damage on the national way of life" (WARD, 2004, p. 55). In line with that, 
the preservation of rural areas became a central concern: the foundation of the 
Council for Preservation of Rural England in 1926 attested to this. The technocratic 
agenda of the Council, promoting the virtues of planning and good design, was 
combined with a nationalistic and idealistic discourse of rurality (WOODS, 2005, p. 171). 
As the most prominent co-founder of the Council, urban planner Patrick Abercrombie 
(then president of the Town Planning Institute) argued: 
"The greatest historical monument we possess, the most essential thing which is England, 
is the Countryside, the Market Town, the Village, the Hedgerow Trees, the Lanes, the Copses, 
the Streams, and the Farmsteads" (quoted by WOODS, ibid., emphasis original). 
This picture of rural England has actually come to embody the "scenic essence" of 
English (and British) identity (LOWENTHAL, 1994, p. 20, emphasis original). Importantly, 
as Woods noted, the positioning of the countryside as the symbol of Englishness was 
also driven by the aristocratic elite. In particular members of the landed classes in the 
colonies of the Empire nurtured the image of an ideal countryside they left behind. In 
fact, it was a particular rural terr i torythat has come to symbolize Englishness, namely 
the core area of the country in the South East, the 'Home Counties' (TAYLOR, 1993). 
Subsequently, as the Empire began to be dismantled, returning former colonial 
administrators and settlers engaged in new battles to defend the English rural idyll 
of their old-new homes (WOODS, 2005). 
On the whole, 'the English rural' "is not the country in which the English actually 
live, but the place they imagine they are living in" (PAXMAN, 1998, p. 144, emphasis 
original), and this imagery is "so astonishingly powerful because it is a sort of heaven" 
(ibid.). Or as Newby put it: "the English have always regarded the countryside as the 
proper place for people to live in" (cited by LOWENTHAL, 1994, p. 26). There are many 
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examples of how this romantic ruralism has manifested itself and has been nurtured 
m practice To name just t w o examples, there is the still popular National Trust, 
founded m 1895, wi th the aim of protecting picturesque areas of countryside 
Two years later, the magazine Country Life was launched (PAXMAN, 1998) 
Labour could not invent an alternative to the "roses-round-the-door, thatched 
cottage and village-green impression of England" (PAXMAN, 1998, ρ 163), embodied by 
the increasingly Conservative-dominated shire areas m the South The failure to do 
so was largely due to the above-mentioned factors that prevented Labour from 
becoming the political expression of the North Also, as Paxman notes, the above 
party-political spatial division of the country meant that those doing well in trade 
moved to the shire counties, as a result, an association was cemented between 
political affil iation and social aspiration Furthermore, many idealists were anti-urban 
and hostile to industry, and many leaders of the Labour movement themselves 
aspired to escape the city (PAXMAN, 1998, pp 163-164) At the same time, within 
Conservative discourse, Labour and socialism were positioned as standmgfor politics 
and change and, as such, a threat to the existing 'natural' order of the countryside 
(WOODS, 2005, 2008) 
The urban-rural cleavage m British electoral geography peaked in the 1970s In 
the first half of the twentieth century, the general dominance of the Conservative 
Party m rural areas was broken by pockets of Liberal and Labour support (and by 
independent MPs) From the 1960s, however, class allegiance became the primary 
factor in shaping party support in both urban and rural areas (WOODS, 2005) In the 
1979 general election, the Conservatives won all but six of the 72 'rural' constituencies 
m England and Wales This pattern held largely throughout the 1980s, until the 
Conservatives started to lose control of a number of rural councils during the 1980s 
According to WOODS (ibid ), the weakening of the Conservative hold over the rural 
vote partly reflected the weakening of the class cleavage as a determinant of party 
support Furthermore, middle class disaffection with the Conservative Party was also 
encouraged by the property slump of the late 1980s Counter-urbanization had 
stimulated sharp increases in property prices m many rural areas that were not 
sustained, as a result, a great number of m-migrants experienced 'negative equity' 
with their homes worth less than they had paid for them (WOODS, 2005, ρ 95) 
The spread of housing developments generated by the economic boom of the 
South East actually induced protest m affluent Tory shires against the market-led, ad 
hoc planning regime that emerged and grew under Mrs Thatcher (BAKFR, 1998) 
SERPLAN's anti-growth stance reflected the public opinion of the region, m particular 
the view of wealthy middle class Tory voters who wished to preserve the pockets of 
254 
sleepy small-town rural idylls in the region and thus to keep away development from 
their backyards. According to Charlesworth and Cochrane, the affluent, well-educated 
middle class held substantial influence in planning matters and dominated local 
politics; individual residents and well-organized residents' groups wrote letters about 
planning proposals affecting them, and these were always considered by the planning 
committee (CHARLESWORTH and COCHRANE, 1994). In spite of Thatcherism's challenge to 
the 'Englishness' of the Home Counties, the rural idyll continued to have power as a 
symbol of success in England, as testified to by the rise of demand for country 
mansions by members of the new middle class (ALLEN et αϊ, 1998). Within the 
Conservative Party, conflict emerged between the need for the government to retain 
the allegiances of both the development industry, who advocated building large new 
settlements in rural areas, and the shire Conservative Party supporters (ALLMENDINGER 
and TEWDWR-JONES, 1997). Actually, from the late 1980s, a more plan-led system was 
introduced through the strengthening of the status of development plans, and one 
could observe the first signs of a re-emergence of interest in planning at the regional 
level (BAKER, 1998). 
6.2.3.2 New Labour's structurally informed spatial claims 
With regard to English regionalism, Harvie's remark that it is 'the dog that never 
barked' has been repeatedly cited by scholars discussing the evolution of post-1997 
regionalization (e.g. SANDFORD, 2006; ToMANEvand WARD, 2000). So how can we account 
for the way New Labour undertook the reordering of state space on a regional basis 
and for the fact that ultimately, England has not remained "unfriendly toward the 
charms of the new regionalism" (cf. TOMANEY and WARD, 2000, p. 476)? In order to 
answer this question, we have to zoom in on New Labour's measures and examine 
them as structurally informed decisions shaped by the structurally inscribed 
discursive selectivities of nation-state space. 
To begin wi th, greater decentralization to the regions appeared desirable for 
Labour to address its traditional concern with the redistribution of wealth and 
economic development. The main line of reasoning was that if the price of 
centralization in the 1980s was economic problems, then the reward of regionalism 
now ought to be economic improvement (SANDFORD, 2006). The Labour Party's 
commitment to regional government (already mentioned in the Party's 1992 
manifesto) was also a response to the growing opposition of the creeping regionalism 
under the Conservative government. As Labour's Shadow Environment Secretary 
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argued m 1993 "a regional bureaucracy already exists The challenge is to 
democratise this burgeoning unelected state with the establishment of elected 
assemblies for all the standard regions of Britain" (Straw, cited by HARDING, WILKS-HIEC 
and HUTCHINS, 1999, pp 672-673) Straw's arguments briefly held sway within the 
Party, but proved vulnerable to a Conservative countercharge that the creation of 
regional government, particularly m England, would create an extra layer of decision­
making (ibid ) To fend off criticism, the set of conditions that Labour's 1997 manifesto 
specified for elected regional government included a move towards unitary 
government (1 e to a single-tier local government from the two-tier county/district 
formation) This meant actually the continuation of the policy direction taken under 
Major that, following the recommendations of the 1992 Local Government 
Commission, proceeded to the establishment of unitary authorities In addition, the 
1997 manifesto stated that an audit had to prove that no additional public expenditure 
would be incurred and that regional referenda were to be held to demonstrate public 
support (MORGAN, 1999) 
As SANDFORD (2006) notes, for Labour then, regionalism appeared as a purely 
technocratic solution to various problems of governance in certain regions of England 
Regionalism was seen as justified if it 'works', ie it contributes to the goal of 
improving economic performance The imperative of enhancing economic 
performance m turn was grounded in the view of globalization as "a self-regulating 
and implacable Force of Nature" that asks the government to "manage change" (HALL, 
2003, ρ 85) In line with the above, the argument was advanced that a regionalism 
that would not bring economic improvement would be (viewed as) mere self 
indulgence and would be rejected by the electorate (SANDFORD, 2006) We can 
understand the fact that Labour did not want its regionalization agenda to become 
expressive of any identity politics if we recall its traditional neglect of, or uneasiness 
about, regional identities Political activists in favour of regional empowerment 
tended to be socialists or liberals first, and regionalists second (Lamgan, discussed by 
SANDFORD, 2006) Labourthuscouched its proposed movetowards regional governance 
m the language of economic performance and efficiency, and occasionally, democracy, 
and not m the language of regional diversity Claims for autonomy made by grass-roots 
regional movements on the basis of a distinct cultural ident i ty-as in the case of the 
Cornish Nationalist Party - could not successfully challenge Labour's approach to 
regionalization based on standard regions (JONES and MACLEOD, 2004, SANDFORD, 2006) 
This approach was also supportive of New Labour's One Nation politics, 1 e the 
set of claims that aimed at reworking the relations of equivalence and difference 
through which the nation-state spaces of England have been constituted 
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The conditions for this reworking were greatly shaped by the 1997 election that 
radically redrew the traditional geographical patterns of party support in Britain. 
The Conservatives were wiped out in Scotland and Wales and pushed back into a 
suburban and rural heartland in the South of England. Labour in turn made important 
gains across the English midlands and parts of the South, even taking an additional 
21 seats in suburban London (WARD, 2002). Appealing to voters in rural and semi-rural 
areas was crucial for the electoral success of Labour (WOODS, 2005) that appealed in 
its campaign to the imagination of Britain as 'One Nation'. In an interview given to 
Country Life, Tony Blair noted that "I wouldn't live in a big city if I could help it" (cited 
by WOODS, 2005, p. 97). 
Labour's election manifesto was rather silent, however, on rural issues (WARD, 
2002), and in face of the highly organized rural lobby it became imperative to come 
up with a more concrete vision of the future of the countryside. Accordingly, from the 
autumn of 1997, Labour engaged in elaborating its own vision for the countryside. 
The main elements of this process will be highlighted below by drawing on Woods' 
work (WOODS, 2005; 2008) in particular. According to WOODS (2008), Labour's attempt 
to reclaim the rural political agenda involved two intertwined processes: one was 
governmental, entailing the establishment of a 'rural team' in the Cabinet Office 
Innovation and Performance Unit. The other was party political, led by the Rural 
Group of Labour MPs. 
Labour embarked on the discursive reconstruction of ' the rural' by first advancing 
a redescription of the characteristics of rural Britain. The Rural Economies report and 
the Rural Audit described the countryside not solely through agricultural statistics, or 
the broader quantification of the rural economy, but also through a range of diverse 
social statistics that highlighted traditional Labour concerns like poverty, welfare and 
equality. This new description of rural areas - that emphasized the diversity of the 
countryside-became the basis for identifying the problems of rural areas and for key 
policy priorities. As WOODS (2005; 2008) notes, by focusing on social issues such as 
health education, poverty and transport. Labour not only marginalized issues such as 
agriculture and hunting, but also began to construct an argument that rural areas 
have to deal wi th the same problems as urban areas. As such. Labour shifted the 
terrain of rural political debate onto policy areas in which Labour was strong. At the 
same time. Labour isolated concerns about hunting, farming and land access that 
motivated the Countryside Alliance, a newly set-up Conservative-minded lobby 
organization (WOODS, 2005). 
Next to the redefinition of rural policy, it was also necessary for Labour to 
establish its legitimacy to propose solutions to rural problems. This was the more 
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crucial as the Conservative Party, in an attempt to undermine the geographically and 
politically expanded appeal of Labour, was eager to stress the common view of Labour 
as an urban party A key tactic m this political strategy was to brand Labour politicians 
as insensitive to rural issues and problems (WARD, 2002) In response to Tory attacks, 
the Rural Group of Labour MPs was established in November 1997 In order to 
challenge the widely held view that the Conservative Party dominated shire areas, 
Labour politicians took county constituencies as the definition of rurahty and claimed, 
on that basis, that the Party holds many 'rural and semirural' seats In fact, as WARD 
(2002) pointed out, the above was a rather maximizing definit ion of what might be 
called rural Britain with county constituencies being defined as those containing 
'more than a small rural element', many large towns actually fall m that category if 
the constituency boundary includes a number of outlying villages 
Furthermore, Labour politicians refused to acknowledge that the Labour Party 
has 'heartlands', areas which have an above average Labour-voting propensity 
Instead, they sought to reposition Labour as a 'One Nation' party that is relevant to, 
and representative of, every socio-spatial constituency in the country, a party "that 
can unite rich and poor, north and south, west and east, as opposed to being a 
provincial party of the poor" (MORGAN, 2001, ρ 345) As Tony Blair argued 
"There are those on the political right who seek to divide town and country, to say that because 
you live in a city you neither know nor care about those who live m the country Again, not true 
Of course there are specific rural problems, there are also specific problems m major towns and 
cities But there is more that unites us than divides us There are more common challenges, 
common values and indeed common solutions, than there are things that divide us This is one 
Britain, one nation, and I will challenge the politics of division wherever they exist ' (Tony Blair, 
speech in Exeter, February, 2000 cited by WOODS, 2005, ρ 98) 
According to MORGAN (ibid ), at the core of Labour's assumptions was a very simple 
political equation "heartlands plus middle England equals electoral hegemony" 
In other words, the best way to help the 'heartlands' m the North and the West is 
to construct as wide an electoral appeal as possible, socially and spatially, since this 
is the only way to win office Once elected, office is used to promote a 'One Nation' 
agenda, so as not to alienate the votes of 'middle England', 1 e the group of voters 
between the working class and the upper middle class 
Actual policy proposals carried forward the framing of rural and urban issues m 
terms of a One Nation approach by building on notion of 'community' The foreword 
of the Rural White Paper Our Countryside The future - A Fair Deal for Rural England 
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(DETR, 2000) contained a paragraph that figured also in the Urban White Paper that 
was published at the same time, with the tit le Our Towns and Cities: The Future -
Delivering an Urban Renaissance (DETR, 2000b): 
"How we live our lives is shaped by where we live our lives. But wherever people live, they 
want the same things: jobs, a healthy economy, a decent home, good public services and an 
attractive and safe environment. North or South, urban or rural, the parts of our country -
though different - are inextricably intertwined and interdependent. People also want to 
have a say in what happens in their community and to shape their own future" (DETR 2000; 
20000'"). 
The organic conception of community was thus propagated as a basis for the 
development and delivery of social policy objectives that are shared by urban and 
rural areas. The difference between rural and urban communities as objects and 
subjects of government policy was blurred from the point of view of the outcome 
focussed targets and performance measurement related to the Local Public Service 
Agreements. Furthermore, the measures of regionalization, especially the 
establishment of the RDAs, pointed also towards the integration of urban and rural 
issues, and were potentially undermining claims to treat the rural as a distinct policy 
domain. The RDAs, as noted above, took over the tasks of the former Rural Development 
Commission that was charged with the responsibility for the socio-economic 
development of rural areas. According to WARD, LOWE and BRIDGES (2003), the demise of 
the Rural Development Commission could be seen as a step in the dismantling of a 
particular construction of national (English) rurality. The incorporation of the 
Commission's tasks intothat of the RDAs raised concern, however, amongst the vocal 
rural lobby that rural areas would lose out to urban-oriented regional development 
interests. Due to the lobby's pressure, RDAs had to assume a higher profile of rural 
development responsibilities than might otherwise have been envisaged. Initially, 
although RDAs did integrate rural issues in their strategies, references to the rural 
tended to be bland and indistinct. Subsequently, however, a move towards a more 
differentiating view of rural areas occurred. This move was due to several factors, 
such as pressures from the rural lobby and the crisis in farming (caused by foot and 
mouth disease) (ibid.). 
Designing policy initiatives wi th a 'community' focus was a means of 
reconstructing state spatiality not only without the urban-rural divide, but also 
84 The foreword was written by John Prescott (Deputy Prime Minister) for the Urban White Paper and by 
Prescott and Nick Brown (Mmisterfor Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) for the Rural White Paper. 
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without the North-South divide Community-based policies became central t o 
tackling micro-scale territorial disparities that were seen by New Labour as 
undermining national unity more severelythan larger-scale territorial gaps of wealth 
In 1999, a study entitled The Widening Cap was released, providing evidence of the 
worsening social and spatial health gap in Britain over the past t w o decades The 
study concluded that Britain had experienced some of the fastest growth m income 
inequality in the developed world and by the late 1990s had some of the highest 
levels of poverty seen within Europe (SHAW et al, 1999) Subsequently, the Labour 
Party came up with a report called Sharing the Nation's Prosperity thai emphasized 
the same discrepancies, but on an mtraregional basis The report drew attention to 
the fact that despite London and the South East being the richest areas of wealth and 
economic activity in Europe, 16 of London's boroughs are among the 50 most deprived 
local authorities in the country At the same time, the northern city of Leeds was 
pictured as one of Europe's most affluent at the time, with a per capita output that 
is nine per cent above the EU average Tony Blair embarked on a two-day tour to the 
North to promote the report, and he claimed that the North-South divide was an 
oversimplified myth The denial of the North-South divide continued to reappear m 
the Prime Minister's statements 
"There are those on the Left who seek to divide North and South, who claim everything in 
the North is poor, everything in the South is prosperous Not true There is poverty and 
deprivation m all parts of the country It exists side by side with prosperity m all parts of 
the country' (The Independent 2000) 
Within the framework of Labour's One Nation politics, what came to matter was thus 
not the levelling out of large-scale regional differences (as these were seen as (quasi-) 
nonexistent) As the Prime Minister formulated m the foreword to the National 
Strategy Action Plan to Neighbourhood Renewal 
'My vision is of a nation where no-one is seriously disadvantaged by where they live where 
power wealth and opportunity are in the hands of the many not the few This Action Plan 
is a crucial step m creating one nation, not separated by class, race, or where people live" 
(Blair in SOCIAL EXCLUSION UNIT 2001, ρ 5) 
It should be noted that concerning to the dismissal of the North-South divide (and 
the 'bridging' of the urban-rural divide), we cannot speak of a homogenous 
standpoint within New Labour Some key Labour politicians, like John Prescott, 
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Stephen Byers and Peter Mendelsohn, for example, were less dismissive, partly 
because they represented Northern seats, partly because they still felt that the North 
was becoming structurally decoupled from the South (MORGAN, 2002). 
6.2.4 Concluding remarks 
This section aimed at reinterpreting the evolving agenda of regionalization underthe 
first Blair administration in terms of the discursive selectivity of the state. Accordingly, 
regions were regarded as taking shape, i.e. acquiring their signification, through the 
interplay of the structurally inscribed discursive selectivities of the state on the one 
hand and the structurally informed claims of various actors on the other. 
The spatial practices and meanings that constitute the structurally inscribed 
discursive selectivities of the state were discussed above in terms of three spatial 
divides. These spatial practices and meanings are relatively stable but fundamentally 
incomplete. This is because the relations of equivalence and difference through 
which these practices and meanings exist are never ultimately fixed. The identity of 
'the North' for example is precarious because in face of its Other, the South East, it 
can assert its difference, but at the same t ime it relies on the suppression of diversity 
within the North. Or, historically, the identity of Labour had been constructed by 
articulating an equivalence (among other things) between 'urban', 'North' and 
'working class', in opposition to the Conservatives' articulation of 'rural', 'South' and 
'farming/landowning/upper-middle class elites'. These equivalences became largely 
eroded by Labour's 1997 election victory that, from the perspective of the Politics of 
Space Approach, can be seen as a dislocatory event. The geographical expansion of 
Labour's support base made Labour experience a disruption in its 'being' first and 
foremost an urban-based party speaking for the North and the working class. Labour 
had thus to re-establish itself as a concrete political subject and redefine its identity. 
As shown above. Labour did so by redefining itself as a One Nation party. On the one 
hand, the One Nation was to be forged in response to the external pressures of 
globalization that enforce regulatory changes. On the other, the One Nation project 
also necessitated the establishment of relations of equivalence through which 
England's spaces f i t within the One Nation framework. 
The discursive formation of regional economic governance can be seen as part of 
Labour's attempt to rearrange the relations of equivalences and differences that 
have constituted England's spaces and also to rethink the relation of particular spaces 
('the North', 'the rural' etc.) against the universal 'national'. The above discursive 
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formation has rather successfully reordered relations of equivalences and differences 
in a way that supported the One Nation strategy However, this reordering has 
been far from smooth for example, the political pressure of the rural lobby required 
that some mechanism be found for acknowledging the urban-rural difference 
This function was filled through the appointment of a 'rural advocate' in November 
2000 and the introduction of the 'rural proofing' of policies (WOOD, 2005) 
6.3 The shaping of the England's state spaces until the 'no-'vote 
63 ι The solidification of the regionalization agenda 
There have been differences m commitment to New Labour's shaping regional 
governance agenda Committed regionalists, including Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) 
and DETR-head John Prescott, who saw the RDAs as a first step towards elected 
Regional Assemblies in England, were m a minority The majority view, shared by 
regional sceptics such as Blair and Brown, held that RDAs, while undoubtedly an 
important innovation, need time to prove themselves (HARRISON, 2006, MORGAN, 1999) 
At the same time, powerful elements in the Labour government - principally Tony 
Blair and Jack Straw - showed more enthusiasm for empowering cities than regions 
(MORGAN, 1999) In fact, the modernization of local government, of which the 
empowerment of 'the local' was part, was arguably higher on New Labour's agenda 
than the issue of regional governance 
In 2001 and 2002, the regionalization agenda for England gained considerable 
momentum Next to John Prescott, new voices appeared in the debate on 
regionalization Among the most important was that of Stephen Byers, head of the 
Department of Trade and Industry, and that of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Gordon Brown In a number of speeches, both made the case for greater action at the 
regional level to alleviate socio-economic disparities and for a regional policy based 
on local initiative and the fostering of indigenous resources (TOMANEY, 2002) As Brown 
noted 
'We are moving away from the old Britain of subjects where people had to look upwards to 
a Whitehall bureaucracy for their solutions - to a Britain of citizens where region to region, 
locality to locality we are ourselves in charge and where it is up to us" (Brown 2001 cited 
by TOMANFY, 2002 ρ 722) 
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According to TOMANEY (2002), the acknowledgement of persisting regional disparities 
emanated not merely from general concerns with national economic performance. 
Also, in the run-up to the 2001 General Election, New Labour was eager to neutralize 
perceptions that its traditional heartlands in the North are disfavoured. 
As TOMANEY (ibid.) further notes, the post-2001 election government reshuffle 
had major implications for the evolution of the regionalization agenda, including the 
preparation of the White Paper. As a part of the reshuffle, the Office of the Deputy 
Prime Minister (ODPM) chaired by John Prescott was created in the Cabinet Office to 
deal wi th the issue of regionalization85 and some other responsibilities. The ODPM 
became a department in its own right in May 2002 when it absorbed some of the 
responsibilities from the disbanded Department for Transport, Local Government 
and the Regions. 
It was unclear to what extent the Chancellor was actually supportive of the plan 
for elected regional assemblies. Nevertheless, he endorsed the view that the 
bolstering of RDAs could play a substantial role in enhancing productivity (TOMANEY, 
ibid.), which, next to employment, had become seen by the government as a key 
determinant of national economic growth (HM Treasury, 2000). As Gordon Brown, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer formulated: 
"I think most of you would agree that 50, 20 or even 10 years ago the idea that the Treasury 
would be interested in issues like public space, the design quality of public procurement in 
urban areas, devolution, regionalism and social exclusion would be almost unthinkable. But 
we know that not only are these questions vital to successful, economically vibrant cities 
but they a re at the heart ofthe agenda for social and economic progress. And I can genuinely 
say that I and the Treasury are privileged to be associated with the challenge, led by the 
Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott, of creating sustainable communities in our towns 
and cities" (BROWN, 2002). 
Following the initial focus of HM Treasury on the national scale, concern shifted to 
the drivers of productivity at other (regional and local) scales. The 3rd piece in the 
'Productivity' series entitled Productivity in the UK 3: The Regional Dimension (HM 
TREASURY and DTI, 2001) argued that tackling the gap between regions and localities in 
the UK has a crucial role to play if the UK is to address the productivity gap with its 
main competitors. Furthermore, this gap was to be addressed in a way that does not 
85 The regional portfolio was previously owned by the Department of Environment, Transport and the 
Regions (DETR). As a result ofthe government reshuffle, the DETR was replaced by the Department for 
Transport, Local Government and the Regions (DTLR). 
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restrain the growth of the London and the South East As it was noted 
" any regional economic policy must befocussed on raising the performance of the weakest 
regions rather than simply re-distributing existing economic activity Real economic gain 
for the country as a whole will only come from a process of 'levelling up'" (HM TREASURY and 
DTI, 2001, pv) 
Alan Johnson, government minister for manufacturing, said the following about the 
government's plans to close the productivity gap between the English regions. 
"How are we going to do i t ' There can be no question of holding back London and the South 
East [ ] Thankfully we've moved from the one-dimensional debate about the North-South 
divide We must aim to strengthen the indigenous potential of all regions, the focus must 
be on the weakest region, without constraining growth in the strongest" (Johnson, cited by 
MASSEV, 2OO7, ρ 102) 
RDAs were to assume a key role m delivering the strategy for improving UK 
productivity Accordingly, the government decided that RDA resources were to be 
increased from £1 2 billion m 2000-1 to f 17 billion in 2003-4, and also that a single 
cross-departmental budget (a 'single pot') was to be introduced from April 2002. 
The increased flexibility granted by the single pot was to be matched, however, with 
increased accountability through both national targets and strong and effective 
Regional Chambers (HM TREASURY and DTI, 2001, ρ vi) As to national targets, the 2002 
Spending Review actually committed the government to a new PSA 
"[to m]ake sustainable improvements in the economic performance of all English regions 
by 2008 and over the long term reduce the persistent gap in growth rates between the 
regions, demonstrating progress in 2006" (ODPM, 2002) 
The 'Regional Economic Performance' target, owned by the DTI, HM Treasury and 
ODPM, represented the first government commitment m t w o decades to reduce 
disparities in regional growth 8 6 . 
86 Regional growth targets first became national policy in the 2000 Spending Review, when the DETR and DTI 
agreed the PSA to "improve the economic performance of all regions, measured by the trend ingrowth of 
each region's GDP per capita" (BENNEWORTH, 2003) The reduction of regional disparities was thus not part of 
the PSA 
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As to the measurement of the target, it was specified in the 2002 Spending 
Review that the trend rate of growth in Gross Value Added (CVA) per head in each 
region would be used, and that the gap in growth rates would be measured by 
comparing the average growth rate of those regions that currently have above 
average GVA per head, with the average growth rate of those regions that currently 
have below average GVA per head. In practice, this meant comparing a single average 
growth rate for London, South East and East wi th a single average growth rate for 
North East, North West, Yorkshire and the Number, West Midlands, East Midlands 
and South West. It was also noted that as well as comparing the growth rates 
between these aggregations of regions, the gap in growth rates for individual regions 
would also be scrutinized (HM TREASURY, 2006). Finally, the document entitled A 
Modern Regional Policy for the United Kingdom (HM TREASURY, DTI and ODPM, 2003) 
also propagated the PSA target based framework. 
As to the issue of elected regional governments, the White Paper Your Region, 
Your Choice (CABINET OFFICE and DTLR, 2002), published in May 2002, took forward the 
commitment to directly elected assemblies that was formulated in New Labour's 
Manifesto. The White Paper reiterated the main elements of New Labour's 'regional 
thinking' in which regions, as sites of more tailored and joined-up policy-making, 
contribute to a more socially just and better-performing society. Following the White 
Paper, elected regional assemblies were to assume tasks in a wide range of fields: 
sustainable development, economic development, skills and spatial planning, 
transport, waste housing, health improvement, culture (including tourism) and 
biodiversity). Assemblies were supposed to complete the agenda for regional 
governance by making it more effective and more accountable to the regional 
electorate. In the words of John Prescott and Stephen Byers: 
"For decades, the needs and aspirations of the English regions were at best neglected and 
at worst ignored. The laissez-faire and 'Whitehall knows best' approaches of the past 
created both a widening regional economic divide and a regional democratic deficit. By 
1997 we had all but abandoned regional policy and had one of the most centralised systems 
of government in the western world. [...] This White Paper carries forward that regional 
renaissance and puts the regions firmly at the heart of our policies to build a modern and 
more prosperous society. By devolving power and revitalising the regions we bring 
decision making closer to the people and make government more efficient, more effective 
and more accountable. Empowering our regions does not mean the break-up of England, 
just as devolution has not meant the break-up of the UK. It makes our nation stronger and 
more dynamic. Our success as a nation depends on every region achieving its full potential. 
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We therefore propose for all regions a package which includes freedoms and flexibility for 
the RDAs, a new enhanced role for the regional chambers, better regional planning and a 
strengthening of the Government Offices and other regional bodies Our aim is to improve 
service delivery and get all our regions firing on all cylinders" (CABINET Omcr and DTLR, 2002, 
PP5-6) 
The White Paper expected that the move towards elected regional assemblies 
throughout England would be a gradual one and noted that the t iming of referendums 
would vary between regions, depending on preceding assessments of public interest 
m each region As the Paper further specified, in line with the government's belief 
that the local government structure of a region with an elected assembly should 
become 100% unitary, prior to the actual referendum the Boundary Committee for 
England would be asked to review the local government structure and recommend 
the most effective wholly unitary arrangements in that region, this way, voters 
would know the implication of a yes vote 
As HARRISON (2006) notes, the Your Region, Your Choice White Paper opened up the 
possibility of coupling economic regional governance with democratic regional 
governance in England on the one hand and a differential treatment of regions (outside 
London) on the other To make this coupling, and to break with the previous course of 
regional policy, DPM Prescott had to convince sceptical regionalists Tony Blair, Cordon 
Brown and Stephen Byers to commit themselves to his proposals by giving up some of 
their centrally based powers In 'return', the regional agenda had to remodel itself to f i t 
in with higher-level New Labour policy strands such as government modernization, 
service delivery, and local government Ultimately, as HARRISON (ibid ) further remarks, 
Treasury became itself involved in the regionalization agenda, under the proviso that 
the agenda developed along the following conditions 1) regions make commitment to 
some centralist targeting for extra funding, 2) previous statements regarding RAs' 
ability to raise tax and have legislative powers are backtracked, and 3) regional 
institutions become inserted into Labour's control-conscious and heavily centralized 
Comprehensive Spending Reviews and Public Service Agreements 
632 The growing emphasis on sub-regions 
While the Your Region, Your Choice White Paper only opened up the possibility of a 
differential treatment of regions outside London, the parallel reshaping of the 
planning system pointed towards a more decisive differentiation of spaces of 
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intervention via the selective focus on functional sub-regions. Sub-regions based on 
administrative boundaries (for example county boundaries) had already been 
recognized as programme delivery areas by each of the RDAs in England, in their 
respective Regional Economic Strategies (MORPHET, 2005). In contrast, the newly 
forming concern wi th sub-regions was based on an understanding of sub-regions as 
areas defined by functional relationships that should be the privileged targets of a 
more flexible strategic spatial planning. 
Making planning more flexible was an overarching objective of the 
competitiveness and productivity-oriented reshaping of the planning system. 
The Planning Green Paper entitled Planning: Delivering a Fundamental Change (ODPM, 
2001) marked the formal launch of substantial changes (CULLINCWORTH and NADIN, 2007). 
The starting point of this document was the conviction that planning, 
"[a] system that was intended to promote development now blocks it. Business complains 
that the speed of decision is undermining productivity and competitiveness. People feel 
they are not sufficiently involved in decisions that affect their lives" (Stephen Byers in the 
Foreword, ODPM, 2001). 
From the Paper's perspective, a successful planning system would promote economic 
prosperity by delivering land for development in the right place and at the right time. 
In particular, the RPGs were considered by the Paper (ODPM, 2001) as insufficiently 
strategic and not well integrated or coordinated with other regional strategies (such 
as the RDAs' strategies). Also, the process of preparation was regarded as leading to 
RPGs avoiding diff icult decisions (for example, in relation to the provision of an 
adequate supply of housing in the South East of England, or the location of key 
growth areas). To remedy these shortcomings, it was proposed that the RPGs be 
replaced with statutory Regional Spatial Strategies (RSSs) that have a more focussed 
content and outline specific regional or sub-regional policies (via sub-regional plans), 
address the broad locationof major development proposals, set targets and indicators 
where necessary, and cross-refer to, rather than repeat, national policy. A main 
concern was thus to "ensure that each RSS reflects regional diversity and specific 
regional needs within the national planning framework" (ODPM, 2001b, p. 21). 
Actually, these propositions were in conformity with the objectives formulated by 
the 2002 PSAs most relevant to planning, in particular PSA5 that set the aim of 
achieving a better balance between housing availability and the demand for housing 
in all English regions (see CULLINCWORTH and NADIN, 2007). 
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The proposals of the Green Paper were taken forward by the policy statement 
Sustainable Communities - Delivering through Planning (ODPM, 2002b) that asserted 
that the future Regional Spatial Strategies would have strong sub-regional elements 
Finally, the Planning and Compulsory Purchase8'Act, which came to statutory force m 
June 2004, gave effect to the government's policy on the reform of the planning 
system The Act, having as its mam aim the speeding up of the planning system, 
recast existing regional planning guidance notes as Regional Spatial Strategies (RSSs) 
and made the latter a statutory planning instrument to be prepared by regional 
planning bodies (in fact RAs) 
One of the most important implications of the changes was that county structure 
plans were no longer to be produced Counties, supported by the Campaign to Protect 
Rural England and in Parliament by the House of Lords, tried to retain their central 
role As MARSHALL (2007) notes, all they could achieve was, however, two stipulations 
First, that RPBs have to seek advice from the strategic authorities (counties, unitary 
authorities, National Park Authorities) on the exercise of their functions Second, that 
if the RPB decides to make different provisions for different parts of the region, the 
detailed proposals for such different provisions must first be made by a strategic 
authority Actually, one could barely see the above as a compromise, as the ODPM 
guidance made clear that the final form of the elements m question is a decision just 
of the RPBs Also, Minister Keith Hill stressed in a letter to RPBs that if the arrangements 
did not work "because of a lack of goodwill from the parties concerned", government 
would come back and amend the law As MARSHALL (2007) noted, this was a crystal clear 
threat to strategic authorities to cooperate with the government's agenda 
Planning Policy Statement η Regional Spatial Strategies summarized the specific 
form, scope and procedure of RSSs (ODPM, 2004d) Planning Policy Statement (PPS) 
11 noted that it was the responsibility of the RPB, m consultation with local planning 
authorities and other stakeholders, to identify the circumstances in which a 
sub-regional approach to spatial policy development is required In particular, t w o 
principles were advanced to consider the need for a sub-regional approach 
"[First,] the definition of need for a sub-regional approach should be based on an assessment 
of the functional relationships between settlements such asjourney-to-work patterns, or 
land uses within the area affected by the same strategic planning issue or issues which 
may well differ from administrative boundaries This could include consideration for 
87 A compulsory purchase order 15 a legal function m [he United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland that 
allows certain bodies which need to obtain land or property to do so without the consent of the owner 
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example, of how the strategic planning system can assist not only in creating and sustaining 
the economic competitiveness of a city or a cluster of towns but in spreading the benefits 
of a prosperous city to the wider region (the concept of a 'city-region'); and [second,] the 
sub-regional definition should be based on a clearly recognisable 'strategic policy deficit' 
which cannot be adequately addressed by general RSS policies or by LDDs [Local 
Development Documents""] on their own" (ODPM, 2004d, p.4). 
It should be noted that the proposed sub-regional dimension of RSSs was not 
expected to be comprehensive in its geographical coverage. Or as the Minister of 
State of the ODPM, Lord Rooker, put it: 
"Where there is a perceived need for a sub-regional strategy, one should go ahead and do it, 
but the idea that every square inch of England should be covered by a sub regional strategy 
makes no sense" (Hansard, 2004). 
Indeed, sub-regional planning proved to make different sense In certain regions than 
others; this is the issue that the next two sections discuss in more detail. 
6.3.2.7 Managing growth in the South East 
As analysts have pointed out, the reappraisal of the priorities of regional planning 
and the increasing focus on sub-regional planning was primarily motivated by the 
concern of government to manage growth in the South East. Or to refer to Marshall: 
"that the difficulties the planning ministry was having in planning growth in the 
Greater South-east during 1999-2001 had made It wonder whether the old county 
based structure plans system could do the job government wanted to be done" 
(MARSHALL, 2007, p. 109). So what difficulties are at issue here? 
To begin wi th, the South East, as the UK's most developed region, has been the 
chief source of inflationary pressures, hence UK monetary policy has tended to be 
calibrated to the overheated conditions in this core region (MORGAN, 2002). 
The necessity of balancing housing supply and demand came strongly to the fore in 
88 According to Planning Policy Statement 12: Local Development Frameworks (ODPM, 2004f), Local 
Development Documents collectively deliver the spatial planning strategy for the local planning 
authority's area. 
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the Treasury's June 2003 assessment of the 'five tests' for UK membership of the 
euro*9. The assessment saw the volatility of the housing market and potential for 
higher inflation as a problem for stability that needed to be addressed irrespective of 
the decision on the euro (BROWN, 2003). The Barker Review of Housing Supply (BARKER90, 
2004) that was commissioned prior to the assessment (and published on 17 March 
2004) reasserted that the volatility of the UK housing market had contributed to 
macroeconomie volatility, thus creating a more diff icult environment for businesses 
and for economic policy-makers. 
Following the abolition of SERPLAN in 2001, central government was the only 
body which could overview the whole South Eastern region the result was the 
Sustainable Communities Plan (MARSHALL, 2007), launched by DPM John Prescott m 
February 2003. To the question of 'What are the problems we must tackle?, the 
Sustainable Communities Plan, entitled Sustainable Communities: Building for the 
Future (ODPM, 2003), noted the following. 
"Too many people do not have access to decent affordable housing in decent surroundings 
Across the country there are still homes in poor condition occupied by vulnerable people In 
parts of the country there ts a shortage of housing Homes are unaffordable for people on 
moderate incomes, including many of the key workers on whom our public services depend 
[ ] In other parts of the country there are areas suffering the opposite problem of housing 
market collapse, leading to homes or even whole streets being abandoned" (ODPM, 2003, ρ 
6, emphasis added) 
Eventually, the Plan was more heavily weighted to the objective of increasing housing 
delivery m the South East. As the Plan noted: 
"[t]o accommodate the economic success of London and the wider South East and ensure 
that the international competitiveness of the region is sustained, for the benefit of the 
region and the whole country To alleviate pressures on services and housing caused by 
economic success where these pressures cannot readily be dealt w i t h within existing 
towns and cities Where new and expanded communities are needed, to ensure that these 
are sustainable, well-designed, high quality and attractive places m which people will 
positively choose to live and work" (ODPM, 2003, ρ 46) 
89 These are the following 1) whether there is sufficient flexibility to cope with economic change, 2) the 
effect on investment, 3) the impact on the financial services industry, 4) the effect on employment, 
5) sustainable convergence between Britain and the economies of the single currency (ROLLO, 2002) 
90 Kate Barker was a member of the Bank of England's monetary policy committee 
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The response to these challenges was to provide for major growth in the four growth 
areas identified in 2000 in the Regional Planning Guidance for London and the rest of 
the South East (RPG9). These growth areas were the Thames Gateway (East London), 
Milton Keynes/South Midlands, Ashford and Stansted -Cambridge (the Mn Corridor). 
On a more general level, the Communities Plan noted that the reform of the planning 
system is the key to the proper use of land and to enabling well-designed housing 
developments to happen. The Plan referred the Planning Bill (then in preparation) 
that would introduce a streamlined planning system (ODPM, 2003). 
The Communities Plan was in particular welcome by Ken Livingstone, the Mayor 
of London. As he noted in an interview: 
"What we've come to is actually the Deputy Prime Minister's office backing the London 
Plan.. It seems to me the government has signed up to [my] housing targets and it's actually 
made the money available to deliver" (Livingstone in Inside Housing, 2003, p. 16) 
The draft of the London Plan, a strategic plan setting out an integrated social, 
economic and environmental framework for the future development of London and 
carrying forward the considerations of the document Towards a London Plan, was 
published in 2002. The final version of the Plan came out in 2004, entitled The London 
Plan: Spatial Development Strategy for Greater London. The central message of the 
Plan was the fol lowing: 
"London must fulfil its potential as a world city in the national interest as well as that of 
Londoners. Accommodating the anticipated growth in London would be beneficial both to 
London and the rest of the UK. This plan seeks to work with the market and to address the 
potential supply-side constraints in terms of space, transport, environmental quality and 
education to ensure London is capable of accommodating growth" (GLA, 2004, p. 4). 
6.3.2.2 Sub-regions in 'the North' 
While the government seemed to take over the reins of planning in the Greater South 
East, at the same time it seemed to intervene to a lesser extent elsewhere (MARSHALL, 
2004). The Sustainable Communities Plan spoke of tackling "low [housing] demand 
and abandonment" (ODPM, 2003, p. 24) in the North. In order to meet this objective, 
the Plan proposed nine pathfinder projects for the most deprived areas, based, among 
other things, on the evaluation of the New Deal for Communities Programme. 
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The pathfinder projects were to rely on the partnerships of local authorities and other 
key stakeholders that, supported by the government and its agencies, develop their 
strategic plans for housing markets. The Plan noted that there was no blueprint 
because problems differ in the nine pathfinder areas and the solutions will too 
Soon there was, however, pressure from Northern politicians "keen to plan for 
growth not simply decline" (HAUCHTON and COUNSELL, 2007, p. 231) In response to 
growing criticisms of the excessive South East focus of the government, the 
elaboration of a growth strategy for the North became considered at the ODPM from 
the end of 2003 on. Also, as New Labour's historical heartland and DPM Prescott's 
constituency (Hull East) were m the North, a Northern-oriented plan was also 
expected to bring electoral benefits (GONZALEZ, 2006b, GONZALEZ and TOMANEY, 2006) 
As a result, the first Sustainable Communities progress report entitled Making it 
Happen The Thames Gateway and the Growth Areas, published m July 2003, was 
followed by one (on 4 February 2004) with the t it le Making it Happen The Northern 
Way (ODPM, 2004e). At its launch, DPM Prescott argued that m order to reduce the 
persistent f30 billion output gap between the North and the rest of the UK, "we 
must make the most of the natural strengths of the North A different way of doing 
things that I like to call the 'Northern Way'" (PRESCOTT, 2004) Although the report was 
more of a symbolic gesture to the three regions labelled 'Northern' (1 e the North 
East, the North West, and Yorkshire and the Humber) and had l itt le concrete substance 
(GONZALEZ, 2006b), it evidently aimed at stressing the importance of the North as a 
space of intervention for the promotion of economic growth As it was noted 
"The Northern Way would help l ift the productivity of the three northern regions and bring 
the jobs, investment and quality housing that can create sustainable communities Greater 
success in the North will benefit the national economy and improve our global competi­
tiveness" (Prescott m ODPM, 2004e, ρ 6) 
Referring to the three Northern RDAs'own proposal for enhancing growth, the report 
stressed the relevance of exploiting and developing the existing transport corridors 
m the North that could match the growth corridors of the Thames Gateway and the 
wider South East The development of existing corridors suggested by the report 
meant m particular upgrading the West Coast Mam Line, widening the M6 from 
Birmingham to Manchester, and major improvements to the M60, M62, Mi and Ai(M) 
(Figure 6.4) 
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Figure 6.4 Transport corridors in the North 
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The suggestion of an inverted "L" shaped corridor linking the M62 and the Ai 
motorways (figuring on the cover of the report) was actually the result of some 
adjustments; originally, the ODPM's emphasis would have been on the M62 corridor 
(linking Liverpool and Hull), the economic potential of which had been recognized for 
a time (GONZALEZ and TOMANEV, 2006). As GOODCHILD and HICKMAN (2006, p.126) note: 
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"[t]he idea of concentrating growth across the Pennmes, and notably between 
Manchester and Leeds, has been a recurrent theme m regional planning discussions 
in the North of England" The growth corridor that Making it Happen spanned along 
the East-West axis was not only larger than previous conceptualizations, but was 
completed by a second, North-South corridor, connecting Sheffield, Leeds and 
Manchester to Newcastle upon Tyne The move towards this more inclusive vision 
was largely due to the fact that leaving out the North East, the region where the 
establishment of an elected RA was to be put to a referendum first, would have been 
difficult to defend (GONZALEZ and TOMANEY, 2006) 
The implementation of the Northern Way became assigned to the inter-regional 
partnership of three RDAs that appointed a Steering Group and a Task Group and 
seconded policy officers to elaborate the first Growth Strategy With the Steering 
Group involving representatives from various government levels and from the 
business sector, the Northern Way took the shape of a multi-level governance 
partnership (GONZALEZ, 2006b) In the process of working out the Growth Strategy, 
the corridor idea gradually lost ground m favour o f tha t of the 'city region' This shift 
of emphasis was closely linked to the fact that m the preceding years, the view of 
cities being important to economic growth had started to gam weight m policy 
circles (see Table 61) Actually, m the field of transport, city regional governance 
arrangements had been m place for a long time as the powers to establish Passenger 
Transport Authorities (PTAs) and Passenger Transport Executives (PTEs) were 
contained m the 1986 Transport Act and the Local Government Acts of 1972 and 1985 
Between 1974 and 1986, the PTAs for the English PTEs were the metropolitan county 
councils When the latter were abolished, along with the Greater London Council, 
PTAs were reconstituted wi th representatives from the constituent metropolitan 
district councils Each council nominated councillors as PTA members, with the 
balance between districts being allocated accordmgto population, and the nominees 
within each district being selected according to the political balance within that 
authority (Passenger Transport Executive Group {pteg), 2006) 
Following the adoption of the new city-regional approach, the Northern Way 
Task Group identified eight city-regions Tyne and Wear, Tees Valley, Hull and 
Humberside, Central Lancashire, Leeds, Manchester, Liverpool/Merseyside and 
Sheffield The first Growth Strategy of the NORTHERN WAY STEERING GROUP (2004), 
published in September 2004, noted that all of the eight city-regions cover areas 
extending well beyond the city centres at their core and contain a spectrum of towns, 
villages and urban fringe areas At the same time, the document's map did not 
propose any clear-cut delimitation of city-regions (see Figure 65) 
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Figure 6.5 The city-regions of the Northern Way 
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With regard to the objective of enhancing economic growth m the North through a 
city-regional approach, the Growth Strategy referred to research conducted at the 
Centre for Sustainable Urban and Regional Futures at Salford University According to 
the centre's research, all English regions (with the exception of the North East) 
experienced absolute Gross Value Added (GVA) growth of over 30% between 
1995-2001, at the same time the South, particularly London and the South East, 
considerably outperformed all regions with an absolute GVA growth of nearly 50% 
In the North, the North West was the only region m which absolute GVA growth 
(38%) was above the national average Against this background, the Growth Strategy 
stated what the Northern Way regards as the overarching measure of success to 
"achieve national UK average GVA per head within 25 years" (NORTHERN WAY STEERING 
GROUP, 2004, ρ 4) To this end, the Growth Strategy noted that each of the eight 
city regions should, by building on the work of existing sub-regional planning and 
delivery partnerships, prepare a city-regional development programme (CROP) for 
each city-region The aim was to enable economic growth w i t h specific proposals for 
housing, transport and economic development as a key input to the review of the 
RESs in the three regions m 2005 At the same time, central government and the RDAs 
announced a three-year £100 million Northern Way Growth Fund to pay for the 
programmes and policy development 
6 3 3 Concluding remarks 
Under Labour's second term m office, regional economic governance evolved further 
as a discursive formation of state space that redefined development planning as a 
strategic spatial intervention geared to the promotion of economic growth and relied 
increasingly on self-managing local (regional) actors Gradually, the discursive 
formation of regional economic governance became also a framework within which 
regional inequalities, as well as the policy responses to them, acquired a new meaning 
As Massey summarizes, this framework has become grafted on the assumption that 
"there is indeed regional inequality, and it must be addressed, however this must be done by 
analysing and correcting the weaknesses of the regional economies and/or by helping them find 
the means to improve their competitive position What is certain - it is insisted upon again and 
again - is that encouragement to 'the regions must in no way be allowed to challenge, question, 
or m any way restrain the growth m London and the South East of England (MASSEY, 2007 ρ ιοί) 
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While the Your Region, Your Choice White Paper argued that centralization was a 
thing of the past (CABINET OFFICE and DTLR, 2002, p. 6), the grip of the Treasury on 
regional policy had undoubtedly centralization as a result. This became especially 
clear wi th the formulation of the regional performance PSA target and, later (first in 
2005), w i th the launch of the Regional Funding Allocations process, through which 
Treasury could build relationships with GOs, RDAs and RAs (at the same time, the 
ODPM became insulated from the process). As FOTHERCILL (2005) aptly noted. New 
Labour's locally (regionally) run regional policy was in fact becoming a national 
industry policy implemented in the regions. Pressures towards conformity stemming 
from national economic targets eventually prevented regions from coming up with 
unique approaches to development. As JONFS (2004) remarked, while the RDAs' task 
was to highlight the distinctive contributions which their respective regions can 
make to economic development, actually the eight Regional Economic Strategies 
were anything but distinctive. 
At the same time, London (and the greater London super-region) could assert Its 
particularity as it gradually became constructed as a world city that is at once "the 
golden goose" of the national economy (MASSEY, 2007) and also (partly) an 
extra-national entity (see MCNEILL, 2006). London's particularity has become also 
firmly institutionalized, not only through relations between the City and national 
government, but also through the concentration of 
"the main executive instruments of national government, the flurry of ancillary institutions 
that surrounds them, the political news media, the Houses of Commons and Lords, and 
what helps knit the whole thing together - t h e mesh of institutions of general sociability: 
restaurants, bars, clubs.These institutions are important in their own right as both 
lubricants and means of gaining influence" (MASÌEV, 2007, p. 120). 
In fact, "[t]he imagination of ' the nation', sphere after sphere, is constructed through 
London" (ibid., p. 121). 
As JOHN, MUSSON and TICKELL (2002) note, while London has an elected mayor and 
assembly, the wider South East region has remained fragmented into counties and 
sub-regions, which jealously guard their autonomy and fear centralization. Elites in 
the South East do not articulate a regional point of view; in fact, "English regionalism 
appears only to be associated with the politics of (relative) economic decline and the 
need to restore economies ravaged by their lack of competitiveness" (ibid., p. 734). 
Indeed, the "politics of (relative) economic decline", i.e. claims made by those speaking 
for the North to acknowledge its disadvantaged and neglected position - combined 
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with Labour's (and in particular, Prescott's) allegiance to the North - did make an 
impact on the course of events The distinction that government policy had drawn, 
since the Communities Plan, between the need to manage growth m the London 
super-region and to tackle decline in less developed and mainly Northern areas was 
no longer tenable The ensuing launch of the Northern Way and the reference to the 
North's alleged, 'natural strengths' is especially noteworthy in view of the previous 
decline of emphasis on the North-South divide However, while pan-Northern 
cooperation could rely on a feeling of resentment in connection w i t h the government's 
Southern bias (relation of difference), the mtra-Northern divisions and divergences 
of interest (thus the diff iculty to create relations of equivalence) became evident 
following the set-up of the Northern Way As Sir Graham Hall, Chair of the Northern 
Way Steering Croup, noted 
"There are some commonalities between the city regions but there are many differences as 
well [ ] This will involve cities that are used to competing now having to learn how to 
cooperate At the heart of this thinking is a deal that the two great Pennine rivals, Leeds 
and Manchester, agree not to tread on each other's toes" (Hall in ODPM, 2005, ρ 5) 
The gradual extension of the geographical 'backbone' of the Northern Way - the 
city-regions were said to cover 90% of the North's population and more than 90% of 
its economic activity and current economic assets (NORTHERN WAY STEERING GROUP, 2004b, 
ρ 4 ) - w a s a way to make the strategy more inclusive Making the city-regions appear 
on the Strategy's map (see above) as eight dark, undifferentiated blobs was arguably 
also helping to construct city-regions as fuzzy and fluid economic entities, without 
clearly identifiable borders (GONZALEZ, 2006c, ρ 6) As we will see, m spite of this 
extension - that already substantially undermined the Northern Way's capacity for 
spatial targeting (GOODCHILD and HICKMANN, 2006) - the Northern Way (and ultimately 
the city-region concept) continued to be contested by those who felt left out This m 
turn affected the way the city-region concept articulated w i t h the discursive 
formations of state space 
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6.4 The growing m o m e n t u m for city-regionalism 
6.4.1 A new space for city-regions 
In July 2004, the government announced that referendums were to be held in the 
three Northern English regions: the North East, the North West and Yorkshire and 
the Humber. Actually, referenda in the North West and Yorkshire and the Humber 
were postponed; the referendum for the North East was scheduled for November 
2004. The North East was chosen by the government as most likely to vote 'yes' to a 
regional assembly "because of its strong sense of regional identity, proximity to 
Scotland, remoteness from London, and long history as a Labour heartland" (HAZELL, 
2006, p. 46). In the referendum that offered the prospect of dismantling England's 
longstanding unitary tradition, ultimately 77.9% of the voters said 'no' to an elected 
regional assembly, at a turnout of just below 48% (Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC), 2005). It is not the objective of this study to engage with the possible 
reasons for this result. To refer briefly to generally mentioned voter motives, many 
voters felt that what was on offer was weak and only likely to be a waste of money, 
and a reinforcement of bureaucracy. Also, many feared that the proposed Assembly, 
which they did not consider capable of effectively tackling developmental problems, 
would be held responsible by the government in the case of continuing problems 
(ESRC, 2005; HUDSON, 2007). 
In any case, the outcome of the referendum made clear that the envisaged model 
of regionalization could not be pursued. Ideas relating to the role of cities and 
city-regions in development, which started to gain increasing policy attention In the 
previous years, filled the vacuum created by the defeat of the regionalization agenda 
based on elected assemblies (MORGAN, 2007; PIKE and TOMANEY, 2009). As MORGAN (ibid.) 
notes, it was not a homogenous city-region lobby, but a combination of efforts of 
various propagators of the city-region idea that gained momentum in the immediate 
post-referendum period. To begin wi th, ODPM emerged as a key sponsor of city-
regionalism within the government. In December 2004, ODPM published Our Cities 
Are Back: Competitive Cities Make Prosperous Regions and Sustainable Communities 
(ODPM, 2004). This document argued that cities were now acknowledged as the 
driving forces of modern knowledge-based economies and as the powerhouses for 
competitiveness in advanced countries throughout the world. Furthermore: 
"Given the priority Government now attaches to improving the performance of all regions, 
the need for an action plan to improve competitiveness in Core Cities becomes urgent. The 
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emphasis m the Northern Way on the critical role of cities and their regions adds further 
importance" (ODPM, 2004 ρ 29) 
Also in December 2004, the ODPM commissioned a study entitled A Framework for 
City-Regions, wi th the purpose of developing the evidence base that was seen as 
necessary to underpin any sustained, future move towards a clear national policy 
framework for city-regions The mam questions to be addressed were 1) why are 
city regions important and what is the utility of a city egional approach to policy, 2) 
which types of city-regional definition suit which policy purposes, and 3) which 
advantages could a city-regional policy framework have over those applied at 
different spatial scales (eg neighbourhood, district, region) (ROBSON et al, 2006) 
Another, albeit more indirect, support for the city-regional idea came from the 
Treasury (and DTI), this support was rooted m the growing conviction that cities 
(might) play a key role in meeting regional growth targets 
Furthermore, the Core Cities Croup and a metropolitan network of think-tanks -
consisting of the New Local Government Network (NLCN), the Institute for Public 
Policy Research (IPPR) and the Work Foundation - were also acting as key sponsors of 
the city-regional approach to development The Core Cities Croup, a network of 
England's major regional cities (Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, 
Newcastle, Nottingham and Sheffield) was established m 1995 m order to promote 
the role of the Core Cities as drivers of regional and national economic growth and 
raise their profile internationally As to the network of thmk-thanks, they generally 
advanced the view that city-regions could generate a net economic dividend if 
sufficiently empowered by the government (MORGAN, 2007) 
While the above-mentioned actors were arguably some of the most "visible", 
their claims were just some among the many in the debate that developed around 
the city-region concept In fact, the city-region concept started to act as a floating 
signifier it became variously invested with - often contradictory - meanings and 
articulated in different actors' claims In what follows, I will review the city region 
debate as a struggle over the meaning of nation-state spaces As m the case study of 
Hungary, the claims and actions of the various actors engaging m the debate are 
regarded as attempts to fix 'the city region' as an object-space on the basis of 
particular differentiations and particular relations of equivalence At the same time, 
those contesting the overall relevance or any particular understanding of the 
city-region question m fact the same differentiations and equivalences Although 
claims regarding territorial delimitation and claims about the substantial 'content' or 
rationale(s) of city-regional arrangements are inseparable aspects of claims of 
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differentiation, I propose to discuss them in two subsequent sections in order to 
structure the overview. What is especially relevant in view of the concerns of this 
study is how claims of differentiations have embodied demands for the recognition 
of particular spaces against the horizon of noi/o/io/space. 
64.2 Delimiting city-regions 
The City-regions economic analysis (NORTHERN WAY TASK GROUP, 2004) underpinning the 
Northern Way Growth Strategy noted the following: 
"The definitions [of the Strategy] are not meant to delineate fixed boundaries of the 
city-region areas- A significant aspect of the city-region work in the Northern Way has 
been the recognition that the appropriate boundaries of the city-regions vary depending 
on the subject being considered and are necessarily malleable- However, for the purpose of 
statistical analysis, it was decided that a grouping of local authorities needed to be 
identified in order to allow for data comparisons" (NORTHFRN WAY TASK CROUP, 2004)-
The city-regions that were initially determined by members of the Task Group with 
assistance from people with local knowledge and expertise were supported by 
research commissioned from the Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies 
(CURDS) at Newcastle University. CURDS undertook to draw travel-to-work areas 
(TTWA) based on the 1991 census data using wider self-containment levels than the 
standard usage of 75%91. As it was put, the map oftheTTWAs at the 95% containment 
level associated closely with the city-regions determined by the Task Group (ibid.). 
Elsewhere in the strategy, it is noted that the city-regions identified correspond in 
broad terms with the major travel-to-work areas, shopping catchments and housing 
markets. 
According to some, the definition of city-regions adopted in the Northern Way 
strategy, fol lowing a non-nodal approach developed at CURDS, was rather pragmatic, 
in part because of the tight timescales constraining the strategy's underpinning 
analysis, but also because of the nature of available data on economic activity at 
different spatial scales (MIDGLEY, WARD and ATTERTON, 2005). Following GONZALEZ and 
91 The criterion of a minimum level of self-containment has two elements: the first is a supply-side 
one, referring to the percentage of an area's working residents who work in the area; the second is a 
demand-side one, referring to the percentage of all workers at the area's workplaces who live in the area. 
TTWAs must meet the required level of self-containment on both the supply and demand-side measures 
(CooMBEs. RAYBQULDand WYMFR, 2005)-
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ToMANEY (2006), the above designation was preceded by a selection of the five 
Northern Core Cities, but the latter approach was dropped m favour of a more 
inclusive one including Hull and Humber, Central Lancashire and Tees Valley The 
research carried out by Newcastle University gave only partial evidence for the 
broader approach, the research on travel data did not identify the Hull and Humber 
area as a coherent unit (ibid ) The inclusion of Hull and Humber was actually not 
seen as straightforward, neither among stakeholders of the Hull and the Humber 
city-region, nor by actors speaking for other city-regions 
"To be frank with you, when the city regions were launched, the idea of them [ ] the then 
Humber Forum, now Humber Economic Partnership, showed no interest whatsoever in 
doing that work so Hull City Council called a meeting of all the sub regional partners, the 
local authorities and the Humber Economic Partnership and said look guys we've got to 
do this so we did it " 
"You know even I think Hull questions themselves sometimes whether they are a true 
city region or just happen to be the biggest city in that bit of the country and therefore by 
default ' 
Actually, the Growth Strategy identified the central section of the M62 (Manchester-
Leeds) as the 'hottest spot' within the Northern Way area and noted that areas to the 
West and South of this 'boom' area (Chester-Liverpool-Sheffield) exhibit steady 
improvement 
After the publication of the Northern Way Growth Strategy, work carried on to 
refine the city-region concept and its territorial delimitation, as well as its policy 
relevance The first working paper of the ODPM-commissioned study series 
A Framework for City-Regions, entitled Mapping City-Regions (ROBSON et al, 2006), 
recognized that city-region boundaries are essentially fuzzy and issue-specific 
The working paper considered five different approaches to defining city regions 
demarcations in terms of characteristics of the labour market, the housing market, 
economic activities, service districts or administrative divisions Eventually, 
the document argued that given the ambition to enhance competitiveness, the 
most appropriate geometry may be the smaller number of generously-defined 
travel-to-work catchments associated with the flows of professional and managerial 
workers 
The report State of the English Cities The Competitive Economic Performance of 
English Cities, commissioned by the ODPM (2006) (a body to be superseded by the 
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Department of Communities and Local Government), also built on TTWA-based 
definitions of city-regions, although it chose first of all to identify major cities in 
terms of their physical extent (thus not in terms of local authority areas or 
administrative boundaries). Departing from the official set of Urban Areas definitions 
based on 2001 built-up areas, 56 Primary Urban Areas were identified that were not 
coterminous with local government boundaries, but were mostly larger than local 
authorities and frequently contained several of them. As to the analysis of the 
competitive performance of English cities, the report argued that this is best carried 
out at city-regional level as approximated by TTWAs (the report took the standard 
75% self-containment levels as a basis for defining TTWAs). At the TTWA-level, which 
was considered as one step higher in the report's typology, the 56 largest units were 
identified. Concerning the question of why 56 TTWAs were identified, a 'frequently 
asked questions' section at the DCLC website argued that the in-depth focus on 56 
cities reflected data constraints and availability, and also the timeframe and resources 
involved (http://www.communities.gov.uk). 
Subsequently, the TTWA-based concept of the city-region was taken forward by 
the report Devolving decision making: 3 - Meeting the regional economic challenge: 
The importance of cities to regional growth, commissioned jointly by HM Treasury, DTI 
and ODPM (2006). Identifying proximity as the economic rationale for the existence 
of cities, the report advanced an "economic definit ion" of a city as an 'urban 
agglomeration'and a place for production and exchange-a definition that is distinct 
from the concept of cities as administrative units. As it was argued: 
"Indeed as many people and economic flows overlap city local authorities' boundaries, cities 
have an 'economic footprint' that does not typically correspond to administrative city 
boundaries. [...] This wider functional economic area is an important determinant of people's 
quality of life and access to opportunity" (HM TREASURY, DTI and ODPM, 2006, p. 8), 
Notwithstanding the emphasis on city-regions being the footprints of functional 
processes, city-region building in practice had to deal primarily with the 'hard lines' 
of local government boundaries. The inclusion in city-regions was thus made on local 
authority basis but, at the same time, high containment level TTWAs remained the 
starting point. As a city-region policy officer put it: 
"[It's] not a club... it's not a 'we like you, we want to work with you kind of thing'...this is an 
economic reality... [...] We've had some of the North Yorkshire districts saying they want to 
be more involved with us...and we have to kind of say, well, alright, this proximity...you're 
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real neighbours, but in reality there's no economic interaction there's not much point in 
forcing partners m 
However, considering (memories of) superimposed supra-local 'hard' boundaries, 
and the fact that larger districts are heterogeneously patterned, making city-regional 
governance arrangements reflect functional economic spaces has been far f rom 
straightforward (see Box 6.2). 
64s Arguing for and against city-regions 
Parallel to the contentious issue of delimiting city-regions, the related question of 
how to define the content of city-regional governance arrangements (in other words, 
'what city-regions are good for') was also central to discussions m the post-referendum 
period. Here I rely on the Report of the Communities and Local Government 
Committee (CLGC)9' that, m its inquiry Is there a future for Regional Government?, 
identified three different but interconnected rationales, 1 e strands of arguments, 
concerning the potential added-value of city-regional arrangements The inquiry was 
initiated because the Committee felt that more than twelve months after the North 
East referendum, the new direction of the government's regional policy was still not 
apparent and as a consequence, it wished to probe the likely future direction of this 
policy. The three strands of arguments were the following 1) the economic, 2) the 
(technocratic) strategic planning and 3) the subsidiarity and devolution argument. 
As to the economic argument, it stressed the role of urban centres in achieving the 
government's objectives relating to economic performance and delivering its 
commitment set out in the Regional Economic Performance PSA The strategic 
planning argument emphasized the added-value of strategic policy-making beyond 
municipal boundaries for functionally integrated territories Finally, the subsidiarity 
and devolution argument suggested that after the 'no' to elected R As, the creation of 
city-regional political autonomy through directly elected authorities (following the 
example of London's governance arrangements) would be a way to carry on the 
government's devolution agenda Below I discuss how arguments of different actors 
became bundled together around these rationales 
92 The Communities and Local Governmenl Committee (before the Government reshuffle discussed below 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister Housing, Planning, Local Government and the Regions Committee) 
is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, admmistralion and policy of the 
Department for Communities and Local Government and its associational bodies 
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Box 6.2 City-regions in Yorkshire and the Number 
The ambition of forming city-regional arrangements in Yorkshire and the Humber along 
functional economic relations (in particular commuting patterns) implied that existing 
administrative local and regional boundaries were not considered in the first instance. 
Except the Hull and Humber Ports City Region that is identical with the existing Humber 
sub-region, emerging city-regional arrangements have partly diverged from 'given' regional 
administrative divisions: Richmondshire, Hambleton and Scarborough districts of North 
Yorkshire became included in the Tees Valley City Region's 'zone of influence' that includes 
districts from the North East Region, and Sheffield City Region includes four districts from 
the East Midlands Region. At the same time, while the district of Barnsley expressed the 
wish to belong to both Leeds and Sheffield city-regions (as a city-region coordinator argued: 
"that makes sense if you look at travel to work"), Ryedale does not fall into any of the region's 
city-regions. In the case of some larger districts of North Yorkshire, notably Harrogate and 
Craven, doubts were also raised:"it's fair enough to say that Craven and Harrogate are quite 
big spatial entities in their own right...the economic region of Leeds does not go up until the 
Lake District...so there's probably some fuzzy boundary going on here [i.e. the TTWA-line is 
cutting the districts in question in two]". In the case of districts being part of two-tier areas, 
city-region partnerships included the relevant county council even if geographically not the 
whole county was involved (North Yorkshire County Council thus became included in the 
Leeds City Region Partnership and Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire County Councils in the 
Sheffield City Region Partnership). 
Interestingly, the 'coterminosity' of city-region boundaries with that of existing sub-
regional partnerships seemed to bring about its own problems, as the case of Hull and 
Humber Ports City Region showed. In 1996, a set of unitary authorities replaced the shire 
county of Humberside (created in 1974). This move was especially welcomed by the local 
authorities; as a policy officer put it, Hull for example "was furious that a big city like this 
wasn't in charge of education, housing, transport...they wanted to have their powers back 
from this big body...so they got them back... so when the city-region idea comes along in 
2004, ten years after this [the county] was being broken up, some of the actors here in this 
sub-region think it's a recreation of the unit which they hated...so there's a lot of historical 
baggage in the Humberside...[...] It would have been much, much betterforthisarea, if when 
the government started to talk about city-regions in 2004 and there was a Government 
document, the Northern Way document, which actually said that the Hull and Humber 
Ports City Region was made up of the four local authorities here...if another local authority 
had been put into that mix, Doncaster, Selby, or York...it would have been much better for us 
because we would have been forced to get away from history...". 
City-regions as the powerhouses of the national economy 
As already referred to, within the government, HM Treasury was the most fervent 
supporter of the economic argument. The Core Cities group was another propagator 
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of the significance of the contribution of cities to national economic growth This is 
clear from, among other things, the memoranda that the Association of Greater 
Manchester Authorities (AGMA) and the Leeds City Region sent as a response to the 
CLCG's inquiry 
"For AGMA and its constituent authorities, the potential gams [of city regional 
arrangements] are the greatest of all The Manchester City Region, with its concentration 
of key economic assets and its proven growth and development profile over the last few 
years in particular, is more important than most We account for over 50% of the GVA for 
the whole of the North West of England If we fail to achieve our full potential, there is no 
prospect of achieving regional or national job/wealth creation targets andjust as crucially, 
there is no serious and sustainable counter balance m the UK to London and the South East 
It is equally clear that many national Public Service Agreements (PSA) targets, including key 
floor targets, will only be achieved if they are achieved in City Regions It is m City Regions 
that gaps in outcomes are widest' (HOUSE OF COMMONS, ODPM HOUSING, PLANNING LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT AND THE REGIONS COMMITTEE, 2006 Evidence 62) 
"The sheer size of the [Leeds] city region economy means that boosting its dynamism will 
lead to economic impact locally, regionally and nationally The city region is recognised, 
along with Manchester city region, as playing a key role within the Northern Way Growth 
Strategy If the Leeds city region fails to achieve its full potential there is little prospect of 
achieving local, regional or national job and wealth creation targets, and just as crucially 
there is no serious and sustainable counter balance m England to London and the South 
East ' (HOUSE OF COMMONS, ODPM HOUSING, PLANNING, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE REGIONS COMMITUE, 
2006, Evidence 185) 
At the same time, other actors criticized a perspective from which the role of the 
Core Cities wi th regard to national economic performance is overemphasized In 
particular, various organizations representing county interests voiced their concern 
in this respect As early as 2001, the Chief Development Officers' Society (CEDOS), a 
forum for economic development professionals working for upper-tier local (1 e 
county) authorities in England, and the County Surveyors' Society (CSS), published 
the document England's County Sub-regions, Cornerstones of Economic Growth 
(CEDOS and CSS, 2001) This document acknowledged the importance of large 
regional cities to economic growth, but dismissed a narrow focus on city-regions as 
the economic motors of the national economy as not only naive, but also as counter 
productive Instead, CEDOS and CSS stated the following 
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"Our aim is to restore the balance in the national debate about regional economic 
development. The role of the core cities is vital. The role of England's county sub-regions is 
equally vital. Unless this is recognised and a balanced approach is taken, the goal of 
effective, sustainable economic development and growth will prove elusive" (ibid., p. 3). 
The point that a more balanced approach was needed to national and regional 
investment was underpinned with references to the share of county sub-regions in 
England's land area {93%) (see Figure 6.6), to their share in England's total GVA in 
2001 (58%) and also to the effective leadership of strategic local authorities (ibid.). 
CEDOS reiterated their criticism of the city-regional approach in their 
memorandum submitted to the CLGC inquiry and also in another joint document 
with CSS entitled Making the Most of Our Economic Potential: tooking Beyond the 
Core Cities (CEDOS and CSS, 2007). This document argued that: 
"England's counties are vital to England's economic performance. Alongside the core cities 
and the other metropolitan areas, the county areas are key sub-regional components of 
every region in the country outside London. They are a major part of our national social and 
economic infrastructure" (CEDOS and CSS, 2007, p. 5). 
Also, it was argued that city-regions might be right for some areas but not for others, 
and thus should not be imposed in a 'one-size-fits-all' way. Instead: 
"[...] a step change is needed with a much stronger sub-regional focus - one that reflects 
the varied economic geography of this country" (ibid., p. 4). 
In a similar manner, the County Councils Network (CCN), a special interest group of 
the Local Government Association (LGA), which in turn is the national association for 
English local government93, argued as follows: 
"The CCN considers that it is important to give due weight to the inter-relationship which exists 
between these cities and their hinterland. It is that hinterland which is served by county 
councils. Shire areas play a key role in the prosperity ofthe core cities" (HOUSE OF COMMONS, ODPM: 
HOUSING, PLANNING, LOCAI GOVERNMENT AND THE REGIONS COMMITTEE, 2006, Evidence 196). 
93 The LGA emerged from the merger of three former local authority associations - the Association of County 
Councils, the Association of District Councils and the Association of Metropolitan Authorities - taking 
place about the same time as New Labour came to power (see ENTWISTLE and LAFFIN, 2003). 
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Figure 6.6 England's county sub-regions 
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Actual ly , seeing c i ty - reg ions as a rest r ic t ive concept for deve lopmen t became t h e 
s t a n d p o i n t for t he broader LGA. As t h e LGA argued in the i r pub l i ca t ion en t i t l ed City 
regions and beyond: 
"In very rural and peripheral areas the city region concept may have little resonance, but 
these areas also have local economies that make an important contribution to the national 
and regional economy and would benefit from policies that better reflect the realities of 
local market forces" (LGA, 2006, p. 2.) 
Fu r the rmore it was no ted : 
"We recognise the value of the 'city regions' concept but fear that it can appear quite 
exclusive and does not reflect the reality of the many areas in England that do not have a 
readily identifiable 'core' city. It would be more appropriate to talk about the devolution of 
powers to sub-regions, which would include city regions, but could also include areas that 
have different patterns of development" (ibid., p.5). 
As it w a s also apparen t f r o m t h e f i r s t quo te f r o m t h e LGA documen t , a rgumen ts 
in f avou r o f a more balanced and inclusive approach came up against t he exclusion 
o f ' t h e rural ' . The fear t h a t a c i ty - reg iona l approach t o deve lopmen t w o u l d enta i l 
such exc lus ion accompan ied t he r is ing m o m e n t u m o f t he c i ty - reg ion concept . 
A s t a t e m e n t o f Lord D i l l i ng ton , f o r m e r rural advocate o f t he rural commiss ion o f 
the LGA, in a House o f Lords debate is a good i l l us t ra t ion o f th is : 
"I heard last week that the new in-phrase is to refer to the "city region", meaning that the 
best way to deliver the regional agenda is to focus largely on the main city or cities within 
that region. One can only assume that under this philosophy the rural areas go hang" 
(Hansard, 2005). 
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t he general ly pos i t ive recept ion o f t h e Nor the rn Way G r o w t h 
Strategy, i t indeed p r o m p t e d concerns w i t h regard t o t h e po ten t ia l negl igence o f 
rural areas (COUNSELL and HAUCHTON, 2005; MIDGLEY, WARD and ATTERTON, 2005). One o f 
t h e ma in cr i t ics, t h e Campaign t o Protect Rural England (CPRE) d isapproved t h e 
N o r t h e r n Way G r o w t h Strategy's t o o na r row focus on GVA and voiced a concern t h a t 
t he t h r u s t o f t he in i t ia t i ve may be unde rm ined by t h e gove rnmen t ' s e f f o r t s t o 
a c c o m m o d a t e s imu l taneous ly (and as it was put , unsusta inably) t he pressures o f 
new economic g r o w t h in t h e South East (CPRE, 2005). Fur thermore , CPRE cr i t ic ized 
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that the Strategy did not propose a sufficiently differentiated approach to the 
development of various areas of the North and expressed discontent with the way 
"[ ] any note of concern about the Northern Way's effects is being answered with a 
pacifying remark along the lines of 'of course the Strategy will not [forget about the areas 
outside the city regions / damage the environment / etc], the idea is simply to add value to 
existing work'" (ibid , ρ ig) 
In a similar manner, the Countryside Agency noted m their memorandum to the CLCC 
inquiry the following 
'There is a real risk that the idea of city regions together wi th greater devolution itself 
could lead to a weakening of the position of rural areas, market towns and smaller cities 
The focus on urban centres rather than geographical regions may pose particular threats to 
communities on the periphery of England or on regional boundaries" (HOUSE OF COMMONS, 
ODPM HOUSING, PLANNING, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE REGIONS COMMITTEE 2006, Evidence 224) 
CEDOS and CSS also argued for the acknowledgement of the significance of 
'the rural' 
"It important to dispel some myths that too often remain about England's county areas - for 
example the rural areas, which some may still think, are 'all farming and food' [ ] In fact, rural 
England is home to 34% of England's registered firms, has more businesses per head of 
population than in urban areas, and makes a major contribution to 'Britain pic' Another 
persistent myth that needs dispelling is the notion that all the most severe problems of 
unemployment and deprivation are to be found in the metropolitan areas They may be less 
physically concentrated and therefore less visible, but many county sub regions have high 
unemployment, low incomes, and multiple deprivation both in individual areas and groups 
within the population" (CEDOS and CSS, 2001, ρ ιο-ιι) 
CEDOS and CSS further made reference to the responsibility of the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) for the economic performance of rural 
areas, m particular to one of its PSA targets "to reduce the gap m productivity 
between the least well performing quartile of rural areas and the English median by 
2006" (ibid , ρ 6) As the city-regional approach gained momentum, Defra did show 
concern for the implications for rural areas and commissioned SOW Consulting and 
Cambridge Econometrics m April 2006 to examine the economic performance of 
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rural areas inside and o u t s i d e c i ty-regions. The analysis w a s t o rely on t h e d e f i n i t i o n 
o f r u r a l i t y based o n a c o m b i n a t i o n o f p o p u l a t i o n d e n s i t y and s e t t l e m e n t m o r p h o l o g y 
t h a t Defra set o u t in its 2 0 0 4 Rural Strategy. The s t u d y c o n c l u d e d , a m o n g o t h e r 
t h i n g s , t h a t by using w o r k p l a c e earnings as a proxy, levels o f p r o d u c t i v i t y in rural 
areas w i t h i n c i t y - r e g i o n s are a b o u t e i g h t per cent h igher t h a n in t h o s e rural areas 
o u t s i d e c i ty-regions. 
In a c t u a l c i t y - r e g i o n b u i l d i n g , concerns w i t h t h e negl igence o f rural areas w e r e 
a c k n o w l e d g e d as w e l l , like in t h e case o f N o r t h Yorkshire in Yorkshire and t h e H u m b e r , 
w h e r e t h e RDA s t a r t e d t o make plans f o r a t r a n s i t i o n f r o m t h e sub-regional 
approach t o i n v e s t m e n t p l a n n i n g t o one o n a c i ty-reg ional basis. At t h e same t i m e , 
t h e s ign i f icance o f t h e rural w a s n o t solely f r a m e d in t e r m s o f iso lat ion and 
u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t . As one RDA pol icy o f f i c e r p u t i t : 
"Four districts in North Yorkshire are not covered by the current city-region set-up... A debate 
is going on and it is actually more of a national problem than a regional one...it's likely that 
it becomes some kind of an additional area...Basically it's a rural coastal fringe...which is 
right...that's what it is...heavily rural.... It's a tricky situation, because those districts are 
actually economically the most successful...there are pockets of deprivation, but it all tends 
to be on all indicators of social well-being higher than the cities...In Richmond, on one street 
there's three doctors, t w o architects, an MP...it's not low-value sort of professions,..it's a 
nice, pleasant green area...they tend to drive down and back every day." 
In a c i t y - r e g i o n c o o r d i n a t o r ' s a c c o u n t , rural areas a c t u a l l y f i g u r e d as b e n e f i t i n g f r o m 
resources reserved f o r rural areas only: 
"To be honest with you...that is where my prejudice comes out...there are...sources of funding 
that go into rural areas..., from the EU, one way or the another... one budget stream of the 
EU, not necessarily Structural Funds, which continue to provide large benefits for rural 
parts... I'd probably beshot if I stood u ρ and would try to say that...but they are not under-or 
unresourced..." 
Actually, consul tat ion a m o n g regional stakeholders in Yorkshire and t h e H u m b e r over 
s u m m e r 2007 reiterated concerns over t h e rural and coastal areas t h a t fel l outs ide o f one 
of t h e city- regions. In a m e e t i n g o f t h e YORK AND NORTH YORKSHIRE DEVELOPMENT BOARD (2007) 
in July 2007, t h e discussion o f t h e t rans i t ion f r o m sub-regions t o city-regions b r o u g h t 
doubts t o t h e fore a b o u t t h e alleged t r ick le-down ef fects f r o m city-regional d e v e l o p m e n t 
t o rural areas and also fears a b o u t a d r i f t o f f u n d i n g f r o m rural t o urban areas. 
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City-regions as sites of strategic planning 
Next and closely linked to arguments regarding city-regions' contribution to national 
economic performance, another strand of arguments evolved around the potential 
role of city-regions as bases of strategic governance and planning As already noted, 
the 2004 Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act stressed the necessity of a 
sub-regional approach that cuts across established boundaries and addresses 
strategic cross-border issues The growing emphasis on city-regions affected the 
elaboration of Regional Spatial Strategies (RSSs), m particular considerations about 
the scope and coverage of sub-regional planning, and the appropriate spatial scale 
for sub-regional planning within the RSS At the same time, this emphasis presented 
planners with a dilemma, namely how to prevent a loss of capacity of rural areas to 
meet the needs of their residents for adequate housing, jobs and services (PAINTER, 
2007) There was, as already mentioned, widespread concern m peripheral areas that 
the supposed trickle-down effects from city-regions would not be realized (COUNSELL 
and HAUCHTON, 2005) 
A further issue was that agreeing on a consistent set of sub-regions/city-regions 
for policy and investment decisions was not always straightforward In Yorkshire and 
the Number, for example, the three principal regional policy documents divided the 
region into three different sets of subdivisions The Northern Way strategy identified 
three city-regions (Leeds, Sheffield and Number), the Regional Spatial Strategy spoke 
of seven (partly overlapping) sub-areas (Leeds City Region, South Yorkshire, Number 
Estuary, York, Coast, Vales and Tees Links, Remoter Rural), finally, the Regional 
Economic Strategy was based on four (administrative) sub-regions (North Yorkshire, 
South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire and Number) (see COUNSELL and HAUCHTON, 2006) As a 
planner noted in relation to the link between the RSS and the RES 
"We are doing a slightly different job This isn't a marketing tool, like the Regional Economic 
Strategy is, or the Northern Way is this is a statutory planning document " 
Concerning the same strategies, a Yorkshire Forward (RDA) policy officer noted 
"The RES is formulated starting from the top-down approach, DTI says what the economic 
policy is, we have to tailor the RES accordingly [ ] The RSS is meant to be a document that 
does not take a stand on anything [ ] a lot of things in the RSS are compromises where 
one particular area wants something and they have to take the middle ground [ ] on 
the other side, when we do make harder decisions then they attack us because we have not 
been voted for if anything ever goes wrong, we have to answer to a minister" 
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It is important to consider the tensions between the respective strategies and the 
bodies charged with their elaboration, in the light of the uncertainty that surrounded 
the future of Regional Assemblies in the post-referendum period. In its response to 
the 2007 Budget Report, the English Regions Network (ERN), an umbrella organization 
for England's eight partnership Regional Assemblies, argued as follows: 
"Improved regional economic performance cannot be achieved without the full collective 
engagement of local authorities. Councils must remain the building blocks of regional 
architecture, working in partnership with regional stakeholders. As place-shapers, councils 
are critical not only to regional accountability but also to delivery. Led by local government. 
Regional Assemblies represent a practical, partnership model of democratic governance; 
they are effectively regional strategic partnerships" (ERN, 2007, p.2). 
In summary, the ERN expressed the belief that the SNR should recognize the key 
contribution of Assemblies to regional governance in providing a Strategieframework 
with clear priorities for local delivery at sub-regional, city-regional and local level. 
RDAs, backed by Treasury and DTI as the regional executives of national economic 
policy objectives, certainly did not have to fear abolition. At the same time, they were 
looking forward to guidelines specifying the actual links that the government wants 
to see between city-regional arrangements and their own task load. 
City-regions as sites of empowerment 
In particular after the 'no' vote in the North East referendum, the government seemed 
to favour stronger local leadership. David Miliband, Minister of the Department for 
Communities and Local Government (DCLG) that was created after the May 2005 
Labour election victory, spoke of a "double devolution of power from Whitehall to 
the town hall and from the town hall to citizens and local communities". The belief in 
strong local leadership was greatly spurred by the success of London's governance 
arrangements. As Ken Livingstone, Mayor of London, argued: 
"[F]ollowing the failure of the referendum for directly elected regional government in the 
North East, the future for further devolution in England should focus on applying some of 
the lessons from London's success- namely providing additional powers to the city-regions 
outside of London" (HOUSE OF COMMONS, ODPM: HOUSING, PLANNING, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE 
REGIONS COMMITTEE, 2006, Evidence 20). 
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Although the renewed attention to strong local leadership was understandable in 
view of the outcome of the referendum, it might be considered still surprising m view 
of the failure of the mayoral policy introduced by the 2000 Local Government Act 
mentioned above As CAINS, JOHN and STOKER (2005) note, in the end fewer than three 
per cent of all councils chose a mayoral option (1 e a directly elected mayor and 
cabinet, or a directly elected mayor and council manager) as provided for by the Local 
Government Act, and even some of those only occurred fol lowing petitions raised by 
local residents to put the issue on the political agenda Finally, some 29 referendums 
were held between June 2001 and October 2002, and of these, less than half (11) 
produced a 'yes' vote Moreover, none of the 'yes' votes occurred in the big cities for 
which the office of elected mayor had been originally envisaged (TOMANEY and 
HETHERINCTON, 2003) Interestingly, party traditions appeared to have a strong effect 
on the response of councils to the changes forced by the 2000 Act While about 60% 
of the authorities with a Conservative Party majority adopted a high leadership 
model, Labour authorities were more likely to follow their collectivist traditions, thus 
apparently challenging the strong leadership and scrutiny approach favoured by the 
Labour government itself (GAINS, JOHN and STOKER, 2005) 
Nonetheless, New Labour-friendly thmk-thanks in particular continued to push 
the issue of elected mayors, especially for city-regions A publication of the New Local 
Government Network's City Regions Commission m December 2005 entitled Seeing 
the light? Next Steps for City Regions argued that Westminster had failed to appreciate 
the democratic demands of city-regions The document launched a call for an 
incremental development of city-region governance based on local authorities 
voluntarily engaging m voluntary associations As it was noted, city-regions could be 
led by an executive committee of leaders drawn from local authorities (the 'senate of 
leaders') At the same time it was not excluded that as they develop distinct identities, 
city-regions would evolve into more formal units of governance, with elected 
city-region mayors (NLGN, 2005) In a similar way, the publication of the Centre for 
Cities (an independent urban policy unit at IPPR) entitled City Leadership Giving 
City-Regions the Power to Crow stressed that the scale of devolution is critical and 
recommended a priority focus on the largest city-regions (Manchester and 
Birmingham) The document proposed new governance structures for city-regions 
with directly elected mayors m the lead and a set of general flexibilities for all areas 
The authors talked of "asymmetric devolution", meaning that different places have 
different degrees of autonomy, proportionate to their economic importance (MARSHALL, 
FINCH and URWIN, 2006) 
While the need to reconsider certain issues (such as transport planning) across 
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city-regions was widely acknowledged, for many actors this was not necessarily 
associated wi th the establishment of new, directly elected authorities. Greater 
coordination on the basis of existing cooperation was predominantly seen as the 
preferred alternative. As to the ODPM, it welcomed the contribution to the debate 
around elected mayors, but the Centre for Cities report received a lukewarm reception 
elsewhere. Liberal Democrats acknowledged that it contained some good ideas but 
were critical of what they saw as "New Labour's blinkered preoccupation with 
mayors". Similarly, the Conservative Party's spokesman Eric Pickles responded 
negatively to the idea: "A new tier of government isn't going to change the current 
centralisation of power or make people more involved in their local communities"94 
(STEVENS, 2006). Nonetheless, the issue remained high on the government's agenda. 
In the foreword of Strong and Prosperous Communities: The Local Government White 
Paper (DCLG, 2006), Tony Blair argued as follows: 
"The White Paper proposes a new approach to local partnership to give local authorities 
more opportunity to lead their area, work with other services and better meet the public's 
needs. It sets out the important contribution of our cities to the economic health of our 
communities. We want the offer of greater power to cities and city-regions matched by 
stronger governance and accountability at that level" (DCLG, 2006, p. 2). 
The White Paper indeed proposed a substantial change in the leadership arrangements 
of English local authorities, movingfrom the straight choice between a council leader 
elected annually by other councillors, which operates in the vast majority of councils, 
or a directly elected mayor, which operates in only twelve. Instead, three types of 
local authority leader were proposed: a directly elected mayor, a directly elected 
executive, and an indirectly elected leader with a four-year mandate. 
At the same time, the White Paper contained few, if any, concrete proposals for 
city-regional governance and elected city-region mayors. This was certainly in part 
due to the negative responses that the above-mentioned proposals received from 
main city council authorities such as Manchester and Birmingham. As ACMA made it 
clear in its submission New Deal for Manchester9''to DCLG: 
94 This statement suggested some inconsistency in Tory policy Party leader David Cameron had previously 
called for a newgeneration of city mayors in his leadership campaign launch and subsequently backed the 
NLCN report on city regions (STEVENS, 2006). 
95 The New Deal for Cities was launched in September 2005 by David Miliband, then Minister of State for 
Communities and Local Government, for a seriesof City Summits with the English Core Cities. 
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"We propose the creation of an Executive Board, comprising the Leaders of the 10 Manchester 
Authorities, to act as the primary commissioning agent for key services and activities for 
the conurbation as a whole From our perspective it is by providing this direct link to the 
local authorities that there can be democratic accountability between the Executive Board 
and the constituent parts of Greater Manchester [ ] for Manchester, this proposal needs 
to be the starting point for developing a new way of strategic working at city region 
level"(ACMA, 2006) 
In a later statement about the future governance of AGMA, it was argued that once 
powers are ceded to any 'Mayor for Greater Manchester', part of local authorities' 
existing sovereignty is lost, probably for good Furthermore, it was noted that the 
comparison between Greater Manchester and London was inadequate inasmuch as 
in London there is a strong cultural identification wi th 'London', and in Greater 
Manchester the identification is more with individual towns and neighbourhoods 
Governing through an executive formed by the leaders of the ten councils was 
regarded as reflecting the history of cooperation (AGMA, 2008) 
A federalist model of city-region governance was also favoured in the Birmingham, 
Coventry and Black Country City Region (BCBC City Region) As was concluded at a 
Steering Group meeting. "Birmingham is the only brand within the City Region that is 
recognised for international inward investment marketing purposes, but there are 
acknowledged issues and sensitivities attached to this as there is to the name 'Greater 
Birmingham'" (BCBC City Region, 2008, p. 6). Similarly, concerning the possibility of 
an elected mayor for the Leeds City Region, the Chair of Yorkshire Forward noted the 
following m his letter to Leeds City Councillor Carter· 
"The Board of Yorkshire Forward did not detect any appetite for Governance arrangements 
at anything other than at a Local Authority level [ ] we do not see the City Region groupings 
as delivery vehicles We firmly believe that delivery should continue to be undertaken at 
local level" (LEEDS CITY REGION, 2007) 
As a local government policy officer argued: 
"This [an elected mayor] is a step too far, certainly for the Leeds City Region, because that is 
taking away, perhaps too much of the historic influence that they, the leaders of the 11 
councils have got in the city region, taking away too much of their influence and 
concentrates the power in one person that is not likely to happen " 
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On the whole, the Core Cities were all opposing the idea of elected city-regional mayors. 
Whi le t h e apparent silence o f t h e W h i t e Paper on c i ty - reg iona l mayors was less 
o f an issue, var ious actors w h o expec ted the W h i t e Paper t o set clear d i rec t ions were 
rather d isappo in ted by its permissive and indecisive approach. As var ious local and 
regional representat ives no ted ; 
"[In the White Paper] there wasn't anything in it, about cities and regions, ..just a couple of 
paragraphs"; "you could read it either way.Jt seemed to point in a certain direction, but 
wasn't firmly backing one thing or the other, a sense of 'we'll know what we want when 
we see it'"; "it was more watered-down than any of us has expected." 
The gove rnmen t received similar react ions f r o m t h e oppos i t i on in par l iament . As a 
Conservat ive MP no ted in a par l i amenta ry debate a f te r t h e pub l i ca t ion o f t h e W h i t e 
Paper: 
"What worries me about the White Paper is the level of compromise, which is the symptom 
of a party that is unsure of its direction. Does the Secretary of State agree that empowering 
council leaders is a fudge between the Prime Minister's stated preference for directly 
elected mayors and the Chancellor's opposition to them?" (Hansard, 2006). 
Similarly, a Liberal Democra t wonde red as f o l l ows ; 
"One of the most talked-up parts of the White Paper was the part relating to city regions. 
My question to the Secretary of State is simple; what happened to it? If the mayors are in 
because of No. 10, city regions seem to be out because of No. 11. What exactly has the city 
regions project to do with the Treasury, and how has the Secretary of State let the Treasury 
get its hands on it?" (Hansard, 2006). 
Indeed, t he loss o f m o m e n t u m o f t h e c i ty - reg iona l t u r n in deve lopmen t pol icy t h a t 
t he Wh i te Paper seemed to signal was par t ly roo ted in (reshaping) i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l 
relat ions. Fur thermore , it was also l inked t o t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f a r t i cu la t i ng t he 
c i ty- reg ional focus o f economic deve lopmen t and t h e cons t i t u t i ona l re fo rm plans o f 
local gove rnmen t (cf. BURCH, HARDING and REES, 2007). Several respondents c o n f i r m e d 
th is i n te rp re ta t i on ; 
"There are two agendas, one economic, one more about strengthening political accountability... 
sometimes they got confused as well." 
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"There was duplication creeping m regional economic policy because Brown and Balls 
[Cordon Brown, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Ed Balls, Economic Secretary to the 
Treasury] were rallying policy from the Treasury alongside the situation at DCLG but it s 
been a feature of the past 5 10 years that the Treasury has developed policy independent of 
DTI and DCLG " 
' There's been always a strange dynamic between DTI, DCLG and Treasury, DTI wants us to 
be productivity drivers , DCLG wants to focus on the economic inclusion issues, community, 
susta inability and Treasury just wants usto sort out the economy" 
6.5 Fading city-regionalism 
Having reached its height m 2004 and 2005, the potential of the city-region concept 
to shape the formation of new state spaces began to wane This penultimate section 
will discuss the reasons for this gradual loss of momentum m terms of the failure of 
the city-region concept to become embedded in the discursive formation of regional 
economic governance and that of 'modernized' local government 
While city-regional conceptualizations of devolution were f irst primarily 
animated by economic development considerations (MORGAN, 2007), especially under 
Miliband's leadership of the DCLG it seemed that the city-region concept can be 
embedded within both of the above-mentioned discursive formations Or to refer to 
Healey, the city-region concept seemed to 
"occupy the institutional spaces left by the perceived failure of political devolution to 
regions and m advance of an as yet unfulfilled commitment to substantial devolution to 
municipalities" (HEAIEV, 2009, ρ 839) 
As his much-quoted reference to 'double devolution' indicated, Miliband showed 
himself eager to carry on the new locahst agenda of Labour that wished to mobilize 
local government as a self-sustaining system of improvement (see DAVIES, 2007) 
Miliband also showed great interest m the potential role of cities m making economic 
development more dynamic and proposed a series of Urban Summits m September 
2005 to explore how the eight Core Cities could develop strategic leadership Miliband 
launched a 'New Deal' that addressed the Core Cities and asked each core city to 
submit a business case to DCLG According to a RDA policy officer 
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"Miliband was very keen on the idea on city-region administration and mayor actually; 
DCLG was along the lines that he wants to see much more devolution to the cities, because 
they are the legitimate, locally accountable bodies...it looked like we are heading down a 
country wi th blocks of mayoral city-regions wi th some rural fringe areas In It". 
As a result of a major Cabinet reshuffle after what were devastating local government 
elections for Labour in May 2006, Miliband's post at DCLG was taken over, however, 
by Ruth Kelly (Miliband shifted to Defra). Subsequently, the city-region concept itself 
started to f ind itself in a vacuum. On the one hand, ultimately the city-region concept 
could not effectively challenge the role of regions, and in particular that of RDAs, as 
key actors of regional economic governance. On the other hand, it could not become 
embedded within the discursive formation of modernized local governance, only at 
the price of being finally watered down and transformed into 'sub-region'. 
6.5.7 City-regions and regional economic governance 
Concerning the role of city-regions as spaces of regional economic governance, it was 
supported by both the Core Cities group and the Northern Way strategy, where these 
two'push ing factors'stood for two different views on England's regional geographies. 
While from the perspective of the Core Cities group, the emphasis was on the 
promotion of urban centres other than London, the Northern Way built on the 
deep-rooted (real-and-imagined) spatial division between the 'North' and the 'South'. 
During Miliband's term, (Northern) cities had to prepare both a business case for 
DCLG and a City Regional Development Plan (CRDP) for the Northern Way; as a 
consequence, a duplication of requirements started to emerge. This led to some 
uncertainty in the policy direction and stretched already limited local resources and 
capacity. In some cases, these short term pressures had consequences for the quality 
and focus of the CRDPs (PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2007); many officers regarded the 
CRDP as secondary to writ ing the business case (GONZALEZ, 2006b). 
Increasingly, the Northern Way (NW) initiative seemed to lose momentum. 
The departure of Prescott, a strong supporter of the case of the North, undoubtedly 
played a role in the fading away of the NW. Furthermore, one of the major obstacles 
to encouraging a spirit of collaboration and partnership was the lack of one 
pan-regional identity for the Greater North (LIDDLE, 2009). The long and short-term 
histories of regional and sub-regional identity- and institution-building proved to be 
an underlying source of tension, even as actors tried not to get too mired in the legacy 
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of the past (HAUCHTON and COUNSELL, 2007) Already existing tensions were further 
enhanced by the fact that through its emphasis on city-regions, the NW advanced a 
rationale for (pan-)regional development intervention that was similar to that 
prevailing at the national scale, namely support growth where it occurs, retrench and 
withdraw elsewhere (GOODCHILD and HICKMAN, 2006) Ultimately, although the NW set 
itself the task of concentrating investment efforts, rather than spreading investment 
priorities, consensus and equity concerns tended to prevail However, these concerns 
were difficult to address First, although the city regional geographical coverage 
became more inclusive, actors outside the Northern Way priority areas feared that 
they might become disconnected from new growth areas On the other hand, there 
was little engagement with mutual links between the established city-regions, or 
between city-regions and the wider Northern scale (GONZALEZ, 2006b) In fact, 
although the Northern Way as a pan-regional cooperation was founded on a deal 
that the two great Pennine rivals, Leeds and Manchester, would not tread on each 
other's toes, following the (second version of the) Leeds CROP, the Manchester-Leeds 
rivalry remained an issue, especially with Manchester as a financial and business 
centre, and having a major international and regional airport (LEEDS CITY REGION, 2006) 
This rivalry stood in the way of the emergence of one Northern centre that effectively 
counterbalances London As a Yorkshire and Humber RDA policy officer formulated 
"Leeds and Manchester are competitors they want to work together, they can see the 
economic benefits of that [ ] The big thing about the North is that we don t have a London 
in our middle if you are the biggest, everyone agrees with you in the North you have 
eight different economic areas arguing with each other there s a need for a group in the 
middle to sit down and agree on what we need to do as the North of England As to 
collaboration and competition, so far there were no problems because no difficult decisions 
had to betaken' 
In addition, although most local actors readily prescribed to city-regional strategy-
making, some political issues remained important barriers m some areas, and past 
rivalry between smaller centres and the core city-region authorities (eg Bradford 
and Leeds) presented some difficulties (LEEDS CITY REGION, 2006) 
In fact, the newly emerging city-regional arrangements underpinning the NW 
foreshadowed the possible reconfiguration of scalar relations, with a new set of 
institutional winners and losers both at particular scales of governance and across 
them (HAUGHTON and COUNSELL, 2007) Local authorities, especially outside core 
city regional areas, anticipated losing out as a result of city-regional arrangements 
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As to beneficiaries, it seemed that RDAs in particular were gaining influence. 
The Northern Way was actually most clearly identified with the regional level, given 
the RDAs role in driving the programme. There was also some tension between 
the local (city-regional) and the regional because it was not always clear who had 
the responsibility and right to carry out work (PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2007). As one 
city-region coordinator put it: 
"It's been a very strange relationship wi th the Northern Way to be honest.they've done 
their own thing as far as I can see with their workstreams and the RDAs...and they only 
talked to the city regions as a kind of last resort." 
The view that the RDAs used the Northern Way programme to further their own 
agenda rather than to maximize the wider Northern Way goals and to support the 
CRDP was actually more generally held by city-regional actors (PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 
2007). 
On the whole, newly forming city-regional bodies - both in the North and 
elsewhere - struggled to assert their position in the face of incoherent national policy 
frameworks, and next to established local and regional actors. At the same time, 
RDAs, slightly concerned about their future roles, could rely on the patronage of the 
Treasury. As a policy official put it, the main question that arose was: 
"Whether the Sub-National Review is going to recommend more powers to the RDAs and some 
powers to city regions, or ...you know, we are not sure where the balance is going to be." 
With Ruth Kelly taking over the lead of DCLG, ultimately an approach based on both 
cities and regions gained acceptance. As Kelly formulated at the Core Cities Summit 
in Bristol: 
"Now, more than ever, we face an economic imperative that means we have to think afresh 
about how to support our cities. Globalisation-the increasing movement of people, money 
and ideas across borders - has repositioned cities as drivers of national economies [...] And, 
crucially, we need strong cities and strong regions. There is no case for saying that we must 
choose between them. Strong cities make stronger regions, and - furthermore - strong 
cities need strong regions" (KELLY, 2006), 
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The reference to strong cities and regions was interpreted in different ways As a RDA 
policy officer formulated, the move of Miliband was 
"[ ] a good move for us, because the RDAs were a bit concerned wi th what our roles are 
going to be Ruth Kelly came in she agrees more with Treasury that there is a role for both, 
regions and cities, there's a role for the regions as a strategic level and there's a need for 
some bolstering at local and sub national level " 
For others, the simultaneous concern with cities and regions was already a sign of a 
possible weakening of the city-regional focus 
"Ruth Kelly came along and she wasn't sure what she wanted to do about cities and regions 
and the devolution agenda, she wasn t convinced to start with but then she made a 
number of visits, to Hull, Leeds, and she heard the partnerships talk about their aspirations, 
the barriers to development etc and eventually she agreed that devolution to cities and 
city regions was potentially to lead to economic growth " 
A further indication that regions remain important to the approach taken by the 
government was the publication of the NLCN pamphlet entitled Redesigning 
Regionalism Leadership and accountability in England's regions (NLCN, 2007) This 
document spoke of enhancing existing RDA powers through the creation of a new 
Regional Executive Agency As one of my respondents pointed out, the fact that the 
foreword to the pamphlet was signed by two prominent Treasury officials, Ed Balls 
(Economic Secretary) and John Healey (Financial Secretary), made many anticipate -
as we will see below, rightly s o - t h a t the strengthening of RDAs would beone of the 
key messages of the Sub-National Review At the same time, the prospect of 
reinforcing RDAs in their position raised questions concerning the future of 
city-regions As the same respondent put it 
' [Having read the NLGN document,] we began to think, well, if Balls and Healey are signing 
this document, which effectively talks about more powers to regional organizations like 
the RDAs, where does that lead to for the city regional agenda?" 
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6.52 City-regions and 'modernized' local governance 
Concerning the failure of the city-region concept to articulate with the discursive 
formation of 'modernized' local government, this was most evidently indicated by 
the tocal Government White Paper, the preparation of which was started under 
Miliband and finished (with delay) under Kelly's term. The White Paper, with its stress 
on local government as a strategic leader and place-shaper, could be seen as 
announcing a "third new dawn for localism" (DAVIES, 2008). 
The White Paper's actual propositions reflected DCtG's primary concern with 
changes in administrative local government arrangements. A key message of the 
document was that councils in shire areas will be able to seek unitary status and in 
the remaining two-tier areas there would be new opportunities "to bring local 
government closer to the people and deliver better value for money" (DCtG, 2006, 
p. 9). According to the document Invitations to councils in England that accompanied 
the White Paper, the above-mentioned propositions were made in order to tackle the 
additional challenges that two-tier areas face in terms of achieving strong leadership 
and strong accountability96 (DCtG, 2006b). Also, the White Paper indicated that the 
number of national targets would be reduced and that others would be tailored to 
local circumstances, providing freedom and space for councils to respond wi th 
flexibility to local needs and demands. Furthermore, the White Paper introduced the 
term 'Multiple Area Agreements' (MAA) so that linkages between places at wider 
geographical levels are properly considered to add real value. MAAs were expected to 
be voluntary sub-regional cooperations, able to agree on shared outcome-based 
targets drawn from the national indicator set and to agree on local priorities, which 
would then be reflected in each area's tAA. As it was also noted, authorities and their 
partners would be able to agree to pool funding to be used across the sub-region. 
The White Paper was criticized for failing to develop a position on city-regional 
governance. According to some views, the fact that the White Paper neglected the 
issue of city-regional governance was partly due to the above-mentioned Cabinet 
reshuffle, i.e. the move of Miliband from DCtG. Also, Tony Blair's authority as Prime 
Minister was waning, and his successor Gordon Brown remained silent about his own 
plans for local government (STEVENS, 2006b). The issue of local government reform 
96 Following DAVIES (2008), the permissive tone of the White Paper was an understatement as in reality the 
government proposed to assume powers to invite or to direct local authorities to make proposals for uni-
tary authorities. It has to be mentioned that in the document invitations to counciis in England it was 
stated that "the Government thinks it wi l l be unlikely to be able to implement more than eight proposals' 
(DCLC, 20o5b, p. 17). This was said to be due to Treasury concerns about the risk of sudden increases in 
public spending if a la rgenumberof proposals were implemented at once wi th transitional costs financed 
through reserves (CNN, 2006) 
SOS 
was thought to bea key battleground between supposed Browmte and Blainte wings 
of the Labour Party (BURCH, HARDING and REES, 2007) 
Furthermore, critics also pointed out that "the function and finance of local 
government are t w o sides of the same com", and as the White Paper came well m 
advance of the Lyons Inquiry into local government finance, it could hardly have 
substantial meaning (e g Hansard, 2006). The Lyons Inquiry was already established 
by HM Treasury m July 2004 to examine changes m the local government system, the 
reform of council tax and additional revenue raising powers, it was extended m 
September 2005 to consider the fundamental role and function of local government, 
and then again in December 2006 to encompass the implications of other inquiries 
launched by HM Treasury. The commissioning of these other inquiries into different 
aspects of economic development (i.e. planning, skills and transport9') was clearly 
indicating Treasury's concern with sub-national governance in economic regeneration 
The inquiries were expected to feed into the Sub-National Review of Economic 
Development and Regeneration (SNR), conducted by the Treasury, DCLG and DTI with 
the aim of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of existing sub-national 
structures in England, and finally to feed into the Comprehensive Spending Review 
2 0 0 7 9 8 . 
Notwithstanding the arguably problematic t iming of various reviews, the new 
localist tone of the White Paper - and its watered-down approach to city-regions -
coincided with the expectations of the LGA. As it was put in Prosperous Communities. 
Beyond the White Paper 
"[ ] w e are very pleased b o t h at t h e W h i t e Paper's proposals t o r e i n f o r c e Local Area 
A g r e e m e n t s a n d t o d e v e l o p M u l t i - A r e a A g r e e m e n t s In p a r t i c u l a r , w e t h i n k it is r i g h t f o r 
local g o v e r n m e n t a n d R D A s t o be covered by t h e d u t y t o c o - o p e r a t e w i t h i n LAAs W e e x p e c t 
t h a t t h e y w i l l g ive a s imi lar c o m m i t m e n t t o M A As B e t w e e n t h e s e t w o kinds of p a r t n e r s h i p , 
w e feel w e can d e v e l o p s t r u c t u r e s f o r c i t ies, w i d e r m e t r o p o l i t a n areas, and shires, t h a t can 
be t a i l o r e d t o t h e real p a t t e r n o f s u b r e g i o n a l e c o n o m i e s " (LGA, 2 0 0 6 b , ρ 6) 
97 The Eddmgton Review of Transport, the Leitch Review of Skills and the Barker Review of Land Use Planning 
were all published m early December 2006 
98 It was in July 2005, on the occasion of his first appearance before [he House of Commons Treasury 
Committee that Chancellor of the Exchequer Cordon Brown announced that there would be a 
Comprehensive Spending Review m 2007 (rather than a Spending Review in 2006), establishing 
expenditure totals w i th in Departmental Expenditure Limits for 2 0 0 8 - 0 9 2009-10 and 2010-11 (HOUSF OF 
COMMONS TRLASURY CoMMin[r,2007) 
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In a fol low-up publication entitled Prosperous Communities II: Vive la dévolution!, 
the LGA propagated the 'localist case': 
"Each place, city, town and shire is different. All require local solutions. The LGA has indeed 
championed the devolutionary cause by instinct and belief, it now does so on the evidence. 
[...] The evidence is crystal clear that sub-national economies are sub-regional. [...] In the 
light of the evidence, devolution now seems to us both necessary and unavoidable. We 
believe that the government has, in the Sub-National Review, created for itself an 
unmissable opportunity to bring about this decade's decisive economic transformation [...] 
Circumstances, geography and challenges all vary and make up the personality of a place. 
Every place is unique so uniform national policy solutions will not work everywhere. It 
follows from this that decisions are best taken at the spatial level where they are most 
relevant. Matching geography with relevance also improves targeting and transparency. 
This idea of 'local optimisation' is an economic concept that is at the core of the localist 
case" (LGA, 2007, pp. 5,11). 
While the document recognized that devolution does entail some risks, it argued that 
relative economic performance of the regions of England is a failure that was brought 
about by the centralized status quo. It stressed the need for 'differential devolution' 
and that the economy of England outside London cannot afford to remain a laggard. 
Similarly to the LGA, the County Councils Network (CNN) also welcomed the 
localist perspective of 'place-shaping'. In their Response to Lyons' questions to 
stakeholders on promoting economic prosperity: Considering the implication of 
Eddington, Barker and Leitch (CNN, 2006), the CNN argued as follows: 
"County councils should become "county regions" with wider powers in relation to a number 
of strategic functions which could include: economic development, strategic planning and 
housing, transport, public health, police and crime prevention, learning and skills and 
environmental sustainability. These powers would make a significant contribution to 
enabling county councils to play an even more effective role in place shaping" (CNN, n.d., p.i). 
CNN stressed that county authorities represent 48% of the population of England, 
provide services across 87% of Its land area, accommodate around 58% of jobs In 
England, and play a key role In the prosperity of the core cities. Furthermore, It was 
argued that there should be significant devolution of functions from regional 
governance to the county level, to be combined with the existing functions of county 
councils, and that powers and functions should not be taken from the local level. 
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On the whole, a general refusal of a 'one-size-fits-all' approach was observable across 
the whole policy spectrum In that respect, localism appeared not so much as 
something pertaining to the realm of local government, but more generally as a 
stance positioned vis-a-vis central government control Responses to the CLCG inquiry 
Is there a future for Regional Government} greatly converged on the dismissal of the 
'one-size-fits-all' treatment of regional governance, arguing that a centrally steered, 
uniform approach will not be able to address the needs of and capitalize on the 
unique assets of regions and sub-regions Clearly, this generally agreed weaker form 
of localism, standing for flexibil ity at different scales, became coupled with different 
views on local government and city-regions, in principle, it did not exclude a more 
radical, constitutional localism that opposes the political empowerment of 
city-regions In practice, as it was obvious that central government would not wish to 
vest city-regions wi th political power in their own right, stakeholders in city-region 
building welcomed the concept of the MAA as one that serves as a good basis for 
delivering the specific CRDPs Leeds City Region, for example, started to investigate 
the possibilities of developing a MAA around transport, while Sheffield City Region 
were looking at a housmg-focussed MAA 
The much-awaited Lyons Inquiry entitled Place-shaping a shared ambition for 
the future of local government (LYONS, 2007) was supportive of the view of local 
governments as place-shapers, where place-shaping was understood as "the creative 
use of powers and influence to promote the general well-being of a community and 
its citizens" (ibid , ρ 6o) The Lyons reporttalked also of "managed difference", 1 e the 
need to recognize the right and the ability of local communities to make their own 
choices, confident m their own competence and m the knowledge of their own 
preferences (ibid , ρ in) In line with that, Lyons welcomed what he called the 
government's nuanced approach to proposals for unitary local government that 
seeks to change current arrangements only where there is a strong case for change 
and a broad cross-section of support 
It goes beyond the scope of this study to discuss in detail what actual policy 
changes took place following the Local Government and Public Involvement m Health 
Bill 2007 (passed by the House of Commons on 22 May 2007) that was supposed to 
provide legislative underpinning for the White Paper What is of particular relevance 
for this study is that the Bill in question - contrary to the White Paper - made no 
mention at all of city-regions According to DAVIES' (2008) assessment, one does not 
have to bea radical localistto be frustrated by the the fact that the Bill failed to begin 
rebalancing the relationship between centre and locality, the micro-prescriptions of 
the Bill carry on the government's technocratic centralism This view was shared by 
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the LGA that expressed concerns that the Bill, unlike the White Paper, allows the 
Secretary of State to impose restructuring on two-tier structures. Furthermore, the 
LGA found that the Bill, by omitt ing an explicit upper limit to national targets, 
delivered less than the White Paper promised, and also that the Bill failed to 
"plug in the large hole in the White Paper around devolving powers over planning, housing, 
transport, skills and economic development from national and regional government to 
councils" (LGA, 2006c, p. i). 
The Bill's stipulation that local authorities have to choose between two forms of 
leadership (namely between having an elected mayor and cabinet on a four-year 
mandate, ora leader and cabinet elected by the council itself for a four-year mandate) 
was welcome by the LGA as enabling strategic leadership; at the same time it was 
stressed that there have to be adequate means to remove incompetent leaders. 
6.5.3 The Sub-National Review 
The idea of city-regions thus failed to seriously challenge the role of RDAs in economic 
governance, and it also became gradually writ ten off from the 'new localist' agenda 
in the post-White Paper period. In line wi th these developments, expectations of the 
Sub-National Review and its clarification of the role of city-regions in economic 
development were rising. The six months prior to the publication of the SNR was 
described by many as a period of limbo. Local and regional actors experienced some 
tension between their freedom to come up with their own ideas and the need to 
know what decisions would actually receive government support: 
"Actually...the government is actually actively seeking leadership from local actors...and 
some of them are struggling with that...there's still the mentality in England of expecting 
the government to tell us what we have to do, they should issue guidelines...people 
struggling mentally with the government's changing approach...it's not a decisive change, 
but it's a new way of doing things in a very highly centralized nation-state, England 
obviously." 
"The national steer on it (city-regions] has been very vague...Some are seeing this as a 
criticism that people are being told what to do [...] another view is that local areas decide 
on what course is best for them...an element of truth in both arguments." 
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"But I think until government says well, these are the powers, these are the resources we 
will devolve, and we don't know what these powers and resources are going to be until the 
Sub-National Review reports some authorities are not preceding as quickly as others, 
because they don't know what they are going to get out of it 
"[ ] we do need some sort of framework from government the sooner that comes out the 
better, even if it's only saying this is on the agenda and this if off it even if it's lots of grey 
areas which are kind of local dimension where we kind of decide how we want to do things 
that Sub-National Review can't come quick enough if you like 
In its encompassing review of CRDPs commissioned by the Northern Way Secretariat, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers confirmed that a number of city-regions felt that the 
expectations from government had been set very high and the reaction to the CRDPs 
when they were published was somewhat disappointing. The PwC study also noted 
that city-regions felt that m some areas there had not been sufficient guidance for 
them on what would have been welcomed and what the implications could have 
been. In particular, if city-regions had felt that there were actual funding streams 
potentially lined up behind their recommendations, they would have focused 
resources on those specific areas m order to be able to facilitate local delivery (PRICE­
WATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2007) As city-regional coordinators further noted, the vagueness 
around city-regions could turn politicians off because they saw nothing happening 
The long-awaited Sub-National Review (HM TREASURY, BERR and DCLG, 2007) was 
published on 17 July 2007. Certainly, the SNR has to be regarded as "policy-m-the-
makmg" (PIKE and TOMANEY, 2009), and not the end point of the evolution of city-
regionalism Nonetheless, to the extent the SNR's announcements can be taken as 
indicative of the future path of government policy, we can take the Review as a 
significant milestone m the process of policy evolution 
Below, only the key announcements of the Review are briefly discussed First of 
all, the Review was said to be based on the following three principles· 1) managing 
policy at the right spatial levels; 2) ensuring clarity of roles, and 3) enabling places to 
reach their potential The SNR announced that the newly created Department for 
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (DBERR) would assumethe responsibility 
for the performance management of the RDAs and for the Regional Economic 
Performance PSA. With regard to the PSA, the SNR noted that although there are 
signs of improvement m the performance of regions, "it is not possible to say whether 
the regional economic performance PSA or the neighbourhood PSA will be met" (HM 
TREASURY, BERR and DCLG, 2007, ρ 45) 
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As to the questions surrounding the landscape of regional governance, the Review 
contained a number of proposals to streamline existing arrangements. It noted that 
RAs will be phased out from 2010 onwards and their planning responsibilities would be 
transferred to RDAs, which will be in charge of producing a single, overarching strategy. 
AstothescrutinyofRDAs, that task would be assumed by an as yet unspecified system 
including local authorities and MPs. Concerning city-regional development, references 
to it were either subsumed to 'sub-regional' development or mentioned next to it. 
The Review reasserted earlier statements that there would be benefits in greater 
working at sub-regional level, but stressed that there are also functions which are best 
undertaken at the regional level (such as the coordination and procurement of business 
support) or the national level (such as strategic planning decisions and decisions on 
major infrastructure). MAAs in particular were mentioned as the means that would 
allow sub-regions, including city-regions, to take a more active role in leading economic 
development. It was noted that a guidance on the production and delivery of MAAs 
would be produced so that the first round of MAAs become set up by mid-2008. It was 
also noted that proposals in the Local Transport Bill regarding city-regional transport 
regulation would be strengthened. The Review stated that the government would 
work with interested sub-regions to explore the potential for allowing groups of local 
authorities to establish statutory sub-regional authorities, which enable pooling of 
responsibilities on a permanent basis for economic development policy areas beyond 
transport. Finally, as to local government, the SNR contained the commitment to 
consider measures that give greater incentives to promote economic development and 
regeneration. It envisaged that local authorities would carry out an assessment of the 
economic circumstances and challenges to their economy. 
6.6 Concluding remarks 
This chapter examined the recent evolution of city-regionalism in England as an 
episode of the neoliberal transformation of (UK) state spatiality. Undeniably, the 
concern underlying (New) Labour's spatial reforms was to secure economic growth 
through supply-side policies in order to create a competitive advantage under 
globalization. This concern in turn gave way to the incentive structures of post-iggy 
governments that were supposed to make spaces at various scales increase their 
economic potential through their own efforts. 
This chapter demonstrated that in order to understand how and why the 
evolution of city-regionalism took a particular course, we need to examine that 
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process of evolution as one that is fundamentally about problematizmg the English 
nation as a spatial community In order to duly ground such an examination, and m 
order to trace those relatively sedimented practices and meanings (structurally 
inscribed discursive selectivities) that shape the process of problematization, this 
chapter located the recent emergence of city-regionalism m a broader historical 
study of England's state spaces This study brought forward three mam interrelated 
sets of relatively stable, but continuously changing, meanings of spaces the 
centralizing, 'anti-territorial tradit ion' of British politics, and the urban-rural and 
North-South 'divides' The discursive formations of regional economic governance 
and 'modernized' local government, key manifestations of the post-1997 Labour 
governments' first attempts to restructure state spatiality, were shaped by the 
above-mentioned practices and meanings, but they also reworked them 
Against this background, the (re-)emergence of the concept of the city-region 
was examined here as a spatial concept around which the struggle over nation-state 
spaces was unfolding The case study highlighted two related aspects of this struggle 
First, that the revival of the city-region concept was largely due to the fact that it 
could embrace a range of spatial policy concerns m the broad sense following the 
dislocation effected by the 2004 referendum The city-region concept's appeal was 
further reinforced by the allusion it made to the 'natural' space of flows of 
socio-economic relations, as well as by its compatibility with the already established 
notion of 'local community' The second aspect stressed here is that the city-region 
concept enabled actors speaking for different spaces to address and challenge the 
meaning that ('their') particular spaces (urban/rural spaces, the North/the South 
East, the standard regions etc ) have as part of the national space of England 
This chapter further showed that we can have a fuller understanding of the way 
city regionalism has become institutionalized if we regard the struggle over the 
meaning of city-regions as being structured by the logic of equivalence and the logic 
of difference As to the former, outside the wider London mega-region - that can 
claim to stand for England i tse l f - no other city(-region) could claim to be recognized 
as a particular space that is fundamentally different from other nation-state spaces 
Actors speaking for spaces 'outside' the South East (the interests of which have been 
taken to be synonymous wi th that of England), have had difficulties in asserting 
'their' space within the national space economy (cf BENNEWORTH etal, 2006) They had 
to establish and institutionalize chains of equivalence with other spaces and assert 
the relevance of these spaces within England Attempts to establish such chains of 
equivalence manifested m the formation of various territorial coalitions as the 
Northern Way and the Core Cities network 
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However, ultimately, logics of difference seem to have structured the 
institutionalization of city-regions more strongly. First, the Northern Way and the 
Core Cities Network stood for two different understandings of 'the rest' of England. 
Also, the debates around particular city-regional arrangements became framed 
in terms of the local being inserted into the national, wi thout exploring 
interdependencies between particular local places. Finally, counterclaims of county 
and regional actors also undermined initial attempts to set up a uniform national 
'system' of city-regions. Initially, the city-region concept's "oversimplification of 
complex spatial economics" successfully depoliticized the post-referendum debate 
on spatial reorganization. Subsequently, however, this oversimplification became 
attacked as "a key weakness of the city-region approach" (CEDOS and CSS, 2007, p. 5), 
especially by actors speaking for counties and/or rural areas who feared to lose out 
to emerging city-regions. Regional actors, in particular RDAs, relying especially on 
their solidified position within the framework of regional economic governance, 
successfully articulated the city-region concept with the standard region based 
perspective on regional economic development. As a result, the city-region concept 
ultimately did not challenge the RDAs' position. 
On the whole, this case study showed that city-regionalization in England has 
not simply evolved as (yet another) project of spatial reorganization of the neoliberal 
state promoting inter-territorial competition and sacrificing the 'one-nation' ethos of 
the post-war settlement. Rather, I suggest that we interpret the watering down of 
the concept of the city-region as a pragmatic answer of the still powerful central 
state to the English Question - a question that continues to underpin multi-actor 
struggles about the nation as a spatial community. 
i n 

RepoLiticizing spatial difference 

"[...] the 'nation' is pulled apart by its very geography" 
(MASSEY, 2007, p. 124) 
"[...] society still describes itself in terms of 'nat ion'" 
(MicGELBRiNK and REDEPENNINC, 2004, p. 566) 
"The last decade of the 20,h century saw regional issues rise to prominence, both in society 
at large and on the agenda of academic analysts [...] In the first decade of the 21st century 
the prominence of regions can no longer be taken for granted to the extent it tended to be 
in the 1990s" (SAGAN and HALKIER, 2005, p. 1). 
This thesis was motivated first of all by an interest in the phenomenon commonly 
labelled 'new regionalism' that implied an enhanced focus on regions in both 
academic and policy-making circles in the 1990s, and in how 'new regionalism' 
underwent a change as attention turned to cities and city-regions. The (alleged) 
resurgence of regions and city-regions was examined in view of the general 'neolib-
eralization' of the state, and of the related changes in the role of the state as the 
primary unit of socio-economic regulation, political organization and identity 
building. The objective of the research presented here was to offer a theoretically 
informed framework for understanding the outcomes of actual processes of state 
spatial reorganization in Europe. By formulating this objective, this research wished 
to contribute to the drawing of historical geographies of neoliberalization (PECK, 
2004) - historical geographies that are always expressive of both the "messy" forms 
(PECK and TICKELL, 2007) of "actually existing neoliberalisms" (BRENNER and THEODORE, 
2002) and also "neoliberalism-in-general" (PECK, 2004). In this last chapter, the main 
findings of the research are summarized and reflected upon. 
7.1 FTOTTI the strategic regulation of space... 
The starting point of the thesis' account was a perceived discrepancy encountered in 
the initial phase of the research, namely between the actual form of state spatial 
reforms observable in Hungary and the suggestions from one of the most prominent 
strands of scholarship on neoliberal state spatial reforms. The strand in question, 
referred to as the regulationist strand throughout this study, has addressed the 
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(spatial) reorganization of the state by building on (various currents of) Marxism 
Accordingly, regulationist accounts have conceptualized the state as a set of 
institutional relations that is implicated in securing the socio spatial preconditions 
for sustainable capital accumulation On this basis, regulationist scholars have 
analysed spatial reorganization processes as regulatory adjustments that have been 
undertaken m order to manage the recurring crises of the capitalist economy From 
this regulationist perspective, 'urban locational policies', through which the state 
selectively privileges particular cities and regions wi th the aim of enhancing the 
territorial competitiveness of these cities and regions, are a distinctive feature of 
neoliberal state territorial management More broadly, following Brenner, one of the 
key regulationist theorists, changes in state spatiality under neoliberalism can be 
summarized under four mam trends, each of which has contributed to the break with 
the spatial regulatory practices of the Keynesian post-war welfare state In particular, 
BRENNER (2004) speaks of a shift towards the decentralization of state administration, 
the distribution of socio-economic activities at multiple scales, the promotion of 
customized, area-specific arrangements, and the promotion of development 
concentration 
At first sight, regulationist scholars seem to offer f i t t ing accounts of recent state 
spatial reforms that - m contrast to welfare state practices - no longer have the 
ambition of the central management of spatially equalizing and stabilizing 
interventions In addition, regulatiomsts have built their accounts on the basis of a 
comprehensive and rigorous theoretical framework Central to this framework has 
been the assumption that the state as a set of relations is strategically selective, 
which means that the above-mentioned set of relations has a specific, differential 
impact on the ability of various political forces to pursue particular interests and 
strategies 
Notwithstanding its merits, however, a deeper engagement with the regulationist 
framework has raised more questions than it could answer In particular, the 
preliminary assessment of Hungary's recent state spatial reforms revealed that these 
reforms cannot be straightforwardly described by the four-fold shift as suggested by 
Brenner Furthermore, although recently there has been, in scholarly circles, an 
enhanced concern with cities and city-regions as bases for integrated strategic 
governance, no urban locational policies comparable to those in 'Western capitalist 
countries' have been formulated in Hungary Actually, at present, not only institutional 
reorganization, but even greater cooperation within urban regions seems to have 
poor prospects Although the objective of strengthening the position of major urban 
centres became inserted into Hungary's latest National Spatial Development Concept, 
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so far actual policy measures do not help to realize this. Briefly, the regulationist 
framework seemed to be ill-equipped to make sense of the spatial effects of 
neoliberalization in the case of a state that has turned capitalist only recently and 
where state restructuring has taken a more fundamental form. 
The subsequent attempt to interpret the spatial reorganization of the state in 
England through the lens of the regulationist, strategic-relational approach to the 
state also raised doubts concerningthe usefulness of the above-mentioned approach 
in accounting for changes in the case of an 'established Western capitalist state'. 
While some elements of recent state spatial reforms in England - such as the 
establishment of Greater London, for example - seemed to f i t well the regulationist 
perspective, some others-such asthe recent evolution of city-regional arrangements 
outside London-could not be grasped that straightforwardly. The upsurge of interest 
in city-regions, observable after the first referendum in which an elected regional 
government was rejected, has not translated into a clear-cut commitment of the 
government to institutionalize city-regions as spaces of state intervention. 
This thesis acknowledges that if we are interested in the way the state as a set of 
institutional relations is implicated in securing the socio-spatial preconditions for 
sustainable capital accumulation, then regulationist accounts provide us with useful 
insights. Regulationists are arguably right in suggesting that state spatial reforms 
are generally formulated with the aim of supporting particular broader (neoliberal) 
economic policy agendas. On the other hand, regulationists have suggested that the 
state tends to strategically privilege urban-regional spaces, wi thout demonstrating 
how this actually occurs (if at all). Why have cities and city-regions not been privileged 
as spaces of regulation in Hungary? And how can weexplain the ascent of the concept 
of the city-region in England and the fact that eventually, no radical steps were taken 
to establish city-regions? The regulationist theoretical and conceptual toolkit does 
not help us to formulate satisfying(ly fine-grained) responses to these questions. 
In fact, by now there is a substantial body o f - rather heterogeneous - writings 
that have criticized regulationist accounts for maintaining a subtle but persistent 
structural economic bias. This bias is at the root of the problematic treatment of 
'space' in regulationist writings, which have tended to regard space in terms of i) a 
fixed base through which capitalist relations are regulated; 2) as the mediating 
instrument of power relations in times of capitalist crisis; and 3) as the expression of 
a newly formed compromise on capitalist regulation. I argued that by engaging wi th 
the (often implicit) philosophical source of regulationist scholarship, i.e. critical 
realism, we can gain a better understanding of the sources of the above, structural 
economic bias. Regulationist analysts of state spatial reforms have, by drawing on 
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the critical realist conceptualization of causality, argued that the particular form that 
state spatial organization takes is always contingently necessary, ι e it is produced 
through the contingent (ι e non-necessary) interaction of multiple causal chains I 
argued that this view is problematic inasmuch as it presupposes the existence of 
distinct realms of society, each with its own (set of) causal chains In addition, from 
numerous statements of regulationist writers it appeared that they accord a primary 
causal power to the "inevitable, incompressible and unsurpassable contradictions 
and dilemmas of the capital relation" (JESSOP, 2004b, ρ io) 
Considering the above, I assumed that if we wish to understand how state spatial 
restructuring processes actually unfold, then we need to take a different perspective, 
one that is not driven by the desire to confirm a particular theory Rather, I suggested 
that we need a problem-driven approach that is driven by an exploration of 'what is 
actually going on m the world' What has been 'going on in the world' concerning 
state spatial reforms is not simply that the state's organization has become 
reconfigured under 'neoliberal pressures' Significantly, the reconfiguration of the 
state has entailed more broadly a reopening of interrogations as to what the state is 
and should be, m other words, a reopening of debates about the meaning of the state 
The spatial regulatory practices of the state have also been expressive of the 
geographical imagination of the nation, 1 e a historically evolving understanding of 
the nation as a spatial community Consequently, debates about the meaning of the 
state open up a range of other questions concerning the relation between state, 
society and nation, and how these relations are (should) be managed spatially 
7.2 ... to the politics of space 
The current study started from the assumption that in order to arrive at a better 
understanding of state spatial restructuring processes, we need to go beyond 
regulationist accounts in t w o respects First, we need to engage more deeply wi th 
the political reality of the struggles that evolve around the above-mentioned 
questions Second, we have to acknowledge more explicitly that the meaning of the 
state has always been subject to contestation and, accordingly, we have to examine 
the redefinition of the state under neoliberalism within a broader, historical 
perspective It is important to note that the emphasis here on the persisting 
importance of the national dimension to state reorganization should be seen neither 
as expressive of a normative view, nor of methodological (national) temtorialism 
Rather, this study wished to acknowledge that (national) societies, by virtue of 
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sharing the same politico-institutional bounded space (see ANTONSICH, 2009), remain 
meaningful spatial communities that have to continue to work out ways of organizing 
that space. In other words, national territory "deserves to be further investigated in 
its role of binding people together beyond the nationalist idea (I) of 'one territory, one 
people' (in cultural/ethnic terms)" (ANTONSICH, 2009, p. 790). Against this background, 
the thesis developed the argument that for a better grasp of state spatial restructuring 
processes, we need to further consider how the understanding of the nation as a 
spatial community has been implicated - and problematized - in the above processes. 
From this perspective, the 'national' appears as a contested dimension, and the term 
'post-national', which is recurring in regulationist analyses, is less helpful as it 
precludes the acknowledgment of contestation. 
The Politics of Space Approach (PSA) developed in this thesis crystallized around 
the above-mentioned considerations. The label was actually inspired by a remark of 
Ward and Jonas echoing the concerns of this research: Ward and Jones argued that 
we should conceive of "city-regionalism as an actual politics of and in space rather 
than as an expression of a new era of capitalist development and postnational state 
territoriality" (WARD and JONAS, 2004, p. 2122). The PSA regards neoliberalism not as a 
hegemonic economic rationality inflicting a strategically selective reshuffling of the 
state. Certainly, the dominance of 'neoliberal ideas' has brought about some general 
tendencies and contributed to new structural constraints. The pursuit of public policy 
efficiency along neoliberal lines has generally implied a tension between the 
importance of national standards and priorities, and the setting of corresponding 
targets for sub-national actors on the one hand, and the recognition of the role of the 
same actors in delivering 'locally sensitive' public services on the other. As a result, 
while one could witness a general tendency to increase political and/or administrative 
decentralization in many countries, at the same time (re)centralization has been 
observable in fiscal terms (see e.g. LOUCHLIN, 2007); the objective of macroeconomic 
growth necessarily entailed a more interventionist stance towards sub-national 
public expenditure control. While not losing sight of the a bove fisca I and institutional 
constraints, the PSA wishes to give more attention to the fact that neoliberalism as a 
rationality has not imposed policy answers right away. Rather, it brought to the fore 
dilemmas of whereto ultimately locate control, and has enforced new decisions about 
the state as a set of institutional relations and the way these order space. 
It is important to note that the PSA is not based on a complete rejection of the 
regulationist, strategic-relationist approach to state spatial restructuring. Actually, 
the PSA builds on the idea that socio-spatial change is produced through the 
interaction of strategic actors and the strategically selective context in which they 
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f ind themselves However, I suggested that m order to overcome the identified 
shortcomings of regulationist accounts, we should embed the idea of strategic 
selectivity not m a framework based on a dialogue of critical realism and the 
regulation approach, but m a framework inspired by what has become commonly 
labelled as Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory Consequently, the Politics of Space 
Approach can be seen as a particular interpretation of discourse theory's philosophical 
assumptions for the analysis of (state) spatial restructuring 
Discourse theory is a framework of inquiry starting out f rom the assumption 
that meaning m the social world depends on contingently constructed rules and 
differences (see e g TORFING, 1999, 2005) A key analytical concept of discourse theory 
is 'discourse' (or discursive formation), defined "as a relational system of signifying 
practices that is produced through historical and ultimately political interventions 
and provides a contingent horizon for the construction of any meaningful object" 
(ToRFiNC, 2005, ρ 8) From a discourse-theoretical perspective, discourses can be seen 
as constituting social reality (meaning) by systematically ordering it by asserting 
relations of equivalence, discourses simplify social reality, by emphasizing relations 
of difference, they concede to complexity In fact, the perspective of discourse theory 
implies an ontological inquiry (in the Heideggenan sense) into the preconditions for 
the existence of particular types of objects 
A discourse-theoretical perspective lends itself particularly to the study of the 
constitution of political identities, of the establishment of political frontiers, and of 
the practices of hegemonic articulation among certain discourses and subjectivities 
(HOWARTH, 2005) The appeal of the above-mentioned perspective within the social 
sciences has been especially that it allows for a non-essentalist analysis of processes 
of social construction The gams from a discourse-theoretical perspective for 
geographical analyses have only recently been explored (GLASZE and MATTISSEK, 2009, 
HOWARTH, 2008, MARCHART, 2004, STAVRAKAKIS, 2007) This study wished to offer a more 
comprehensive assessment of the implications of discourse theory for contemporary 
debates m geographical scholarship In particular, this thesis wished to contribute to 
t w o mam, more or less distinct, scholarly debates The first debate is the one, 
unfolding at the intersection of political economy and political geography, on the 
necessity to develop more culturally inflected accounts of state spatial restructuring 
(e g JESSOP, 1999, 2004, 2008, JESSOP and OOSTERLYNCK, 2008, KRAMSCH, MAMADOUH and VAN 
DER VELDE, 2004, MIGGELBRINK and REDEPENNING, 2004) The second is on the issue of 'how 
far' we should go m thinking of regions relationally m times of growing mter-
connectedness and on how we should conceptualize territories, which are still 
important m defining 'given' regional particularities (see ALLEN, MASSEY, and COCHRANE, 
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1998; AMIN, 2004; HUDSON, 2007; JONES, 2009; JONES and MACLEOD 2004; MACLEOD and 
JONES, 2007; MASSEY, 2005; PAASI 2009; PAINTER, 2008). 
Concerning the first debate, I suggested that a discourse-theoretical perspective 
is useful for reframing our accounts of state spatial restructuring for three main 
interrelated reasons. First, it allows us to discard a view from which the operation of 
the state has an essential unifying element (such as capital accumulation). Rather, a 
discourse-theoretical perspective helps to acknowledge that state spatial 
restructuring always entails the broader reconfiguration of political space: a process 
in which the nation becomes re-imagined as a community at multiple scales, 
subdivided in different territories, and in which not only economic, but socio-cultural 
and political relations become rescaled and reterritorialized as well. Furthermore, the 
assumptions of discourse theory imply that practices (spaces) are never 'only' 
economic, but also cultural (because they result from the attr ibution of particular 
meanings) and political (because the attribution of meaning is never power-free). 
Second, discourse theory enables us to acknowledge that disagreement is constitutive 
of social life (NORVAI, 2004) and helps us recognize that diverging social demands -
concerning the spatial organization of the state-can never be reconciled for good on 
the basis of rational consensus; we need to conceive of meaning as inherently unfixed 
for politics to be possible. This insight was particularly relevant for emphasizing that 
collective decision-making can never be unproblematic and that spatial inequalities 
do not constitute a problem per se. Third, discourse theory keeps us aware of the 
'political origin' of structural constraints that seem to be uncontested. 
As to the second debate on the issue of relationality, a discourse-theoretical 
perspective is especially helpful as it enables us to differentiate between different 
kinds of actually existing spaces (ontical level) and the discursive space (ontological 
level) within which the meaning of actually existing spaces becomes fixed through 
the relational articulation of meanings. By making this differentiation, we can 
simultaneously acknowledge the fact that particular spatial differences or 
particularities exist and are 'given' to actors at a particular moment, and also that 
spatial differences or particularities are not 'out there to be discovered', but are 
always (re)constructed in power-laden struggles over the meaning of spaces. 
As these struggles are necessarily ongoing, spatial differences or particularities are 
ultimately never 'given'; in other words, ontical spaces are never fully constituted 
social spaces. These insights concerning the constructed character of spatial 
differences or particularities were relevant for the argumentation of this thesis in 
two important respects. 
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First, they help us to acknowledge that national spaces as particular social spaces are 
never fully constituted the imagined unity of the nation has always struggled to 
cope wi th actual diversity and difference (see ROBINS, 2001) At this point, it is insightful 
to refer to Massey, who notes the following 
"Children in London's schools have easy access to the Science Museum, while for those in, 
say, Barrow m Furness or Millom an equivalent school outing would cost a fortune in both 
time and money In all these small but crucial ways the 'nation' is pulled apart by its very 
geography ' (MASSEY 2007, ρ 124) 
In fact, state spatial organization always implies an engagement of the various ways 
through which the nation as an imagined spatial community is being pulled apart 
In other words, it implies a specification of which space matters and how, a definition 
of which spaces should be recognized as 'different' This process of recognition has 
always been necessarily contested as various actors advance various - and often 
conflicting - claims concerning the recognition of particular spaces Due to the 
deeply-anchored role of the nation-state in organizing socio-spatial relations, 
'the national' constitutes the horizon of 'universality' in these struggles m the sense 
that the particularity of a space is always claimed m relation to national space 
A second reason why the differentiation between the ontical and the ontological 
dimension was useful for the present research is that it allowed me to address the 
task of developing "adequate historical geographies of neoliberahzation" (PECK, 2004, 
Ρ 399) A s noted above, this task is challenging inasmuch as it entails accounting 
for the hybrid and "messy" forms (PECK and TICKELL, 2007) of "actually existing 
neohberalisms" (BRENNER and THEODORE, 2002), wi thout neglecting the fact that 
there is also a "neohberalism-m-general" (PECK, 2004) From a discourse-theoretical 
perspective, "actually existing neohberalisms" pertain to the ontical level On the 
other hand, from the above-mentioned perspective, ontologically, the (state) spaces 
of any "actually existing neoliberalism" are constituted relationally through logics of 
difference and equivalence This latter insight permits us, first, to connect "actually 
existing neoliberal isms"-such as that of Hungary, a post-socialist, "transformational" 
(DRAHOKOUPIL, 2007) state, and that of England that is (part of) an 'established, Western 
capitalist state' Second, the same insight allows us to say something about the neo-
liberalization of the state more generally, without attr ibuting changes in particular 
states to a single causal force (e g the capitalist economy) Or to refer to Massey, by 
ascribing to a discourse theoretical perspective, we can appreciate that "there is 
more than one story going on in the world" (MASSEY, 1999, ρ 7) 
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On the basis of the above, the starting point of the Politics of Space Approach 
developed and applied here was that state spaces become restructured in an ongoing 
process where actors subjected to various discursive formations of space (re-) 
negotiate the meanings of spaces. The Politics of Space Approach does attend to the 
(changes in) specific types of state spaces, but more importantly, it is directed at an 
ontological inquiry examining how state spatial practices are structured by logics of 
equivalence and difference. In line with that, the PSA addresses the transformation 
of the state's spatial organization (ontical level) by deconstructing the articulations 
(ontological level) through which the state, as a set of spatial institutional relations, 
acquires its meaning, i.e. becomes what it is, at a particular moment. So, according to 
the PSA, spaces are not given units (objects) that can be instrumentalized straight 
forwardly for state economic objectives. Rather, state spaces 'become' (meaningful) 
through discursively structured struggles of meaning that constitute and reproduce 
the state as a set of practices organizing (and thus ordering) society. 
7.3 Exploring "actually existing neoliberalisms" 
Starting out from the assumptions of the PSA, this thesis investigated two case 
studies, wi th three objectives in mind. One objective was to give a thick analysis of 
recent 'neoliberal' state spatial reforms in the selected countries, i.e. Hungary and 
England, by locating the struggles around reforms within a broader historical 
perspective. Such a perspective allowed tracing those discursive selectivities that 
help understanding the path-dependent evolution of state spatialities. The second 
objective, supporting the theoretical considerations implied by the PSA, was in turn 
realized through the juxtaposition of the case studies of Hungary and England. In the 
first instance, post-socialist Hungary's case was treated, in line with a regulationist 
view, as 'atypically messy' and 'overpoliticized'. This point of departure was relevant 
for backing the thesis' theoretical argument inasmuch as it helped to demonstrate 
that we cannot account for the spatial restructuring of ony capitalist state unless we 
go beyond an ontical analysis. The need to move to the ontological plane and to do 
away wi th the privileging of economic structures in the face of political ones might 
be lessevident in the case of'established Western capita list states', the most common 
objects of regulationist analysis. However, if we accept the Ontological sameness' of 
the state spacesof Hungary and England, then we have to recognize that by restricting 
our analysis to the ontical plane, we can only have a limited understanding of the 
way state spatial restructuring unfolds in 'Western capitalist states'. In other words. 
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the choice of Hungary as a first case study had the aim of enhancing our reflexivity 
with regard to the inherently political nature of the spatial restructuring of any 
capitalist state It is on the basis of this recognition of the inherently political nature 
of any process of spatial restructuring that it became possible to address the third 
objective of case study research connecting the two cases and commenting on the 
neoliberalization of the state more generally (discussed in the next section) 
The examination of "actually existing neoliberalism" in Hungary focused on the 
episode between Hungary's EU accession (May 2004) and the approval of the 2ncl 
National Development Plan (December 2006) as part of the broader post 1990 period 
The spatial reforms of the post 1990 period were interpreted here as the super 
imposition of three discursive formations of nation state space self-government 
(onkormanyzatisag), spatial development (teruletfejlesztes) and development policy 
(fejlesztespohtika) Furthermore, these discursive formations were examined as being 
produced through the interplay of relatively stable meanings of Hungarian 
nation-state spaces on the one hand and the claims of (especially party political) 
actors on the other As to the relatively stable meanings of state spaces (or'structurally 
inscribed selectivities'), the case study on Hungary identified, through a broader 
historical analysis, the structuring role of four mam, interrelated sets of meanings 
concerning 1) the significations of the county, 2) the nepies-urbanus debate, 3) the 
urban-rural divide, and 4) the Budapest-v/c/e/r divide The sociologica I and institutional 
anchorage of political parties m the nepies-urbanus debate, the geographical pattern 
(urban/rural) of their support base, and their actual position in county level politics 
considerably formed the parties' claims on the mam issues of spatial reorganization 
m the post 1990 period On the whole, by conducting the analysis of state spatial 
restructuring m terms of discursive selectivity, we gained important insights 
about the shaping of Hungary's state spaces and, more specifically, about the 
undifferentiated treatment of cities and urban regions 
As to the examination of "actually existing neoliberalism" in England, it focused 
on the episode between the referendum on an elected Regional Assembly m the 
North East (November 2004) and the publication of the Sub National Review (July 
2007), as part of the broader post 1997 period The post 1997 Labour governments' 
spatial reforms m England were interpreted here as attempts to reconfigure state 
spatiahty through the establishment of two discursive formations of state space 
regional economic governance and 'modernized' local government The ascent of the 
concept of the city-region m England, as well as its subsequent fading away, could be 
well explained in relation to these discursive formations At the same time just as m 
the case of Hungary, for a fuller understanding of the struggle over the meaning of 
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the 'city-region', it was necessary to consider the development of state spaces in 
England priorto 1997. This extended historical analysis revealed three relevant sets of 
relatively stable, but continuously changing, practices and meanings of spaces that 
have shaped the evolution of city-regionalism. These practices and meanings of 
space - the centralizing, 'anti-territorial tradit ion' of British politics, and the 
urban-rural and North-South 'divides' - have been substantially shaping the claims 
of various actors and, ultimately, the formation of city-regionalism. 
On the whole, the two case studies confirmed the remark made by others that 
"[e]ach state provides a distinct opportunity structure and set of incentives and 
constraints" (KEATING, 1997, p. 389) for (city-)regionalism. The PSA helped to 
conceptualize these incentives and constraints not as fixed parameters, but as a 
combination of discursive formations of state space that are being continuously 
reconfigured. What the (city-)region means, or whether it is a space that can be 
conceived of at all, depends on how the notion of the (city-)region articulates with 
the particular discursive formations that define a particular state's spatiality. 
To paraphrase Painter's notion of ' local politics', we can say that 'the (city-)regionar 
emerges through a political process involving the development of 'discourses of the 
(city-)regionar and of political practices which constitute 'the (city-)regionar as an 
object of political intervention (see PAINTER, 1997, p. 104, emphasis added). 
7.4 On "neolibeTalisTn-in-geTieral" 
What can we say, on the basis of the insights from the two case studies, on "neolib-
eralism-in-general"? In this regard, this thesis focused on one aspect in particular: on 
how the signification of 'the nation(al)' has been implicated in the neoliberalization 
of the state. I argued that we should not stop - as regulationists have tended to do -
at considering 'the national' merely as a still relevant scale of regulatory practices. 
As MiGCELBRiNK and REDEPENNING (2004) remind us, societies still describe themselves in 
terms of nations and, accordingly, the 'national' is still central to framing conceptions 
of how particular spaces (should) make part of national space. As the accounts of 
Hungary and England demonstrated, by attending to the way in which struggles 
around 'neoliberal' state spatial reforms are conducted in terms of 'the nation', we 
gain important clues regarding the particular outcomes of these reforms. 
On the one hand, the understanding of the nation as an unproblematic 
community has played a central role in depoliticizing claims and decisions on state 
spatial reorganization under neoliberalism. The depoliticization of these claims and 
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decisions has taken a different form in Hungary and England In the case of the latter, 
Labour's consensual 'One Nation' discourse expressed Labour's ambition to bridge, 
through its Third Way, the traditional Left/Right divide The 'One Nation' discourse 
became predicated on the (seemingly) unproblematic view of territorially defined 
communities making up the nation - a view that denied an alternative view of 
national space as being inherently "pulled apart" Or as Tony Blair stressed. "This is 
one Britain, one nation, and I will challenge the politics of division wherever they 
exist" (Tony Blair, speech in Exeter, February 2000, cited by WOODS, 2005, p. 98). 
In contrast to the consensual tone prevalent in England, Hungarian party politics 
became characterized by greater polarization, and more and more heated debates. 
As PALONEN (2006) aptly formulated, in Hungary one could observe the shaping of a 
'bipolar consensus'. The solidification of the frontier between the two mam political 
camps entailed there being only one possible line of conflict between two competing, 
'natural' understandings of the nation 
On the other hand, the case studies also showed that the depoliticization of 
claims and decisions on state spatial reorganization through the concept of ' the 
nation' has not remained fully unchallenged The nation has always been a contested 
spatial community as constitutive parts of national space have continuously 
competed for recognition within the frame of reference of the nation-state (see 
ZIMMER, 2003). The ongoing character of this struggle for recognition tends to be 
ignored by many regulationist scholars who view collective decision-making in the 
post-war decades as unproblematic (see BARNETT, 2005, LARNER, 2005) and seem to 
suggest that competition-oriented neoliberal policies induced competition m the 
first place However, actors 'speaking for' (i.e in the name of) various particular 
spaces have, by advancing specific claims about how 'their' space makes part of 
national space, constantly challenged state interventions that made appeal to 
depohticized notions of 'national interest' 
This study investigated recent processes of contestation and found that of the 
two countries, these contestations were especially striking in Hungary As noted 
above, in Hungary, due to party political polarization, two distinct conceptualizations 
of nation-state space have formed. While speakers of the governing parties claimed 
Budapest's development to be m the nation's, and thus also m the vidék's, interest, 
actors speaking for the vidék have fundamentally opposed that view and the 
privileging of'pole cities' more broadly In England, New Labour's spatial interventions 
that were intended to (re)build One Nation have also become variously contested. 
Most spectacularly, the outcome of the North East referendum showed that the 
claim that "our success as a nation depends on every region achieving its full potential" 
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(through elected regional governments) (see Cabinet Office and DTLR, 2002, p. 6) 
lacks mobilizing force. Or we can also referto actors speaking for the counties or 'the 
rural' who countered the shaping city-regional agenda by stressing that "England's 
counties are [also] vital to the country's performance" (CEDOS and CSS, 2007, p. 5). 
On the whole, we can say that political struggles around state spatial reforms 
can be redescribed in terms of a constant tension between instances of depoliticiza-
tion and instances of repoliticization. However, by thinking through the Politics of 
Space Approach developed in this thesis, this is not a fully satisfying conclusion. 
For, although claims that are depoliticized through the invocation of 'the nation' are 
countered by other claims, these latter claims are also informed by (other) views of 
the nation as an unquestioned community, and/or by (seemingly) apolitical 
conceptions of national space. These counterclaims thus never accomplish the 
repoliticization of spatial differences because they are equally rooted in the idea of 
the nation as a community that shares a fundamental common interest, and/or in 
the idea of a 'natural' ordering of national space. In Hungary, for example, actors 
speaking for municipal self-governments have suggested that the equality of self-
governments constitutes the nation and that it is in the nation's common interest to 
maintain this equality. In England, claims in favour of the institutionalization of 
city-regions were countered by claims that "below the national level, the key economic 
layer in England is sub-regional" (CEDOS and CSS, 2007, p. 7), suggesting that national 
space is principally made up of sub-regions. 
By looking through the lens of the PSA, it becomes evident that the framing of 
spatial policy claims in terms of particular understandings of 'the nation' entails a 
closure that prevents a 'fuller' repoliticization of spatial differences and, ultimately, 
prevents spatial ordering from being done differently. In the case of Hungary, for 
example, it is clear that the discursive formation of self-governments shapes those 
spatial outcomes that are commonly regarded as problematical-such as the growing 
inequalities between Budapest and the rest of the country, or the lack of integrative 
urban regional governance arrangements. In England, the shift to sub-regions 
reproduced thinking about national space in terms of rather undifferentiated, 
territorially defined collectives that serve the prosperity of 'the whole'; at the same 
time, the room for addressing regional disparities has remained limited. 
To sum up, by examining how the politics of new state spaces have been fought 
through struggles about the nation as a spatial community, we can understand and 
explain better the outcomes of neoliberal state spatial reforms. This is, however, not 
the only added value of thinking through the politics of space. The insight that the 
framing of state spatial interventions in terms of 'the nation' is inherently 
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depoliticizmg also opens up a way for rethinking the struggles around new state 
spaces and - albeit indirectly - a way for challenging their actual form The next, 
concluding section reflects on the PSA's implications for a critical engagement with 
new state spaces 
7.5 Repoliticizing spatial diffeTence 
The modern state has acquired its (perceived) 'natural' character on the basis of the 
equivalence between a national community and the public domain embodied m 
state institutions Parallel to the socio-economic transformations of the past decades, 
scholars have increasingly emphasized that state spatiality is not 'natural', but 
'naturalized' (e g BRENNER et al, 2003, HAKLI, 1998, 2001, PAASI, 1999, 2009b, SPENCER and 
WoLLMAN, 2002) By examining the phenomenon of 'new regionalism', this study 
contributes to the growing scholarly literature that engages with the question of 
how the 'naturalness' of nation state spaces is being questioned m the current, 
'globalizing' era To date, scholars dealing wi th 'new regionalism' in terms of a 
challenge to established nation-state spatiality have predominantly focused on what 
are considered to be plurinational states, with a strong presence of regionalist 
movements (e g BELAND and LECOURS, 2005, KEATING, 2001, 2009, 2009b, MCEWEN, 2002) 
In the countries analysed in this thesis, mobilization for the recognition of regional 
autonomy has been missing (Hungary), or has been marginal (England - notably 
Cornwall) Nonetheless, the case studies demonstrated that even though such 
mobilizations have been absent or marginal, new (city-)regionalism in Hungary and 
England has implied new struggles about the plurality of spaces that (can be imagined 
to) constitute national space On the whole, these concerns have entailed the 
problematization of the 'naturalness' of nation-state spatiality 
Analysing the formation of new state spaces as processes that challenge 
established frameworks of state intervention implies a critical engagement with 
neoliberal state spatial reforms that is different from the regulationist stance 
As previously noted, regulatiomsts have disapproved of the reforms m question as 
normalizing and institutionalizing uneven development through the differential 
privileging of spaces (BRENNER, 2004, JESSOP, 2008, LOVERINC, 1999) Brenner in particular 
argued that neoliberal state spatial restructuring m Europe entails "a regressive 
politics of unfettered territorial inequality and sociospatial polarization", and the 
suppression of "a substantive commitment to territorial redistribution and 
sociospatial justice" (BRENNER, 2004, ρ 304) 
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From the perspective of the PSA, however, we cannot analyse state spatial 
restructuringonthebasisof assumptions of competition as'bad'and of redistribution 
as 'good'. Instead of suggesting that pre-established categorizations of 'bad' and 
'good' exist, the PSA sheds light on how state spatial restructuring implies decisions 
that respond to dilemmas concerning 'how much' competition and distribution is 
'good', and also about 'how much' autonomy is good at which scales. Certainly, 
interpreting state spatial restructuring in terms of dilemmas and challenges is far 
from new. Keating, for example, in his account entitled Rescaling Europe, notes that 
"[t]he challenge is [then] to recover pluralism without losing or sacrificing democracy 
and solidarity" (KEATING, 2009, p. 44). Similarly, Morgan argues that the conundrum of 
devolution in England can be summarized by the question of "how to sustain a 
tolerable marriage between democracy and equality, two equally important values 
that carry different social and spatial implications" (MORGAN, 2007, p. 1247). By drawing 
on discourse theory, the PSA offers a lens for the analysis of these dilemmas. 
Furthermore and more specifically, the PSA draws our attention to how, by conducting 
discussions about what is a 'bad', 'good', or ' just' way of organizing state space in 
(apparently) apolitical terms such as 'the nation', the discussions in question fail to 
genuinely (re)address the above-mentioned dilemmas. For how could there be an 
open debate about 'which space matters and how' if we retain the idea of the nation 
as an unproblematic community and that of any 'natural' ordering of national space? 
Evidently, for such an open debate to take place, we need to repoliticize spatial 
differences, i.e. deconstruct those claims and practices that make spaces (appear as) 
given. To refer to the case studies of this thesis, this repoliticization would entail us 
questioning claims according to which London's or Budapest's development is in the 
interest of the nation, claims that posit that the vidék or self-governments embody 
Hungarian nationhood, or claims that England is a mosaic of sub-regions. 
Admittedly, repoliticizing such claims is dif f icult to the extent that they are 
backed by 'strongly' institutionalized practices (such as the system of self-
governments in Hungary, or the London-centred state apparatus in England). 
Furthermore, solidarity is inextricably linked to identity, or as Massey puts it: 
"[geographical] responsibility [...] derives from those relations through which identity 
is constructed" (MASSEY, 2004, p. 10). In fact, it is extremely difficult to repoliticize 
struggles about 'which space matters and how' because taken-for-granted 
understandings of spaces are constitutive of people's identities. In this regard, 
questions arise such as: 'Would it be possible to repoliticize the notion of the vidék as 
an embodiment of Hungarian nationhood in struggles around Hungary's state spatial 
reforms and let it, at the same time, stay an unquestioned element of identity (for 
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those who feel attached to the videk)'> Such a separation is problematic, for at 
least t w o reasons First, 'national identity' on the one hand and people's cultural 
(PENSKY, 2000) and spatial identity (PAASI, 1999, 2009b) on the other cannot be 
straightforwardly detached from each other Second, identity should not (cannot) be 
untied from politics (SPINNER-HALEV, 2006) In this latter regard, Massey aptly remarks 
that "[r]ethinking a politics of place, or nation, is an emotionally charged issue" 
(MASSEY, 2004, ρ 6) 
To sum up, any attempt to repohticize spatial differences undeniably faces 
substantial difficulties However, this thesis suggests that challenging the outcomes 
of neoliberal state spatial reforms goes necessarily via the ongoing interrogation of 
those assumptions m which spatial ordering practices and spatial identities are 
entrenched By reinterpreting state spatial restructuring processes through the lens 
of the Politics of Space Approach, the present study wished to open up the way for 
this task of interrogation 
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Appendix 
List of interviewees 
The majority of interviews were conducted between April 2006 and March 2008 
The interviewees are listed below per case study, m alphabetical order. The position 
of the interviewees is noted for the t ime of the interview 
Hungary 
Dr FARAGÓ, Làszló 
Deputy director-general, senior research fellow, Centre for Regional Studies of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Transdanubian Research Institute 
FODOR, Marek 
Project manager, National Development Agency, Unit of Development Policy 
Coordination 
GERGELY, Gyongyi 
PhD student, University of Pecs 
GERGELYNÉ MÉSZAROS, Erzsebet 
Project manager, National Development Agency, Unit of Development Policy 
Coordination 
Dr. HRUBI, Laszló 
Senior research fellow, Centre for Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences, Transdanubian Research Institute 
LUDESCHER, Gabriella 
Policy officer, Pecs Micro-region 
MAGAY, Miklós 
Policy officer, Pecs, Mayor's Office, Department of Urban Development and Planning 
MARTON, Gyorgy 
Director of developent issues ('fejlesztési igazgató'), Regional Development Agency 
of the South Transdanubian Region 
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Dr MERZA, Péter 
Managing director, Pecs Development Ltd. 
NAGYHÂZI, Cyorgy 
Policy officer, Ministry of Self-Covernment and Spatial Development, Chief 
Department of Spatial Development 
Dr PÉTI, Marton 
Senior Planner, VATI Hungarian Public Nonprofit Company for Regional Development 
and Town Planning, Directorate of Spatial and Regional Policy and Information Services 
PUSZTAI, Beatrix 
Director of organizational issues ('szervezesi igazgató'), Regional Development 
Agency of the South Transdanubian Region 
RADVÀNSZKI, Adam 
Planner-analyst, VATI Hungarian Public Nonproßt Company for Regional Development 
and Town Planning, Directorate of Spatial and Regional Policy and Information Services 
Dr SIKFÓI, Tamàs 
Secretary General, Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Pecs-Baranya 
Dr. SOMLYÓDYNÉ PFEIL, Edit 
Senior research fellow. Centre for Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences, Transdanubian Research Institute 
Dr SZENDRÉNYI, Péter 
Head of department, Ministry of Self-Covernment and Spatial Development, Chief 
Department of Spatial Development 
TÓTH, Viktoria, 
Project manager, Pecs Development Ltd 
Dr TÓTSIMON, Péter 
Advisor on spatial development, Office of the Self-Covernment of Baranya County, 
Department Development and Economy, Development and Project Croup 
Dr ZOLD-NAGY, Viktoria, 
Deputy head of department, Ministry of Self-Covernment and Spatial Development, 
Chief Department of Public Administration Offices and Notaries ('Kozigazgatasi 
Hivatah Jegyzöi és Hatósagi Fó'osztaly') 
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England 
ADAMS, Phillips 
Lead officer, Yorkshire Forward (Regional Development Agency for Yorkshire and the 
Number) 
HAUCHTON, Graham 
Professor, University of Hull, Department of Geography 
HETHERINCTON, Alice 
Sheffield City Region coordinator, Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council 
KAYS, Patsy 
Regional & European Policy Manager, Hull City Council 
McKICNEY, Mick 
Head of Policy & Research, First Wakefield District Development Agency, Research 
and Strategy Team 
MURFIN, Rob 
Planning Policy Manager, Yorkshire and the Number Assembly 
NEWBY, Les 
Director, Yorkshire Futures (Regional Observatory for Yorkshire and the Humber) 
NORREYS, Robert 
Project Manager, Leeds City Region Secretariat 
REDFERN, Peter 
Senior Policy Officer, City of Bradford Metropolitan District Council 
SAUNDERS, Jamie 
Senior Policy Officer, City of Bradford Metropolitan District Council 
SHUTT, John 
Professor, Leeds Metropolitan University 
WELHAM, John 
Policy Officer, Government Office for Yorkshire and the Humber 
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Summary 
This thesis was motivated by an interest m the phenomenon commonly labelled as 
'new regionalism' and m how 'new regionalism' underwent a change as attention 
turned to cities and city regions from around the year 2000 The mam objective of 
this study was to develop a framework for understanding how regions and city regions 
have - if at all - 'resurged' m Europe as new objects and subjects of policy-making I 
examine new (city-)regionalism m view of the general 'neohberalization' of the state 
and of the related changes m the role of the state as the primary unit of socio economic 
regulation, political organization and identity building To use a much-recurring term 
of the body of literature that inspired this study, I approach the actual outcomes of 
state spatial reorganization processes as the spatial manifestations of "actually 
existing neoliberahsms" (BRENNER and THEODORE, 2002) On this basis, my aim was to 
elaborate a theoretical and conceptual perspective from which the ongoing struggles 
to (re)definethe spatial organization of the state can become better understood and 
the concrete outcomes of the struggles be better explained 
Theorizing the shifting spatialities of the state: 
from the strategic-relational approach to the politics of space approach 
In Chapter 2, I give a thorough assessment of the state-theoretical framework that 
served as the thesis' starting point for analysing the shifting spatialities of the state 
the regulationist, strategic-relational approach (SRA) to the state The exploratory 
literature review already directed my focus to the strand of work applying this 
approach that has recently risen to prominence, m particular m Anglo-Saxon 
scholarship The SRA as elaborated by Bob Jessop builds on various currents of 
Marxism and regards the state as a set of institutional relations that perform a range 
of regulating functions necessary to the reproduction of capitalism A widely 
recognized merit of the SRA is that it enables an understanding of the state not as a 
coherent and territorially sovereign 'given', but as a political project m a continual 
process of (re)formation Furthermore, the SRA has also fruitful ly addressed the 
philosophical puzzle concerning the relationship between structure and agency 
It has done so by suggesting that structures are privileging some actors and 
actions over others and, on the other, by positing that actors, when undertaking a 
course of action, (potentially) assess how structures privilege some actions over 
others A strategic relational approach to the state more specifically entails regarding 
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the state as a social ensemble that has a specific, differential impact on the ability 
of various political forces to pursue particular interests and strategies m specific 
spatio-temporal contexts (JESSOP, 1990, 2002b) 
From the mid 1990s on, there have been numerous attempts to develop a 
political geographic perspective on the basis of Marxist-oriented political economy 
by 'spatiahzmg' Jessop's state theory Underlying these attempts has been the 
assumption that the state has a tendency to'geographical privileging', in other words, 
that the state as a political project favours certain places against others From the 
point of view of the present study, this idea of 'geographical privileging'was especially 
relevant as it has been a central tenet of regulationist studies focusing on recent, 
new (city-) regionalist state spatial reforms According to Neil BRENNER (2004), a leading 
theorist on the spatial selectivity of the state, new (city-)regionalist reforms must be 
understood as path dependent political strategies through which (national and 
local) states are attempting to manage the crisis tendencies of Keynesian welfare 
regulation Brenner, as well as numerous other scholars who have aligned with his 
interpretation of new state spaces, have criticized state spatial reforms m particular 
for their strong emphasis on spatial competitiveness and for enhancing uneven 
development at different spatial scales 
This thesis acknowledges that if we are interested in the way the state as a set of 
institutional relations is implicated in securing the socio-spatial preconditions for 
sustainable capital accumulation, then regulationist accounts provide us with useful 
insights At first sight, regulationist analyses seem also to offer f i t t ing accounts of 
the spatial reforms of the 'neohberal' state t h a t - in contrast to the post war welfare 
state - no longer has the ambition to carry out spatially equalizing and stabilizing 
interventions However, the application of the regulationist framework in the initial 
phase of this study raised more questions than it could answer m connection with 
the evolution of concrete processes of spatial reorganization In particular, the 
regulationist, strategic-relational approach could not satisfymgly explain why m 
Hungary, the first empirical focus of this study, no urban-locational policies exist that 
are comparable to those that Brenner and others have identified across Western 
Europe At the outset, I attributed the discrepancy between the empirical observations 
of Hungary and the suggestions of regulationist scholarship to the fact that the 
neoliberalization of the Hungarian state and its post-socialist transformation have 
been simultaneous My subsequent attempt to interpret the spatial reorganization 
of the state m England through the lens of the SRA, however, also raised doubts 
concerning the usefulness of the SRA in accounting for changes m the case of an 
'established Western capitalist state' While some elements of recent spatial reforms 
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in England - such as the establishment of Greater London - seemed to f i t well the 
regulationist perspective, some others - such as the evolution of city-regional 
arrangements outside London - could not be grasped that straightforwardly 
Drawing on existing criticisms, I discuss the main shortcomings of the 
regulationist 5RA its subtle but persistent economic bias and its related tendency to 
reify spaces Furthermore, I argue that these can be linked to the way the SRA was 
conceived as dialogue between critical realism and the regulation approach (JESSOP, 
2002d, JESSOP and SUM, 2006) I suggest that in order to arrive at a better understanding 
of state spatial restructuring processes, we need to go beyond the regulationist SRA 
in t w o respects First, we need to engage more deeply with the political reality of the 
struggles that evolve around (the design and implementation of) state spatial 
reforms Second, we have to acknowledge more explicitly that the meaning of the 
state has always been subject to contestation and, accordingly, we have to examine 
the redefinition of the state under neoliberalism within a broader, historical 
perspective In addition and more specifically, I argue that by analysing the (spatial) 
redefinition of the state as a process that necessarily implies a struggle about the 
meaning of 'the nation' as a spatial community, we can enhance our understanding 
of transformation processes In order to duly acknowledge these aspects, I suggest 
that we apply a perspective that is not driven, like the regulationist approach, by the 
desire to confirm a particular theory (namely critical realist Marxism), but a 
problem driven approach that is driven by an exploration of 'what is actually going 
on m the world' (HOWARTH, 2005) 
The Politics of Space that I develop in Chapter 3 intends to be such a problem driven 
approach that considers state spatial reforms as processes that imply a struggle 
about the mean mg of the (spatial ity of the) state The label'Politics of Space Approach' 
(PSA) was actually inspired by a remark made by Ward and Jonas echoing the concerns 
of this research m connection with regulationist scholarship Ward and Jones argued 
that we should conceive of "city-regionalism as an actual politics of and in space 
rather than as an expression of a new era of capitalist development and postnational 
state territorial ity" (WARD and JONAS, 2004, ρ 2122) 
The PSA does not imply a complete rejection of the regulationist, strategic-
relatiomst approach to state spatial restructuring In fact, the PSA itself builds on the 
idea that socio-spatial change is produced through the interplay of strategic actors 
and the strategically selective context in which they f ind themselves However, 
I suggest that in order to overcome the identified shortcomings of regulationist 
accounts, we should embed the idea of strategic selectivity not m a framework based 
on a dialogue of critical realism and the regulation approach, but m a framework 
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inspired by Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory Discourse theory builds on the 
assumption that meaning m the social world depends on contingently constructed 
rules and differences (see e g TORFING, 1999, 2005) A key analytical concept of 
discourse theory is 'discourse' (or discursive formation), defined "as a relational 
system of signifying practices that is produced through historical and ultimately 
political interventions and provides a contingent horizon for the construction of any 
meaningful object" (TORFING, 2005, ρ 8) 
I suggest that reframmg our view of state spatial restructuring from a discourse-
theoretical perspective is useful for three mam interrelated reasons First, such a 
perspective allows us to discard a view from which the operation of the state has an 
essential unifying element (such as capital accumulation) Second, discourse theory 
enables us to acknowledge that disagreement is constitutive of social life (NORVAL, 
2004) and helps us recognize that diverging social demands - among other things 
concern mg the spatial organization of the state-can never be reconciled for good on 
the basis of rational consensus, we need to conceive of meaning as inherently unfixed 
for politics to be possible Third, discourse theory keeps us aware of the 'political 
origin' of structural constraints that seem to be uncontested 
In Chapter 4, I reflect on the methodological implications of a discourse-
theoretical approach as well as on the issues of scientific validity, and social and 
political relevance In the same chapter, I discuss the translation of the Politics of 
Space Approach into methodology and into the use of particular methods In this 
regard, the distinction made by discourse theory (following Heidegger) between an 
ontological inquiry on the one hand and an ontical inquiry on the other is of key 
significance The latter identifies which types of objects (spaces) exist, the former 
examines the preconditions for the existence of particular types of objects The 
analysis of empirical material for this study was conducted along the two above-
mentioned dimensions On the one hand, data analysis meant conducting an ontical 
inquiry focusing on the institutional power relations and institutionalized 
understandings (in fact discursive formations) that we can observe On the other -
and it is here that discourse theory actually appeared as a method - data analysis 
implied conducting an ontological inquiry, 1 e tracing those articulations of meaning 
through which institutional power relations and institutionalized understandings 
exist and appear as natural/rational/plausible By reinterpreting the empirical data m 
the analytical terms of the Politics of Space Approach, I locate the claims made by 
various actors m a broader historical perspective, and shed light on change and 
continuity m state spatial organization 
The gams from the Politics of Space Approach are demonstrated through t w o 
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m depth case studies The first case study examines state spatial reorganization m 
Hungary by focusing on the period between Hungary's EU accession (May 2004) and 
the approval of the 2™1 National Development Plan (December 2006) (Chapter 5) The 
second examines state spatial reforms m England by looking at the period between 
the referendum on an elected Regional Assembly in the North East (November 2004) 
and the publication of the Review of Sub National Economic Development and 
Regeneration (July 2007) {Chapter 6) I opted for a case study based research strategy 
not simply in order to offer contextualized accounts of concrete state spatial reforms 
Rather, the juxtaposition of the cases of Hungary and England is intended to support 
the theoretical arguments of the thesis In the first instance, post socialist Hungary's 
case was treated, in line with the regulationist view, as 'atypical' and 'overpoliticized' 
This point of departure was relevant for backing the thesis's theoretical argument 
inasmuch as it helped to demonstrate that we cannot account for the spatial 
restructuring of any capitalist state unless we go beyond an ontical analysis The 
need to move to the ontological plane and to do away with the privileging of economic 
structures mtheface of political ones might be less evident in the case of'established 
Western capitalist states', the most common objects of regulationist analysis 
However, if we accept the above mentioned 'ontological sameness' of the state 
spaces of Hungary and England, then we have to recognize that by restricting our 
analysis to the ontical plane we can only have a limited understanding of the way 
state spatial restructuring unfolds m Western capitalist states In other words, the 
choice of Hungary as a first case study had the aim of enhancing our reflexivity wi th 
regard to the inherently political nature of the spatial restructuring of any capitalist 
state 
The gains f rom the Politics of Space Approach 
In view of the shortcomings of the regulationist SRA, the Politics of Space Approach 
elaborated in this thesis offers gams on four interrelated fronts First, by applying the 
PSA, it became possible to formulate fine-grained responses to the questions 
underpinning the two case studies 1) Why have cities and city-regions not been 
privileged as spaces of regulation in Hungary? 2) How can we explain the ascent of 
the concept of the city region m England and the fact that eventually, no radical 
steps were taken to establish city-regions institutionally? 
As to the case of Hungary, I interpreted the spatial reforms of the post-1990 
period m terms of the subsequent institution of three discursive formations of 
nation state space, namely the discursive formations of self-government, spatial 
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development and development policy These discursive formations were examined 
as being produced through the interplay of relatively stable meanings of Hungarian 
nation-state space on the one hand and the newly formulated claims of (especially 
party political) actors on the other As to the relatively stable meanings of state 
spaces, I identified the structuring role of four mam, interrelated sets of meanings 
concerning the significations of the county, the nepies-urbanus debate, the 
urban-rural divide and the Budapest-wc/e/r divide As to the claims of parties on the 
mam issues of spatial reorganization in the post 1990 period, they have been 
especially shaped by the sociological-institutional anchorage of political parties in 
the nepies-urbanus debate, the geographical pattern (urban/rural) of their support 
base and their actual position in county level politics By investigating the interplay 
of the above, relatively stable meanings of Hungarian nation-state space and the 
various claims of actors, the PSA-mformed case study of Hungary offered a new 
perspective considering the transformation of Hungarian state spatiality and the 
undifferentiated treatment of cities and urban regions more specifically 
As to the case of England, I interpreted the post-1997 Labour governments'spatial 
reforms as attempts to reconfigure state spatiality through the establishment of 
two discursive formations of state space, that of regional economic governance and 
'modernized' local government The ascent of the concept of the city-region in 
England, as well as its subsequent fading away, could be well explained in relation to 
these two discursive formations At the same time, just as m the caseof Hungary, for 
a fuller understanding of the struggle over the meaning of the 'city-region', it was 
necessary to consider the development of state spaces m England prior to 1997 
This extended historical analysis revealed three relevant sets of relatively stable, 
but continuously changing practices and meanings of spaces that have shaped 
the evolution of city-regionalism These practices and meanings of space - the 
centralizing, 'anti-territorial tradit ion' of British politics, and the urban-rural and 
North-South 'divides' - have been substantially shaping the claims of various actors 
and, ultimately, the formation of city-regionalism 
In addition to enabling a f me-gra med analysis of "actually existing neohberal isms", 
a second and more general gam from the Politics of Space Approach is that it is useful 
for reframmg our view on state spatial restructuring and for providing insights on 
"neoliberalism-m general" More specifically, the PSA helps to acknowledge that state 
spatial restructuring always entails the broader reconfiguration of political space a 
process m which the nation becomes re-imagmed as a community at multiple scales, 
subdivided into different territories, and m which the spatiality of not only economic, 
but of socio-cultural and political relations becomes reconfigured In other words, 
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the PSA enables the examination of the way in which new (city-)regionalism implies 
new struggles about the plurality of spaces that (can be imagined to) constitute 
national space 
The focus of this study on the ongoing significance of 'the national' has 
underlined an aspect of neoliberal state spatial reforms that has not received much 
attention to date the way in which the concept of 'the nation' has been central to 
the (re)politicization and depoliticization of various claims m debates around state 
spatial reforms Politicization occurs whenever the concept of 'the nation' figures as 
an explicit object of political struggles about state spatiality We can in turn speak of 
depoliticization when the possibility of political conflict or choice is displaced (see 
CLARKE, 2004) by various actors through references to a particular understanding of 
'the nation' I emphasize that even though at first sight it seems that we can interpret 
struggles over the meaning of state spaces m terms of a constant tension between 
instances of (re)politicization and depoliticization, we should not be contented with 
such a conclusion Infact.the idea of the nation, by implymgthatthere is a community 
that shares some fundamental common interest and/or that there is any 'natural' 
ordering of national space, remains al waysfundamentallydepoliticizmg Consequently, 
framing spatial policy claims in terms of particular understandings of 'the nation' 
entails a closure that prevents a 'fuller' repoliticization of claims about space(s) 
The third gam from the PSA concerns the nature of critique that is (can be) 
formulated m relation to state spatial reforms In contrast to regulationist scholars, 
the PSA underlines that there are no pre-established categorizations of 'bad'or 'good', 
and that accusing the neoliberalization of the state of promoting inequality and 
suppressing justice is missing the point Instead, the PSA emphasizes that what are 
'bad'or 'good'ways of organizing space is a question to which (political) decisions are 
the answer Starting from this assumption, the PSA points out that what is problematic 
is that by conducting discussions about such questions m (apparently) apolitical 
terms (such as 'the nation'), these questions fail to become addressed appropriately 
On the whole, the PSA suggests that if we areto critically engage with the outcomes 
of 'neoliberal' state spatial reforms, then it is processes of depoliticization that we 
have to take issue wi th 
Fourth and finally, the PSA also enables us to readdress some of the broader 
concerns of, as well as some specific debates within, contemporary geographical 
scholarship As to the former, the PSA offers a particular perspective on the social 
construction of space on how spaces are not given objects, but devices that order 
(and thus give meaning to) social relations, while being themselves manifestations of 
power As such, the PSA can serve as a basis for any interrogation concerning the 
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formation of spaces Furthermore, the PSA can be seen as a contribution to two mam, 
more or less distinct, scholarly debates The first debate is the one, unfolding at the 
intersection of political economy and political geography, on the necessity to develop 
more culturally inflected accounts of state spatial restructuring In this regard, the 
PSA stresses that practices (and the spaces they constitute) are never 'only' economic, 
but also cultural (because they result from the attr ibution of particular meanings) 
and political (because the attribution of meaning is never power-free) The second 
debate is that on the issue of 'how far' we should go m thinking regions (spaces) 
relationally m times of growing mterconnectedness and on how we should 
conceptualize territories, which are still important m defining 'given' regional 
particularities Concerning this debate, the PSA enables us to make a difference 
between different kinds of actually existing spaces (ontical level) and the discursive 
space (ontological level) within which the meaning of actually existing spaces 
becomes fixed through the relational articulation of meanings By making this 
differentiation, the PSA simultaneously acknowledges the fact that particular spatial 
differences or particularities exist and are 'given' to actors at a certain moment and 
also that spatial differences or particularities are not 'out there to be discovered', but 
are always (re-)constructed m power-laden struggles over the meaning of spaces 
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Összefoglaló 
Jelen disszertació érdekló'désének kozéppontjâban egyrészt a kozkeletüen „uj 
regionahzmusnak" nevezett jelenség âll, mâsrészt az, hogy a figyelem varosok és 
varosrégiók felé tolódasaval milyen âtalakulâson ment keresztul az un „uj 
regionalizmus" az ezredforduló óta. A dolgozat fó' célja egy olyan keret kidolgozâsa 
volt, melyben értelmezhetdvé vâlik, hogy hogyan „emelkedtek fel" régiók és 
varosrégiók Európaban (mar ha felemelkedtek) mint a kozpolitika târgyai és szerepló'i. 
Az „uj (vâros)regionalizmust" az âllam âltalânos neoliberalizàciójàra, illetve azokra az 
âllam szerepében bekovetkezett vâltozâsokra vaiò tekmtettel vizsgâlom, melyek 
kovetkezteben az âllam megsziint a târsadalmi-gazdasâgi szabâlyozâs, a politikai 
szervezddés és az identitâsepités elsó'dleges egységekent mùkodni A dolgozatot 
inspiralo irodalom egyik gyakran felbukkano kifejezésével élve, az âllam térbeli 
ujraszervezése folyamatânak konkret eredményeit ugy tekintem mint a „valóban 
létezó' neoliberalizmus" (BRENNER - THEODORE, 2002) térbeli megnyilvânulâsait Erre 
épitve célom egy olyan elmeleti-konceptualis nézopont kialakitâsa volt, melybó'l az 
âllam térbeli (ujra)szervezése koruli kuzdelmek érthetó'bbé vâlnak, illetve amelybó'l e 
kuzdelmek konkret eredményei jobban megmagyarâzhatok. 
Az âl lam vàltozó térbeliségének elméleti megközelitése: a stratégiai-
Telacionâlis megközelitéstó'l a térpol i t ikai megközelitésig 
A mâsodik fejezetben részletesen târgyalom és értékelem azt az âllamelméletet, 
amely a dolgozat kimdulopontjâul szolgâlt az âllam vâltozô terbelisegenek 
elemzéséhez: ez az âllam szabâlyozâsi, stratégiai-relacionâlis megközelitése 
(regulationist, strategic-relational approach to the state) Mar a kezdeti irodalomât-
tekmtés azokra a munkakra irânyitotta a figyelmem, melyek e fenti, kulonosen az 
angolszâsz szakirodalomban nagy befolyâsra szert te t t megkozelitest alkalmazzâk 
ABobJessopâltal kidolgozott stratégiai-relacionâlis megkozelités kulonbozó'marxista 
irânyzatokra épit, és az âllamot olyan mtezmenyi kapcsolatok osszességének tekmti, 
mely a kapitalizmus ujratermelésének szempontjaból nélkulòzhetetlen szabalyozó 
funkciókat tolt be A stratégiai-relacionâlis megkozelités széles korben elismert 
érdeme, hogy lehetóvé teszi, hogy az âllamot ne ugy értelmezzuk mint koherens és 
teruletileg szuverén „adottsâgot", hanem mint egy âllandoan (ât)alakulâsban levò' 
politikai projektet Tovâbbâ, a stratégiai-relacionâlis megkozelités sikeres vâlaszt 
adott a struktûra-âgens viszony fi lozófiai kérdésére azâltal, hogy egyrészt a 
377 
Strukturakra ùgytekint, hogyazokbizonyosaktorokatéscselekvéseket mâsaktorokkal 
és cselekvésekkel szemben eló'nyben részesitenek, illetve azt feltételezi, hogy az 
aktorok egy konkret cselekvés megkezdése eló'tt felmér(het)ik, hogy a fennâllo 
struktùràk hogyan részesitenek eló'nyben bizonyos cselekvéseket. Ami az âllam 
stratégiai-relacionâhs megkozelitését illeti, az azt jelenti, hogy az âllamot tarsadalmi 
viszonyok egyuttesének tekmtjuk, mely kulonbozó'keppen hat egyes politikai eró'k 
azon képességére, hogy bizonyos tér- idö kontextusokban, bizonyos érdekeket és 
stratégiâkat érvényesitsenek (JESSOP, 1990, 2002b) 
A '90-es évek kozepétöl szâmos probâlkozâsnak lehettunk tanii i , melyek a 
marxista irânyultsâgu politikai gazdasâgtan talajân akartak egy politikai foldrajzi 
perspektivât kialakitam Jessop âllamelméletének „ténesitésével" Ezen probâlkozâsok 
mogott az a feltételezés huzódott meg, hogy az âllam hajlamos „foldrajzilag 
privilegizâlni" {geographical privileging), mâs szoval, hogy az âllam mint politikai 
projekt bizonyos foldrajzi helyeket eló'nyben részesit mâs helyekkel szemben A jelen 
dolgozat szempontjâbol a „foldrajzi privilegizâlâs" gondolata azért birt kulonos 
jelentó'séggel, mivel az a szabâlyozâsi megkozelitést alkalmazo, és a kozelmult „uj 
(vâros)regionalista" âllamtér-reformjait elemzó' tanulmânyok kozponti feltevéseként 
szerepelt Neil BRENNER (2004), az âllam térbeli szelektivitâsânak egyik fo' teoretikusa 
szerint az „uj (väros)regionalizmus" szulte reformokra ugy kell tekintenunk mint 
meglévó' strukturâk aitai alakitott (path-dependent) politikai stratégiâkra, melyekkel 
a (nemzet- és a helyi) âllam kisérletet tesz a keynes-i jóléti szabâlyozâs krizismenedzs-
mentjére Brenner - illetve szâmos, Brenner az allam uj tereire (new state spaces) 
vonatkozo fenti értelmezesével egyetértó' szerzo' - kntikâval illette az âllam térbeli 
reformjanak âltalânos irânyât annak hangsulyos versenyképesség-onentaciojâért és 
amiatt, hogy a kérdéses reformok a térbeli egyenlôtlenségeket novelik kulonbozó' 
térbeli szinteken. 
Ez a dolgozat elismen, hogy ha arra vagyunk kivâncsiak, hogy az âllam mint 
mtézményï kapcsolatokosszessége hogyan biztositjaafenntarthatotôkefelhalmozâs 
târsadalmi-térbeli felteteleit, akkor a szabalyozâsi megkozelitést alkalmazo irâsok 
hasznos adalékokkal szolgâlnak Elsó' lâtâsra a szabâlyozâsi megkozelitést alkalmazo 
elemzések talâlô leirasât adjâk a „neoliberâlis" allam térbeli reformjamak, melyeknek 
- a hâborû utâmjoléti âl lammalellentétben-nemfo'célja azegyenló'sitó'ésstabilizaló 
térbeli beavatkozâsok megvalositâsa. A kutatâs kezdeti fâzisâban azonban a 
szabâlyozâsi megkozelités mkâbb még tobb kérdést vetett fel a térbeli ùjraszervezés 
konkret folyamataival kapcsolatban, mmtsem vâlaszokat segitet t volna 
megfogalmazm A szabâlyozâsi, stratégiai-relacionâhs megkozelités adós maradt 
kulonosképpen annak a kérdésnek a kielégito megvalaszolâsâval, hogy Magyarorszâg 
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esetében (mely e dolgozat elsö empmkus fókusza) miert nem talâlunk olyan vâros(i 
telephely-)politikät (urban locational policies), mint amelyet Brenner és mésok 
Nyugat-Európa-szerte megfigyeltek Kezdetben a Magyaroszâggal kapcsolatos 
empirikus megfigyelések és a szabâlyozâsi megkozelitést alkalmazó elemzések kozti 
eiterest annak a ténynek tulajdonitottam, hogy a magyar allam neoliberalizâcioja 
egybeesett annak posztszocialista âtalakulâsâval A kovetkezô lépésben azonban, 
amikor a szabâlyozâsi, stratégiai-relacionâlis megkozelités segitségével azt kiséreltem 
meg értelmezm, hogy hogyan alakult az âllam térbeli ujraszervezése Angliâban, 
kételyek merultek fel azt illetó'en is, hogy a kérdéses megkozelités hasznos-e egy 
„kiépult nyugati kapitalista âllamban" végbemenó' vâltozâsok értelmezéséhez Bâr a 
kozelmult egyes térbeli reformjai - mint peldâul Nagy London kialakitâsa - jol 
magyaràzhatóak a szabâlyozâsi megkozelitéssel, mâsok - példâul a Londonon kivuli 
vârosrégios megâllapodâsok - nehezen értelmezhetô'ek a kérdéses szemszogbó'l 
Masok âltal megfogalmazott kntikâkra épitve târgyalom a szabâlyozâsi, 
stratégiai-relacionâlis megkozelités fó'bb hiânyossâgait, nevezetesen annak burkolt, 
de tartósan fennàlló elfogultsâgât a gazdasâgi aspektus irânt, valammt arra vaiò 
hajlamât, hogy a teret objektiv kategóriaként kezelje Tovabbâ ugy érvelek, hogy e 
fenti hibâkat visszavezethetjuk arra a módra, ahogyan a stratégiai-relacionâlis 
megkozelités a kritikai realizmus es a szabâlyozâsi megkozelités pârbeszédébôl 
létrejott (JESSOP, 2002d, JESSOP - SUM, 2006). Az âllam térbeli ujrastrukturâlodâsanak 
megertéséhez két tekmtetben kell tullépnunk a szabâlyozâsi, stratégiai-relacionâlis 
megkozelitésen Eló'szor is behatóbban kell foglalkoznunk az ällam térbeli reformja 
(illetve annak megtervezése és kivitelezése) koruli kuzdelmek politikai reahtâsaval 
Mâsrészt hangsulyosabban el kell ismernunk, hogy az âllam jelentese mmdig is vita 
târgya volt, és ennek megfeleló'en az âllam neohberalizmus alatti ujradefiniâlâsât 
tâgabbtorténelmi tâvlatban kell vizsgâlnunk Emellettaztâll i tom, hogyaz âtalakulâsi 
folyamatokat jobban megérthetjuk, ha az âllam (térbeli) ujradefiniâlâsât egy olyan 
folyamatként elemezzuk, mely szukségszerüen magâval von a „nemzet" mint térbeli 
kozósségjelentése koruli kuzdelmeket Ezen aspektusok megfeleló'figyelembevétele 
céljâbol egy olyan, probléma-onentâlt megkozelités szukségessége mellett érvelek, 
mely nem egy bizonyos elmélet megeró'sitésére torekszik (mint ahogy a szabâlyozasi 
megkozelités a marxista, kritikai realizmus megeró'sitését célozza), hanem melynek 
mozgatorugója az a kérdés, hogy „mi torténik valôjâban a vilâgban" (HOWARTH, 2005) 
Aj./e/ezetbenkidolgozom a térpolitikai megkozelitést (Politics of Space Approach), 
mely egy ilyen problemaonentâlt megkozelités, s amely az âllam térbeli âtalakitasât 
az âllam (térbeliségének) jelentéséró'l fo lytatott kuzdelmek szempontjâbôl vizsgâlja 
A „térpohtikai" elnevezést Ward és Jonas egy megjegyzése ihlette, mely a szabâlyozasi 
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megkozelitéssel kapcsolatos, fent emlitett kritikai megfontolâsokkal egybecseng. 
Ward és Jonas ugyanis ugyérvelnek, hogy„a varosregionahzmust ugy kelltekintenunk 
mint térben jatszódó és térró'l szoló aktuâlpohtikât [an actual politics of and m space), 
és nem egy uj kapitalista fejlddés korszakânak és egy posztnemzetâllami 
teruletiségnek a kifejezó'dését" (WARD-JONAS, 2005, p. 2122) 
A térpolitikai megkozelités nem utasitja el teljesen a szabâlyozâsi, stratégiai 
megkozelitést Valójaban a térpolitikai megkozelités maga is epit arra a gondolatra, 
hogy a târsadalmi-térbeli vâltozâsok stratégiakovetó' aktorok, és az aktorok 
stratégiâira szelektiven ható kontextus kolcsonhatâsâbol erednek A szabâlyozâsi 
megkozelités fent emlitett hiânyossâgamak elkerulése érdekében azt javaslom 
azonban, hogy a stratégiai szelektivitâs gondolatét ne a kritikai realizmus es a 
szabâlyozâsi megkozelités pârbeszédére épitett keretbe âgyazzuk, hanem egy a 
Laclau es Mouffe diskurzuselmélete âltal inspirait keretbe A diskurzuselmélet arra a 
feltevesre épit, hogy a târsadalmi jelentést nemdetermmisztikus {contingent) modon 
alkotott szabâiyok és differenciâk alakitjâk (TORFINC, 1999; 2005) A diskurzuselmélet 
egyik kozpontifogalmaa„diskurzus"(vagydiszkurzivformâcio), mely ugydefmiélható 
mint „jelentést adó praxisok olyan relacionâlis rendszere, mely torténelmi és végsö 
soron politikai cselekvések sorân formâlodik, s mely minden jelentés konstrukciojânak 
nemdetermmisztikus honzontjât képezi" (TORFINC, 2005, ρ 8). Hârom fó', egymâssal 
osszefuggó' okból javaslom, hogy a diskurzuselmélet nézó'pontjaból gondoljuk ujra az 
âllam térbeli atstrukturâlodâsâra vonatkozó nézeteinket Eló'szor is e nezó'pont 
lehetó'vé teszi, hogy elvessunk minden olyan nézetet, mely szerint az âllam 
mu'kodésenek van egy alapvetó'en lényeges és egységesitó' eleme (példâul a 
tókefelhalmozas) Mâsodsorban, a diskurzuselméleti nezó'pont aitai tudatosithatjuk, 
hogy az egyetnemertes a târsadalmi valósag lényegi dimenziója (NORVAL, 2004), es 
hogy a - tobbek kòzott az âllam térbeli szervezésére vonatkozó-divergenstârsadalmi 
kovetelések sosem békithetó'k ki egymâssal vegérvényesen racionalisan elért 
konszenzus alapjân. A politikânak csak akkor van tere, ha a jelentést alapvetó'en 
mstabilnak vesszuk Harmadsorban, a diskurzuselméleti nezó'pont emlékeztet a 
megkérddjelezhetetlennek tùnó' strukturâhs korlâtok „politikai eredetére" 
A 4 fejezetben âttekmtem, hogy milyen kovetkezménye van egy diskurzuselmé-
leti megkozelitesnek az alkalmazott módszertanra, illetve kitérek a tudomânyos 
érvényesség és a târsadalmi-politikai relevancia kérdésére Ugyanebben a fejezetben 
târgyalom, hogy a térpolitikai megkozelités hogyan forditható le módszertamlag, 
illetve konkret kutatasi modszerek alkalmazâsâra E tekmtetben a diskurzuselmélet 
(Heideggert kovetó) kulonbségtétele az ontológiai és ontikus vizsgâlodâs kozott 
kulcsfontossâgu jelento'ségù' Az ontikus vizsgâlodâs annak azonositésât célozza, 
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hogy milyen („fajta") objektumok (terek) léteznek, az ontológiai vizsgalódas pedig 
bizonyos (fajta) objektumok lehetó'ségfeltételeire irânyul Az empinkus anyagok 
elemzése e fenti két dimenzió mentén tortént s épult be a dolgozatba. Az empinkus 
adatok elemzése egyrészt ontikus vizsgâlodâst jelentett arra fókuszalva, hogy milyen 
mtezményi eró'viszonyokat és mtézményesult jelentéseket (valojaban diszkurziv 
formaciókat) figyelhetunk meg Masrészt - s a diskurzuselmélet i t t jelent meg 
módszerként - az adatelemzés ontológiai vizsgâlodâst is maga utân vont, mely annak 
feltârâsâra irânyult, hogy mely jelentéskapcsolódasok [articulations of meaning) 
biztositjakazmtézményieró'viszonyokésaz mtézményesult jelentések fen nmaradasât, 
illetve azt, hogy ezek termeszetesnek/racionalisnak/plauzibilisnek tünnek Az 
empirikus adatokat a térpolitikai megkozelités elemzési keretében ujraértelmezve a 
kulonbozó' aktorok âllitâsait egy tâgabb torténelmi tévlatban helyeztem el, s igy uj 
megvilâgitâsba kerult az âllam térbeli szervezésenek vâltozàsa és folytonosséga 
A térpolitikai megkozelités hozadékât két részletes esettanulmänyon keresztul 
szemléltetem Az elsó' esettanulmâny (5 fejezet) az âllam terbeli ujraszervezését 
vizsgâlja Magyarorszâgon az orszâg EU csatlakozasa (2004 majusa) és a 2. Nemzeti 
FejlesztésiTervelfogadâsa (20o6decembere) kozotti idó'szakra fókuszalva A mâsodik 
esettanulmâny (6 fejezet) târgya az allam térbeli reformja Angliâban, az Észak-keleti 
Régióban a välasztott régiógyülésró'l tar tot t népszavazâs (2004 novembere) és az 
„Âttekintés a szubnacionâlis gazdasägi fejló'désró'l és regeneracióról" [Review of 
Sub-National Economic Development and Regeneration) cimü' dokumentum (2007 
juliusa) megjelenése kozti idó'szakot tekmtve Az esettanulmâny-alapu kutatâsi 
stratégiâra nem csupân azért esett a vâlasztasom, hogy konkret âllamtér-reformok 
kontextualizâlt leirâsât adjam Magyarorszâg es Anglia esettanulmânyamak egymâs 
mellé âllitâsa mkâbb az elmeleti érvelés alâtâmasztâsât szolgalta. Elsó' lépésben a 
posztszocialista Magyarorszâg esetét a szabâlyozâsi megkozelitésnek megfelelöen 
„atipikusnak" és „tulpohtizâltnak" tekintettem Ez a kimdulasi pont annyiban volt 
fontos a dolgozat elméleti érvelése szempontjaból, hogy segitett râmutatni, hogy 
egyetlen kapitahsta âllam térbeli ujrastrukturâlodâsât sem magyarâzhatjuk 
megfelelöen, ha nem lépunk tul az ontikus jellegù' vizsgâlodâs keretein Az ontológiai 
vizsgalódas irânti tovâbblépés szukségessége, illetve az, hogy ne tulajdonitsunk 
nagyobb jelentó'séget a gazdasägi strukturäknak, mint a politikaiaknak lehet, hogy 
kevésbé szembetünó' „kiépult nyugati kapitalista allamok" esetében, melyek a 
szabâlyozâsi megkozelitést alkalmazó elemzések leggyakonbb târgyai Azonban ha 
elfogadjuk Magyarorszâg és Anglia âllamteremek „ontológiai azonossâgât", akkor fel 
kell ismernunk, hogy csupân az ontikus dimenzióra szùkitve elemzésunket nem 
kaphatunk teljes kepet arról, hogyan zajlik le az âllam térbeli ûjrastrukturâlodâsa a 
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nyugati kapitalista âllamokban Mâs szóval, Magyarorszâg szerepeltetése elsó' 
esettanulményként annak tudatositésât szolgâlja, hogy bârmely kapitalista âllam 
térbeli ujrastrukturalódasa lényegileg politikai természetu 
A térpol i t ikai megközelités hozadéka 
A szabâlyozâsi, stratégiai-relacionâlis megközelités hiânyossâgait tekmtve az e 
dolgozatban bemutatot t térpolit ikai megközelités hozadéka négy, egymassal 
osszefuggó' téren mutatkozik Elöszor is, a térpolitikai megkozelitést alkalmazva 
kimeritó'bb vâlaszt adhatunk a két esettanulmânyt megalapozó kérdésekre, melyek 
a kovetkezó'k ι Miert nem vâltak a vârosok és vàrosrégiók a szabâlyozâs hemelt 
tereive Magyarorszâgon? 2 Hogyan magyarazható a varosrégió koncepciójanak 
felemelkedése Angliâban, illetve az a tény, hogy vegul nem kerult sor radikâlis 
lépésekre a varosrégiós mtézmények létrehozâsâra? 
Ami Magyarorszâg esetét illeti, az 1990 utam idó'szak térbeli reformjait ugy 
értelmeztem mint a nemzetâllami tér hârom kulonbozó' diszkurziv formâciojânak, az 
onkormanyzatisâg, a teruletfejlesztés, és a fejlesztéspolitika diszkurziv formâciômak 
egymâs utâm mtézményesulését Ezeket a diszkurziv formâciokat ugy vizsgâltam 
tovabbâ mint egyrészt a magyar nemzetâllami terre vonatkozó relativ stabil 
jelentések, illetve mâsrészt (fó'leg pârtpohtikai) aktorok aitai te t t kijelentések 
kolcsonhatâsânak eredményeit. Ami a magyar nemzetâllami tèrre vonatkozó relativ 
stabil jelentéseket illeti, négy, egymâssal osszefuggó' jelentéscsoport strukturâlo 
hatasât azonositottam a megyéhez kapcsolódó jelentéseket, illetve a népies-urbânus 
vitahoz, valammt a varos-videk és a Budapest-vidék szétvâlasztâshoz kapcsolódóakat. 
Az 1990 utâm idó'szakban a pârtok térbeli ujraszervezésre vonatkozó kijelentéseit 
kulonosen a pârtok népies-urbânus vitâba vaiò szociológiai-mtézményes 
beâgyazottsâga, illetve a tâmogatottsâguk foldrajzi vetulete (vârosi/vidéki) es a 
megyepolitikâban elfoglalt aktuâlis poziciója alakitotta. A magyar nemzetâllami terre 
vonatkozó fenti relativ stabil jelentések es a kulonbozó' aktorok kijelentésemek 
kolcsonkapcsolatât vizsgâlva a térpolit ikai megkozelitést alkalmazó magyar 
esettanulmâny ûj megvilâgitâsba helyezte a magyar âllam térbeliségének 
âtalakulâsât, illetve a vârosok és vârosrégiok differenciâlatlan kezelését 
Ami Anglia esetét illeti, az 1997 utâm munkaspârti kormânyok térbeli reformjait 
ugy értelmeztem mint az âllamtér ujrarendezésére te t t kisérletet két, âllamteret 
képzó' diszkurziv formâcio - a regionâlis gazdasâgi kormanyzâs {regional economic 
governance) es a „modermzâlt" helyi kormânyzat ('modernized' local government) -
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létrehozâsa aitai. A varosrégió koncepciójànak angliai felemelkedése, miképp annak 
azt kovetó' elhalvânyulâsa magyarâzhatovâ vâlt a tenti két diszkurziv formació 
vonatkozâsâban Ugyanakkor, csakugy, mint Magyarorszâg esetében, a varosrégió 
jelentése feletti kuzdelem jobb megértése érdekében szukség volt Anglia âllamtereinek 
1997 eló'tti alakulâsât is figyelembe venni E tâgabb torténet i elemzés a tèrrei 
kapcsolatosjelentések és praxisok härom olyan relative stabil, defolytonosan valtozó 
csoportjàra muta to t i râ, melyek hatottak a vârosregionalizmus alakulâsâra Ezek a 
tèrrei kapcsolatos jelentések és praxisok - a brit politika centralizaló, „anti-territoriâ-
lis" hagyomânya, illetve a vârosi-rurâlis és az Észak-Dél „vàlasztóvonalak"-jelentó'sen 
alakitottak a kulonbozó' aktorok kijelentéseit, és végeredményben a vârosregionaliz-
mus alakulâsât 
Amellett, hogy hozzâsegit a „valóban létezó' neoliberahzmusok" ârnyaltabb 
elemzéséhez, a térpolitikai megkozelités mâsodik és âltalânosabb hozadéka, hogy 
hasznos ujraértelmezését adja az âllam térbeli âtstrukturâlodâsârol alkotott 
képunknek, illetve, hogy uj adalékokkal szolgâl az „âltalâban vett neoliberalizmussal" 
kapcsolatban. A térpolitikai megkozelités segitségével belâthatjuk, hogy az âllam 
térbeli âtstrukturâlodâsa mmdig a politikai tér âtkonfigurâl(od)âsâtjelenti, egy olyan 
folyamatot, mely ujraképzeh a nemzetet mint tobb szinten létezó' és kulonbozó' 
teruleti egységekbe osztott kozosséget, s melyben nemcsak a gazdasàgi, hanem a 
tarsadalmi-kulturâlis és politikai kapcsolatok térbelisége is âtalakul Mas szóval, a 
térpolitikai megkozelités lehetó'vé teszi annak megvizsgâlâsât, hogy az „uj (varos-) 
regionalizmus" milyen kuzdelmeket implikâl azokról a kulonbozó terekról, melyek a 
nemzeti teret alkot(hat)jâk 
E tanulmâny „a nemzeti" tovàbbra is fennàlló jelentó'ségére fókuszal, s ezzel a 
neoliberâlis âllamtér-reformok egy eddig kevés figyelmet kapott aspektusâra tereli a 
figyelmet· arra, hogy „a nemzet" koncepciója kozponti szerepet tol t(ott) be az 
âllamtér-reformok koruli vitak kijelentésemek (ujra)politizaciója és depolitizâcioja 
szempontjaból Politizàcióról akkor beszélhetunk, amikor „a nemzet" fogalma az 
âllam térbeliségéró'l folytatott politikai kuzdelmek explicit târgyaként jelemk meg 
Depolitizacióról ezzel szemben akkor van szó, amikor a politikai konfliktus vagy 
valasztâs lehetó'sege szem eló'l veszik (Id. CLARKE, 2004) kulonbozó' aktorok „a nemzet" 
egy bizonyos felfogâsâra tet t utalâsai âltal A fentiekkel kapcsolatban hangsùlyozom, 
hogy bar elsó're ûgy tü'nik, hogy az âllam tereiró'l folyó kuzdelmeket értelmezhetjuk 
mint a(z ujra)politizâcio és a depolitizâcio momentumai kozotti feszultséget, ezzel a 
kovetkeztetéssel nem elégedhetunk meg Valojâban a nemzet gondolata, mely 
valamilyen alapvetöen kozos érdeken osztozó kozosséget feltételez, illetve/vagy azt, 
hogy létezik a nemzeti térnek valamiféle termeszetes rendje, mmdig is megmarad 
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alapvetó'en depolitizàló természetünek Kovetkezésképpen, a kulonbozô' terulet-
politikai kijelentéseknek „a nemzet" bizonyos értelmezésem keresztul való 
megfogalmazâsa akadalyt jelent a térró'l (terekró'l) való kijelentések „teljesebb" 
ujrapolitizaciója szempontjaból 
A térpolit ikai megkozelités harmadik hozadéka az âllamtér-reformokkal 
kapcsolatban megfogalmazott kritika természetére vonatkozik A szabâlyozâsi meg-
kozelitéssel szemben a terpolitikai megkozelités kiemeli, hogy a „ jó" és a „rossz" nem 
eleve létezó' kategónék, és hogy célt téveszt, aki az âllam neoliberahzàciójàt teszi 
feleló'ssé az egyenlótlenségek fokozasâért és az igazsâgossâg einyomâsâért Ehelyett 
a térpolit ikai megkozelités hangsulyozza, hogy arra a kérdésre, hogy mi a tér 
szervezésének „jo" és „rossz" módja, (politikai) dontés a felelet Ebbó'l a feltételezesbó'l 
kimdulva a térpolitikai megkozelités râmutat arra a problemâra, hogy a fenti kerdések 
nem kezelhetók megfelelöen, ha azokról olyan, (latszólag) apolitikus fogalmakat 
hasznâlva vitâzunk, mint „a nemzet". Osszességében, a térpohtikai megkozelités azt 
âllitja, hogy ha kritikât akarunk megfogalmazm az âllam „neoliberâlis" térbeli 
âtalakitâsâval kapcsolatban, akkor mmdenekeló'tt a depolitizaciós folyamatokkal kell 
foglalkoznunk 
Vegul és negyedszer, a térpohtikai megkozelités lehetó'vé teszi, hogy hozzaszóljunk 
a mai foldrajztudomànyt foglalkoztató tâgabb témakorokhoz, illetve nehâny szù'kebb 
vitâhoz Ami az eló'bbieket il leti, a térpolitikai megkozelités a tér târsadalmi 
konstrukciója értelmezése egy olyan perspektivâjât nyujtja, mely szerint a kulonbozô' 
terek nem adott târgyak, hanem a târsadalmi kapcsolatokat rendezó' (s egyben 
azoknak jelentést adó) eszkozok, melyek maguk is a hatalom megnyilvânulâsai. 
Ekképpen, a térpolit ikai megkozelités alapjâul szolgâlhat bârmely, a terek 
formâlodâsara iranyuló vizsgâlodâsnak Emellett a térpolitikai megkozelités tovâbbi 
két, tobbé-kevésbé elkulonithetó' tudomänyos vitahoz való hozzâjarulâsnak is 
tekinthetó' Az egyik vita a politikai gazdasâgtan és a politikai foldrajz hatârân 
bontakozott ki annak szukségességéró'l, hogy az allam térbeli ujrastrukturâlodâsânak 
magyarâzatâba bevonjuk a kultura fogalmât E tekmtetben a térpolitikai megkozelités 
azt hangsulyozza, hogy a praxisok (és egyben az âltaluk konstituâlt terek) sosem 
„csupân" gazdasâgiak, hanem egyben kulturâlisak (mivel mmdig valamilyen jelentés-
attribuciók nyomân nyernek értelmet), és pohtikaiak (mivel a jelentésattribuciók 
sosem hatalommentesek) A màsodik vita ahhoz a kérdéshez kapcsolodik, hogy 
„milyen messze mehetunk el" a régiók relacionâlis értelmezésében a novekvó ossze-
kapcsoltsâg korâban, illetve hogyan konceptuahzâljuk a teruletiséget, mely ma is 
fontosmeghatarozója„adott"regionâlissajâtossâgoknak Evitâtilletó'enatérpolitikai 
megkozelités lehetó'vé teszi, hogy kulonbséget tegyunk a kulonbozô, konkrétan 
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létezó' terek (ontikus szmt), illetve akozott a diszkurziv tér kozott (ontológiai szmt), 
melyben a konkrétan létezó terek jelentése meghatàrozódik a jelentések relacionalis 
osszekapcsolódàsa révén E tenti kulonbségtétel aitai a térpohtikai megkozelités 
egyidejüleg ismen el azt a tenyt, hogy bizonyos térbeli differenciâk es sajâtossâgok 
léteznek és „adottak" az aktorok szâmâra egy adott idöpillanatban, illetve azt, 
hogy a térbeli differenciâk és sajâtossâgok sosem „varnak készen felfedezésre", 
hanem mindig a tér jelentésérdl folyó, hatalommal at i ta to t t kuzdelmek sorân 
konstrualódnak (ujra) 
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SaTTìenvatting 
Aan dit proefschrift ligt een interesse m het fenomeen 'new regionalism' ten 
grondslag Meer specifiek is de aanleiding voor deze studie de toenemende nadruk 
die binnen het kader van dit 'new regionalism' wordt gelegd op steden en stedelijke 
regio's De centrale doelstelling is een kader te schetsen om tot nieuwe inzichten te 
komen over of en hoe regio's en stedelijke regio's als nieuwe beleidsobjecten subject 
m Europa zijn 'herrezen' De studie analyseert new (city-)regionalism met betrekking 
tot de algemene 'neoliberalisermg' van de staat, en de daaraan gerelateerde 
veranderingen m de rol van de staat als de voornaamste entiteit van socio-economi-
sche regulering, politieke organisatie en identiteitsconstructie Om een term te 
gebruiken die veel voorkomt m de literatuur die inspirerend was voor deze studie, 
beschouw ik de concrete resultaten van deze ruimtelijke reorganisatieprocessen als 
ruimtelijke manifestaties van "actually existing neoliberalisms" (BRENNER and THEODORE, 
2002) Hierop voortbouwend, is mijn doel een theoretisch conceptueel perspectief 
uit te werken van waaruit de voortdurende strijd over de (her-)definiering van de 
ruimtelijke organisatie van de staat begrijpelijker wordt, en de concrete resultaten 
van deze strijd beter verklaarbaar zijn 
Een theoretisch perspectief op de verschuivende ruimtel i jkheid van 
de staat: van de strategisch-relationele benadering naar de 'Politics of 
Space' benadering 
Hoofdstuk 2 bevat een grondige beschouwing van het staatstheoretische kader dat 
het uitgangspunt vormde voor de analyse van de verschuivende ruimtelijkheid van 
de staat m dit proefschrift de zogenaamde 'regulationist', strategisch-relationele 
benadering (strategic relational approach - SRA) Al tijdens de verkennende 
literatuurstudie werd mijn aandacht getrokken door analyses die de bovengenoemde 
benadering hanteren, en die recentelijk vooral m de Angelsaksische, wetenschap-
pelijke literatuur grote bekendheid hebben verworven De SRA, uitgewerkt door Bob 
Jessop, bouwt voort op verschillende Marxistische stromingen Ze ziet de staat als 
een set van institutionele relaties met een reeks van regulerende taken die 
noodzakelijk zijn voor de reproductie van het kapitalisme De SRA wordt breed 
gewaardeerd vanwege het feit dat zij de staat met ziet als een coherent en territoriaal 
soeverein 'gegeven', maar juist als een politiek project dat zich m een continu proces 
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van (her)vorming bevindt Bovendien is de SRA er ook m geslaagd om een antwoord 
te geven op de filosofische vraag over de relatie tussen structuur en agentschap 
Volgens de SRA bevoordelen structuren aan de ene kant bepaalde acties over andere, 
aan de andere kant acht de SRA actoren m staat m te schatten hoe structuren acties 
begunstigen alvorens ZIJ zelf actie ondernemen Een strategisch-relationele 
benadering van de staat betekent meer specifiek dat men de staat beschouwt als 
een sociale entiteit welke, binnen een gegeven ruimtelijk-temporele context, aan 
verschillende politieke groeperingen gedifferentieerde mogelijkheden biedt hun 
eigen belangen en strategieën na te streven (JESSOP, 1990, 2002b) 
Sinds halverwege de jaren 90 zijn talrijke pogingen ondernomen om op basis van 
de Marxistisch georiënteerde Politieke Economie een politiek geografisch perspectief 
uit te werken door Jessop's staatstheorie te 'verruimtelijken' Deze pogingen werden 
gebaseerd op de veronderstelling dat de staat de neiging heeft to t 'geografische 
privilegering', of, m andere worden, dat de staat als politiek project bepaalde plaatsen 
tegenover andere bevoordeelt Voor deze studie was het idee van 'geografische 
privilegering' relevant, omdat het een centrale gedachte is binnen de regulationist 
studies met een focus op de recente, new (city jregionalist ruimtelijke hervormingen 
van de staat Volgens Neil BRENNER (2004), een leidende theoreticus op het gebied van 
de ruimtelijke selectiviteit van de staat, moeten new (city-)regionalist hervormingen 
gezien worden als padafhankelijke politieke strategieën waarmee de (nationale en 
lokale) staat de crisistendens van de Keynesiaanse welvaartsregulering probeert te 
managen Brenner - en talrijke andere auteurs die Brenner's interpretatie van 'new 
state spaces' gevolgd hebben - staat kritisch tegenover de ruimtelijke hervormingen 
van de staat, vooral vanwege het feit dat deze hervormingen een sterk nadruk leggen 
op ruimtelijke concurrentiekracht en dat ze ruimtelijke ongelijkheden op verschillende 
schaalniveaus verhogen 
Dit proefschrift ontkent met dat regulationist werk nuttige inzichten levert met 
het oog op de vraag hoe de staat als een set van institutionele relaties de sociaal 
ruimtelijke voorwaarden van kapitaalaccumulatie schept Op het eerste gezicht lijken 
regulationist analyses een treffend beeld te schetsen van de ruimtelijke hervormingen 
van de 'neoliberale' staat die - anders dan de naoorlogse welvaartstaat - met langer 
de ambitie heeft ruimtelijk nivellerende en stabiliserende ingrepen uit te voeren 
Maar de toepassing van het regulationist kader m de eerste fase van deze studie 
heeft, wat betreft de concrete afloop van ruimtelijke hervormingsprocessen, eerder 
tot meer vragen geleid dan tot antwoorden Meer specifiek kon de regulationist, 
strategisch-relationele benadering met op een tevredenstellende manier verklaren 
waarom er m Hongarije, de eerste empirische focus van deze studie, geen stedelijk 
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vestigingsbeleid {'urban locational policy') bestaat dat vergelijkbaar is met wat 
Brenner en anderen m West Europa hebben aangetoond Aanvankelijk heb ik de 
discrepantie tussen de empirische observaties over Hongarije enerzijds en de 
suggesties van regulationist denkers anderzijds toegeschreven aan het feit dat de 
neoliberahsermg van de Hongaarse staat parallel heeft plaatsgevonden aan diens 
postsocial istische transformatie Maar mijn daaropvolgende poging om de ruimtelijke 
hervorming van de staat m Engeland door de lens van de SRA te bekijken heeft ook 
twijfels opgeleverd met betrekking tot het nut van de SRA voor het verklaren van 
veranderingen m een 'gevestigde Westerse kapitalistische staat' Hoewel bepaalde 
elementen van recente ruimtelijke hervormingen in Engeland - zoals het oprichten 
van Greater London - goed bleken te passen m het regulationist perspectief, waren 
sommige andere - zoals de evolutie van stedenregionale arrangementen buiten 
Londen - met zo makkelijk te begrijpen 
Voortbouwend op bestaande kritiek op de regulationist benadering bediscussieer 
ik de centrale tekortkomingen van de regulationist SRA, namelijk haar subtiele maar 
aanhoudende vooringenomenheid tegenover 'het economische', en de daaraan 
gerelateerde neiging om ruimtes als gegeven te beschouwen Verder beargumenteer 
ik dat deze tekortkomingen in verband gebracht kunnen worden met de manier 
waarop de SRA geconcipieerd werd als een dialoog tussen kritisch realisme enerzijds 
en de regulation approach anderzijds (JESSOP, 2002d, JESSOP and SUM, 2006) Ik stel dat 
de regulationist SRA m twee opzichten moet worden herzien indien we de ruimtelijke 
hervorming van de staat beter willen begrijpen Ten eerste moeten we ons dieper 
met de politieke realiteit van de strijd bezighouden die rond de (opzet en implementatie 
van de) ruimtelijke hervorming van de staat plaatsvindt Ten tweede, moeten we er 
expliciet van uit gaan dat de betekenis van de staat altijd al onderhevig is geweest 
aan onenigheid Het gevolg hiervan is dat we ook de herdefiniëring van de staat 
onder het neoliberalisme binnen een breder, historisch perspectief moeten bezien 
Bovendien beargumenteer ik dat deze transformatieprocessen beter te begrijpen zijn 
wanneer we de (ruimtelijke) herdefiniëring van de staat zien als een proces dat nood 
zakelijkerwijs een strijd over de betekenis van 'de natie' als een ruimtelijke 
gemeenschap met zich mee brengt Om aan deze aspecten voldoende aandacht te 
schenken, stel ik voor een perspectief te hanteren dat met gedreven is, zoals de 
regulationist benadering, door de wens om een bepaalde theorie (namelijk kritisch 
realist Marxisme) te bevestigen, maar juist een benadering te kiezen die 
'probleem-gedreven' is Dat wil zeggen, een benadering die gedreven wordt door het 
verkennen van dat 'wat er feitelijk gaande is m de wereld' (HOWARTH, 2005) 
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De 'Politics of Space' benadering (PSA) die ik m Hoofdstuk 3 uitwerk is bedoeld als 
een dergelijke 'probleem-gedreven' benadering Het is een benadering die de 
ruimtelijke hervormingen van de staat als een proces beschouwt welke noodzakelijker 
WIJS een strijd over de betekenis van de (ruimtelijkheid van de) staat met zich 
meebrengt Het label 'politics of space' is geïnspireerd op een opmerking van Ward 
en Jonas waarin de kritiekpunten op de regulationist benadering weerklinken Ward 
en Jonas stellen namelijk dat we city regionalism moeten zien als "als een politiek 
proces met als objecten context de ruimte {an actual politics of and in space), en met 
als een manifestatie van een nieuw tijdperk van kapitalistische ontwikkeling en 
postnationale terri tonaliteit" (WARD and JONAS, 2004, ρ 2122) 
De PSA houdt geen totaal verzet tegen de regulationist, strategisch-relationele 
benadering m In feite bouwt de PSA zelfs voort op het idee dat sociaal ruimtelijke 
verandering bewerkstelligd wordt door de interactie van strategische actoren en de 
strategisch selectieve context waarin ZIJ zich bevinden Maar ik stel dat, om tegemoet 
te komen aan de tekortkomingen van regulationist analyses, het idee van strategische 
selectiviteit met moet worden ingebed m een kader dat is gebaseerd op een dialoog 
tussen kritisch realisme en de regulatiomst benadering, maar juist moet worden 
ingebed m een kader geïnspireerd door Laclau en Mouffe's discourstheorie Discours-
theorie berust op de veronderstelling dat, m de sociale wereld, betekenis afhangt van 
contingent geconstrueerde regels en verschillen {'differences') (TORFING, 1999, 2005) 
Een centraal analytisch concept van discourstheorie is 'discourse' (of 'discursive 
formation'), gedefinieerd als een "een relationeel system van betekenisgevende 
praktijken, gevormd door historische, en uiteindelijk politieke interventies, dat als 
een met-deterministisch kader fungeert voor de constructie van elke nieuwe 
betekenis" (TORFINC, 2005, ρ 8) 
Ik stel dat het nutt ig is om onze kijk op de ruimtelijke herstructurering van de 
staat met de hulp van discourstheorie te herzien vanwege drie onderling verbonden 
redenen Ten eerste, kan, vanuit een dicourstheoretisch perspectief, de opvatting dat 
het handelen van de staat een essentieel en unificerend element heeft (namelijk 
kapitaalaccumulatie), achterwege worden gelaten Ten tweede stelt discourstheorie 
dat onenigheid een constitutief element is van de sociale wereld (NORVAL, 2004) 
Uiteenlopende sociale eisen - wat betreft o a de ruimtelijke organisatie van de staat 
- zullen dus nooit voor altijd met elkaar verenigbaar zijn puur en alleen op basis van 
rationele consensus Als WIJ ruimte willen laten voor politiek, moeten WIJ betekenis 
zien als iets dat fundamenteel instabiel is Ten derde, discourstheorie houdt ons 
bewust van de 'politieke oorsprong' van schijnbaar onbetwiste structurele 
beperkingen 
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In Hoofdstuk4 reflecteer ik op de methodologische implicaties van een discours 
theoretische benadering Tevens ga ik m op de vraagstukken omtrent wetenschap-
pelijke validiteit en sociaal-politieke relevantie In hetzelfde hoofdstuk bespreek ik de 
vertaling van de Politics of Space benadering naar methodologie en de toepassing 
van bepaalde methoden In dit opzicht is het onderscheid, gemaakt door discours-
theoretici (m het voetspoor van Heidegger), tussen een ontologische ondervraging 
enerzijds, en een ontische ondervraging anderzijds, van centrale betekenis De laatst 
genoemde ondervraging identificeert welk soort objecten (ruimtes) er zijn, de eerste 
kijkt naar de voorwaarden voor het bestaan van dergelijke objecten De analyse van 
het empirisch materiaal voor deze studie is langs de twee bovengenoemde dimensies 
uitgevoerd Data analyse betekent aan de ene kant een ontische ondervraging 
met een focus op de te observeren institutionele machtsverhoudingen en 
geïnstitutionaliseerde betekenissen (m feite discursive formations) Aan de andere 
kant - en in dit opzicht fungeert discourstheorie als een methode - vereisde data 
analyse een ontologische ondervraging, d w z het traceren van de articulaties van 
betekenissen waardoor institutionele machtsverhoudingen en geïnstitutionaliseerde 
betekenissen bestaan en als natuurlijk/rationeel/plausibel blijken Door de empirische 
data via de Politics of Space benadering te herinterpreteren was ik m staat de claims 
van actoren m een breder historisch perspectief te plaatsen om zodoende de 
verandering en continuïteit van de ruimtelijke organisatie van de staat te laten zien 
De voordelen van de Politics of Space benadering worden m twee diepgaande 
casestudies zichtbaar gemaakt De eerste casestudy analyseert de ruimtelijke 
reorganisatie van de staat m Hongarije door te focussen op de periode tussen de 
toetreding van Hongarije tot de EU (m mei 2004) en de goedkeuring van het 2de 
Nationale Ontwikkelingsplan (in december 2006) (Hoofdstuk 5) De tweede bespreekt 
de ruimtelijke hervormingen van de staat m Engeland en kijkt naar de periode tussen 
het referendum over een gekozen regionaal parlement m de Regio Noord Oost en de 
publicatie van de Review of Sub-National Economie Development and Regeneration (m 
juli 2007) (Hoofdstuk 6) De keuze voor een casestudiestrategie beoogde met slechts 
het komen tot een gecontextualiseerde analyse van concrete staatsruimtelijke 
hervormingen, maar was veel meer bedoeld om, door het naast elkaar stellen van de 
casussen over Hongarije en Engeland, het theoretisch argument van het proefschrift 
te ondersteunen Conform het regulationist perspectief werd de case van post 
socialistisch Hongarije eerst als 'atypisch' en 'overgepoliticiseerd' beschouwd 
De keuze voor dit uitgangspunt was relevant voor de theoretische argumentatie 
van het proefschrift omdat ik hierdoor kon demonstreren dat WIJ de ruimtelijke 
herstructurering van een kapitalistische staat alleen kunnen verklaren als we verder 
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gaan dan alleen een ontische ondervraging De noodzaak om de stap te maken naar 
het ontologisch niveau, en de noodzaak om economische structuren met als 
belangrijker te zien dan politieke structuren, is misschien minder voelbaar m het 
geval van 'gevestigde Westerse kapitalistische staten', die het meest als onderzoeks-
object van regulationist analyses voorkomen Maar als we accepteren dat state spaces 
van Hongarije en Engeland uit ontologisch oogpunt 'hetzelfde' zijn, dan wordt het 
duidelijk dat een ontische ondervraging maar een beperkt beeld oplevert van de 
ruimtelijke herstructurering van Westerse kapitalistische staten In andere worden, 
de keuze voor Hongarije als eerste casestudy was bedoeld om onze reflexiviteit ten 
opzichte van de fundamenteel politieke aard van de ruimtelijke hervorming van kapi-
talistische staten te verhogen. 
De winsten van de Politics of Space benadering 
Uitgaand van de tekortkomingen van de regulationist SRA valt met de Politics of 
Space benadering winst te boeken op vier onderling verbonden terreinen Ten eerste, 
door de toepassing van de PSA is het mogelijk om gedetailleerde antwoorden te 
geven op de centrale vragen van de casestudies, namelijk i) Waarom zijn steden en 
stedelijke regio's m Hongarije met ingericht als ruimtes van regulering? 2) Hoe kunnen 
WIJ de opkomst van het city-region concept in Engeland verklaren, en het feit dat er 
uiteindelijk geen radicale stappen zijn gezet om stadsregio's op te zetten? 
Wat de case van Hongarije betreft heb ik de hervormingen van de periode na 
1990 geïnterpreteerd in termen van de opeenvolgende institutionalisering van drie 
discursive formations of nation-state space, namelijk de discursive formations van 
zelfregermg, ruimtelijke ontwikkeling en ontwikkelingsbeleid Deze discursive 
fomations heb ik onderzocht als het product van de interactie tussen de relatief 
stabiele betekenis van verschillende Hongaarse nation-state spaces enerzijds, en de 
claims van (vooral partijpolitieke) actoren anderzijds Betreffende de relatief stabiele 
betekenis van de verschillende state spaces heb ik de structurerende rol van vier met 
elkaar verbonden sets van betekenissen geïdentificeerd de verschillende betekenissen 
van de provincie, het népies-urbónus debat, de urbaan-rurale scheiding, en de 
Budapest-wdéir scheiding De claims van partijpolitieke actoren over de centrale 
kwesties van ruimtelijke reorganisatie m de periode na 1990 waren m het bijzonder 
gevormd door de sociologisch-mstitutionele verankering van politieke partijen m het 
népies-urbónus debat, het geografische patroon van partijpolitieke support (urbaan 
of ruraal), en de actuele positievan partijen m de provmciepolitiek Door de interactie 
van de bovengenoemde, relatief stabiele betekenissen van Hongaarse nation-state 
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spaces en de verschillende claims van actoren te onderzoeken, heeft de op de 
PSA gebaseerde casestudie van Hongarije nieuwe inzichten geboden op de 
transformatie van de ruimtelijkheid van de Hongaarse staat, en, meer specifiek, op 
de ongedifferentieerde behandeling van steden en stedelijke regio's 
Wat betreft de case van Engeland heb ik de ruimtelijke hervormingen van de 
Labour regeringen na 1997 geïnterpreteerd als pogingen om de ruimtelijkheid van de 
staat door twee discursive formations of state space, te weten regional economic 
governance en 'modernized' local government, te reconfigureren De opkomst van het 
city-region concept, alsmede haar daaropvolgende verzwakking, was goed te 
verklaren door de interconnecties van deze twee discursive formations Tegelijkertijd 
was het, om de strijd over de betekenis van de city-region beter te begrijpen, nodig 
om de ontwikkeling van state spaces in Engeland voor 1997 te onderzoeken 
Deze uitgebreide historische analyse heeft drie sets van relatief stabiele, maar 
voortdurend veranderende praktijken en betekenissen van ruimte geïdentificeerd die 
de evolutie van city regionalism hebben gevormd Deze praktijken en betekenissen 
van ruimtes - namelijk de 'antiterritonale tradit ie' van de Britse politiek, de 
'scheidingen'tussen het urbane en het rurale, en het Noorden en het Zuiden - hebben 
de claims van verschillende actoren, en uiteindelijk, de vorming van city-regionalism 
wezenlijk beïnvloed 
Naast het mogelijk maken van een gedetailleerde analyse van "actually existing 
neoliberalisms" is een tweede en meer algemeen voordeel van de Politics of Space 
benadering dat het een nieuw beeld schetst van de ruimtelijke herstructurering van 
de staat en dat het nieuwe inzichten levert over "neoliberalism-in-general" Meer 
specifiek, helpt de PSA ons te erkennen dat de ruimtelijke herstructurering van de 
staat altijd een bredere reconfiguratie van de politieke ruimte betekent een proces 
waarin de natie als een gemeenschap herverbeeld wordt op diverse schalen, ingedeeld 
in verschillende territoria, en waarin de ruimtelijkheid van met alleen economische, 
maar ook socio-culturele en politieke relaties gereconfigureerd wordt In andere 
woorden, de PSA maakt het mogelijk te onderzoeken op welke manier new (city-) 
regionalism een nieuwe strijd oproept over de verschillende ruimtes die een 
(potentieel) deel uitmaken van de 'nationale ruimte' 
De focus van deze studie op de aanhoudende relevantie van 'het nationale' heeft 
ook een aspect van neoliberale ruimtelijke hervormingen onderstreept waar tot op 
heden minder aandacht aan werd geschonken Dit is de wijze waarop het concept 
van 'de natie'centraal staat voor de (re)politisering en depolitisering van verschillende 
claims m debatten over staatsruimtelijke hervormingen Er is sprake van politisering 
wanneer het concept van 'de natie' een expliciet object wordt van de strijd over de 
393 
ruimtelijkheid van de staat Van depolitisering is er wederom sprake wanneer de 
mogelijkheid tot politiek conflict of keuze is verdrongen door de verwijzingen van 
verschillende actoren naar (een bepaalde opvatting van) 'de natie' Ik benadruk dat 
hoewel het op eerste gezicht lijkt dat wij de strijd over de betekenis van ruimtes 
kunnen zien m termen van een permanente spanning tussen (re)politisering en 
depolitisering, dit geen tevredenstellende conclusie is In feite bli j f t het idee van de 
natie fundamenteel depolitiserend van aard omdat het impliceert dat er een 
gemeenschap bestaat die intrinsiek gezamenlijke belangen deelt, en/of dat er een 
'natuurlijke' orde van de nationale ruimte bestaat Het gevolg is dat het formuleren 
van ruimtelijke beleidsclaims m termen van bepaalde opvattingen van 'de natie' een 
closure inhoudt die wederom een 'volledigere' repolitisermg van claims over ruimtes 
m de weg staat 
Een derde voordeel van de PSA heeft betrekking op de aard van de kritiek die 
geformuleerd wordt ten opzichte van ruimtelijke hervormingen van de staat 
In tegenstelling tot de regulationist benaderingen onderstreept de PSA dat er geen 
essentiële categorieën van 'goed' of 'slecht' bestaan, en dat de beschuldiging dat de 
neoliberalisermg van de staat leidt tot het promoten van ongelijkheden en het 
onderdrukken van gerechtigheid, de plank misslaat In plaats daarvan benadrukt de 
PSA dat wat 'slechte' en 'goede' manieren van ruimtelijke organisatie zijn een vraag is 
waarop (politieke) beslissingen het antwoord zijn Uitgaande van deze laatste 
veronderstelling belicht de PSA het probleem dat door discussies over zulke kwesties 
in (schijnbaar) apolitische termen (zoals 'de natie') te voeren, deze kwesties met op 
een adequate manier aangepakt worden Alles bij elkaar stelt de PSA dat als WIJ 
kritisch willen zijn over de uitkomst van neoliberale ruimtelijke hervormingen van de 
staat, WIJ dan vooral op processen van depolitisering moeten ingaan 
Ten vierde maakt de PSA het mogelijk om sommige bredere vraagstukken, 
alsmede meer specifieke debatten m de hedendaagse geografie, op een nieuwe 
manier aan te pakken Wat het eerste betreft, biedt de PSA een specifiek kader van 
waaruit de sociale constructie van ruimtes te bekijken is Dit kader houdt m dat 
ruimtes met bestaan als gegeven objecten, maar als een middel om sociale relaties te 
ordenen (en dus te voorzien van betekenis), terwijl ZIJ tegelijkertijd ook manifestaties 
zijn van macht Als zodanig is de PSA een bijdrage tot twee, mm of meer van elkaar 
verschillende, wetenschappelijke debatten Het eerste is het debat dat zich ontwikkelt 
op het kruispunt van politieke economie en politieke geografie Dit debat gaat m 
op de noodzaak om meer cultureel georiënteerde analyses van de ruimtelijke 
herstructurering van de staat te leveren In dit opzicht benadrukt de PSA dat praktijken 
(en de door hen geconstitueerde ruimtes) nooit 'alleen maar' economisch zijn, maar 
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juist ook cultureel (omdat ZIJ het resultaat zijn van betekenisgeving) en politiek 
(omdat betekenisgeving nooit los staat van macht) zijn Het tweede is het debat 
rondom de vraag in hoeverre WIJ m een tijdperk van groeiende verwevenheid, 
regio's (ruimtes) als relationeel moeten opvatten, en hoe WIJ territoria moeten 
conceptualiseren die nog altijd op belangrijke wijze 'gegeven' regionale specificiteiten 
bepalen Wat dit debat betreft maakt de PSA het mogelijk een onderscheid te maken 
tussen concreet bestaande ruimtes (ontisch niveau), en de discursieve ruimte 
(ontologisch niveau) waarin de betekenis van concreet bestaande ruimtes wordt 
vastgelegd door de relationele articulatie van betekenissen Door dit onderscheid te 
maken erkent de PSA het feit dat bepaalde ruimtelijke verschillen en specificiteiten 
voor bepaalde actoren op een bepaald moment 'gegeven' zijn, maar ook dat ruimtelijke 
verschillen en specificiteiten 'met bestaan om ontdekt te worden', maar dat ZIJ 
constant (opnieuw) geproduceerd worden m een machtgeladen strijd over de 
betekenis van ruimtes 
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